Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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The Crumbling Foundation of America's Military

AI Summary. A U.S. Army Science Board report warned that the American industrial base may be incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future conflict with a peer adversary. Much of the reduction in U.S. arms-manufacturing capacity was deliberate, following the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Mark Bowden The Atlantic
Date Posted:
December 18, 2024

Mark Bowden documents the decline of the US defense industrial base as the country cashed the post-Cold War peace dividend, noting “much of the reduction in America’s arms-manufacturing capacity was deliberate.”

Mark Bowden documents the decline of the US defense industrial base as the country cashed the post-Cold War peace dividend,...

Can the U.S. industrial base meet wartime munitions demand?

Core argument: The U.S. Army Science Board warned in 2023 that the American industrial base "may be incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.".

In 2023, the U.S. Army Science Board expressed concern that the nation’s industrial base “may be incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.” Mackenzie Eaglen, a defense analyst AEI and one of the authors of the Science Board’s report, immersed herself in this world of procurement and manufacturing for nearly a year. “When I was done,” she told me, “the only thing I could think was It’s a miracle the U.S. military has anything that blows up, ever.” This is not just a bump in the road, and it is not just about munitions. The U.S. military, the richest in the world, confronts a deep, institutional deficiency. War planning occurs in a political and strategic context bigger than the Pentagon, which is another reason the U.S. finds itself where it is. Much of the reduction in America’s arms-manufacturing capacity was deliberate—a consequence of the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. Army Science Board warned in 2023 that the American industrial base "may be incapable of meeting the munitions demand created by a potential future fight against a peer adversary.".
  2. Mackenzie Eaglen, an AEI defense analyst and co-author of the Science Board report, spent nearly a year examining procurement and manufacturing and concluded it is a miracle the U.S. military has anything that blows up.
  3. Much of the reduction in America's arms-manufacturing capacity was deliberate, a consequence of the Soviet Union's collapse and the end of the Cold War.

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  • Why is the U.S. Navy Running Out of Tomahawk Cruise Missiles? — The U.S. Navy has been firing Tomahawk land-attack cruise missiles faster than it can replace them, with opening-day strikes in Yemen expending more than 80 missiles against 30 targets. An entire year's purchase of 55 Tomahawks accounted for 68% of the precision munitions fired at the Houthis in a single day.
  • Pentagon Runs Low on Air-Defense Missiles as Demand Surges — U.S. stocks of some air-defense missiles are running low, raising questions about the Pentagon's readiness for conflicts in the Middle East, Europe, and a potential Pacific war. The U.S. has launched dozens of Standard Missile interceptors in single months, while the producer can make at most a few hundred a year, shared with at least 14 allied buyers.
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Previous articleDecember 18, 2024We’re Burning More Coal Than Ever Thanks to ChinaAn @IEA analysis finds that global coal demand hit a record high in 2024, and projects that demand will likely rise through at least 2027. @JavierBlas notes that China consumes 30% more coal than the rest of the world combined.Next articleDecember 19, 2024Immigrants Dominate U.S. Population GrowthThe Census Bureau estimates that 2.7mm immigrants accounted for 84% of US population growth in the 12 months ending June 2024. Over the past four years, the US population grew by 8.5mm, with immigrants making up the vast majority.
Showing 9 database articles primarily about Security

Defense Spending: Macroeconomic Consequences and Trade-Offs

AI Summary. Peacetime defense spending booms—when the two-year average of defense outlays rises 1pp of GDP—are followed by sizable increases in real GDP, government consumption, investment, and the capital stock, with a short-lived rise in inflation. Imports accelerate while exports are broadly unchanged, widening current account and trade deficits.

Hippolyte Balima, Jared Bebee, Colombe Ladreit, Andresa Lagerborg, et al. International Monetary Fund
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

An IMF report notes defense spending booms are associated with an increase in TFP “over longer horizons, consistent with evidence showing that the R&D component of defense spending can boost innovation and crowd in private R&D spending.”

How do defense spending booms affect output, inflation, and productivity?

Core argument: Peacetime defense spending booms, defined as a 1pp of GDP rise in the two-year moving average of defense spending, are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP, a short-lived rise in inflation, and a roughly 9% increase in government consumption within three years.

Defense spending booms [periods when the two-year moving average of defense spending increases 1pp of GDP] in peacetime are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP and by a short-lived rise in inflation. Consistent with a large share of the stimulus being allocated to personnel and operating expenses, government consumption rises by about 9% within three years. Total investment shows a comparable positive response, reflecting both higher public investment in defense equipment and infrastructure and increased private investment, particularly in defense-related industries. Turning to the external sector, stimulus-driven demand leads to wider external imbalances, as both the current account and trade balance deteriorate. Imports accelerate—reflecting leakages from defense spending and stronger demand for foreign goods—while exports remain broadly unchanged. Defense spending booms are associated with a subsequent increase in the stock of capital, in line with the documented boost to investment, and an increase in total factor productivity, which may be explained by changes in capacity utilization and learning by necessity, as firms adapt to surging demand by improving productivity when facing capacity constraints. Total factor productivity [loses] its statistical significance once capacity utilization is controlled for. However, defense spending booms are followed by greater total factor productivity over longer horizons, consistent with evidence showing that the R&D component of defense spending can boost innovation and crowd in private R&D spending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Peacetime defense spending booms, defined as a 1pp of GDP rise in the two-year moving average of defense spending, are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP, a short-lived rise in inflation, and a roughly 9% increase in government consumption within three years.
  2. Defense spending booms widen external imbalances, with both the current account and trade balance deteriorating as imports accelerate on leakages from defense spending and stronger demand for foreign goods while exports remain broadly unchanged.
  3. Defense spending booms are associated with a subsequent increase in the capital stock and in total factor productivity, though the productivity effect loses statistical significance once capacity utilization is controlled for, while greater total factor productivity follows over longer horizons.

Related Articles:

  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
  • The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market — The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.
  • Will Higher Defence Spending Boost The European Economy? — Defense spending typically has a fiscal multiplier below one, meaning each euro spent raises GDP by less, so it is not a short-term growth strategy. One estimate holds that extra military spending worth 1% of GDP could lift output up to 2% long term if concentrated on research and development.
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The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market

AI Summary. The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.

Ilyana Kuziemko, Donato Onorato and Suresh Naidu National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
March 31, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Defense spending played a major role in sustaining tight labor markets for low-skill workers following the Second World War. Drops in procurement spending between the 1950s and the 1990s explain between 18 and 30% of the decline in manufacturing employment.

How much did falling military procurement drive manufacturing decline and inequality?

Core argument: The authors estimate the 1950s–1990s decline in U.S. military procurement spending explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under 10% of the rise in top-ten inequality.

We have shown that in the decades immediately following World War II, the Cold War was a major factor sustaining tight labor markets. On the labor demand side, military procurement increased demand for manufacturing workers and put downward pressure on the share of income flowing to the richest households. We can explain roughly between 18 and 30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under ten percent of the rise in top-ten inequality by the 1950s to 1990s decline in procurement spending. We thus conclude that Cold War procurement—while under-studied in the modern, quantitative economics literature on inequality—played a major role in sustaining tight labor markets for low-skill workers in the decades immediately after World War II and creating political coalitions in support of hawkish foreign policy and military expenditure. Figure 8 panel (a) shows that manufacturing employment is highly sensitive to defense spending, consistent with our state-year evidence. As is well known, manufacturing booms during World War II, but, less discussed, plummets in the years between World War II and Korea. After bouncing back during Korea, it slowly declines alongside the declining defense share of GDP until both series experience an uptick during Vietnam. Overall, the relationship remains highly significant even after taking out a linear time trend and dropping the World War II period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate the 1950s–1990s decline in U.S. military procurement spending explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under 10% of the rise in top-ten inequality.
  2. The authors conclude that Cold War military procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers, pressured the share of income flowing to the richest households downward, and sustained tight labor markets for low-skill workers after World War II.
  3. U.S. manufacturing employment booms in World War II, plummets before Korea, rebounds during Korea, then declines alongside the defense share of GDP until an uptick during Vietnam, a relationship that remains highly significant after removing a linear time trend.

Related Articles:

  • The Intellectual Spoils of War? Defense RD, Productivity and International Spillovers — The authors estimate that a 10% increase in government-financed R&D, largely defense, is associated with a 4.3% rise in privately funded R&D across OECD countries, indicating "crowding in" rather than "crowding out." They also find international spillovers raise private R&D abroad, though the overall effect on US productivity growth is modest.
  • The Old Economy Begins To Take Its Revenge — The author argues that capital rotates between the financial economy's asset-light booms and the physical economy, with commodity capacity constraints and the use of critical materials as geopolitical leverage now making returns on physical investment more attractive. In this view, higher interest rates reflect the better returns and capital spending needed to expand production capacity.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
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The First 36 Hours of War Consumed Over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli Munitions

AI Summary. The authors estimate replacing two destroyed U.S. radars would take five to eight years and $1.1bn for one and 12–24 months and $50m–$75m for the other, making supply-chain fragility and replacement timelines a greater constraint than materials cost. Both systems require gallium, of which China controls 98% of global supply.

Macdonald Amoah, Morgan Bazilian, and Jahara Matisek Foreign Policy
Date Posted:
March 6, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A Colorado School of Mines analysis of the munitions used in the first 36 hours of the war estimates the “mineral bill” and highlights the current and target timelines to replenish these systems, noting critical minerals “cannot be surged.”

Do replacement timelines constrain radar rebuilding more than materials cost?

Core argument: The first 36 hours of the war consumed over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli munitions, and two advanced U.S. radars were destroyed: the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain.

Beyond the sheer volume of munitions, the loss of high-value assets introduces another layer of complexity. The destruction of two advanced U.S. radars, the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain, highlights a problem where the total weight of the “mineral bill” is less of a concern than the extreme fragility of the supply chain and the extensive timelines for replacement. Per our analysis, for the AN/FPS-132, it will take five to eight years for Raytheon to build a new radar at a cost of $1.1 billion. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin will require at least 12 to 24 months and an estimated $50 million to $75 million to replace the AN/TPS-59, based on the original Bahrain Foreign Military Sales contract adjusted for inflation. The biggest issue for the defense industrial base will be sourcing the 77.3 kilograms of gallium needed for both systems, a material for which China controls 98% of the global supply. This is not to mention the 30,610 kilograms of copper that will also be needed, a commodity facing surging demand from the technology sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The first 36 hours of the war consumed over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli munitions, and two advanced U.S. radars were destroyed: the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain.
  2. By the authors' analysis, replacing the AN/FPS-132 will take Raytheon five to eight years at a cost of $1.1 billion, while Lockheed Martin needs at least 12 to 24 months and an estimated $50 million to $75 million for the AN/TPS-59.
  3. Sourcing the 77.3 kilograms of gallium needed for both radars is, by the authors' assessment, the biggest issue for the defense industrial base, since China controls 98% of global supply; the systems also require 30,610 kilograms of copper.

Related Articles:

  • Why China Keeps Winning The Trade War — Governments seeking supply-chain leverage face limited visibility into their own supply chains, and China's rare earth licensing requirements for multinationals may be partly intended to give Beijing that visibility and allow more precise targeting of future restrictions. Effective measures must impose asymmetric costs, and keeping foreign manufacturers dependent on drip-fed supply is central to Beijing's strategy.
  • China Hatches Plan to Keep U.S. Military From Getting Its Rare-Earth Magnets — China is designing a "validated end-user" system that would fast-track rare-earth and other restricted material export approvals for U.S. firms while excluding companies tied to the U.S. military. The arrangement would let China ease export flows while keeping the materials away from U.S. military suppliers.
  • How U.S. Defense Industry Dodged a Rare-Earth Shortage After China’s Curbs — A decades-old stockpile of samarium nitrate held at a chemical plant in France was refined into usable metal, allowing a U.S. maker of samarium-cobalt magnets to source the rare-earth material outside China. Samarium processed outside China costs 5–8x as much, and the French plant had stopped separating rare-earth elements as uneconomical.
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How Russia’s Fatalities Compare With Ukraine’s

AI Summary. A model estimates Russian casualties in the full-scale Ukraine war at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, equivalent to roughly one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 killed or severely wounded. One estimate puts Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 with 100,000–140,000 dead—lower in absolute terms but a higher share of its population.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
February 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The Economist estimates one in 25 Russian men btw the ages of 18 and 49 have been killed or wounded in Ukraine since 2022. CSIS estimates Ukrainian casualties at one in 16. Russian losses are escalating; today it is “losing more men than it can recruit.”

How do Russian and Ukrainian war casualties compare?

Core argument: The Economist's model puts Russian casualties at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, implying that one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the full-scale war began.

Our model suggests that Russian casualties are now between 1.1m and 1.4m, of whom 230,000-430,000 are dead. That would mean one in 25 Russian men between the ages of 18 and 49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the start of the full-scale war. There are too few reliable estimates of Ukrainian deaths to construct a similar meta-estimate. One single estimate, published on January 27th by CSIS, a think-tank, put total Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 as of December, including 100,000-140,000 dead. Though much lower than Russia’s casualties in absolute terms, as a share of its population it is higher—equivalent to about one in 16 Ukrainian men aged 18-49 before the war. These figures exclude civilian deaths, for which reliable data are scarcer still. Ukrainian losses appeared heaviest early in the war: American officials estimated that 70,000 soldiers had already been killed by August 2023. Russia’s campaign, by contrast, has only grown bloodier. Some estimates suggest that it is now losing roughly 1,000 soldiers a day. Our modelling shows that as many may have died in the past year as in the first three combined. It is losing more men than it can recruit.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Economist's model puts Russian casualties at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, implying that one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the full-scale war began.
  2. CSIS estimated total Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 as of December, including 100,000–140,000 dead, a lower absolute figure than Russia's but a higher share of population, equivalent to about one in 16 prewar Ukrainian men aged 18–49.
  3. Some estimates put Russia's losses at roughly 1,000 soldiers a day, and The Economist's modelling suggests as many may have died in the past year as in the first three combined, more men than Russia can recruit.

Related Articles:

  • Russian War Spending May Be Maxed Out — Despite large increases in value-added, excise, income, and social insurance taxes, deficits financed roughly two-thirds of the rise in Russia's consolidated budget spending, including more than 80% of the federal spending increase. Russian government debt remains very low relative to national income, yet officials plan slower nominal spending growth and no additional military and national security spending in ruble terms.
  • Russians Shun Putin’s Plea for More Babies as Population Shrinks — Russia's population decline has accelerated, with births falling 3.4% to 1.22m — the lowest level in roughly 25 years — while deaths rose 3.3% to 1.82m, according to Russia's Federal Statistics Service. The decline is attributed in part to Russia's war on Ukraine, though detailed mortality data has been classified and war deaths enter the statistics with long delays.
  • The Russian Paradox: So Much Education, So Little Human Capital — Russia is an exception to the global correspondence between educational attainment and human capital, combining an advanced educational profile with strikingly poor health outcomes and only weak contributions to knowledge production and skills-intensive service exports. World Health Organization estimates put male life expectancy at age 15 near that of the world's least developed countries.
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Drones Are Key to Winning Wars Now. The U.S. Makes Hardly Any.

AI Summary. China's DJI accounts for about 70% of commercial drones sold globally, and industry experts estimate its output far exceeds that of any other manufacturer, with capacity in the millions of drones a year. About 500 US companies manufacture drones, producing fewer than 100,000 annually, according to an industry association.

Farah Stockman New York Times
Date Posted:
July 14, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

China’s DJI can manufacture millions of drones a year; about 500 American drone manufacturers are collectively building fewer than 100,000 drones annually.

China’s DJI can manufacture millions of drones a year; about 500 American drone manufacturers are collectively...

Does China outproduce the US in drone manufacturing?

Core argument: DJI accounts for about 70% of all commercial drones sold globally for hobby and industrial uses such as aerial photography, package delivery and weather research, with industry experts estimating its output far exceeds that of any other drone manufacturer.

DJI accounts for about 70% of all commercial drones sold globally for hobby and industrial use, such as aerial photography, package delivery and weather research. The company declined to share market data, but industry experts estimate that DJI’s output far exceeds that of any other drone manufacturer. “No one even comes close,” said Bobby Sakaki, chief executive of UAS NEXUS, a drone industry consultant. “DJI can make millions of drones per year. That is a hundred times more than anybody in the United States can make.” About 500 companies manufacture drones in the United States, producing fewer than 100,000 a year, according to Ryan Carver, communications manager for the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International, a nonprofit organization of industry professionals.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. DJI accounts for about 70% of all commercial drones sold globally for hobby and industrial uses such as aerial photography, package delivery and weather research, with industry experts estimating its output far exceeds that of any other drone manufacturer.
  2. About 500 U.S. companies manufacture drones and together produce fewer than 100,000 a year, according to Ryan Carver of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International.
  3. Bobby Sakaki, chief executive of drone industry consultant UAS NEXUS, says DJI can make millions of drones per year, a hundred times more than any manufacturer in the United States can make.

Related Articles:

  • China Made Millions of Drones. Now It Has to Find Uses For Them — China accounts for 70-80% of global commercial drone supply and 79% of approved drone patents globally, according to industry analysts and a patent study. The Civil Aviation Administration of China projects the low-altitude economy, which includes flying cars, will grow fivefold to $490bn by 2035.
  • Ukraine Drone Strikes Hit Nuclear Bombers Deep Inside Russia — Ukraine used drones smuggled into Russia aboard trucks and released remotely from mobile wooden structures to strike strategic airfields as distant as eastern Siberia. An official in Ukraine's Security Service said more than 40 Russian aircraft, including Tu-95 and Tu-22 M3 long-range bombers and A-50 surveillance planes, were damaged, with losses assessed at at least $2bn.
  • A US Drone Maker Tries to Take Back the Country’s Skies — US drone maker Skydio has produced 45,000 drones in total, while Chinese rival DJI likely makes that many every few weeks — a scale gap that matters because production costs fall predictably with cumulative output. The Pentagon's Defense Innovation Unit says that at attrition rates observed in Ukraine, the US military would exhaust its entire drone supply in five days.
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Germany Backs Donald Trump Goal For Nato To Spend 5% Of GDP On Defence

AI Summary. Germany has backed the US demand that NATO allies spend 5% of GDP on defence, up from the alliance's current 2% target. Berlin signalled it would meet the goal via the NATO secretary-general's proposal of 3.5% of GDP on hard military spending plus 1.5% on related areas such as infrastructure and cyber security.

Anne-Sylvaine Chassany and John Paul Rathbone Financial Times
Date Posted:
May 15, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Germany will aim to raise spending on defense to 5% of GDP by 2032 by increasing “hard military spending” from this year’s 2% to 3.5%, while adding 1.5% of GDP of “related spending, including infrastructure and cyber security.”

Will Germany back a higher NATO defence spending target?

Core argument: German foreign minister Johann Wadephul said in Antalya that Berlin is "following" Donald Trump's demand that NATO allies spend 5% of GDP on defence, up from the alliance's current 2% target.

Speaking at a meeting in Antalya on Thursday, German foreign minister Johann Wadephul said Berlin was “following” Trump on his demand that Nato allies reach a 5% goal. Currently the alliance has a 2% spending target. Wadephul also signalled that the way the country would meet the target would be by embracing a proposal by Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte. The Dutchman has called for Nato members to reach 3.5% of GDP on “hard military spending” by 2032, to which he has suggested adding 1.5% of GDP on “related spending” including infrastructure and cyber security.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. German foreign minister Johann Wadephul said in Antalya that Berlin is "following" Donald Trump's demand that NATO allies spend 5% of GDP on defence, up from the alliance's current 2% target.
  2. NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte has called for members to reach 3.5% of GDP on "hard military spending" by 2032, and has suggested adding 1.5% of GDP on "related spending" including infrastructure and cyber security.
  3. Wadephul signalled that Germany would meet the 5% goal by embracing Rutte's proposal.

Related Articles:

  • Friedrich Merz Wins Second Vote to Become Germany’s Chancellor — Christian Democrat Friedrich Merz became Germany's chancellor after securing 325 votes in Germany's 630-member parliament on a second ballot, having unexpectedly fallen short in the first round. He has angered parts of his conservative bloc by loosening Germany's constitutional borrowing limit to fund a €1tn debt-financed program for the military and infrastructure.
  • From Trains to Tanks: Germany’s Rearmament Marks Industrial Shift — Germany's defense spending has risen almost 80% since 2020 to over €90bn, according to NATO estimates, offering hiring growth in a country where nearly 250,000 manufacturing jobs have disappeared since the pandemic began. Four major defense contractors added more than 16,500 employees over three years, a gain exceeding 40%, and plan roughly 12,000 more hires.
  • German Army Struggles to Get Gen Z Recruits ‘Ready for War’ — Germany's armed forces commissioner warned the country is not moving closer to its target of 203,000 active troops by 2031, as the military slightly shrank amid high dropout rates, with a quarter of new recruits leaving within six months. Conscientious objector applications reached 2,998, up from 200 in 2021.
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