Edward Conard

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Why Are Some Recoveries Short and Others Long?

Edward Leamer National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 15, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Manufacturing job share prior to recessions dictates their length and severity, with higher proportions leading to deeper downturns. As manufacturing jobs decline from 30% in 1950 to 8% today, traditional policies fall short.

The length and severity of economic recessions and recoveries are significantly influenced by the share of manufacturing jobs prior to the downturn. Historically, a higher proportion of manufacturing jobs has correlated with deeper and longer recessions, as seen in the last three U.S. recessions. This is due to the shift from temporary layoffs to permanent separations in manufacturing, driven by technological advancements and globalization, which have reduced manufacturing employment from over 30% in 1950 to about 8% today. The decline in manufacturing jobs has led to prolonged recovery periods, as displaced workers require more time to transition to new sectors. This trend is not effectively addressed by traditional monetary or fiscal policies, highlighting the need for targeted interventions to mitigate the impact of manufacturing job losses on economic recovery.

Good finding from Leamer that permanent separations from manufacturing have been closely correlated with the length and depth of recent American recessions both on the national and state level, "... Using the recession recovery point equal to the month when private payrolls first exceeded their previous peak level, this paper argues that it was the negative secular trend in manufacturing jobs that was the most important determinant of the length and depth of the last three recessions/ recoveries. This negative secular trend changed the layoff/recall pattern of jobs in manufacturing into permanent displacements, a malady that lengthened the recovery periods and that is not the explicit target of either traditional monetary policy or traditional fiscal policy. Using the ideas gathered from an examination of the US two-digit sectoral data for the US overall, attention turns to the recession/recoveries of the 50 US states in the last three national recession periods. Regressions that explain the lengths and depths of the recessions in 50 US states reveal the importance of construction jobs, but the most important predictor was manufacturing jobs: the greater the share of manufacturing jobs prior to the recession, the worse was the recession/ recovery...."

His takeaway, "...The role of declining manufacturing jobs in making our recessions deeper and longer lasting has not to my knowledge had the attention of housing.... The long-term decline in manufacturing jobs from over 30% of jobs in 1950 to about 8% today has eliminated many of the best jobs for high school graduates, and devastated many communities around the United States. This decline in jobs was caused by a combination of technology, globalization and low savings. Process improvements in manufacturing have continuously increased worker productivity which means fewer manufacturing workers unless that force is offset by a combination of population growth and product innovations. Globalization which integrates high-wage countries with low-wage countries shifts the labor-intensive manufacturing work to the low-wage countries, leaving the high-wage countries with fewer manufacturing jobs.In addition, a country with a low savings rate needs a real exchange rate that is high enough to create an external deficit large enough to close the gap between savings and investment. This can shift the workforce out of the tradables sector into the nontradable service sector work: fewer manufacturing jobs and more restaurant work. The biggest public policy contributor to this outcome is probably the large deficit run by the Federal Government. Policies to increase national saving like tax breaks to encourage more savings for retirement would help out, but the fundamental technological and globalization forces cannot be reversed....In conclusion,there is substantial evidence that the behavior of job shares in construction and manufacturing predicted the length, depth and severity of the last two recessions. Theregressions that are used to support this conclusion have rather low R-squares, which means that there is a lot more than just manufacturing and construction that matter, and it remains to be seen if the results in all these regressions would be upended if other variables are included. All this is looking backward but the negative secular trend in manufacturing may be at an end, in which case what we learned about the last three recessions may not tell us much about future ones...."

The evidence, "... The unemployment data illustrated in Figure 4 reveal that the unemployment rate was always above its previous peak level when payrolls returned to their value at the previous peak. Both GDP and the unemployment rate are therefore suggesting that the recovery was not completed when payrolls returned to their previous peak level....”

Why Are Some Recoveries Short and Others Long?: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Why Are Some Recoveries Short and Others Long?: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Edward Leamer, "Why Are Some Recoveries Short and Others Long?," National Bureau Of Economic Research, July 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w28982

“…Table 7 is a similar set of results for the Great Recession 2008/09 period with explanatory variables equal to construction, manufacturing and information employment shares in 2006, 2000 and 1990. The results on the left have a mixture of signs of coefficients and the results on the right with a reduced parameterization is again designed to make the results more understandable. All variables in the results on the right have unit standard errors and the coefficients are “beta-values.” The largest t-values and the largest beta-values are highlighted. Again manufacturing jobs contribute most noticeably to length, depth and severity of the recession, but here the manufacturing variable is not the level but the increase in employment share from 1990 to 2000 or to 2006. The change in share variables have negative coefficients which might seem hard to understand. The explanation for the negative coefficient lies in the scatter diagram at the right which compares the change in the manufacturing employment share from 2000 to 2006 with the change in the previous period from 1990 to 2000. What this scatter indicates is that a large decline in manufacturing employment in one period predicts a large decline in the subsequent period. What this suggests is that troubles in manufacturing before Again manufacturing jobs contribute most noticeably to length, depth and severity of the recession, but here the manufacturing variable is not the level but the increase in employment share from 1990 to 2000 or to 2006. The change in share variables have negative coefficients which might seem hard to understand. The explanation for the negative coefficient lies in the scatter diagram at the right which compares the change in the manufacturing employment share from 2000 to 2006 with the change in the previous period from 1990 to 2000. What this scatter indicates is that a large decline in manufacturing employment in one period predicts a large decline in the subsequent period. What this suggests is that troubles in manufacturing before…"

"...In preparation for the study of the variability of recession outcomes across US states,Figure 19 illustrates the national employment shares of manufacturing, construction and information since 1987 with the official recessions in red and the periods during which total payrolls were below their previous peak in yellow except that payrolls in the last month of each recovery exceeded the previous peak.These three sectors are thought to be “foundation” jobs on which the other jobs are constructed. The foundation sectors sell most of their output outside the state, to other states or to other nations. These are the sectors in which a state earns revenues that can be used to purchase goods and services produced elsewhere. If these foundation jobs are established in a state, then they attract support jobs in restaurants, health care, education, government and so on. The apparent exception to this statement is the construction sector which sells it’s output locally, but the finance needed to support the purchase of homes or other structures comes from the national or global bond market, bringing revenue that can be spent locally in restaurants and hospitals and schools. The declining share of manufacturing until 2010 probably contributed to both the depth and the length of the recessions, since this created large numbers of permanently displaced workers who had to find jobs in other sectors, something that probably took significantly longer than the recalls that occurred after earlier recessions. The construction sector probably contributed to the length and depth of the 1990 recession and the 2008/09 recession when the share of construction jobs fell substantially but not much in the 2001 recession when the share of construction jobs was rather constant. The Information jobs share bubbled up in the late 1990s but fell from then on. Those jobs are likely to have had adverse consequences especially for the 2001 recession but also played a role in the 2008/09 downturn....”

Explaining the Depth and Lengths of Three Recessions in 50 States Via “Foundational Jobs” Separations

“…The difference between “Layoffs and Recalls” versus “Permanent Separations” in manufacturing is made abundantly clear in Figure 9 which illustrates manufacturing jobs from cycle peak to cycle recovery point. Here we see the V-shaped patterns with a strong bounce back of manufacturing jobs except for the last three recessions: 1990, 2001, 2007. (2020 was a shutdown not a recession.) That confirms with the logic of Figure 8...."

“… The reason why the underlying long-term direction of job growth separates the labor market performance into these two categories is explained with the two illustrations in Figure 8.Each illustration begins with a cost-cutting phase with a downward stroke representing the job loss and a shorter upward stroke representing the amount of hiring that is necessary to get back to previous peak output, allowing for the improvements in productivity put in place during the recession, as was discussed above. To that cost-cutting partial V is added a secular time trend to reflect the long-term trend in employment, contrasting up from down. The first illustration shows that when positive growth in demand is added to the recession cost-cutting, the result is a happy V: layoffs followed by recalls. The lower image adds to the cost-cutting partial V a secular decline, and that is what produces the lazy L, with permanent layoffs and no recalls. The message of these images is that secular increases in jobs support a layoff and recall pattern but a secular decline creates permanently separated workers who may need to move to new locations and/or acquire new skills and/or greatly reduce their aspirations before they can find another job. That takes a lot more time than a recall….”

“…One important reason for a slow recovery is the prevalence of permanent job separations... One of the most important reasons for the slowing recoveries is illustrated in the manufacturing employment data in Figure 7 with log scales that allow straight lines to represent constant rates of growth This figure has three straight arrows, the first arrow identifying the period of generally rising employment in manufacturing and the other two identifying period of declining employment, the first labeled suggestively “Layoffs and Recalls” and the other two “Permanent Separations.”..”

“…To make clear that the last three recoveries have been unusually long,Figure 5 is a bar chart with one bar for each of the eleven expansions, with a blue segment representing the number of months from peak to trough and an orange segment representing the additional months until payrolls return to the previous peak. Until recently the recessions lasted a bit under 12 months and the recoveries occurred in another 12 months, under 24 months (2 years) in total. The previous peak was recovered in under two years in the first five recessions and the sixth was the first to exceed two-years, but by only one month. The seventh (1980) was very short-lived and then commenced a sequence of four expansions with variable length recessions but much longer recoveries....”

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Previous articleJuly 15, 2021Biden Turns Back the Progressive ClockTransportation deregulation reduced the cost of moving goods as a % of GDP by 50% over 40 years.Next articleJuly 15, 2021Concerns About ConcentrationMeasuring concentration accurately requires establishment-level data, reflecting the size distribution of all firms, not just large or publicly traded ones. The Hirschman Herfindahl Index (HHI) is preferred for its detailed insight into revenue distribution.
Showing 218 database articles primarily about Business Cycle

3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. Direct lending represents roughly 3% of total U.S. household and business debt, a fraction of the 60% share mortgages held at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Core argument: Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.
  2. The mortgage market’s dominance has shifted dramatically since the 2006 housing peak, reducing systemic risk concentration.
  3. Non-bank lenders now capture meaningful market share in credit provision across the economy.

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  • Business Cycle
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Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

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  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

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  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Why are constant-quality house prices 15% above their pre-2007 peak? Ed Glaeser notes that US housing grew just 0.6% annually in the 2010s, down from 4% in the…
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth

How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

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  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
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Is it Over?

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

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  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

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    • Fiscal Deficits
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