Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Falling Rates and Rising Superstars

Amir Sufi National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
November 1, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Low interest rates may explain the rise of superstar firms, which benefit disproportionately. In 1980, the spread was 31bps; by the 2010s, it grew to 127bps due to lower borrowing costs relative to “following” firms.

The decline in interest rates has disproportionately benefited industry leaders, defined as the top 5% of firms by market capitalization, by significantly lowering their borrowing costs compared to followers. This advantage has widened the borrowing cost spread from 31 basis points in the 1980s to 127 basis points in the 2010s. As interest rates approach zero, the relative valuation of these leaders increases more than that of followers, enabling them to leverage cheaper debt for share buybacks, capital investments, and acquisitions. This "snowballing" effect is more pronounced at lower interest rates, leading to a substantial increase in debt issuance and leverage ratios for leaders. Consequently, these dynamics contribute to the rise of superstar firms, reshaping market structures and competition in the U.S. economy.

Key evidence, “…A decline in interest rates boosts the value of industry leaders relative to followers, and this effect snowballs as the level of the interest rate becomes lower. We now explore mechanism through which industry leaders gain relative to industry followers when interest rate declines. We first explore whether the decline in economywide interest rates such as the 10 year Treasury rate has been associated with a differential decline in the cost of debt financing for industry leaders relative to followers. A stronger pass-through of lower Treasury rates into the cost of debt financing for industry leaders represents another advantage of a low interest rate environment for leaders relative to followers. As before, industry leaders are defined as the largest 5% of firms in each Fama-French industry, measured by market capitalization. We define each firms borrowing cost as the ratio of interest expense to total liabilities, which is simply average rate of interest paid on it’s liabilities. We treat the largest 5% of borrowing costs in the sample as missing in order to exclude any outliers in the data. Figure 6 plots the evolution of the median borrowing cost faced by both leaders and followers, displaying both a clear downward trend and also a stark increase in spreads since 1980. The spread in the 1980s was 31 basis points whereas the spread in the 2010s is 127 basis points.The interest rate spread between market leaders and market followers widened even though the level of interest rate fell considerably. We present estimates of the effect of a decline in interest rates as defined by the monetary policy shocks discussed in Section 3 on the cost of debt financing for industry leaders versus followers. As above, we measure borrowing costs using the average interest rate paid by the firm on all debt. We calculate this as the total interest expense divided by total debt. We exclude the top 5% observed values of borrowing costs, due to the presence of implausibly large values….”

Falling Rates and Rising Superstars: Extended Excerpt Image 1

Note this builds off their “Low Interest Rates, Market Power, and Productivity Growth” which argued that low interest rates reduce business dynamism as market leaders gain share as market followers cut investment to a greater degree then they do in face of low rates (attached)

Thomas Kroen, Ernest Liu, Atif Mian and Amir Sufi, “Falling Rates and Rising Superstars,” National Bureau Of Economic Research, October 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w29368

Mian and Sufi find that falling interest rates disproportionately help industry leaders, particularly in low rate environments. They find that spreads (borrowing) btw industry followers versus the leaders is stable and the borrowing capacity of leaders growths Mian characterizes it as “snowballs” as interest rates approach 0. They find that as rates go down the market value of leaders rises more than followers (superstar effect) and their borrowing cost (relative to followers) fall. That allows cheaper leverage, buybacks, capex and acquisitions making effect more pronounced. “…we find that falling interest rates boost the relative valuation of industry leaders relative to industry followers, and the relative valuation effect becomes largest as the initial interest rate approaches zero. This result is robust to the use of high frequency monetary policy shocks as a source of variation in economy-wide interest rates. A decline in the interest rate disproportionately lowers the cost of borrowing of industry leaders, who take advantage of the lower cost of borrowing to raise additional debt financing, increase leverage, repurchase shares, boost capital investment, and conduct acquisitions. All of these effects snowball as the level of the interest rate decline; that is, a decline in interest rates has a stronger effect on all of these outcomes of leaders relative to followers when the initial level of the interest rate is already low.The findings provide empirical support to the idea that extremely low interest rates may be a culprit in explaining the rise of superstar firms in the U.S. economy…

Falling Rates and Rising Superstars: Extended Excerpt Image 2

The basic dynamic, “…This paper formally investigates the empirical relationship between economy wide interest rates and the rise of superstar firms in the United States using the merged CRSP-Compustat data set from 1962 to 2019. We begin by analyzing the stock market reaction to an interest rate decline for industry leaders versus industry followers, where we define the top 5 percent of firms by value in an industry as “leaders” and the rest as “followers”. We construct a “leader portfolio” that goes long industry leaders and shorts industry followers, and we examine the portfolio’s performance in response to changes in the ten year U.S. Treasury rate (r). We find that the leader portfolio exhibits higher returns in response to a decline in r, and, more importantly, this response becomes stronger, or snowballs, when the initial r is low. We control for the price to earnings ratio as a measure of implied duration, showing that the snowballing effect is not mechanically driven by industry leaders having higher duration. This suggests that lower r impacts relative firm valuations not only through changing the discount rate but also through possible endogenous changes in expected future cash flows that favor the current industry leader – a finding consistent with the strategic competition channel above. Interest rate changes are endogenous to changes in the overall economy, and there is an obvious concern that omitted variables may be responsible for the results. For example, the interest rate decline is naturally correlated with negative news about future demand; if industry leaders have a larger option value on future demand, then the spurious correlation between the interest rate movement and expected demand will lead us to underestimate the true differential impact of the interest rate decline on industry leaders….”
Impact is stronger at lower interest rates, “…Since the impact is stronger at low levels of r, for expositional purposes we always report the predicted magnitude of our estimates at an interest rate of r = 2%. We find that a 10 basis point reduction in r when r = 2% translates into a 0.53 percentage point larger increase in the market valuation of industry leaders relative to industry followers. We investigate the possible reasons and mechanisms that lead to lower rates boosting the relative valuation of industry leaders. We find that a fall in r exhibits a stronger pass-through to the borrowing costs of industry leaders relative to industry followers, and this effect snowballs at lower r. In terms of magnitudes, a 10 basis point decline in r leads to a 14 basis point relative decline in the borrowing cost of industry leaders relative to followers at r = 2%. When the initial r is very close to the zero lower bound, a 10 basis point decline in r leads to a 24 basis point relative decline. Industry leaders take advantage of the lower cost of debt financing. There is a large relative increase in debt issued by industry leaders relative to industry followers, and the book leverage ratio of leaders also increases. The effects of a decline in r on these two financial outcomes also exhibit the snowballing effect: the effect of a decline in r is larger when the initial interest rate is lower. When the economy is close to the zero lower bound, a 10 basis point decline in r leads to a 5.2 percent relative increase in debt issued, and a 1 percentage point relative rise in the leverage ratio for industry leaders. Some of the additional debt raised is used to buy back shares, which also contributes to the rise in leverage we observe….”

“…The final set of results concern the relative real effects of lower interest rates on industry leaders versus followers. These results largely follow the stock market and financial effects described above. We find that a decline in r leads to a relative increase in capital expenditures, cash acquisitions, and property, plants, and equipment (PPE) for industry leaders relative to followers. These real effects, like the valuation and financial effects, also snowball at lower levels of the initial interest rate. The results on investment provide empirical support to the prediction in Liu et al. (2021) that industry leaders respond more aggressively to a decline in the interest rate in order to “go for the kill” to ensure their claim on the more valuable future cash flows. Interestingly, one of the strongest results is on cash acquisitions, which suggests that industry leaders may be more likely to target their rivals when interest rates fall from very low levels. Overall, our results have important implications for the broad literature on persistently low interest rates (or r*) and their implications for the macroeconomy, including the literature on “secular stagnation” (e.g., Summers (2014)). Most of the work in this literature has focused on possible causes for the low interest rate, with explanations ranging from demographics, inequality, and low productivity growth. Our work suggests that there is a potentially important feedback effect from low r back to the real economy through market structure and industry competition….”

Table 2 “…The estimates reported in columns (1) and (2) confirm earlier results. A decline in the interest rate is associated with positive returns for the leader portfolio, and this positive return response to a decline in the interest rate is larger in magnitude when the interest rate is lower.Column (3) uses the 10-year real interest. rate level as before. The coefficient on the interaction between the real rate and the change in interest rate is even stronger than in Table 1. Column (4) shows that the results are driven by both positive and negative changes in interest rates. In particular, the excess return results are materially unchanged whether only positive changes in interest rates or only negative changes in interest rate are used. Column (5) shows that the results are not driven by industry leaders that may have higher duration of cash flows for mechanical or spurious reasons. If industry leaders had higher duration for spurious reasons, then they would have a higher price to earnings (PE) ratio and the difference in the PE ratio between the industry leader and follower at the time of interest rate shock would explain our asymmetric valuation response to a decline in r. Column (5) controls for a “PE portfolio” that is long the top 5% of firms by PE in an industry and short the rest. Inclusion of the PE portfolio return does not change the coefficients of interest, and the return of the leader-minus-follower portfolio is itself negatively correlated with the return of the PE portfolio.4 This result shows that lower r impacts relative rm valuations. not only through changing the discount rate but also through the endogenous changes in future cash flows that favor the current leader…”

Falling Rates and Rising Superstars: Extended Excerpt Image 3


“…. Figure 2 helps visualize the snowballing effect, and the critical interest rate at which the snowballing effect becomes active. More specifically, the figure reports non-parametric estimates of the effect of a change in interest rates on the leader portfolio ( ) at various grid points for it1, which is the lagged 10-year nominal Treasury rate. Moving from right to left in the figure, the coefficient estimate of becomes statistically significantly negative when the level of the nominal interest rate it1 falls into the 5 and 6% region. The 10 year nominal U.S. Treasury rate has been below 5% since 2000, with only a few exceptions….”

Falling Rates and Rising Superstars: Extended Excerpt Image 4

Ed Comment:Hmmm. I’m not surprised that the value of the leaders’ stock rises more as rates fall. Leaders’ future value ought to be more extend more durably/robustly into the future than followers’, who are more fragile/risky. Lower rates increase future values. And I’m not surprised leaders may borrow more and buy back share (i.e., pay dividends) when their stock rises. Given that we have a surplus of risk-averse savings, we should want that—i.e., worthy under-levered collateral willing to borrow more. I would be surprised if it significantly increases their rate of investment. My view is that leaders are largely constrained by ideas and talent, not capital. Do leaders raise investment significantly when rates fall? If not, it doesn’t change the potential of their leadership position. The only thing changing is the discount rate.

  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Growth
  • Productivity
    • Institutional Capabilities
    • Investment
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Showing 114 database articles primarily about Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

How To Buy A Trade Surplus

Joseph Gagnon and Nishtha Agrawal Peterson Institute For International Economics
Date Posted:
July 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Using annual data for 146 countries from 1985 – 2024, Gagnon and Agrawal find that a $1 increase in a country’s cyclically adjusted fiscal deficit is associated with a 22–38¢ increase in its current-account deficit, with most of the estimates ~30¢.

Table 1 presents regression results. The evidence strongly suggests that governments can buy current account surpluses. Raising the fiscal balance by $1 tends to raise the current account by $0.30 [Table 1, first row]. Issuing $1 of domestic currency debt to buy foreign-currency assets (foreign exchange intervention) raises the current account anywhere from $0.20 to $1.00, with a value around $0.50 to $0.60 most plausible [Rows 2 though 5]. NOF is Net Official Flows, and NOS is the stock of net official foreign assets. The most powerful policy, as exemplified by Norway and Singapore, is to run a fiscal surplus and invest the proceeds in foreign-currency assets. In that case, $1 buys a current account surplus of around $0.80 or so. The results are supported by annual panel regressions of current accounts and cross-country stock regressions of cumulated current accounts or stocks of net foreign assets. The estimated effects in the panel regressions may be biased down slightly by incomplete modeling of lagged effects.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Global Imbalances — Four economies—the United States, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with current account surpluses and deficits now lasting twice as long as they did in the 1980s. Persistent imbalances have accumulated into large foreign asset and liability positions, with the United States holding net foreign liabilities
  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities — Obstfeld @PIIE argues that current account deficits have not been forcibly “imposed” on the US from abroad since 2002. Rejecting Pettis’ tax on capital flows…
  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — China’s refusal to address its excess saving will likely fracture the global economy, Wolf argues. He suggests reviving Keynes’ attempt, rejected by the US at…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
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Honey, Who Shrunk the U.S. Income Surplus?

AI Summary. Foreign investors hold $69tn in U.S. assets against $41tn held abroad, creating a $15tn net liability gap that subtracts $150bn from U.S. investment income for every 1% rise in interest rates — 50% more sensitive than five years ago.

Matthew Higgins and Thomas Klitgaard Liberty Street Economics
Date Posted:
May 19, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The US net international investment position worsened by about $16tn between 2019 and 2025, driven by roughly $5.5tn in net inflows and $10tn in valuation losses, as higher rates hit a larger net liability stock, raising interest rate-sensitivity.

Is rising interest rates widening America's foreign investment income gap?

Core argument: The $28tn gap between foreign holdings of U.S. assets ($69tn) and U.S. foreign holdings ($41tn) drives mounting income payments abroad.

Foreign holdings of U.S. financial assets are immense, with official estimates putting their current market value at $69 trillion. U.S. holdings of foreign assets are also impressive but much smaller, at $41 trillion. The shortfall in U.S. foreign assets relative to foreign liabilities has been mounting for decades. Yet U.S. investment income receipts—in profits, dividends, and interest—comfortably exceeded income payments until recently. Payments on U.S. assets owned by foreign investors represent a servicing burden for the U.S. economy. Profits, dividends, and interest payments that would otherwise accrue to domestic investors instead flow abroad. Given the need to sell U.S. assets to finance ongoing trade deficits, this servicing burden seems likely to mount. The related buildup in the U.S. net liability position in interest-bearing assets will also make the income balance more sensitive to swings in interest rates. This increased sensitivity is already in evidence. At present, with the asset-liability gap at -$15 trillion, a 1 percentage point increase in U.S. and foreign interest rates would subtract $150 billion from the U.S. net income balance. (A 1pp fall in rates would result in a similar improvement.) Only five years ago, a 1 percentage point rise in rates would have subtracted $100 billion.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The $28tn gap between foreign holdings of U.S. assets ($69tn) and U.S. foreign holdings ($41tn) drives mounting income payments abroad.
  2. A 1pp interest rate rise now subtracts $150bn from U.S. net income—50% more than five years ago—as the $15tn net.
  3. Ongoing trade deficits force asset sales to foreign investors, leading to larger servicing burdens and greater exposure to interest rate.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Global Imbalances — Four economies—the United States, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with current account surpluses and deficits now lasting twice as long as they did in the 1980s. Persistent imbalances have accumulated into large foreign asset and liability positions, with the United States holding net foreign liabilities
  • Tariffs and “International Payments Problems” — The worsening of the US net international investment position – from -20% of US GDP in 2010, to -53% pre-pandemic, and to -89% as of the end of 2025Q3…
  • Foreigners Rebuff ‘Sell America’ and Buy a Net $1.6 Trillion in Assets — Foreign investors bought a net $1.55T of American long-term US financial assets in 2025, including $720B of net equity purchases and $409B in Treasury notes…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Monetary Policy

Don't Blame America's Current Account Deficit On the Dollar

AI Summary. The United States current account deficit is not required to supply the world with dollars, because foreign entities can acquire dollar assets by selling financial assets to Americans rather than goods, leaving the current account balance unchanged.

Maurice Obstfeld Peterson Institute for International Economics
Date Posted:
April 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Noting the minimal relationship between official liabilities and the CA, Obstfeld argues that the reserve currency role of the dollar is not the cause of the trade deficit. He urges reduction in the US fiscal deficit to increase national saving.

Is the current account deficit driven by dollar demand or asset sales?

Core argument: I cannot generate the requested takeaways because the source material contains no quantitative data, numerical findings, or comparative metrics. The.

Critics of the dollar's global role have argued that foreign official dollar purchases (labeled US incurrence of official liabilities in the figure) feed one-for-one into US current account deficits. To illustrate the true loose relationship between these two variables, the figure shows both of them over the 2003–25 period, as percentages of GDP. US net incurrence of liabilities to official holders, reported with a minus sign as in standard balance-of-payments methodology, is usually far too small to mirror the US current account deficit. And since roughly 2014, net official financial inflows have fluctuated around zero as the current account deficit has widened. To be sure, the strong international demand for dollars may make the dollar stronger against foreign currencies than it would be otherwise, [but] while they imply a smaller current account balance, they do not necessarily imply a negative balance and certainly not a rising negative balance, especially when foreign dollar reserve holdings have been shrinking relative to global economic activity (as figure 1 also implies). The euro is the world's second reserve currency, yet the euro area has a current account surplus. Britain had surpluses up until World War I despite issuing the world's premier global currency and hosting its leading financial center. Reducing the US fiscal deficit materially and sustainably is the most important US policy prerequisite for global current account rebalancing.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. I cannot generate the requested takeaways because the source material contains no quantitative data, numerical findings, or comparative metrics. The.
  2. To produce compliant takeaways, I would need data such as: current account deficit figures, dollar reserve holdings, asset sale volumes.

Related Articles:

  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US trade deficit was $901.5B in 2025, effectively unchanged from 2024 despite the new tariff regime. The US bilateral deficit with China fell to $202B, the…
  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities — Obstfeld @PIIE argues that current account deficits have not been forcibly “imposed” on the US from abroad since 2002. Rejecting Pettis’ tax on capital flows…
  • Pettis on Obstfeld — Responding to Maurice Obstfeld, @michaelxpettis argues that the chronic US current account deficit reflects deep and open US capital markets, which encourage…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • China
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP

Understanding Global Imbalances

AI Summary. Four economies—the United States, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with current account surpluses and deficits now lasting twice as long as they did in the 1980s. Persistent imbalances have accumulated into large foreign asset and liability positions, with the United States holding net foreign liabilities

IMF Staff International Monetary Fund
Date Posted:
April 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

As of 2024, the US, China, Germany, and Japan accounted for ~2/3 of total global imbalances (the sum of the absolute value of each economy’s current account deficit and surplus). The US CA deficit is between 0.8 and 1% of world GDP.

Core argument: Surplus durations have doubled since the 1980s, accumulating massive foreign asset positions for China, Germany, and Japan.

Four economies—the US, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances. The US deficit—equivalent to 4% of GDP as of 2024—has been financed by capital inflows and portfolio investors seeking dollar assets. Germany and Japan’s surpluses have been driven by high saving rates, joined by substantial surpluses in China beginning in the 2000s. Oil-exporting countries’ surpluses fluctuate with commodity prices, creating episodic contributions to global imbalances. In earlier decades, surpluses and deficits were more cyclical: countries moved in and out of surplus depending on business cycles, commodity shocks, and exchange rate movements. While there is no standard definition of persistence, the average duration of a deficit or surplus spell roughly doubled since the 1980s. Persistent surpluses over the past two decades have accumulated into very large net foreign asset positions for economies such as China, Germany, and Japan, with each holding net foreign assets equivalent to 3–3.5% of global GDP in 2024. Similarly, persistent deficits have built up into large net liability positions, most notably in the US where the NIIP stands at about -25% of global GDP in 2024, underscoring the central role of the US position in global balances (Figure 6).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Surplus durations have doubled since the 1980s, accumulating massive foreign asset positions for China, Germany, and Japan.
  2. Understanding Global Imbalances.
  3. Germany and Japan’s surpluses have been driven by high saving rates, joined by substantial surpluses in China beginning in the.

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  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — China’s refusal to address its excess saving will likely fracture the global economy, Wolf argues. He suggests reviving Keynes’ attempt, rejected by the US at…
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  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US trade deficit was $901.5B in 2025, effectively unchanged from 2024 despite the new tariff regime. The US bilateral deficit with China fell to $202B, the…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • China
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Trade (not deficits)

China’s Cheap Money Is Shaking $9.5 Trillion Global Loan Market

Bloomberg Staff Bloomberg
Date Posted:
March 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database

China’s savings glut and “monetary easing to counter slowing growth” are manifesting themselves in credit expansion overseas, as bankers seek higher yields than they can get at home amidst deflationary pressure.

Chinese banks, flush with low-cost funds, are reshaping parts of the global loan market, underscoring how deflationary pressures in the world’s second-largest economy are increasingly influencing competition with international lenders. Much like US and European manufacturers who have long complained about being undercut by cheaper Chinese rivals, bankers at global institutions now say they’re facing the financial equivalent: being priced out of some of Asia’s most sought-after borrowers as Chinese lenders extend cheaper credit across borders. Enabled by Beijing’s monetary easing to counter slowing growth, Chinese banks are expanding overseas lending amid weakening domestic credit demand. That edge may prove even more significant as the Iran crisis threatens to upend global energy markets, raising the likelihood that major central banks will hold off easing interest rates amid mounting uncertainty.

Related Articles:

  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — China’s refusal to address its excess saving will likely fracture the global economy, Wolf argues. He suggests reviving Keynes’ attempt, rejected by the US at…
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  • China’s Trade Surplus, Part I — With China’s high level of investment still not enough to absorb its massive annual saving, Krugram argues, China’s trade surplus “functions as a sort of…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Tariffs and "International Payments Problems"

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
March 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The worsening of the US net international investment position – from -20% of US GDP in 2010, to -53% pre-pandemic, and to -89% as of the end of 2025Q3 – reflects valuation gains on US stocks relative to stocks in the rest of the world.

Foreigners are accumulating more financial claims on Americans than Americans are accumulating on foreigners across every single category: FDI, stocks, bonds, physical currency, deposits, and loans. Foreign official investors supposedly have been mild sellers of U.S. assets over the past 12 months, but the standard measure does not include state-affiliated institutions that operate on behalf of foreign governments. Meanwhile, the U.S. net international investment position has swung massively over the past few years, from -20% of U.S. GDP in 2010, to -53% of U.S. GDP on the eve of the pandemic to -89% as of the end of 2025Q3. Almost all of that reflects massive valuation gains on U.S. stocks relative to stock markets in the rest of the world. The good news is that actual U.S. indebtedness has not meaningfully increased, and the methods used to assign market values to FDI in the U.S. and abroad make the situation look more extreme than it is. (U.S. FDI assets in Ireland are overwhelmingly big tech and big pharma, for example, but the market value of those assets is imputed based on the performance of the maker of Kerrygold.) The bad news is that, if the current level of the NIIP is unsustainable, the easiest way for it to revert is for U.S. stock prices to fall dramatically.

Related Articles:

  • The US Trade Deficit and Foreign Borrowing — Persistent trade deficits at current levels would push our net international investment position beyond levels sustained in any advanced economy. Stabilization…
  • The End of Privilege: A Reexamination of the Net Foreign Asset Position of the United States — .@Jonheathcote finds the deterioration of America’s net foreign asset position was driven by the overperformance of American equities held by overseas…
  • United States’ Changing Net IIP — Net foreign claims on US assets are now 80% of US GDP, the most negative in history. @GeneralTheorist notes that this is partly a result of elevated U.S…
  • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
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