Edward Conard

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Government Debt And Capital Accumulation In An Era Of Low Interest Rates

AI Summary. The authors attribute the decline in the natural interest rate to a rise in the global savings rate from 22.2% to 25.1% (-133 basis points), a fall in world economic growth from 4.1% to 2.8% (-181 basis points), and increased market power (-160 basis points).

Greg Mankiw National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
May 11, 2022
Is Database:
Database

Low interest rates are not mysterious but result from higher savings, lower growth, and increased market power, according to @GregMankiw.

What explains the decline in the natural interest rate?

Core argument: A 1.3-point fall in world GDP growth, from 4.1% to 2.8%, is estimated to have lowered real interest rates by 181 basis points, one of three drivers cited for the decline in the natural rate of interest.

The decline in the natural rate of interest (R*) is attributed to a 2.9% increase in the global savings rate, which reduced real interest rates by 133 basis points (bps), a 1.3% decrease in world GDP growth, lowering rates by 181 bps, and a rise in market power, reducing rates by 160 bps. The global savings rate rose from 22.2% to 25.1%, while GDP growth fell from 4.1% to 2.8% over recent decades. Increased markups, possibly exceeding 20 percentage points, further contributed to the decline. These factors suggest that low interest rates are not mysterious but result from higher savings, lower growth, and increased market power. Consequently, government debt may not be problematic as it can be rolled over indefinitely, though this strategy carries risks of failure, potentially leading to debt default or higher taxes in low-growth scenarios.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 1.3-point fall in world GDP growth, from 4.1% to 2.8%, is estimated to have lowered real interest rates by 181 basis points, one of three drivers cited for the decline in the natural rate of interest.
  2. A 2.9-point rise in the global savings rate, from 22.2% to 25.1%, is estimated to have reduced real interest rates by 133 basis points, while rising market power, with markups possibly exceeding 20 percentage points, cut rates by a further 160 basis points.
  3. Higher savings, lower growth, and increased market power suggest low interest rates are not mysterious and that government debt may be rolled over indefinitely, though failure of that strategy risks debt default or higher taxes in low-growth scenarios.

Greg Mankiw, "Government Debt And Capital Accumulation In An Era Of Low Interest Rates,"National Bureau Of Economic Research, May 2022, https://scholar.harvard.edu/files/mankiw/files/government_debt_and_capital_accumulation_may2022_updated.pdf

Uptick in Savings Rate

“…The world saving rate averaged 25.1 percent during the latter half of this period, compared with 22.2 percent during the first half. An increase in the saving rate of 2.9 percentage points can explain a decline in the real interest rate of about 133 basis points…”

Decline In Growth

“…Another development, however, is more important. The rate of growth, represented in the Solow model by n + g, has declined in recent years, in part due to lower population growth and in part due to lower productivity growth. A decline in the growth rate of one percentage point reduces the real interest rate by 139 basis points. This effect goes a long way toward explaining the decline in interest rates. The World Bank reports data on world GDP growth from 1961 to 2020, shown in this figure World GDP growth averaged 2.8 percent per year in the most recent three decades, compared with 4.1 percent per year in the previous three—a fall of 1.3 percentage points. A change of this magnitude can explain a decline in real interest rates of about 181 basis points….”

Adding Market Power

“..An increase in the markup of 1 percentage point reduces the real interest rate by 8 basis points. Some of the literature suggests that markups have increased by 20 percentage points or more. This change could explain a decline in real interest rates of about 160 basis points….”

Implications For Fiscal Policy

“…The bottom line from the Diamond model is that the comparison of the real interest rate and the growth rate is crucial (as indeed it is in the Solow model). If the interest rate is less than the growth rate, as seems to be the case today, the economy is in a dynamically inefficient equilibrium. That is, it is saving so much that the capital stock exceeds the level that maximizes steady-state consumption. (Phelps, 1961, dubbed this the Golden Rule level of capital.) In this case, the government can run a sustainable Ponzi scheme by issuing debt and rolling it over, along with the accumulating interest, forever.6 To be sure, the government debt will absorb saving and crowd out capital, but that is a good thing because the economy has too much of it. Government debt can raise welfare when the debt is issued, in the steady state, and along the entire transition path.... Third, if the government in a dynamically efficient economy observes a safe rate much below the average growth rate and tries to run a Ponzi scheme by issuing a lot of debt and rolling it over forever, it is gambling. The policy may well work, but it might not. And the circumstances in which it fails are particularly dire. The big losers are the generations alive when the scheme fails, who must endure either a debt default or higher taxes. The failure is especially painful because it occurs in a state of world with extraordinarily low growth and thus high marginal utility of consumption. A government running a Ponzi scheme with debt is like a homeowner canceling his fire insurance to save money or an investor selling deep out-of-the-money puts: It works most of the time, but when it doesn’t, all hell breaks loose…”

Like many economists, I have been pondering the causes of the decline in real interest rates and its implications for fiscal policy. I don’t pretend to have all the answers. But this brief essay offers a progress report on my thinking The World Bank reports data on the world gross saving rate (as a percent of GNI) from 1975 to 2020. It shows a clear upward trend, as seen in the following figure The world saving rate averaged 25.1 percent during the latter half of this period, compared with 22.2 percent during the first half. An increase in the saving rate of 2.9 percentage points can explain a decline in the real interest rate of about 133 basis points Another development, however, is more important. The rate of growth, represented in the Solow model by n + g, has declined in recent years, in part due to lower population growth and in part due to lower productivity growth. A decline in the growth rate of one percentage point reduces the real interest rate by 139 basis points. This effect goes a long way toward explaining the decline in interest rates. The World Bank reports data on world GDP growth from 1961 to 2020, shown in this figure: World GDP growth averaged 2.8 percent per year in the most recent three decades, compared with 4.1 percent per year in the previous three—a fall of 1.3 percentage points. A change of this magnitude can explain a decline in real interest rates of about 181 basis points. These calculations lead me to conclude that the decline in the real interest rate over the past few decades is not all that mysterious.Based on just the textbook Solow model, the observed higher saving and lower growth rates can together explain a decline in the real interest rate of more than 3 percentage points, which is in the ballpark of what has occurred. What does a low interest rate mean for fiscal policy? If the interest rate is less than the growth rate, as seems to be the case today, the economy is in a dynamically inefficient equilibrium. That is, it is saving so much that the capital stock exceeds the level that maximizes steady-state consumption The calibrated Solow model gives a real interest rate of about 6 percent. No plausible set of parameters gives an interest rate less than zero, as we are now observing for long-term inflation adjusted bonds. Something must be missing from the model. In fact, two things are missing: risk and market power. An increase in the risk premium can drive down the safe interest rate, and it is possible that a rising risk premium can help explain the observed decline in real interest rates. Gauging this effect is difficult because changes in risk premiums are hard to measure. But I doubt that a rising risk premium is an important part of the story. Stock market valuations, such as price-earnings ratios, have risen while real interest rates have fallen, suggesting that the expected return on risky assets has fallen as well. My best guess is that a rising risk premium does not explain the decline in real interest rates, though the existence of a risk premium is one reason real rates are always low compared with the return on capital. In addition to risk, another reason the interest rate on government debt can fall below the net marginal product of capital is market power. If firms charge prices above marginal cost, there is a wedge between the cost of capital (as reflected by market interest rates) and the marginal product of capital An increase in the markup of 1 percentage point reduces the real interest rate by 8 basis points. Some of the literature suggests that markups have increased by 20 percentage points or more. This change could explain a decline in real interest rates of about 160 basis points. So where does that leave us? Let me suggest four tentative conclusions. The decline in real interest rates around the world over the past several decades is not a mystery. It appears to be the result of an increase in world saving, a decline in world growth, and possibly an increase in market power. Because interest rates are so low, greater government debt is most likely not problematic from a budgetary standpoint. The government can probably roll over the debt and the accumulating interest forever, in essence letting growth take care of the debt. There is an outside chance that this Ponzi scheme of perpetual debt rollover will fail. That possible outcome is especially dire because the failure makes an already-bad state of the world even worse Even if the perpetual debt rollover succeeds, the increased debt could still crowd out capital. If the economy’s capital stock is less than the Golden Rule level, as appears to be the case, this reduction in capital accumulation will, in the long run, depress not only labor productivity and real wages but also the resources available for consumption

We have also seen an acceleration in venture capital investment and the creation of billion-dollar unicorns. At the same time, capital intensive industries, like manufacturing, have also gradually decline as a share of GDP. (Risk-averse) savings have flowed into real estate at the margin, never more than prior to the financial crisis. In sectors where we have seen consolidation, we have seen market leaders invest more, grow productivity faster, and subsequently gain share relative to competitors—the opposite of oligopolistic behavior. Perhaps information technology and globalization are increasing economies of scale. Much of the consolidation occurred in sectors, like retail and wholesale distribution, where an influx of national chains into local markets increased competition despite a consolidation of national share. Much of the rest occurred in industries that remain below concentration levels antitrust experts view as anticompetitive. Excess profits seem to be concentrated in a small number of companies, many with low marginal costs and valuable networking effects who have benefited from one-in-a-million innovations. It’s hardly obvious that the expected values of those bets were positive before-the-fact. Venture capital returns, for example, have been mediocre on average. Rognlie and Karabarbounis have shown that excess profits were high relative to GDP in the ‘50s and ‘60s when industry concentration was lower, fell as interest rates rose through the early ‘80s, have risen as interest rates have fallen since, and that returns on real estate have followed a similar pattern. Those patterns cast doubts on whether the recent rise in profitability relative to GDP is a function of concentration, and not interest rates. Surely, after-tax profits are a better measure of changing profitability than theoretical markups over variable cost. Theory aside, surviving companies must cover their fixed costs. Despite increased concentration, we have also seen increased turnover in the Fortune 500, the Forbes 400, and CEO tenures—the opposite of oligopolistic behavior. Lastly, since the commercialization of the internet in the early 1990s, America, which Philippon and Eeckhout hold out as indicative of growing market concentration, has grown GDP per hour worked relative to Western Europe. …and that’s with a substantially higher share of low academic test-scores than Northwest Europe, during a time when the productivity growth of low-scorers seems to have slowed disproportionately in the face of an enormous (largely low-skilled) labor supply shock from baby boomers, women entering the workforce, immigration, offshoring, and automation. At the same time, America’s outsized contribution of innovation, defense spending, and healthcare profits have made Europe and the rest of the world more prosperous than they otherwise would be, suggesting relative US productivity growth is faster than it appears to be. Nothing is dispositive of course. But, with that many anomalies, a more explanatory hypothesis seems warranted. No?”

Ed Comment:“Greg, Thanks for your recent thoughts on interest rates. I am an eager listener of your voice. I was skeptical of your hypothesis that reduced competition has caused a significant decline in interest rates. Presumably, that suggests, all things considered, we have moved away from the optimal tradeoff between competition and cooperation, where too much of either reduces the optimal level of investment, whether by reducing innovation or routine investment. Even though capital investment has declined as a share of GDP, my impression is that the rise in intangible investments, as measured broadly by Corrado et al, has more than offset the decline in tangible investment. As further evidence of that, we have seen a rise in the share of workers in decision-making roles. Surely decision-makers skew toward investment.

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Previous articleMay 11, 2022Data and Market PowerFirms using data to forecast future demand leads to increased markups, according to a new model by @JanEeckhout. Data-rich firms invest more, reduce costs, and shift production towards high-demand, high-markup goods, boosting economic efficiency.Next articleMay 11, 2022Inflation Adjusted Wages since the PandemicInflation has outpaced average hourly earnings (AHE) in the aggregate private sector & in Leisure & Hospitality Services for production & nonsupervisory roles, yet both remain above Feb 2020 levels
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The Fairest Way to Reform Social Security May Also Be the Worst Way to Grow the Economy

AI Summary. Fully closing Social Security's funding gap by raising the payroll tax rate would require an immediate, permanent increase from 12.4% to 17.6%, which would reduce labor supply and economic growth. Research on a prior benefit cut found affected Americans raised earnings by 61 cents per dollar of lost benefits, generating additional payroll tax revenue.

Andrew Biggs American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
May 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Biggs argues that “fair” approaches to restoring Social Security solvency – those that do not cut already accrued benefits – are less effective than “unfair” ones that do, because the latter incentivize increased work effort, raising growth and revenue.

Biggs argues that “fair” approaches to restoring Social Security solvency – those that do not cut already accrued...

Does closing Social Security's gap with higher payroll taxes hurt growth?

Core argument: Keeping Social Security permanently solvent under the "fairness" model of paying accrued benefits in full would require an immediate and permanent payroll tax increase from 12.4% to 17.6%, which would decrease labor supply and reduce economic growth.

Imagine that Social Security reform follows the fairness model, in which accrued benefits are paid in full but the rate at which future benefits are earned is reduced. A simple way to do this is to increase the payroll tax rate To keep Social Security permanently solvent, meaning through 75 years and beyond, would require an immediate and permanent increase in the payroll tax rate [from] 12.4% to 17.6%. The higher rate would decrease labor supply and reduce economic growth. [Consider] an alternate reform, which looks clearly unfair: fix Social Security’s funding gap entirely by reducing accrued benefits that Americans already have earned. As of 2025, Americans had accrued $54 trillion in Social Security benefits. Social Security’s unfunded obligation as of 2025 was $26 trillion. So, roughly, this means cutting Americans’ “earned benefits” in half. [Analyzing the 1977 reform that undid the notorious 1972 “double-indexing” of benefits, a group of economists], using SSA earnings data, found that, for every dollar of lost benefits, the affected Americans increased their earnings by 61 cents. Moreover, these additional earnings would be taxed by Social Security, further strengthening the program’s finances. In effect, this makes cutting benefits a “cheaper” way to fix Social Security than raising taxes, because people respond in ways that also increase tax revenues.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Keeping Social Security permanently solvent under the "fairness" model of paying accrued benefits in full would require an immediate and permanent payroll tax increase from 12.4% to 17.6%, which would decrease labor supply and reduce economic growth.
  2. Americans had accrued $54 trillion in Social Security benefits as of 2025 against an unfunded obligation of $26 trillion, so closing the gap solely by cutting already-earned benefits would mean roughly halving those benefits.
  3. Economists analyzing the 1977 reform that undid the 1972 "double-indexing" of benefits found, using SSA earnings data, that affected Americans raised their earnings by 61 cents per dollar of lost benefits, earnings that Social Security would tax.

Related Articles:

  • Social Security and Trends in Wealth Inequality — The authors estimate that including Social Security in household wealth leaves top wealth shares little changed over three decades, with the top 10% and top 1% shares rising 1.1 and 1.6 percentage points versus roughly 9 and 6 points for marketable wealth alone. Social Security wealth grew from $7tn to $39tn.
  • How Federal Spending is Distributed by Age — An analysis classifying $4.4tn of $7tn in federal spending by age finds retirees aged 65 and older receive $2.7tn, 38.6% of total outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending, versus $1.2tn for working-age adults and $449bn for those under 26. Social Security and Medicare account for 80% of age-assignable spending on older adults.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Taxation

The World’s Most Surprising Capitalist Makeover Is Under Way in Sweden

AI Summary. Sweden has opened public services to private providers, with nearly half of primary healthcare clinics privately owned and one in three public high schools privately run, up from 20% in 2011. Its public social spending has fallen to 24% of GDP, similar to the US and below the over 30% in France and Italy.

Tom Fairless Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
May 12, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Swedish public social spending is now 23.7% of GDP, just 1pp above that of the US and well under France’s 31.6%. Market-based reforms in the 1990s brought overall government spending down from 69.4% to 49.3% in 2024.

How has Sweden shrunk its state by privatizing public services?

Core argument: Sweden's total public social spending, covering healthcare, education and welfare payments, has fallen to 24% of GDP, similar to the U.S. and well below the over 30% of nations like France and Italy.

For decades, Sweden was shorthand for the brand of high-tax, high-spend government that managed people’s lives from cradle to grave through state-run hospitals, schools and care homes. No longer. With little fanfare, this Nordic country of 11 million has embraced capitalism. Today, nearly half of primary healthcare clinics are privately owned, many by private-equity firms. One in three public high schools is privately run, up from 20% in 2011. School operators are listed on the stock exchange. The capitalist makeover has allowed Sweden to do what few industrialized countries have managed in recent years: shrink the size of the state. That has enabled the government to sharply lower taxes and, economists say, sparked a surge in entrepreneurship and economic growth. Its total public social spending bill—which includes healthcare, education and all welfare payments—has fallen to 24% of gross domestic product, similar to the U.S. and well below the over 30% for nations like France and Italy. Sweden’s economy is expected to grow by around 2% a year through 2030, roughly the same pace as the U.S. and double the growth rates of France and Germany, according to an April forecast by the International Monetary Fund.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sweden's total public social spending, covering healthcare, education and welfare payments, has fallen to 24% of GDP, similar to the U.S. and well below the over 30% of nations like France and Italy.
  2. Nearly half of Sweden's primary healthcare clinics are privately owned, many by private-equity firms, and one in three public high schools is privately run, up from 20% in 2011, with school operators listed on the stock exchange.
  3. An April forecast by the International Monetary Fund projects Sweden's economy will grow around 2% a year through 2030, roughly matching the U.S. and double the growth rates of France and Germany.

Related Articles:

  • How Sweden Overcame Socialism — After government spending reached 70% of GDP and public debt 80% of GDP, Sweden adopted market-oriented reforms including privatized healthcare services, for-profit schools, reduced welfare benefits, deregulation of electricity and transportation, and a corporate tax cut from 28% to 22%. Public debt has since fallen to 41% of GDP, with growth outpacing European Union peers by roughly 1 point annually.
  • Reforming the Welfare State: Recovery and Beyond in Sweden — Sweden's structural reforms — flexible exchange rates, inflation targeting, a smaller public sector, less generous social insurance, and deregulated markets — accompanied export-led growth, a current account surplus lasting over a decade, government spending falling to 52% of GDP, and central government debt dropping from nearly 80% of GDP to about half that.
  • The US Has One of the Highest Fertility Rates Among Peer Countries — The tempo-adjusted fertility rate, which accounts for shifts in the timing of births, shows the US rate falling since roughly 2009-10 and dropping below the 2.1 births-per-woman replacement level around 2017, reaching 1.82 in 2022. The US decline is less severe than in many peer countries.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • Politics

How Policy and Demographics Are Reshaping SNAP: From Families with Children to Older Adults

AI Summary. The share of the US population receiving food stamps doubled from 6% to 12% over roughly 25 years, with real costs per capita rising 179% to $279 a year, though both remain below their post-Great-Recession peak. Households with an elderly person now outnumber those with a child, reversing the early-2000s pattern.

Angela Rachidi American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
May 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

About 40mm Americans, 12% of the population, receive SNAP benefits, up from 6% in 2000. In 2023, only 34% of these households included children, down from 49% in 2010, while 36% contained an elderly person, up from 16% in FY2010.

How have food stamp enrollment, costs, and recipient households changed?

Core argument: The share of the U.S. population receiving SNAP doubled from 6% in FY2000 to 12% in FY2025, while real SNAP costs per capita rose 179%, from roughly $100 to $279 per year in 2024 dollars.

Comparing FY2000 with FY2025, the share of the population receiving SNAP doubled from 6% to 12%, while real SNAP costs per capita increased by 179%—from roughly $100 per year to $279 (in 2024 dollars). Despite this growth, per capita participation and costs in FY2025 remained below their pre-pandemic peak in 2013, which coincided with the aftermath of the Great Recession and changes in eligibility and other policies stemming from the 2008 Farm Bill. SNAP is countercyclical, meaning that all else equal, the number of people receiving SNAP should rise during recessions because of increased unemployment and decline as the economy recovers, [though] overall SNAP participation has grown faster than changes in the unemployment rate alone would predict. Over the long run, and especially since FY2020 (due to the Thrifty Food Plan’s increase in the maximum SNAP benefit), costs per capita have not returned to prerecession levels after a period of high unemployment. In FY2023, the share of SNAP households containing an elderly person (36%) exceeded the share containing a child (34%) for the first time. This was a sharp departure from the early 2000s, when more than half of SNAP households contained a child and less than 20% included an elderly person (Figure 2).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of the U.S. population receiving SNAP doubled from 6% in FY2000 to 12% in FY2025, while real SNAP costs per capita rose 179%, from roughly $100 to $279 per year in 2024 dollars.
  2. In FY2023, the share of SNAP households containing an elderly person reached 36%, exceeding the 34% containing a child for the first time, against the early 2000s when over half contained a child and under 20% included an elderly person.

Related Articles:

  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023 — Extending a consistent poverty measure back to 1939, the authors estimate US absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, driven by growth in market income rather than government transfers net of taxes. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty than before.
  • Government Benefit Programs Already Do A Lot To Help Low Income Families — For a two-adult, three-child family, existing taxes and government benefits bring take-home resources to about $58,000 with no earnings, $79,000 with $20,000 of earnings, and $90,000 with $80,000 of earnings plus $15,000 in employer health premiums. A $75,000 gap in earnings and work-related benefits narrows to $11,000 in take-home pay.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
  • Workforce
    • Poverty/Crime

Washington’s Growing Portfolio: Tracking U.S. Government Investments

AI Summary. The U.S. government has invested $20.9bn across sixteen deals taking direct ownership stakes, expanding beyond its traditional toolkit of grants, loans, and tax incentives. The Department of Defense leads with seven deals, the Department of Commerce has six including a 10% stake in Intel, and partners have mobilized an additional $4.75bn.

Jonathan Hillman Council On Foreign Relations
Date Posted:
April 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Since January 2025, the USG has taken equity stakes totaling $20.9B in 16 American businesses. $8.6B, ~41% of the total, was invested in critical mineral miners and processors, while $8.9B, ~43% of the total, funded the government’s 10% stake in Intel.

Is the U.S. government taking direct equity stakes in companies?

Core argument: Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives.

Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit that has traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives. The Department of Commerce has participated in six such deals, including taking a 10% stake in Intel. The Development Finance Corporation, the United States’ development bank, has executed three equity transactions in critical minerals, healthcare, and infrastructure. The Department of Defense leads the way with seven such deals. The U.S. government is also working with a range of partners and has mobilized an additional $4.75 billion in investment. Private co-investors include J.P. Morgan, Goldman Sachs, and others.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Since January 2025, the U.S. government has invested $20.9 billion across sixteen deals involving direct ownership, broadening a toolkit traditionally focused on grants, loans, and tax incentives.
  2. The Department of Defense leads with seven direct-ownership deals, followed by the Department of Commerce with six, including a 10% stake in Intel, while the Development Finance Corporation has executed three equity transactions in critical minerals, healthcare, and infrastructure.
  3. The U.S. government has mobilized an additional $4.75 billion in investment alongside private co-investors including J.P. Morgan and Goldman Sachs.

Related Articles:

  • Industrial Policy and Economic Security — Industrial policy justified on national security grounds requires weighing how much economic inefficiency is worth tolerating, since costs incurred today make a country poorer and therefore less able to project power later. The calculation is difficult because security gains are probabilistic and long-term economic costs are speculative.
  • The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market — The authors estimate that declining U.S. military procurement spending from the 1950s to the 1990s explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing employment and just under 10% of the rise in top-decile income inequality. They argue Cold War procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers and helped sustain tight labor markets for low-skill workers.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
  • Government Spending
  • Fiscal Policy
  • Politics
  • Productivity
    • Investment
  • Security

How Federal Spending is Distributed by Age

AI Summary. An analysis classifying $4.4tn of $7tn in federal spending by age finds retirees aged 65 and older receive $2.7tn, 38.6% of total outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending, versus $1.2tn for working-age adults and $449bn for those under 26. Social Security and Medicare account for 80% of age-assignable spending on older adults.

Kent Smetters University of Pennsylvania
Date Posted:
April 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In 2025, of the 62.5% of Federal spending that is age-assignable on a per-capita basis, US retirees aged 65+ were given $43,700, working-age adults 26–64 got $7,300, and children and young adults got $4,300.

How is federal spending distributed across age groups?

Core argument: Retirees aged 65 and older receive $2.7 trillion of federal spending in fiscal 2025, equal to 38.6% of total outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending, versus $1.2 trillion for working-age adults aged 26–64.

We trace spending items within 52 general spending categories, totalling $7T for the 2025 Fiscal Year. We are able to classify a total of $4.4T across three broad age categories and assign the remaining $2.6T to an all-ages residual. Retirees (adults age 65 and older) receive $2.7T, equal to 38.6% of total federal outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending. Working-age adults (ages 26-64) receive $1.2T (27.9% of age-assignable), and children and young adults (under age 26) receive $449B (10.3%). The dominance of the retiree category reflects two programs above all others: Social Security and Medicare. Social Security directs $1.3T to retirees, and Medicare sends $835B. Together, they account for 80% of all age-assignable spending on older adults. But the retiree total extends beyond these two entitlements. Federal employee retirement benefits ($169B), housing assistance for older households, Medicaid long-term-care spending, and VA medical care all contribute, making the federal budget more retiree-focused than a Social Security–only lens would suggest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Retirees aged 65 and older receive $2.7 trillion of federal spending in fiscal 2025, equal to 38.6% of total outlays and 61.9% of age-assignable spending, versus $1.2 trillion for working-age adults aged 26–64.
  2. Children and young adults under age 26 receive $449 billion, or 10.3% of age-assignable federal spending, out of $4.4 trillion classified by age within a $7 trillion budget, with $2.6 trillion assigned to an all-ages residual.
  3. Social Security directs $1.3 trillion and Medicare $835 billion to retirees, together 80% of age-assignable spending on older adults, with federal employee retirement benefits ($169 billion), housing assistance, Medicaid long-term care, and VA medical care contributing further.

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  • France and Britain Are In Thrall To Pensioners — French pensioners receive larger government payments than in any other western country and begin receiving them several years earlier, leaving over-65s with higher average incomes than the working-age population — a situation without precedent internationally or in France's own history. Proposals to raise the retirement age or delay pension increases have triggered nationwide protests and government collapses.
  • The Budgetary Impact of the Abandonment of Federalism — Federal spending on activities originally regarded as state, local, or private-sector responsibilities is estimated to have risen from 2% of GDP in 1950 to 14% in 2019, exceeding the entire growth in federal spending over that period and reaching two-thirds of all federal outlays. Aid to individuals accounts for 80% of that increase, grants to states the remaining 20%.
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Has the United States Bent the Health Care Cost Curve?

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a slowdown in US health care spending reflects technology-associated changes in health and site of care (21% of the slowdown, double that in Medicare), more elastic long-run supply (6%), market changes reducing and making demand more elastic (11–27%), improved population health (7%), and slower price growth net of upcoding (24%).

David Cutler and Lev Klarnet Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
Date Posted:
March 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In 2024, medical spending as a share of GDP was just above its 2010 level and 15% ($977B) below its 2010 forecast; 21% of the gap was due to technology, 24% to price reductions, and 11–27% to reforms such as prior authorization and higher deductibles.

What explains the slowdown in US health care spending?

Core argument: Technology-associated changes in health and site of care account for 21% of the overall U.S. health care cost slowdown and double that share in Medicare, according to the authors' estimates.

Five factors are important in the slowdown in spending [Figure 16]. The first is technology-associated changes in health and site of care. These correspond to the subsequent innovations in our model. Together, technologies along these lines account for 21% of the overall cost slowdown and double that in Medicare. Second, long-run supply is more elastic than short-run supply, which lowers spending over time. This is particularly apparent in the impact of patent expiration for pharmaceuticals and in relative declines in imaging reimbursement. We estimate that greater long-run supply explains 6% of the spending slowdown. Third, a variety of market changes contribute to reduced and more elastic demand, including increased cost sharing paid by consumers, physicians not paid as much for using technologies, and insurers imposing restrictions on technology use - a rough guess is that these account for 11 to 27% of the spending slowdown. Fourth, the population is healthier in ways that reduce spending. This includes fewer hospitalizations for smoking-related conditions and reduced need for formal home health care. The birth rate has fallen as well, which reduces the need for care. We estimate improved population health explains 7% of the spending slowdown. A major component is slower price growth. Net of upcoding, we estimate lower price growth explains 24% of the spending slowdown.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Technology-associated changes in health and site of care account for 21% of the overall U.S. health care cost slowdown and double that share in Medicare, according to the authors' estimates.
  2. The authors estimate that slower price growth, net of upcoding, explains 24% of the health care spending slowdown, while market changes reducing demand — higher consumer cost sharing, lower physician payment for technology use, and insurer restrictions — account for a rough 11–27%.
  3. Improved population health explains an estimated 7% of the spending slowdown, through fewer smoking-related hospitalizations, reduced need for formal home health care, and a lower birth rate, while greater long-run supply elasticity explains 6%.

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  • Saved by Medicaid: New Evidence on Health Insurance and Mortality from the Universe of Low-Income Adults — Using linked Census and tax records for 37m low-income adults, the authors estimate that state Medicaid expansions raised enrollment by 12 percentage points and cut mortality among low-income adults by 2.5%, implying a 21% reduction in the mortality hazard of new enrollees. They estimate direct budgetary costs of $5.4m per life saved and $179,000 per life-year saved.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
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