Edward Conard

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Labor Market Concentration, Earnings Inequality, and Earnings Mobility

Kevin Rinz U.S. Census Bureau
Date Posted:
June 29, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Local industrial concentration has been declining. This decline has led to higher wages, with the 90/10 ratio 6% lower than it would have been if mean concentration were at the 1976 level.

Local industrial concentration has been declining since 1976, with average concentration reduced to about 75% of its 1976 level by 2015. This decline has contributed to higher wages, as moving from the median to the 25th percentile of local industrial concentration can increase earnings by about 10%. The reduction in concentration has also impacted earnings inequality, with the 90/10 earnings ratio being approximately 6.3% lower in 2015 than it would have been if concentration remained at 1976 levels. The decline in concentration has not been uniform across all demographics, with men, older workers, and those with lower education levels experiencing the largest increases in inequality when concentration rises. However, overall, the decrease in local labor market concentration has not been a major factor in broader changes in inequality and earnings growth.

Kevin Rinz, "Labor Market Concentration, Earnings Inequality, and Earnings Mobility," U.S. Census Bureau, 2018, https://www.census.gov/library/working-papers/2018/adrm/carra-wp-2018-10.html

Figure 7 focuses on markets containing at least one top-five firm and reports the number of top five firms competing in these markets. In 1976, just over 60 percent of markets with at least one top-five firm contained exactly one top-five firm. By 2015, that share had fallen to just over 50 percent. Notably, the bulk of the approximately ten additional percent of markets with multiple top-five firms in 2015 had three or more top-five firms, as the share of markets with two such firm was fairly stable over this period. Also, as indicated by the previous figure, those ten percent represent substantially more markets in 2015 than in 1976. Together, Figures 6 and 7 show that the largest national firm have expanded their geographic reach over the past 40 years while also increasingly entering the same local markets. The expansion of the geographic reach of these top firm accelerated around the same time that national HHIs began to increase. These patterns provide suggestive evidence that this channel merits further investigation. I now turn my attention to changes in the distribution of local industrial concentration. Figure 8 plots trends in key percentiles of the employment-weighted local HHI distribution. The box and whisker plots present the interquartile range (box) and internecine range (whiskers), with the mean (circle) and median (horizontal line) also plotted. The figure makes a few important features of the distribution immediately clear. First, the distribution has a long right tail; in every year, the value of the 75th percentile is more than twice that of the median, and the value of the 90th percentile is more than twice the value of the 75th percentile. As a result, the mean HHI is consistently well above the median. Second, the distribution has tightened over time, and this appears to have been driven by changes in the top of the distribution. The value of the 90th percentile has fallen by about a third between 1976 and 2015. The values of the 75th percentile and median have also fallen, but more modestly, while the 10th and 25th percentiles have seen little change in absolute terms over this period. Figure 9 extends this distributional analysis beyond the key percentiles presented in Figure 8, showing changes in the values of each percentile between 1976 and 2015. This figure confirms that changes in the values of high percentiles of the local HHI distribution over this period were much larger in absolute terms than were changes in the values of middle percentiles. Low percentiles saw little change in absolute terms, but relative to their initial levels, the changes at the bottom of the distribution were comparable in magnitude to those at the top, as illustrated by the log difference version of the figure….”
Labor Market Concentration, Earnings Inequality, and Earnings Mobility: Extended Excerpt Image 1

Kevin Rinz finds that local industrial concentration (using Herfndahl-Hirschman) has declined over recent decades. Think of large nations chains moving into new markets increasing local competition, “…Though trends in national measures of other forms of concentration may have contributed to recent interest in monopsony, trends in local industrial employment concentration have differed substantially from trends in national industrial employment concentration over the last four decades. While mean national industrial concentration declined sharply in the early 1980s, it began increasing rapidly again around 1990 and continued to do so until the onset of the Great Recession, nearly returning to its initial level. Local industrial concentration, on the other hand, has been declining fairly consistently since 1976, with limited interruptions. By 2015, average local concentration had declined to about three quarters of its 1976 value….”

Relationship btw concentration and wage, …"Consistent with other recent research,I find that increased concentration reduces earnings.My estimates imply that moving from the median to the 75th percentile of the employment-weighted local industrial concentration distribution would reduce earnings by about ten percent. Moving from the median to the 25th percentile would increase earnings by a similar amount. Estimates produced without weighting by employment are larger in magnitude than the baseline estimates, which indicates that earnings reductions associated with increased concentration are larger in smaller markets.... the effects of concentration vary across groups of workers. First, looking across the earnings distribution, I find that increased concentration leads to greater inequality as measured by the ratio of the 90th percentile of the earnings distribution to the 10th percentile (the 90/10 earnings ratio). By comparing changes in the 50/10 earnings ratio and the 90/50 earnings ratio, I estimate that about 60 percent of the increase in the 90/10 earnings ratio arises from changes between the median and the 10th percentile. Moreover, I estimate elasticities of particular percentiles with respect to concentration and find that lower percentiles are more negatively responsive to changes in concentration than are percentiles in the middle of the distribution. Percentiles higher in the distribution change little in response to changes in concentration…”

Distributional impact, "...All demographic groups experience increases in inequality when concentration increases. Men, older workers, and workers with high school diplomas or less see the largest increases in the 90/10 earnings ratio. As in the overall distribution, these increases are generally driven by the bottom of the distribution.Women and Black workers are again exceptions, with virtually all of the inequality increases in these groups coming from the top half of the distribution. This could be due in part to the fact that these groups generally have lower earnings throughout the distribution. As a result, changes experienced at any given point in the overall earnings distribution are experienced further up the distribution of earnings withing these groups..."

Bottom line, "...While these estimates indicate that increased concentration does indeed reduce earnings and increase inequality, combining them with the changes in concentration that have actually been observed since 1976 suggests that local labor market concentration has not been a major contributing factor to broader changes in inequality and earnings growth. According to back-of-the-envelope calculations, average annual real earnings were about 1.2 percent higher and the 90/10 earnings ratio about 6.3 percent lower in 2015 than they would have been if local concentration were at its 1976 level...."

The evidence, "...Some business data are available publicly, but they do not provide frm-level information with fne geographic detail, limiting their usefulness for measuring local employment concentration. As for outcomes, few local labor markets are suÿciently well represented in surveys to construct reliable distributional statistics. Fortunately, I can address both of these issues using administrative records available through the U.S. Census Bureau. The Bureau’s data linkage infrastructure also allows me to construct earnings measures that incorporate demographic information available from the Census Numident file, the 2000 and 2010 decennial censuses, and all available years of the American Community Survey...Before turning to local concentration,Figure 1 presents the average HHI across national four digit NAICS industries from 1976 through 2015, with industries weighted according to total employment.Average concentration falls sharply in the early years of this period, declining by roughly 40 percent between 1976 and 1983. It then sees little change until about 1990, at which point it begins increasing, nearly reaching its 1976 level by the onset of the Great Recession. This pattern is not sensitive to measuring concentration using the HHI. Appendix Figure B1 shows very similar patterns emerge when concentration is measured using the top-four or top-twenty firm employment concentration ratios.

Labor Market Concentration, Earnings Inequality, and Earnings Mobility: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Figure 2 presents the trend in average local industrial concentration, again measured using the HHI, averaged across commuting zone by four-digit NAICS industry markets. Markets are weighted according to employment. Local concentration also declines over the late 1970s and early 1980s, though not as precipitously as national concentration. It also generally continues declining, though more slowly, through the 1990s and even most of the 2000s before increasing during the Great Recession. Like the national trend, this pattern is also evident in the top-four and top-twenty frm concentration ratio trends, as shown in Appendix Figure B5.

Ed Comment:Interesting stuff. It’s hard to understand what it means without understanding what exactly it’s measuring per my other emails, and also what defines a market. Its very abstract without more info. It’s also very hard top understand why and how concentration fell (could fall) off a cliff in the early 1980s. That seems like it could be a data consistency issue to me. the world just doesn’t change that fast, at least not without a cataclysmic event.

Ben Comment:This paper is examining employers’ power to offer wages lower than the marginal product of labor. It’s a monopsony story. The observed changes in local concentration are opposite of observed changes in national concentration - that is, local concentration has gone down while national concentration has gone up. This does not contradict the findings. The story you need to keep in mind is one of national chains expanding. So now there’s a Starbucks and a Pete’s coffee on every corner. Measured nationally that looks like more concentration but locally there are now 2 coffee shops where there used to be one, so concentration has gone down (locally). Because local concentration is decreasing, the paper argues, employers have less market power than they once did. Therefore the 90 are not earning as much more as the 10 used to; and labors’ earnings have increased.

  • Inequality
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleJune 28, 2021Who Pays The Corporate Tax In A Global EconomyResearch by @KimberlyClausing finds no robust link btw corporate tax rates and wages, with workers remaining insulated from corporate tax policies in affluent countries. National Tax Journal.Next articleJuly 1, 2021A new take on the devastating effects of ‘political wage-setting’: the ‘minimum wage paradox’A single parent with 2 children in Forsyth County, NC, earning $7.25/hr would see wages rise by $1,240/month with a $15/hr minimum wage, yet net benefits only increase by $199/month due to reduced social benefits & higher taxes.
Showing 157 database articles primarily about Inequality

Recent Trends in Personal Income & Wage Inequality

AI Summary. New York City's top 1% captured nearly two-thirds of real income growth between 2019 and 2024, versus under 40% nationally, driven by capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wages.

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller
Date Posted:
September 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is capital income concentration widening faster in major cities than nationally?

Core argument: Nearly two-thirds of New York City’s real income growth from 2019–2024 accrued to the top 1%, versus under 40% nationally, driven by faster-rising capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wage divergence.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly two-thirds of New York City’s real income growth from 2019–2024 accrued to the top 1%, versus under 40% nationally, driven by faster-rising capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wage divergence.
  2. The bottom 90% of New York City earners hold purchasing power roughly one-fifth below their national counterparts after adjusting for local prices, even before accounting for transfer programs.

Related Articles:

  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — Since January 2020, private sector real hourly earnings have fallen 9% in New York City, while increasing 3% nationally, as large firms based in NYC move jobs…
  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — For non-college Americans, high local prices mean lower living standards. “A high school drop-out household moving from the least expensive commuting zone to…
  • The Demographic Trends That Shaped Mamdani’s Win — Voters under the age of 45, 46% of registered voters in New York City, made up ~43% of voters in the mayor’s race. In neighborhoods where the nonwhite…
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt

AI Summary. U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are record corporate profits coming at workers' expense?

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

Related Articles:

  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The labor share of income has fallen 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching an all-time post-war low, driven by within-industry dynamics rather than shifts in activity across sectors.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
  • Inequality
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics
  • Workforce

The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. Billionaire wealth from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has reached an all-time high, with fairly earned wealth now accounting for half of total billionaire wealth globally, while wealth from politically connected industries has declined since 2021.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Does self-made wealth now dominate billionaire fortunes globally?

Core argument: For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.
  2. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth—spanning gambling, construction, defence, raw materials, and inheritance—rose modestly from 2001 to 2014 but has declined in absolute terms since 2021.
  3. Inherited wealth, though typically lawfully held, represents a policy failure in wealth distribution, as heirs’ fortunes reflect birth advantage rather than competitive value creation.

Related Articles:

  • AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain — Anti-AI rhetoric is emerging in Democratic fundraising messaging at the same adoption rate that anti-billionaire language showed in 2019, driven by the party's progressive wing and framed not as a jobs or safety concern but as an extension of billionaire power.
  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Inequality is mostly the result of an increasing premium on returns from risk and high-skilled labor ushered in by technological disruption and the feedback…
  • Inequality
  • Politics
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Another Reason the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes!

AI Summary. A shift of ~$200bn in worker pay into corporate profits as stock-based compensation could explain roughly one-third of the long-run decline in labor's share of income, as stock ownership allows high earners to receive tax-preferred pay recorded as profits rather than wages.

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
Date Posted:
July 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Zidar & Zwick suggest about one‑third of the post‑1970s drop in labor’s share is due to stock‑based pay to workers, in addition to the one‑third they already attribute to pass‑through income. That leaves only around one‑third for genuine shifts in technology, power, etc.

Does tax-preferred stock compensation explain the labor share decline?

Core argument: $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.

In our data for 2017, after adjustments for the rise of pass-throughs, we report employee compensation of $7.2 trillion and corporate value added of $12.2 trillion. The unadjusted corporate profits number (which excludes partnership profits) is $1.7 trillion. If we could find around $200 billion of “missing” labor compensation, that would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s. Thus, if workers owned a bit above 10% of those corporate profits via stock compensation, then that would cover the difference. Distributing this amount across the top 10% of public company employees, of which there are 4.2 million, this ownership would imply an additional $40,000 or so in pay. The aggregate numbers are thus quite plausible in terms of how much pay might have shifted to corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.
  2. Top 10% of public company employees ($40k additional implicit pay via equity ownership) concentrate gains that would equal $200bn aggregate.
  3. $12.2tn corporate value added vs. $7.2tn employee compensation reveals labor’s shrinking claim on output, as tax-preferred equity arrangements redirect worker.

Related Articles:

  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
  • Human Capitalists — Equity Based Compensation ~45% Of Total Comp Of High-Skilled Labor, Including It In Labor Share Cuts Decline of Labor Share Since The 1980’s By 60%.
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US income distribution is non-wage income, primarily derived from private business profits, according to @MatthewSmith…
  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States

AI Summary. European immigrants who arrived with nearly no wealth converged to similar wealth levels as earlier European settlers within a few generations, while Black, Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican households remained substantially behind, indicating that initial wealth gaps do not uniformly predict long-run inequality across all groups.

Brian Marein Wake Forest University
Date Posted:
June 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.

Does initial wealth explain persistent inequality across immigrant groups?

Core argument: By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.

Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.
  2. European immigrants arrived at the turn of the twentieth century with nearly zero wealth, yet their descendants’ wealth distributions converged.
  3. White ancestry groups exhibit nearly identical wealth distributions by 1980–1990 despite staggered arrival times spanning 270+ years, while Black, Cuban.

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  • 00 to 2022 — Gregory Clark @PNASNews finds that social status in England was strongly correlated across generations between 1600 and 2022, consistent with a theory of…
  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Raj Chetty @OppInsights finds that a white child born into the bottom household income quintile in 1992 had a 29.7% chance of remaining there, up from 24.9% in…
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Immigration
    • Mobility/Assortative Mating

The Great $110 Trillion Wealth Transfer Won’t Happen Any Time Soon

AI Summary. Bequeathable wealth in the U.S. rose from 256% to 424% of GDP between 1997 and 2021, with 97% of that increase concentrated in households headed by someone 55 or older. The wealthiest 10% of that age group drove 75% of the total gain, meaning inherited wealth is becoming increasingly concentrated

Rachel Louise Ensign and James Benedict Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
May 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The age at which Americans are inheriting money has risen. According to Federal Reserve surveys, btw 1998 and 2010, Americans in their late 50s were most likely to report receiving an inheritance; by 2013–2022, that age had ticked up to the mid 60’s.

Will the concentration of inherited wealth impact economic equality?

Core argument: Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.

Fed data [indicates] that what is known as the bequeathable wealth rose from 256% of gross domestic product in 1997 to 424% in 2021, the last year of available data. A staggering 97% of that increase was due to wealth gains in households where the head of household was 55 or older. Older Americans may keep accumulating wealth, especially if the stock market keeps rising. But some will spend it on living costs and expensive long-term care, leaving less for heirs. When they die, many will leave their money to their spouses, who are often in their same generation. This year, around $1.3 trillion is expected to be passed onto spouses, compared with about $2 trillion to heirs in Gen X and younger generations, according to projections from research firm Cerulli Associates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.
  2. The wealthiest 10% of households age 55+ captured 75% of total bequeathable wealth gains since 1997, resulting in widening inequality.
  3. Boomers accumulated $1tn+ in wealth during Q4 alone, outpacing all other generational groups, as stock and business valuations drive outsized.

Related Articles:

  • A Preliminary Report on Taxing the Great Wealth Transfer: Revenue and Distributional Effects of Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death — Bequeathable wealth/GDP has risen from 256% to 424% over 1997- 2021, but the current estate tax law yields ~$0 revenue. @BrookingsInst researchers propose an…
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  • Inequality
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