Edward Conard

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Trumps 2,000 Stimulus Checks Are a Big Mistake

Larry Summers Bloomberg
Date Posted:
December 29, 2020
Is Database:
Database

@LHSummers: $2,000 stimulus checks would elevate household incomes 15% above normal levels, risking overheating the economy.

The proposal for $2,000 stimulus checks would elevate household incomes to more than 15% above their normal level relative to economic potential, creating an unprecedented situation. Total employee compensation is only $30bn per month below the pre-Covid baseline, and existing measures already add $150bn monthly to household income, replacing losses sevenfold. With $1.6tn in pent-up savings, further universal checks risk overheating the economy, especially with constrained supply due to Covid measures. The policy lacks a sound economic rationale, as household income losses are being fully replaced and checking account balances are above pre-Covid levels. Instead, targeted support for those most affected by the pandemic would be more effective.

Summer’ concerned about the $2000 checks, “…The data are striking. Total employee compensation is now running only about $30 billion per month behind the pre-Covid baseline….With President Donald Trump’s add-on, we are in completely uncharted territory,with household incomes more than 15% above their normal level relative to economic potential.We frankly have no confident basis for judging how much and how fast this excess, and the pre-existing backlog of saving from the Cares Act, will be spent. There is the possibility of some overheating, particularly if the economy’s potential supply remains constrained by Covid protection measures….”

Trump’s $2,000 Stimulus Checks Are a Big Mistake

The attack I made on Bloomberg Television on the idea of universal $2,000 checks as a Covid-19 response has lit up the Twittersphere, so I think it worthwhile to be clear about what I am arguing.

Certainly, I am not opposing stimulus or favoring austerity. For years I have been making the secular stagnation case for more expansionary fiscal policy, and I have often remarked over the last couple of months that “not passing fiscal stimulus is like not wearing a mask at a large indoor gathering — an insane risk.” And both in the immediate term, and on a permanent basis, I am all for strengthening the social safety net with measures such as enlarged Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program benefits or an expanded Earned Income Tax Credit or child tax credit.

There can be no argument that the stimulus bill Congress passed should be implemented immediately, even though it is too late and too little. As I have observed, it fails to support the states and localities as they try to rehire teachers and health-care workers. It does too little to accelerate the availability of the testing necessary to put Covid-19 in the rearview mirror. And its one-month extension of the eviction moratorium and 11-week extension of unemployment insurance are clearly far too short-term.

The issue is whether spending about $600 billion on a one-time tax credit that would be worth $8,000 to a family of four and reach more than 85 percent of taxpayers makes good economic sense. Victims of Covid-19 disruption can and should receive generous targeted support, as should the poor.

The question in assessing universal tax rebates is, what about the vast majority of families who are still working, and whose incomes have not declined or whose pension or Social Security benefits have not been affected by Covid-19? For this group, the pandemic has reduced the ability to spend more than the ability to earn.

The data are striking. Total employee compensation is now running only about $30 billion per month behind the pre-Covid baseline. Measures in the congressional stimulus bill to strengthen unemployment insurance and to support business will add about $150 billion a month to household income in order to replace all this loss.

The question is whether there is a rationale for further tax rebate of more than $200 billion a month over the next quarter. This would represent additional support equal to an additional seven times the loss of household wage and salary income over the next quarter.

Some argue that while $2,000 checks may not be optimal support for the post-Covid economy, taking stimulus from $600 to $2,000 is better than nothing. They need to ask themselves whether they would favor $5,000, or $10,000 — or more. There must be a limiting principle.

One obvious candidate is not overdoing overinsurance. Bringing working families’ income up to benchmark levels is natural. Perhaps bringing them somewhat above benchmark levels makes sense. But further adding to earnings when losses are being replaced seven times over seems hard to justify — especially at a time when pent-up savings totals $1.6 trillion and is rising. If writing universal checks is a good idea, why not do it after household incomes have reverted to normal?

This point is illustrated by the figure below. It shows that because of the legislation passed in 2020, total household income (which takes no account of the stock market) has exceeded normal levels relative to the economy’s potential more or less since the pandemic began. Without new stimulus, things would have normalized in 2021.

But the existing stimulus bill is sufficient to elevate household income relative to the economy’s potential to abnormally high levels — unheard of during an economic downturn. With President Donald Trump’s add-on, we are in completely uncharted territory, with household incomes more than 15% above their normal level relative to economic potential. We frankly have no confident basis for judging how much and how fast this excess, and the pre-existing backlog of saving from the Cares Act, will be spent. There is the possibility of some overheating, particularly if the economy’s potential supply remains constrained by Covid protection measures.

Trumps 2,000 Stimulus Checks Are a Big Mistake: Extended Excerpt Image 1


As my recent paper with Jason Furman argues, I am all for a far more expansive approach to fiscal policy. But that does not mean indiscriminate support for universal giveaways at a time when household income losses are being fully replaced and checking account balances (at least as of October) were above pre-Covid levels.

There is no good economic argument for the $2,000 checks, a policy that was not even on the table until the president’s random pronouncement last week. The Democrats seizing this opportunity to pit the president and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell against each other is fair and good politics — but if it leads to actual implementation, it is bad economics. Trump should instead immediately sign the bipartisan relief package that took months to negotiate and avoid a cutoff of unemployment insurance that will plunge millions of the most vulnerable Americans into poverty.

Lawrence Summers, "Trump’s $2,000 Stimulus Checks Are a Big Mistake,"Bloomberg, December 27, 2020, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2020-12-27/larry-summers-trump-pelosi-2-000-stimulus-checks-are-a-mistake

Potential useful quote, “…I am all for a far more expansive approach to fiscal policy. But that does not mean indiscriminate support for universal giveaways at a time when household income losses are being fully replaced and checking account balances (at least as of October) were above pre-Covid levels. There is no good economic argument for the $2,000 checks, a policy that was not even on the table until the president’s random pronouncement last week.The Democrats seizing this opportunity to pit the president and Senate Majority Leader Mitch McConnell against each other is fair and good politics — but if it leads to actual implementation, it is bad economics….”

  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
Previous articleDecember 29, 2020Zombies at Large? Corporate Debt Overhang and the MacroeconomyAnalysis by @MartinKornejew shows corporate debt overhang does not significantly impact economic recoveries. Data reveals no correlation btw recession depth & business credit growth during prior expansions. Corporate debt booms do not hinder growth.Next articleDecember 29, 2020Digital Capital and Superstar FirmsDigital capital, comprising IT-related intangibles, is concentrated in superstar firms, predicting productivity. Its contribution to growth is double that of IT capital stock, with a 3-year lag btw investment & realized gains.
Showing 100 database articles primarily about Fiscal Deficits

US 30-Year Bonds Erase Gains From Treasury’s Buyback Surprise

AI Summary. US government bond yields have returned to near two-decade highs despite a buyback program targeting long-dated debt, indicating that investor concern over rising government borrowing remains unresolved.

Michael MacKenzie and Alice Gledhill Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The 30-year yield rose ~7bps to as much as 5.27%, and the 10-year yield hit 4.71%, erasing “almost all” the gains that followed Treasury’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds.

Does government debt buyback activity actually reduce long-term borrowing costs?

Core argument: The 30-year Treasury yield surged 7 basis points to 5.27%, erasing virtually all gains from the Treasury’s surprise buyback announcement and signaling the intervention failed to calm investor concerns over fiscal sustainability.

US Treasuries erased almost all of the gains that followed the Trump administration’s surprise decision to increase buybacks of longer-dated bonds, signaling the move has done little to alleviate the angst about the surging government debt that has pushed some yields to the highest in close to two decades. The 30-year yield on Thursday rose over seven basis points to as much as 5.27%, where it was just ahead of the US Treasury Department’s announcement early Wednesday, before paring the gain. The 10-year yield touched 4.71%, just shy of its highest level since early 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 30-year Treasury yield surged 7 basis points to 5.27%, erasing virtually all gains from the Treasury’s surprise buyback announcement and signaling the intervention failed to calm investor concerns over fiscal sustainability.
  2. The 10-year Treasury yield reached 4.71%, approaching its highest level since early 2025, as surging government debt continues to pressure long-duration bonds.

Related Articles:

  • Bessent Boosts Debt Buybacks After Climb in Treasury Yields — The US Treasury doubled the size of its buyback operations for long-dated government debt to reduce upward pressure on yields, which had reached their highest level in nearly two decades.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Higher public debt is historically associated with lower, not higher, government bond returns, as financial repression forces banks to hold low-yield bonds and cheap reserves, suppressing borrowing costs. This mechanism reduced British public debt by ~91% of GDP in 1945–55, dwarfing the contributions from inflation or budget surpluses.
  • The United States Capital Structure — Government bondholders hold the riskiest position in the U.S. fiscal structure, absorbing adverse shocks through inflation or financial repression, while entitlement recipients function as senior claimants whose payments are politically protected.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

A Long-Run Economic Model for Projecting the Finances of the U.S. Government and National Spending on Healthcare: Analysis of Productivity Increases and Health Sector Reform

AI Summary. U.S. federal debt is projected to reach 151% of GDP by 2036 and 309% by 2056 as rising real interest rates exceed economic growth, creating a self-reinforcing cycle of higher deficits and debt. National health spending is projected to reach 21.2% of GDP by 2036, rising to 37.2% by

Mark Warshawsky American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
July 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Warshawsky projects US debt-to-GDP will be 151% in 2036, well above CBO’s 120% projection, as higher real rates and a dynamic Baumol cost-disease effect will increase healthcare spending relative to GDP in an aging economy.

Will rising healthcare costs overwhelm U.S. fiscal capacity?

Core argument: U.S. federal debt-to-GDP reaches 151% by 2036 and 309% by 2056 under this general-equilibrium model—far exceeding CBO’s 120% and 175% projections—as real interest rates outpace economic growth, locking deficits and debt in a self-reinforcing spiral.

The Congressional Budget Office makes certain simplifying assumptions on health care spending, and is based on current law. By contrast, in the model presented in this paper, these variables are simultaneously determined by supply and demand, based on logical functional forms and parameter estimates from the literature or empirical analysis, and the model is based on current policy. This approach better reflects real economic relationships—between health care spending, the federal budget, and investment in capital—and changing underlying conditions, especially demographics. Within the next twenty or so years, the model predicts that federal government debt will grow significantly beyond historical experience, to be judged unsustainable because the real interest rate exceeds real economic growth. Debt-to-GDP will be 151% in 2036, 218% in 2046, and 309% in 2056, compared to CBO’s 120% in 2036 and 175% in 2056. Real interest rates rise for several decades, ratcheting interest payments, deficits, and debt in a vicious cycle.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. federal debt-to-GDP reaches 151% by 2036 and 309% by 2056 under this general-equilibrium model—far exceeding CBO’s 120% and 175% projections—as real interest rates outpace economic growth, locking deficits and debt in a self-reinforcing spiral.

Related Articles:

  • Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis? — Higher economy-wide productivity growth raises incomes but also accelerates healthcare inflation, so a productivity surge from 1.8% to 2.7% raises GDP per capita from $102,000 to $110,000 by 2035 while pushing healthcare spending from 21% to 21.7% of GDP.
  • How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence? — A 0.5% annual productivity growth boost would reduce publicly held federal debt by 39% of GDP over 30 years, cutting roughly half of the projected rise from 101% to 175% of GDP, through higher tax revenue, slower spending growth relative to GDP, and debt dilution that outweighs higher borrowing costs.
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — CBO projects a deficit of 5.8% of GDP in 2026, unchanged from 2025. Outlays, at 23.3% of GDP, will exceed their 50-year mean by 2.1pp; revenue of 17.5% is just…
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Intergovernmental Grants to School Districts and Educational Outcomes During the COVID-19 Pandemic

AI Summary. Emergency federal education grants during the pandemic did not measurably reduce student learning loss, partly because qualifying districts saw local revenues fall by ~$907 per pupil over three years — offsetting federal funds rather than supplementing them.

Jeffrey Clemens, Philip Hoxie and Stan Veuger National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Exploiting a discontinuity in K-12 public school districts’ qualification for Covid emergency funding (ESSR), Clemens et al find that the funds did not mitigate learning loss. To a large extent, local districts used them to lower property taxes.

Emergency funding for K-12 public schools was an important component of recession spending packages during COVID, involving $190 billion in additional expenditure. We see no evidence that ESSER funds helped to mitigate learning loss, at least in the short run. We find no statistically significant evidence that districts increased expenditures in SY 2021 or SY 2022. We do find evidence that districts that qualified for additional ESSER funds had statistically significant reductions in local revenues that were in excess of their ESSER funds. This pass-through of federal funds may partially explain why ESSER had minimal impacts on learning loss for districts around the 5% poverty threshold. Our estimates suggest that over the three years, crossing the qualification cutoff for additional ESSER funds is associated with a $907 per pupil decrease in local revenues, or about 8% of the pre-COVID average. We show the decline in local revenues as an event study in Figure 3, which includes a flat pre-COVID trend in local revenues per pupil across the qualification threshold. In Table 5,Column 5 [], we can see that about 80% of the revenue decline came from decreases in revenues from property taxes, [which fell] by $718 per pupil across the 3 years. The findings apply specifically to districts in the neighborhood of the 5% poverty threshold for qualifying for additional ESSER funds.

Related Articles:

  • Aid for Incumbents: The Electoral Consequences of COVID-19 Relief — An additional senator or representative per mm residents predicted about $1,000 dollars in additional COVID aid per capita over 2020-2022, yielding incumbents…
  • What Do States Do with Fiscal Windfalls? Evidence from the Pandemic — Of the almost $1T in Federal pandemic-era fiscal aid to states, 38% went to general government expenditures (excluding healthcare, education, and…
  • Spatial Spillovers and the Effects of Fiscal Stimulus: Evidence from Pandemic-Era Federal Aid for State and Local Governments — Accounting for spillovers from other states, @stanveuger and @jeffreypclemens find that $900B federal pandemic aid translated to $878,000 of spending to create…
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • K-12
      • Test Scores

How Might Fiscal Policy Respond to the Rise of Artificial Intelligence?

AI Summary. A 0.5% annual productivity growth boost would reduce publicly held federal debt by 39% of GDP over 30 years, cutting roughly half of the projected rise from 101% to 175% of GDP, through higher tax revenue, slower spending growth relative to GDP, and debt dilution that outweighs higher borrowing costs.

Karen Dynan, Douglas Elmendorf and Louise Sheiner National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 13, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

CBO baseline projects debt-to-GDP rising from 101% in 2026 to 175% in 2056. Dynan et al. study how AI might modify that projection. In all but their most optimistic scenario, TFP grows 0.5pp faster, and AI offsets 39–49 pp of that 74pp increase.

Does productivity growth from artificial intelligence solve the federal debt problem?

[In the Base Case], faster economic growth [improves the federal budget and debt outlook] through four channels. First, [higher] incomes increase federal revenue, [while] the progressive tax system [modestly] raises revenue relative to GDP. CBO [estimates] that a [permanent] 0.5 pp increase in annual TFP growth would raise revenue after [30 years] by 0.14% of GDP. Second, [although] faster growth increases [some] federal spending, spending rises [more slowly] than GDP, [reducing noninterest outlays] relative to GDP. Under our [assumptions], discretionary spending falls from 6.1% of GDP in 2025 to 4.5% in 2056. Third, because faster growth does not [change the stock of] existing debt, that debt becomes smaller relative to GDP. Fourth, [stronger] growth generally raises interest rates, increasing the [cost] of new borrowing and [refinancing] existing debt. This represents a partial offset to the [fiscal gains]. [On balance], additional annual TFP growth of 0.5 pp would lower publicly held federal debt after [30 years] by 39% of GDP relative to CBO’s extended baseline. CBO’s extended baseline shows federal debt rising from 101% of GDP in 2026 to 175% in three decades, so this hypothesized increase in growth would offset roughly half of that projected rise.

Related Articles:

  • Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis? — Higher economy-wide productivity growth raises incomes but also accelerates healthcare inflation, so a productivity surge from 1.8% to 2.7% raises GDP per capita from $102,000 to $110,000 by 2035 while pushing healthcare spending from 21% to 21.7% of GDP.
  • U.S. Treasury Investors Are Long in AI — U.S. government debt acts as a leveraged bet on long-run productivity growth, because tax revenue rises automatically with faster growth while spending commitments stay flat. Each 0.1 percentage point increase in permanent productivity growth raises the fundamental value of government debt by $1.3tn, implying a 71 basis point decline in
  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — CBO projects a deficit of 5.8% of GDP in 2026, unchanged from 2025. Outlays, at 23.3% of GDP, will exceed their 50-year mean by 2.1pp; revenue of 17.5% is just…
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Annual Economic Report

AI Summary. Public debt has risen sharply across both advanced and emerging economies, with cyclically adjusted primary deficits nearly doubling in advanced economies to 1.9% of GDP and surging from 0.1% to 1.8% in emerging markets, leaving governments with limited capacity to absorb future economic shocks.

BIS Staff Bank of International Settlements
Date Posted:
June 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

BIS warns, “Countries can no longer count on nominal growth to stabilise debt dynamics. They now must run primary surpluses or significantly smaller deficits to maintain stable debt-to-GDP ratios.”

Does rising public debt limit governments' ability to handle future crises?

Core argument: Cyclically adjusted primary deficits in AEs doubled to 1.9% of GDP since 2022 versus 1.1% over 2000–2019, reducing fiscal space.

Many countries entered the current energy crisis with limited fiscal space. Public debt in [Advanced Economies] (AE) has risen steadily over recent years (Graph 15.A), reducing governments’ ability to cushion fallout from higher energy prices. Although the increase partly reflects successive shocks, from the Covid-19 recession to the war in Ukraine, persistent failures to make meaningful progress on fiscal consolidation during economic expansions have also played a part. Cyclically adjusted primary deficits in AEs averaged 1.9% of GDP from 2022 onwards (Graph 15.B), nearly double the 1.1% recorded over the two preceding decades. [Emerging market economies] (EME) have seen an even sharper deterioration (1.8% since 2022 versus 0.1% between 2000 and 2019). Fiscal positions are set to remain strained over the coming years. Debt servicing costs are unlikely to ease soon, as higher interest rate payments continue to weigh on fiscal accounts (Graph 15.C). Deficits in 2027 are projected at or above 2025 levels in most jurisdictions.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cyclically adjusted primary deficits in AEs doubled to 1.9% of GDP since 2022 versus 1.1% over 2000–2019, reducing fiscal space.
  2. EMEs experienced sharper fiscal deterioration with deficits at 1.8% since 2022 versus 0.1% in 2000–2019, limiting their capacity to cushion.
  3. Higher interest rate payments drive debt servicing costs upward, keeping deficits at or above 2025 levels through 2027 across most.

Related Articles:

  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Across the OECD last year, $13.5T of governmental debt needed refinancing, 70% ($9.5T) of which was US debt, up from 57% in 2020. The US and Japan were…
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — US government bonds, normally safe assets, become risky in times of war because of negative real returns due to bursts of inflation. As in the fiscal theory of…
  • Our Thoughts on Large US Deficits and Their Impact on Bond Yields — Bridgewater believes an increase in the deficit to 7-8% of GDP will not put undue pressure on bond yields. They argue rates reflect total credit creation…
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP

More T-Bills, More Dependence on the Fed

AI Summary. T-bill issuance has reached ~85% of gross Treasury supply, near a two-decade high, making government borrowing costs increasingly sensitive to short-term interest rates set by the Federal Reserve.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
June 17, 2026
Is Database:
Database

T-bills are ~85% of gross Treasury issuance, meaning Federal borrowing costs are more closely tied to the front end of the curve, the part most directly under the Fed’s control.

Does rising short-term debt issuance increase government vulnerability to Fed policy?

Core argument: T-bills comprise 85% of gross Treasury issuance, near 20-year highs, tying federal borrowing costs directly to Fed policy rates.

T-bills now account for almost 85% of gross Treasury issuance, near the highest share in over two decades. By tilting issuance toward short-dated debt, the government ties its borrowing costs more closely to the front end of the curve, making its financing increasingly dependent on Fed policy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. T-bills comprise 85% of gross Treasury issuance, near 20-year highs, tying federal borrowing costs directly to Fed policy rates.
  2. Short-dated debt concentration drives government financing vulnerability to near-term rate decisions, increasing refinancing risk vs. longer-maturity alternatives.
  3. Front-end curve dependence results in fiscal costs rising faster when the Fed maintains restrictive policy, amplifying deficit pressures.

Related Articles:

  • The Budget and Economic Outlook: 2026 to 2036 — CBO projects a deficit of 5.8% of GDP in 2026, unchanged from 2025. Outlays, at 23.3% of GDP, will exceed their 50-year mean by 2.1pp; revenue of 17.5% is just…
  • The Robin Hood State Is Coming For The Rich — Advanced economies have become increasingly redistributive. “While the share of US taxable income going to the top 1% of earners soared, their share of…
  • The United States Capital Structure — Government bondholders hold the riskiest position in the U.S. fiscal structure, absorbing adverse shocks through inflation or financial repression, while entitlement recipients function as senior claimants whose payments are politically protected.
  • Fiscal Deficits
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Inflation
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