Edward Conard

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  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
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A new look at how corporations impact the economy and households

AI Summary. Research on advanced economies estimates that consumers capture $0.40 of surplus and $0.25 in wages and benefits per dollar of corporate revenue, with firms earning over $1bn accounting for 72% of GDP across OECD countries. Over 25 years the labor share of income fell from 67% to 59% while consumer surplus grew across income groups.

James Manyika McKinsey Global Institute
Date Posted:
June 2, 2021
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Large firms in advanced economies significantly influence household economics, with consumers capturing $0.40 per dollar of corporate revenue as surplus and $0.25 in wages/benefits.

How much of corporate revenue reaches consumers and workers?

Core argument: Consumers capture $0.40 of surplus per dollar of corporate revenue in advanced economies, with another $0.25 going to wages and benefits.

In advanced economies, large firms significantly influence household economics, with consumers capturing $0.40 per dollar of corporate revenue as surplus and $0.25 in wages/benefits. Corporations with over $1bn in revenue contribute 72% of GDP in OECD countries, underpinning 85% of technology investment and labor productivity growth since 1995. However, the labor income share has declined from 67% to 59% over 25 years, pressuring lower-income households reliant on wages. Meanwhile, consumer surplus has grown, benefiting all income segments, though price hikes in essential services have reduced surplus for low-income households.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Consumers capture $0.40 of surplus per dollar of corporate revenue in advanced economies, with another $0.25 going to wages and benefits.
  2. Corporations with more than $1bn in revenue account for 72% of GDP across OECD countries and underpin 85% of technology investment and labor productivity growth since 1995.
  3. The labor income share has fallen from 67% to 59% over 25 years, pressuring lower-income households reliant on wages, while price increases in essential services have reduced consumer surplus for low-income households.

A new look at how corporations impact the economy and households: Extended Excerpt Image 1


James Manyika, Michael Birshan, Sven Smit, Jonathan Woetzel, Kevin Russell, Lindsay Purcell, Sree Ramaswamy, "A new look at how corporations impact the economy and households," McKinsey Global Institute, June 2021, https://www.mckinsey.com/business-functions/strategy-and-corporate-finance/our-insights/a-new-look-at-how-corporations-impact-the-economy-and-households

New McKinsey report breaks down large firms in OECD countries three large takeaways, first their impact on GDP, “…The business sector overall contributes 72 percent of GDP in the OECD, and corporations with more than $1 billion in revenue account for an increasingly large share of that.Measured in real GDP per capita, the contribution of the business sector— defined as for-profit companies of all types including corporations, partnerships, and sole proprietorships—has tripled since 1960 on average in major OECD economies, in proportion with those economies’ overall growth. Companies underpin 85 percent of technology investment and 85 percent of labor productivity growth since 1995, a larger proportion than their GDP contribution. The size of the business sector varies only modestly within each of the major economies, and its share has remained steady for the past 60 years. However, this steadiness masks significant underlying shifts, notably the growth of corporations with more than $1 billion in revenue, which increased their global value added by 60 percent relative to their home countries’ GDP since 1995….”
Their breakdown of how value flows from large firms to households largely via labor income and consumer surplus, “…Economic value flows from companies to households via eight pathways, ofwhich labor income and consumer surplus are the largest direct pathways. Our mapping work identifies eight pathways through which economic value from corporations flows to households and the economy. Five are directly measurable monetary flows: labor income, capital income, taxes, investment in capital assets, and payments to suppliers. The money flowing through the supplier and investment pathways passes through other companies to reach households and the economy. The sixth is consumer surplus (the difference between what consumers are prepared to pay and what they do pay), which we estimate. The final two pathways are negative and positive spillovers, which we do not assess comprehensively beyond the examples of environmental impact and contributions to total factor productivity growth (unaccounted for in additional labor or capital input). Based on our data set of about 5,000 corporations with more than $1 billion in revenue,we find that labor income is the largest direct measured pathway, with wages and benefits accounting for $0.25 flowing to households for each dollar of revenue. Just over half of every dollar, $0.58, goes to suppliers (themselves companies large and small), reflecting the role suppliers play in enabling corporations to create and deliver their products and services. The other significant pathway is consumer surplus, which we estimate to be about $0.40 per dollar of revenue….”
How the pathways have changed overtime, “…The size of the pathways has changed over the past 25 years, with capital income growing while labor income and supplier payments have declined. Between the periods 1994-96 and 2016-18, the biggest change has been a two-thirds increase in the capital income pathway, from $0.04 to $0.07 per revenue dollar. Applied to the $40 trillion in revenue represented by our large company data set, this $0.03 difference amounts to an increase in capital income of over $1 trillion. The labor income pathway shrank by $0.02, or 6 percent, as labor per dollar of revenue fell by 15 percent and wages grew only 11 percent. Productivity gains amounted to 25 percent in real terms, significantly more than wage growth, as gains from labor productivity went predominantly to capital income. Investment in intangible assets tripled as a proportion of revenue in this period, while investment in tangible assets dropped by half. Supplier payments fell by $0.02, or 4 percent. The decline was especially steep for suppliers that were small and midsize enterprises, which saw a 10 percent drop in share of payments to suppliers in the United States, with similar patterns in other countries. The share going to domestic suppliers in each country also fell; about half of the decrease in supplier payments moved to foreign OECD suppliers and the other half to non-OECD suppliers. The tax pathway held steady overall as decreases in corporate taxes, especially in the United Kingdom and the United States, were offset by slight increases in production taxes, especially in Japan, and in corporate income tax in France….Decline in the share of the labor income pathway. Labor income from the corporations with annual revenue above $1 billion grew from just under $4 trillion to almost $10 trillion over the past 25 years (in 2018 dollars). However, this represents a lower share of the value that these companies add to the economy, as the labor portion of household income attributable to these corporations declined from 67 percent to 59 percent of the total.That difference is the equivalent of $1.2 trillion. This represents a steeper overall decline than domestic economies in the OECD generally. Japan saw the biggest decrease at more than ten percentage points, followed by Germany (five), the United States (four), and France (three). The United Kingdom saw a rise of four percentage points. A declining labor share puts pressure on incomes of lower-income households, who rely predominantly on income from wages for their livelihoods…. 5. Two diverging trends in the consumer surplus. On one hand, consumers in all household income segments have benefited substantially from the consumer surplus generated by large corporations, especially that from Technologists and Makers. The gains to consumers in OECD countries from these two company archetypes in our data set over the past 25 years amount to about $8 trillion in consumer surplus, compared with a scenario under which their prices of products and services stayed constant. On the other hand, price increases by Experts and Discoverers in our data set, especially for health and education services, correspond to more than $2 trillion in lost consumer surplus. This puts some of these essential services out of the reach of low-income households, at a time when the need for them has risen…”

McKinsey’s description

Approach 2: (Require time series variation in prices)

  1. Assume price decrease is pure gain for consumers + additional gains because of more sales e.g. price falls from 5 to 4; assume consumers capture that whole dollar of value plus assume expanded sales because the price is now lower.
  2. Use “hedonic price deflators” to adjust products for quality changes (really feature changes).
  3. Bottom line - Consumer Surplus = (-1) * change in price * total quantity at new prices * quality adjustment …”

Ben Comment on McKinsey’s consumer surplus calculation: “A little bit of a black box but we can make some headway: Approach 1:

  1. Assume firms and consumers split value equally
  2. Look at firm's/industry’s value added and assume that this is the firm’s/industry’s portion of value (so consumer gets the same amount)
  3. Adjust value added (therefore consumer surplus) “based on evidence of markups above factor costs.” Factor costs are estimated as the WACC (within firms or across industries).
  4. Bottom line - looks like Consumer Surplus = price - WACC

So FRED uses the Penn World Tables For theirLabor Share,in 2019 US was.597 (in GDP at Current National Prices), in 2007 it stood at.604, down from.64 in 2001. McKinsey’s labor share number mirror that (This is from a2019McKinsey Note), not that 57% is likely lower than the 60% in the current report as the later looks only at large firms that are presumably more efficient than the broader economy.

Ed Comment:"It says 25% of each dollar of revenue is captured by labor and 58% is suppliers (of which presumably 25% is labor and 58% is suppliers ad infinitum, which rounds to about 60% labor. If approximately 8 percentage points of the remaining 40% is profit (= 40/ + )...and 40% is consumer surplus, then investors add 12.5 x more value to others per dollar than they capture as profits (= /8) What percent do they and the BER say each of my above estimated components are of GDP? Add that to the summary too."

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Showing 489 database articles primarily about either Productivity, Cronyism, Incentives/Risk-Taking, Innovation/Research, Institutional Capabilities, Intangibles, Investment, Startups, or Workforce Reorganization

How Much Revenue Does The AI Buildout Need In 2030?

AI Summary. The authors estimate AI capital spending of $560bn in 2026 and, in a high-investment case, $3.5tn of net AI capital in service by 2030, requiring roughly $1.3tn in annual infrastructure revenue once depreciation, operating costs and a 15% return are covered. That implies 7.4x growth from current annualized revenues, with downstream revenues of $1.9–2.6tn.

William Gildea and Azeem Azhar Exponential View
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Beginning with capex projections, Gildea/Azhar derive for their high-growth case a $1.3T annual AI-infrastructure revenue hurdle for 2030. This covers $771B of depreciation and operating costs, plus a 15% return on $3.5T of net capital in service.

How much annual revenue must AI infrastructure generate to justify investment?

Core argument: In a high investment case with $3.5tn of net AI capital in service, the authors estimate AI infrastructure must generate $1.3tn of annual revenue by 2030, requiring 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues.

We estimate AI CapEx to be $560B in 2026, 64% of the total declared by the hyperscalers. Unfinished facilities can’t generate revenue, so the investment bill and the productive asset base will grow at different speeds. [In the high investment case], by 2030 we see $3.5T of net AI capital in service. The largest component [of the revenue hurdle] is the $555B in compute depreciation. We model lifespans at the current 5-6 years. Shell depreciation and OpEx combined contribute about a further $216B to the required revenue hurdle. [Adding a 15% return on net capital brings required annual infrastructure revenue to $1.3T]. Reaching the $1.3T hurdle would represent 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues. For its customers to earn 30-50% gross margins, downstream revenues need to be $1.9-2.6T. [Editor’s note: Van Nieuwerburgh’s far larger figure of $3.7T covers mature revenues from projects completed through 2032, using commissioning capital and a 50% infrastructure operating cash-flow margin. This estimate instead charges depreciation and operating costs plus 15% on net capital in service in 2030. Different horizons and cost conventions prevent a direct comparison. Van Nieuwerburgh also has a much higher capex estimate.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In a high investment case with $3.5tn of net AI capital in service, the authors estimate AI infrastructure must generate $1.3tn of annual revenue by 2030, requiring 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues.
  2. Compute depreciation of $555bn, modeled on 5-6 year lifespans, is the largest component of the 2030 revenue hurdle, with shell depreciation and operating expenses adding about $216bn and a 15% return on net capital completing the $1.3tn total.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • What Investment Data Implies about the AI Transition — The five largest U.S. technology firms are scaling AI capital spending about 50% a year, from $155bn to a forecast $755bn. Embedding this in a two-sector model with rare productivity booms, the authors estimate AI adds roughly 5, 20, or 58pp to cumulative growth over a seven-year transition, depending on scenario.
  • Rear Window — Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
  • Investment
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AI and Entrepreneurship: What is Really Happening?

AI Summary. Entrepreneurship by businesses with employees is flat or declining, including in AI-intensive information and professional services, where establishment entry has been flat or falling and young-firm employment in AI-exposed industries is falling. Applications for likely solo businesses with no employees rose steeply in those AI-intensive sectors, but self-employment as a main job is flat, suggesting side hustles.

Nathan Goldschlag Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Nathan Goldschlag finds that available federal data do not yet establish that AI is boosting entrepreneurship. “Across different cuts of the data, there is no clear evidence of AI affecting entrepreneurship, either for likely employers or nonemployers.”

Is AI driving a boom in new employer businesses?

Core argument: Business applications likely to become employer businesses were flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026, with fewer applications of the kind having the highest chance of becoming an employer business.

Employer entrepreneurship is at best rising modestly, and at worst has been falling for several years already. The number of business applications likely to become an employer business was flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026. Fewer of those applications have been the kind that have the highest chance of becoming an employer. Nonemployer entrepreneurship, or “solopreneurship,” is likely rising, but not as the main job of the solopreneurs. These are probably side hustles. Likely nonemployer business applications rose significantly in 2025 and early 2026. But the share of workers claiming to be self-employed nonemployers in their main job — in other words, business owners with no employees — is flat (though noisy). AI-intensive sectors and industries are no exception. Establishment entry in AI-intensive sectors (information and professional services) has been flat or falling in recent years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Business applications likely to become employer businesses were flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026, with fewer applications of the kind having the highest chance of becoming an employer business.
  2. Likely nonemployer business applications rose significantly in 2025 and early 2026, going vertical in the most AI-intensive sectors of information and professional services, while other sectors kept pace until early 2026 and then flattened.
  3. The share of workers reporting self-employment as nonemployers in their main job is flat, though noisy, including among workers in AI-exposed occupations in 2025 and early 2026.

Related Articles:

  • The Age Of The Solopreneur — A surge in US business formation is being driven by solo entrepreneurs, with growth in AI tool usage and in solopreneur activity in high-AI-adoption sectors suggesting artificial intelligence accounts for a meaningful portion of the increase. The authors argue AI is lowering barriers to starting and growing a business by expanding what one-person firms can do.
  • America Has Become An Entrepreneur’s Paradise — US growth in new-business applications is concentrated in professional services (up 25% over four years), retail (18%), and health care and social assistance (18%) rather than artificial-intelligence startups. The share of applications the Census Bureau deems likely to hire at least one employee has fallen to 30% from 38%.
  • Which Entrepreneurs Boost Productivity? — The authors find that a minority of entrepreneurs are "transformative" — generating disproportionate productivity gains, scoring high on IQ tests, being well-educated, and hiring research and development workers. They argue that economies with more such entrepreneurs and R&D workers sustain higher long-run productivity growth.
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Tech's Trillion-Dollar Internal Inconsistency

AI Summary. Wall Street analysts covering technology project the sector's operating cash flow will more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, a gain of over $1.2tn, while analysts covering the rest of the S&P 500 — technology's customers — project those firms will add far less cash flow. These sector-by-sector forecasts are internally inconsistent.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
September 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Tech analysts expect sector operating cash flow to more than double to ~$2.4T by 2028. Analysts covering other S&P 500 sectors (tech’s customers) see far less cash growth in their sectors. Slok “raises the question of who exactly will be writing all those checks to buy AI services.”

Are tech cash flow forecasts inconsistent with customers' projected growth?

Core argument: Analysts covering the tech sector expect its operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, an increase of over $1.2tn.

Wall Street equity analysts work in sector silos, and when you add up their forecasts, the numbers are internally inconsistent. The analysts covering tech expect the sector's operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4 trillion by 2028, an increase of over $1.2 trillion. Meanwhile, the analysts covering the other sectors in the S&P 500, which are tech's customers, expect those companies to add much less operating cash flow. In other words, the tech silo is betting on a future in which demand for AI and tech services explodes, while the silos covering the companies that would pay for those services see a much more modest outlook. Both cannot be right at the same time. The bottom line is that either tech's customers will generate a lot more cash than their analysts expect, or tech's cash flow forecasts are too optimistic, which raises the question of who exactly will be writing all those checks to buy AI services.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analysts covering the tech sector expect its operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, an increase of over $1.2tn.
  2. Analysts covering the other S&P 500 sectors, which are tech's customers, expect those companies to add much less operating cash flow, leaving the combined forecasts internally inconsistent.
  3. Either tech's customers will generate much more cash than their analysts expect, or tech's cash flow forecasts are too optimistic, which raises the question of who will pay for AI services.

Related Articles:

  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • Rear Window — Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
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Nine Percent of GDP

AI Summary. An analysis estimates that for US data center owners to break even on AI investments, the sector would need about $3.725tn in annual compute revenue by 2032 — roughly 9.2% of projected 2032 GDP. The estimate assumes 183 GW of US capacity completed, a $9.61tn capital base, a 10% discount rate, and a 50% operating cash flow margin.

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents
Date Posted:
September 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The US AI-buildout is projected to average ~3.6% of GDP over 2025–32. Lustig notes data-center operators will need ~$3.725T in annual compute revenue by 2032, 9.2% of projected GDP, to earn a 10% unlevered return on the buildout.

How much annual revenue must AI data centers generate to break even?

Core argument: Stijn’s baseline estimate holds that data center owners would need $3.725 trillion of annual revenue by 2032 — roughly 9.2% of projected 2032 GDP — to break even on AI investment at a 10% discount rate.

What do you have to believe about future revenue in order for all data center owners to to break even on their AI investment? Using a 10% discount rate, Stijn’s baseline number is 3.725 trillion of annual revenue by 2032, which would amount to roughly 9.2% of projected 2032 GDP. This number is the top line earned from selling compute in aggregate by whoever operates the 182.7 GW of US capacity completed by 2032.2. The assumptions behind that number: 183 GW of U.S. data-center capacity completed between 2025 and 2032. $8.54 trillion of construction cost, grossed up to a $9.61 trillion capital base to account for the return on capital tied up during construction. A 10% discount rate. A 6-year life for IT equipment (68% of cost) and a 20-year life for everything else (32%). A 50% operating cash flow margin.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Stijn’s baseline estimate holds that data center owners would need $3.725 trillion of annual revenue by 2032 — roughly 9.2% of projected 2032 GDP — to break even on AI investment at a 10% discount rate.
  2. The break-even calculation assumes 183 GW of U.S. data-center capacity completed between 2025 and 2032 at $8.54 trillion of construction cost, grossed up to a $9.61 trillion capital base for return on capital tied up during construction.
  3. The estimate assumes a 6-year life for IT equipment, which accounts for 68% of cost, a 20-year life for the remaining 32%, and a 50% operating cash flow margin.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Rear Window — Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

Financing the AI Buildout

AI Summary. The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.

Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh Brookings Papers on Economic Activity
Date Posted:
September 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Stijn Van Nieuwerburgh projects ~$10.3T will be spent on the AI buildout over 2025–2032, averaging 3.63% of GDP. He estimates 2/3 of that spending reflects IT equipment and one-third real estate and associated power infrastructure.

How much of the planned data center pipeline gets built?

Core argument: Using Cleanview project-level data from July 2026, the authors estimate roughly 57 GW of operating U.S. data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of roughly 509 GW, which they stress is not a completion forecast.

The required investment is enormous. A representative 200 MW AI training campus costs roughly $8.2 billion, about two-thirds of which reflects IT equipment and one-third the real estate and associated power infrastructure. We estimate that 183 GW is completed by 2032 with a further 118 GW completed after 2032. This pipeline will trigger about $10.3 trillion dollars of investment over 2025–2032. At an average of 3.63% of GDP per year, the projected buildout would be larger relative to the economy than the major U.S. canal, railroad, electrification, highway, and telecommunications investment booms. It would double the electricity consumption of the entire U.S. residential sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using Cleanview project-level data from July 2026, the authors estimate roughly 57 GW of operating U.S. data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of roughly 509 GW, which they stress is not a completion forecast.
  2. The authors’ central scenario allocates the announced pipeline so that 182.8 GW of additional U.S. capacity becomes operational during 2025–32, including 19.0 GW tied to projects already operational in 2025 or 2026.
  3. The authors’ scenario has 117.2 GW of planned data center capacity completed after 2032 and 226.9 GW never completed, applying lower realization rates to more distant and less fully documented projects.

Related Articles:

  • Rear Window — Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
  • AI Set to be Largest CapEx Cycle Ever … and Soon Majority Externally Financed — Hyperscaler and data-center investment is tracking toward $1.5tn annually by 2030, which in real terms would exceed the 2005-06 housing boom, the 1990s fiber peak, and the 1882 railroad peak combined. External debt and equity are projected to fund close to 90% of the buildout, making it dependent on credit markets.
  • The Summer I Turned Pretty — A warning sign in a boom cycle is when companies closest to final demand weaken while capital spending beneficiaries keep thriving, as when telecom operators' shares rolled over while communications equipment stocks kept rising. Semiconductor stock prices and free cash flow are soaring while large cloud providers' shares stagnate and their free cash flow plummets.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Growth
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

Moonshot Capitalism: AI Rewrites The Venture Capital Playbook

AI Summary. Global investment in "deep tech" — companies whose products rest on major scientific or engineering advances — has exceeded $150bn since the start of 2024, more than the $133bn invested in the decade through 2019, excluding sums poured into AI start-ups. Failed battery and electric-vehicle bets from an earlier peak illustrate the risks of such moonshot dealmaking.

Tim Bradshaw Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Since the start of 2024, more than $150B of venture capital has been invested into non-AI “deep tech” firms whose products are rooted in significant engineering advances, exceeding the $133B invested in such firms btw 2010 and 2019.

Is the AI boom pushing venture capital toward riskier moonshot bets?

Core argument: Global "deep tech" investment excluding AI start-ups has exceeded $150bn since the start of 2024, more than the $133bn invested in the entire decade through 2019, according to Dealroom.

The AI boom is fuelling a resurgence in ambitious “moonshot” bets, as early SpaceX backers’ huge returns and falling valuations for traditional software companies force tech investors to embrace riskier and more capital-intensive dealmaking. Excluding the giant sums ploughed into AI start-ups, global investment in “deep tech” — companies whose products are rooted in big scientific or engineering advances — has exceeded $150bn since the start of 2024, more than the $133bn in the entire decade to the end of 2019, according to Dealroom. This year’s deep-tech investments have not yet surpassed 2021’s peak, which was propelled by battery and electric vehicle deals for the likes of Rivian and Northvolt — many of which turned sour, highlighting the risks involved in moonshot dealmaking.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global "deep tech" investment excluding AI start-ups has exceeded $150bn since the start of 2024, more than the $133bn invested in the entire decade through 2019, according to Dealroom.
  2. Huge returns for early SpaceX backers and falling valuations for traditional software companies are pushing tech investors toward riskier, more capital-intensive "moonshot" dealmaking.
  3. Deep-tech investment has not yet surpassed the 2021 peak, which was propelled by battery and electric vehicle deals for companies such as Rivian and Northvolt, many of which turned sour.

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