Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
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Goodbye, readers, and good luck youll need it

AI Summary. Economists have overstated their ability to control economic outcomes, and the business cycle remains unconquered despite efforts to manage growth and stability through interest rates, taxes, and government spending. Modern democracies tend to avoid present sacrifices for future gains, as in rising Social Security and Medicare costs and the absence of consensus on climate change.

J. Samuelson Washington Post
Date Posted:
September 14, 2020
Is Database:
Database

@JSamuelson People have a hard time changing their minds. Once their minds are made up, they are relatively impervious to argument, evidence, and persuasion.

@JSamuelson People have a hard time changing their minds. Once their minds are made up, they are relatively impervious to...

Have economists overstated their ability to control economic outcomes?

Core argument: The business cycle remains unconquered despite a half-century of efforts to manage growth and stability through interest rates, taxes, and government spending, with the 2007–2009 Great Recession offered as evidence that economists overstated their control over economic outcomes.

The economic landscape over the past half-century has been marked by the rise and fall of macroeconomic strategies, with economists often overstating their ability to control economic outcomes. Despite attempts to regulate growth and stability through interest rates, taxes, and government spending, the business cycle remains unconquered, as evidenced by events like the 2007-2009 Great Recession. This persistence is partly due to the difficulty people have in changing their minds once set, making them resistant to new arguments or evidence. This resistance is compounded by the tendency of modern democracies to avoid present sacrifices for future gains, as seen in issues like rising Social Security and Medicare costs and the lack of consensus on addressing climate change. These challenges highlight the limitations of economic policies and the need for new approaches to tackle 21st-century problems.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The business cycle remains unconquered despite a half-century of efforts to manage growth and stability through interest rates, taxes, and government spending, with the 2007–2009 Great Recession offered as evidence that economists overstated their control over economic outcomes.
  2. People's difficulty in changing their minds once set makes them resistant to new arguments or evidence, which helps explain the persistence of the business cycle.
  3. Modern democracies avoid present sacrifices for future gains, as seen in rising Social Security and Medicare costs and the absence of consensus on addressing climate change.

Washington Post, September 13, 2020, https://www.washingtonpost.com/opinions/2020/09/13/robert-samuelson-goodbye-column/

Dear Readers,

It’s time to quit. Since coming to Washington in 1969 as a young reporter, I have written, by my crude calculation, about 2 million words, most of them columns for The Post, Newsweek and the National Journal. Some years ago, I promised myself that I wouldn’t overstay my welcome: I would not continue my column simply because I could. I’m almost 75. If I haven’t yet said what’s on my mind, I never will.

Here are a few parting observations. As regular readers know, I write on the economy and its connection with society and politics. Over the years, I’ve explored dozens of subjects: recessions, inflation, executive pay, budget deficits, climate change, poverty, the welfare state, trade, taxes, aging, cybersecurity, China, the stock market — and many others.

So far as I can tell, nothing that I have written has ever had the slightest effect on what actually happened. I’ve routinely suggested shutting down Amtrak, not because I dislike trains (I don’t) but because Amtrak is an excellent example of how the federal government has acquired so many nonessential functions. Amtrak continues chugging along, costing billions of dollars for small public benefits. But I’m resigned to this. No one elected me to anything. In our system, the people rule, not the pundits; and that’s how it should be.

The truly big economic story of the past half-century has been the rise and fall of “macroeconomics.” This is economists’ fancy term for using interest rates, taxes and government spending to regulate the economy’s growth and stability. This once seemed doable. Now, less so.

What happened?

In the 1960s, the American disciples of British economist John Maynard Keynes (1883-1946) argued that they could tame the business cycle. One well-known economist put it this way: “Recessions are now generally considered to be fundamentally preventable, like airplane crashes and unlike hurricanes.”

It didn’t work. Instead of reaching “full employment” (generally defined as an unemployment rate of 4 percent to 5 percent), we got easy money and inflation (peak: 13 percent in 1980). Paradoxically, we also got four recessions from 1970 to 1982 as the Federal Reserve tried to contain the inflation it had unleashed. “Stagflation,” it was called. Only a deep recession in the early 1980s, engineered by then-Fed Chair Paul A. Volcker, reduced inflation to single digits.

A similar saga occurred in the late 1990s and early 2000s. A long period of solid economic growth — labeled the Great Moderation by economists — fueled easy credit, shaky loans, defaults and insolvent lenders. Presidents George W. Bush and Barack Obama responded decisively. Fed Chair Ben Bernanke and Treasury secretaries Henry Paulson Jr. and Timothy Geithner did yeoman work in avoiding a second Great Depression. But that doesn’t excuse their failure to anticipate the housing boom and to preempt the bust.

I didn’t see it coming, either. But I’m not an economist, as I periodically reminded readers. I’m just a reporter who covers economics. One of the pleasures of journalism is that you get to learn lots of new “stuff.” I have learned much from economists. With some exceptions, most are intelligent, informed, engaged and decent. In my experience, this truth spans the political spectrum. But it’s not the only truth.

Another is this: Economists consistently overstate how much they know about the economy and how easily they can influence it. They maintain their political and corporate relevance by postulating pleasant policies. Presidents claim the good and repudiate the bad. There are practical limits to how much economic growth and living standards can be accelerated and sustained.

Recessions remain a threat. Any doubts about that were settled by the 2007-2009 Great Recession and global financial crisis, which at the time was the worst economic collapse since the 1930s’ Great Depression. The business cycle hasn’t been conquered yet and possibly never will be. That’s my main conclusion from a half-century of economy-watching. For at least three reasons, I see this cycle of overpromise continuing.

First, the quest for economic status and power pushes economists and their political sponsors toward exaggerated promises that lead to widespread public disappointment. To be sure, there are long periods of prosperity, but they tend to end badly. That’s been the case since the 1960s.

Second, people have a hard time changing their minds. Once their minds are made up, they are relatively impervious to argument, evidence and persuasion. Life is infinitely complex. To simplify, people make assumptions. If they routinely changed all their assumptions, they’d go crazy, as would the people around them. People do change, but the catalyst is usually some traumatic event.

Third, modern democracies have a hard time making sacrifices in the present for gains in the future. We’re already grappling with this problem. From 2010 to 2030, the elderly’s share of the population (65 and over) is projected to rise from 13 percent to 20 percent. Spending on Social Security and Medicare will skyrocket, and already is. Yet we have done little to prevent spending on the elderly from squeezing the rest of the federal budget. Global warming poses a similar issue: As yet, there is no consensus to spend today in the vague hope that we can curb climate change several decades from now.

I hope I am wrong about the future. That’s one excuse for my throwing in the towel now, in the midst of one of the great news stories of our time. I am a man of the 20th century, but we are now facing the problems of the 21st century, which demand new policies and norms. Goodbye and good luck — you’ll need as much help as you can get.

***

My special thanks over the years to Bill and Sue Jones, who made a young reporter feel at home in a strange city; to Richard Frank, the late editor of the National Journal, who first assigned me a column; to Peter Silberman, who moved the column to The Post; to Marge and Mel Elfin, who moved the column also to Newsweek; to Rich Thomas, the former chief economic correspondent for Newsweek, who has been a constant source of intellectual stimulation and moral support; to Alan Shearer, who syndicated the column through The Washington Post Writers Group; to Joel Havemann, a superb editor and better friend; and to Fred Hiatt, The Post’s editorial page editor who has kept me on the op-ed page for many years.

Samuelson, “…Second, people have a hard time changing their minds. Once their minds are made up, they are relatively impervious to argument, evidence and persuasion. Life is infinitely complex. To simplify, people make assumptions. If they routinely changed all their assumptions, they’d go crazy, as would the people around them. People do change, but the catalyst is usually some traumatic event….”

Ed Comment:“…I agree with most of this, and surely the part that people are utterly unpersuadable (I can hear Steve smugly claiming that I once persuaded him about the financial crisis, and it’s true. But it doesn’t change my view.) Worse, I believe the world is intentionally coated in a thick coating of lies, largely liberal lies. It seems to be that we have sort of tamed unnecessary business downturns. We don’t inflate as if it will produce growth in the long run. And we haven’t intentionally caused a rescissions since Volker stupidly and unnecessarily slammed on the brakes and sent the economy through the windshield. Greenspan largely had it right. The recession we have seen (since Volker) have largely come from non-economic shocks. Covid and terrorists for example. Arguably the financial crisis was avoidable. But I think it was near-impossible to see that large trade deficits destabilized an inherently unstable banking systems. And that would lead to a run on the banks. Perhaps we reduced the risk of that but only by suffering the slowest recovery since the great depression. The real macro economic problem is that we discover risk like covid that then require a reallocation of resources, e.g. from restaurants to jobs for skilled workers we haven’t dreamed up/created. Similarly, the financial crisis required reallocating risk-averse savings away from subprime consumption via subprime home equity loans. Reengineering new allocations can take a long time.…”

Robert J. Samuelson, "Goodbye, readers, and good luck — you’ll need it,"

  • Business Cycle
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3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. The direct lending market is roughly $2tn, or about 3% of total US household and business debt outstanding, compared with mortgages accounting for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Is direct lending too small to threaten the financial system?

Core argument: The direct lending market totals roughly $2 trillion, about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The direct lending market totals roughly $2 trillion, about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses.
  2. Mortgages accounted for about 60% of total US household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006, compared with direct lending's roughly 3% share.

Related Articles:

  • JPMorgan Marking Down Loan Portfolios Of Private Credit Groups — JPMorgan has marked down the value of certain loans in private credit funds' portfolios that serve as collateral for the funds' borrowing from the bank, limiting how much it will lend against them. Unlike most banks, which require triggers such as missed interest payments, JPMorgan reserves the right to revalue those assets at any time.
  • Data Update 7 for 2026: Debt and Taxes — The author argues that companies are collectively over-investing in artificial intelligence and that markets will correct when that belief dissipates. Because debt, particularly private credit, now finances much of this investment, the author contends a correction would spread beyond equity holders and produce a banking-style crisis driven by non-bank lenders.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

AI Summary. An analysis of Federal Reserve data found the top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending, up from 48.5% the prior quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989. Spending by the bottom 80%, those making under roughly $175,000, has merely kept pace with inflation.

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Are top earners accounting for a record share of consumer spending?

Core argument: The top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989, according to Mark Zandi's analysis of Federal Reserve data.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top 10% of US earners accounted for 49.2% of total consumer spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter and the highest share in data going back to 1989, according to Mark Zandi's analysis of Federal Reserve data.
  2. Consumers in the bottom 80% of the income distribution, making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic, according to Moody's Analytics chief economist Mark Zandi.

Related Articles:

  • The U.S. Economy Depends More Than Ever on Rich People — Moody's Analytics estimates the top 10% of earners account for 49.7% of all U.S. consumer spending, a record in data going back to 1989, up from about 36% three decades ago, with their spending alone equal to almost one-third of gross domestic product.
  • To Understand America Today, Study the Zero-Sum Mindset — Younger generations in the United States and other rich countries hold more zero-sum views than older ones, a pattern researchers link to growing up amid slower economic growth and lower mobility. People who have surpassed their parents, or whose families rose over generations, are less likely to think in zero-sum terms.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides — Zero-sum thinking — viewing gains for one group as losses for another — is associated with greater support for liberal economic policies, stronger alignment with the Democratic Party, and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. The authors also find it linked to believing the QAnon conspiracy theory holds some truth and to sympathy for the attack on the U.S. Capitol.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

AI Summary. Regrouping US college majors to match Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science and engineering to humanities and social sciences, the same ratio as in China. The author argues America's building slowdown reflects structural economic shifts—urbanization reached 70% by 1960 and 85% by 2020, shifting needs toward maintenance—rather than a lawyerly culture.

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Does America's building slowdown reflect structural shifts rather than lawyerly culture?

Core argument: Regrouping US college majors according to Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences, the same ratio as in China when management is grouped with science/engineering in both.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Regrouping US college majors according to Chinese disciplines yields a 2:1 ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences, the same ratio as in China when management is grouped with science/engineering in both.
  2. US urbanization rose from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, then grew more incrementally to 85% by 2020, with America's breakneck building phase winding down by the 1960s.
  3. The US building and investment slowdown that began after the 1970s may owe more to structural economic shifts than to lawyers, qualifying Dan Wang's contrast between China's engineering state and America's lawyerly society.

Related Articles:

  • Industrial Colossus: China vs 1950s America — China's growth in its share of global manufacturing has slowed from roughly 1.5 percentage points per year in the early 2010s to just over 0.5 percentage points annually, about one-third the earlier pace. The author argues China's share of global manufacturing is likely near its peak.
  • The Real China Model — China generates more electricity annually than the United States and European Union combined, having added capacity equivalent to the United Kingdom's total supply each year. Electricity makes up nearly 30% of China's energy use, versus 22% in the US and 21% globally, and its share is growing about 6% a year.
  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Housing production intensity has fallen substantially, especially in fast-growing Sunbelt markets once known for building, converging toward the low rates long seen on the coasts and in declining industrial centers. The authors argue incumbent-controlled regulation explains the weakening link between high prices, high demand areas, and new construction.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Growth

How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

AI Summary. About a sixth of America's 2% real GDP growth over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment and data centres, and one estimate puts the artificial intelligence boom's total contribution to growth at 40%. Average electricity bills rose 7%, attributed in part to data-centre demand, while housebuilding and non-AI business investment slumped and real consumption flatlined.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Is the AI investment boom crowding out the rest of the economy?

Core argument: Roughly a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres; one estimate puts the AI boom's contribution at 40% once grid upgrades and software intellectual property are included.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Roughly a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year came from investment in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres; one estimate puts the AI boom's contribution at 40% once grid upgrades and software intellectual property are included.
  2. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid.

Related Articles:

  • Honey, AI Capex is Eating the Economy — Capital spending on AI data centers is around 20% of railroads' peak spending as a share of GDP and is rising quickly, having already surpassed the dot-com era peak in telecom investment. Unlike long-lived rail infrastructure, data centers are short-lived assets requiring frequent hardware replacement, and the capital is being reallocated from other sectors.
  • Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Programming — The four largest US hyperscalers spent $440bn on capital expenditure and research in 2024, with $596bn projected for 2025, a 35% increase, leaving large gaps between AI spending and AI revenues. These firms account for more than half of all capital expenditure growth in the US equity market.
  • The AI Boom’s Hidden Risk to the Economy — Net income at Alphabet, Amazon, Meta and Microsoft rose 73% to $91bn in a quarter two years on, while their combined free cash flow fell 30% to $40bn, as heavy AI investment absorbs cash these firms once recycled into financial markets. That spare cash previously helped hold down long-term interest rates despite large federal deficits.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Is it Over?

AI Summary. Benchmark scores show only modest capability gains in the latest large language model releases compared with the larger jump seen two generations earlier, alongside a broader convergence in performance across competing AI models. Commentators attribute this to inherent limits of the technology and the exhaustion of new training data, raising doubts that the spending on AI hardware is justified.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

Are AI capability gains slowing enough to question hardware spending?

Core argument: GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment with the release, which seemed in some ways a step back, and benchmarks show only modest capability gains since the significant improvement delivered by version 4 two years earlier.

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment with the release, which seemed in some ways a step back, and benchmarks show only modest capability gains since the significant improvement delivered by version 4 two years earlier.
  2. Benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in AI model capabilities, with commentary attributing this to inherent limitations of large language model technology and exhaustion of new training data.
  3. Companies appear to be spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs producing a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from, and the entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

Related Articles:

  • Honey, AI Capex is Eating the Economy — Capital spending on AI data centers is around 20% of railroads' peak spending as a share of GDP and is rising quickly, having already surpassed the dot-com era peak in telecom investment. Unlike long-lived rail infrastructure, data centers are short-lived assets requiring frequent hardware replacement, and the capital is being reallocated from other sectors.
  • Back to Our Regularly Scheduled Programming — The four largest US hyperscalers spent $440bn on capital expenditure and research in 2024, with $596bn projected for 2025, a 35% increase, leaving large gaps between AI spending and AI revenues. These firms account for more than half of all capital expenditure growth in the US equity market.
  • AI’s $600B Question — Comparing spending on AI chips to historical railroad construction overlooks that high-fixed-cost, low-marginal-cost businesses without monopoly or oligopoly power tend to see prices competed down to marginal cost, and that semiconductors continually improve in cost versus performance, unlike physical infrastructure. Speculative frenzies accompany technology, but the payoff will take a long time.
  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

AI Summary. Household and banking sector leverage in the US have declined significantly since 2008, while corporate leverage has moved sideways and federal government leverage has risen significantly. On this measure, the US private sector is in strong financial shape.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Is the US private sector in strong financial shape?

Core argument: US household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have both declined significantly since 2008, leaving the US private sector in what the author characterizes as incredibly good shape.

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have both declined significantly since 2008, leaving the US private sector in what the author characterizes as incredibly good shape.
  2. US federal government leverage has increased significantly since 2008, moving in the opposite direction from the deleveraging in the household and banking sectors.
  3. US corporate leverage has moved sideways since 2008, neither declining like household and banking leverage nor rising like federal government leverage.

Related Articles:

  • Global Debt Report 2025 — About 60% of fixed-rate government debt in advanced economies maturing by 2027 — roughly $9tn — was issued before the recent interest-rate tightening, with weighted average yields below 2% versus projected 10-year rates near 3.6%, implying refinancing at nearly double the original cost. France, Spain, the UK, and the US face heightened vulnerability, with maturing debt exceeding 15% of GDP.
  • The Long-Term Budget Outlook: 2025 to 2055 — The Congressional Budget Office projects the 10-year Treasury note interest rate will average 3.8% over 2025–2055, close to its 3.7% average over the prior three decades, with the inflation-adjusted rate averaging 1.5%. It assesses that long-run rates are largely set by structural factors including demographics, saving and investment behavior, and federal debt.
  • Our Thoughts on Large US Deficits and Their Impact on Bond Yields — Total borrowing in the US is about average despite high government deficits, as high public borrowing has contributed to the need for higher interest rates that have depressed private sector borrowing. Risk premiums on long-dated debt look about average, with no market signs that economic or debt limits are currently being hit.
  • Business Cycle
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
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