Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
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Markets Go Calm: A Lehman Pause or the Real Thing?

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:
March 21, 2023
Is Database:
Database

.@johnauthers cites work by @willdenyer of Gavekal Research whose gauge of financial conditions suggests that financial conditions are now extremely tight.

How exactly should financial conditions be measured? It proves to be a difficult issue. The most widely cited benchmarks incorporating a range of market indicators, produced by Goldman Sachs and by Bloomberg, both suggest that conditions were relatively easy until very recently, and then tightened rapidly. Neither is particularly extreme. But what exactly are we (and Goldman) measuring? Will Denyer of Gavekal Research suggests that these indexes are of limited use. Discussing the Bloomberg index, he said: “It comprises credit spreads in the money and bond markets, the S&P 500, and volatility measures including the VIX index. As a result, it is probably better thought of as an indicator of financial market risk appetite, rather than as a measure of whether or not conditions in the real economy are conducive to credit growth.” He offers his own gauge, which he dubs the “true financial conditions index,” an ambitious undertaking that incorporates money supply growth, the yield curve, metrics of vitality in the banking sector, the spread between the rate of return on corporate investments in real assets and the real cost of financing those investments, and measures of housing affordability (using real mortgage rates, deflated by inflation expectations). Put all of this together, and it looks like money was already very tight last week, ahead of the Credit Suisse weekend, when this chart was produced.

Since the March 2020 sellout, the average S&P 500 stock has outperformed the NYSE FANG+ index. “It is only now that investors have fully grasped that [FANGs] shouldn’t be valued as though the pandemic conditions would continue forever.”

“…This incident is very much about mega-cap tech and the premium it deserves over the rest of the market. Looking at the ratio between the S&P 500 Equal Weight Index, in which each stock has a 0.2% weighting regardless of its size, and the standard S&P 500 benchmark, illustrates just how much tech shares weigh down the index when the average stock isn’t doing so badly. The average stock has comfortably beaten the index so far this year. The average S&P 500 stock has now outperformed the NYSE FANG+ index since the nadir of the Covid-19 selloff in March 2020….”

John Authers, “Wile E. Coyote Moment as Tech Goes Off the Cliff,” Bloomberg, October 28, 2022, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2022-10-28/tech-s-fangs-plummet-in-wile-e-coyote-moment-on-earnings?sref=U3dOGIDF

Wile E. Coyote Moment as Tech Goes Off the Cliff

Crash Landing

There is no character in the entire canon of world literature and drama more useful for explaining markets than Wile E. Coyote. In the Roadrunner cartoons, he would run off the edge of a cliff, and continue running into midair. Only once he stopped, looked down, and realized that he was in midair, did he fall. He thus gave the market the invaluable concept of a Wile E. Coyote moment, when investors realize they’ve been running without support for a long time, and prices that should have long since been gradually coming down suddenly collapse.

The laws of physics make what the coyote does impossible. But markets are driven by human nature and crowd psychology. Coyotes can defy gravity for years in the markets — but generally there comes a point when the game is up. And this week has seen the FANGs (the acronym for the huge internet platform groups that originally stood for Facebook, Amazon, Netflix and Google when coined) respond to gravity at last.

Netflix had well-received results last week; but Microsoft Corp., Google-owner Alphabet Inc., Amazon.com Inc. and even Apple Inc. have all this week suffered sharp writedowns, while the treatment meted out to Meta Platforms Inc., the Facebook parent, has been savage. Since Tuesday evening when its results came out, Meta’s stock has been punished horribly for a disappointing revenue forecast, despite Mark Zuckerberg asking for patience given the social-media giant’s growing investments, particularly in the metaverse. The stock has plunged 25% Thursday and 70% year-to-date:

The fall from grace has been staggering. As of Thursday’s close, Meta has underperformed the benchmark S&P 500 since it went public, even excluding dividends. The following graph shows the performance of the social media giant, the benchmark index and the S&P 500 Total Return Index, which is calculated intraday by the S&P based on both price changes and reinvested dividends. For investors who thought they were betting on the next big thing, it won’t be surprising if they are starting to think twice.

Or let’s put that another way. After Thursday’s carnage, Meta trades at just over nine times trailing earnings (having traded as high as 37 times earnings little more than a year ago). The S&P 500 as a whole trades at 18. One of the most exciting growth stocks on the planet, with all its greatest days still ahead of it, is somehow now regarded as so weak that it should only trade at half the market multiple. That kind of judgment is a recognition that Meta should never have been valued so richly in the first place.

Another important way to illustrate the scale of what’s going on involves comparing market capitalizations. The market value of Meta has slipped by $676 billion this year, pushing it out of the world’s top 20 largest companies. At one point it was the fifth-largest in the US, valued at more than $1 trillion, and almost three times the size of the biggest US bricks-and-mortar retailer, Walmart Inc. Now, for the first time since 2015, Meta is smaller than Walmart:

Naturally Meta’s numbers and predictions were disappointing, but its greatest problem was a sudden return by investors to the basics of cash flow and balance sheet analysis. The decline in Meta’s free cash flow drew an apology even from previously ardent backer Jim Cramer on CNBC. And Neil Campling of Mirabaud Equity Research made this telling observation: “For every $1 Apple spends on operating costs, it generates $6.80 in revenue. For every $1 Meta spends on operating costs, it generates $1.17 in revenue.”

This is all a tad reminiscent of the period of a few weeks in early 2000 when dot-com investors suddenly moved from metrics like “clicks per eyeball” to “burn rate” — an old metric with a new name, referring to how quickly startup companies were burning through their cash flow. Meta has become a vastly more substantial and tangible concern than the entities that evaporated 22 years ago, but the sudden and swift realization that it had been valued far too generously still rings those bells.

The FANGs’ crisis of confidence is all the more interesting because it comes just as bond yields are falling and optimism is growing that central banks will soon relent (of which more below). In fact, the pessimism from Meta, given the company’s sheer size, even overshadowed the positive gross domestic product data Thursday, according to Nicole Webb, SVP and financial adviser at Wealth Enhancement Group. The stock’s slide has had “such a global impact” that it may prompt a broader market recalibration: “I appreciate seeing a slowdown in the mega-cap tech companies. I have always had this thesis that trades don’t grow from the sky. And I think Silicon Valley is showing a bit of its age in that they really ever had to be thoughtful about hiring, layoffs and restructuring.”

She may be right. This incident is very much about mega-cap tech, and the premium it deserves over the rest of the market. Looking at the ratio between the S&P 500 Equal Weight Index, in which each stock has a 0.2% weighting regardless of its size, and the standard S&P 500 benchmark, illustrates just how much tech shares weigh down the index when the average stock isn’t doing so badly. The average stock has comfortably beaten the index so far this year:

Perhaps even more impressively, the average S&P 500 stock has now outperformed the NYSE FANG+ index since the nadir of the Covid-19 selloff in March 2020. For more than a year, investors worked on the assumption that these companies would benefit from the pandemic, which they unquestionably did — but it is only now that investors have fully grasped that they shouldn’t be valued as though the pandemic conditions would continue for ever:

Strategically, Webb suggests that the selloff could offer a good point to enter tech again, although tactically it appears to be a good time to stay in the bricks-and-mortar stocks that are reviving at present. Today’s defensive trades are more about existing in a lower-growth environment for a time, which will create a more sustainable market “and gives us a launching pad to the next wave of growth.”

For Anthony Saglimbene, chief market strategist at Ameriprise Financial, what’s happening is simply the divergence between the old economy and the new economy.

Old economy stocks, he said, comprise those that are value-based, which typically perform better due to their stable earning streams. This is where investors are gravitating now, especially since they are less sensitive to rate increases. The new economy, on the other hand, include high-growth tech names that are prone to fears of rising interest rates, since many of them are valued based on their projected profits far into the future. And as the Fed forges on with its most aggressive tightening monetary policy in decades, the future profits of tech firms will be worth far less.

Unfortunately for the tech sector, the bad news continued at the end of the day, when it was the turn of Amazon.com Inc. to feel the market’s wrath in after-hours trading. Its third-quarter earnings were above prior expectations, but a particularly sanguine warning that the coming holiday season isn’t going to be a good one for sales prompted investor flight. The stock plummeted 20% at one point in extended trading.

The numbers involved are vast. The price at which Amazon’s shares came to rest implied a fall of $159 billion in market cap. This would leave it in the club of trillion-dollar companies, but only just, at $1.02 trillion. This seems like quite a reckoning, as the tech companies fall coyote-like toward the canyon floor. But to Saglimbene, who is overweight tech, the headwinds are only temporary until interest rates find their equilibrium.

For now, other parts of the market are enjoying a boost — companies that warmly fill tummies, bring us to exciting places, and entertain us with endless movies. To Webb, it’s simply a matter of everyone getting their time, as companies that were hurt by the pandemic return to normal: “McDonalds is such a great story in the psyche of the consumer as is Chipotle as is Boeing… When you think about the world today, kids are back in school so it’s not surprising Netflix has new subscribers again. Well now we are back to the school year, winter is coming. Everyone is back to normal activity. Return to normalcy will prevail the trade.”

More telling still was the judgment of Louis Navellier, a veteran growth investor who has cheered fast-growing tech stocks in the past, and has made a fortune by looking at growth prospects rather than valuations. He pointed out that Meta’s spending on the metaverse would likely have a long payback, and that the Dow Jones Industrial Average was still up for the day thanks to strong numbers from McDonald’s Corp. and a range of other old-world names that earn their money from making things and selling them to people, including Honeywell International Inc., Caterpillar Inc., Boeing Co. and Merck & Co. Inc. Amid the bloodbath for tech companies, McDonald’s shares have somehow managed to rise slightly for the year so far.

Navellier suggests that assumptions about tech that have survived for the best part of a quarter century are at last being revised: “Consider that both Microsoft and ExxonMobil are currently generating roughly the same amount of free cash flow yet Exxon has a market value of only 25% of Microsoft. If the economy continues to slow as the Fed intends, the leadership that tech has enjoyed for many years may be brought back down to earth by valuation adjustments.”

And as the Wile E. Coyote moment demonstrates, now that those valuations are at last being examined critically, not even the prospect of lower interest rates can keep the FANGs levitating.

Cruise Path to a Soft Landing (???)

While the FANGs made a crash landing, the top-down macro world is providing much news that investors had been hoping to hear. The European Central Bank met and hiked rates by 75 basis points as expected, but President Christine Lagarde signaled very clearly in her press conference (which you can see here) that we should expect the rate of increases to slow down from now on. Previously, the ECB had alerted that it expected to raise rates at “the next several meetings.” Now, under questioning, Lagarde was much more hedged: “Our sense is that we have already made significant progress, as I said. We are not done yet. There is more ground to cover, and the question of what that pace will be — what will be the magnitude of future rates — will be determined meeting by meeting and will be data dependent.”

That had an immediate impact on the implicit path of interest rates projected by the overnight index swaps market. Expectations had risen sharply over the summer, but Lagarde’s words helped cut projected rates for next year by 25 basis points:

This isn’t a “pivot” toward lower rates. Lagarde said inflation was “far too high, and will stay high for a while,” and predicted an economic slowdown, but it’s plainly a deceleration and it makes it that much easier for the Federal Reserve also to start paving the way to slow its pace during next week’s meeting. It also weakened the euro, which had just exceeded parity to the dollar for the first time in a month.

Shortly after, US GDP numbers for the third quarter were released, and were almost perfectly “Goldilocks” (not too hot, not too cold) as far as the market is concerned. GDP is growing, but consumption is slowing, a combination that should allow some kind of “soft landing.” Bond yields did reduce, with the 10-year Treasury yield dropping below 4% for the first time in two weeks, but not in a way that saved the stock market from a tough day.

One reason for this is that the third quarter’s GDP number of 2.6% is already well in the past. Friday’s release of Personal Consumption Expenditure inflation data, the Fed’s favorite measure and within days of a monetary policy decision, promises to be far more important. Expectations for PCE are widely dispersed, but everyone thinks that they will show a rise. If the number comes in at the bottom of the range of expectations, that could have a much powerful effect on bond yields:

Friday also brings the employment cost index, which comes out only quarterly and is closely monitored by the Fed for any sign of an incipient wage-price spiral. That could have a major impact on the central bank’s flight path from here. Tom Hainlin, national investment strategist at US Bank Wealth Management, said by phone: “Is it a shallow glide lower? Is it a big stair step lower in terms of the outlook for 2023? That’s still unknown. GDP was backward looking. It’s not really going to be a key driver of the market. That employment cost number is going to be a key driver.”

As the FANGs continue their crash landing, there are still hopes of a soft landing for the bond market. That could yet translate into one for the stock market as well, as some ludicrous valuations are corrected, and capital diverts to some places that have been starved of it but could use it. The readjustment from the pandemic seems to be over — but bonds and tech stocks are reassessing assumptions that have stood for a couple of decades or more. This is tricky to engineer. The path to a safe landing might exist, but it’s a perilous one.

  • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy
Previous articleMarch 21, 2023Society's Technical Debt and Software's Gutenberg Moment.@pkedrosky argues that AI like ChatGPT is going to bend the cost curve on software production allowing us to run off “immense, society-wide technical debt,” resulting in significant consumer surplus as better software diffuses through the economy.Next articleMarch 21, 2023SVB-Fueled Turmoil Junks Lessons of the Global Financial Crisis.@greg_ip notes that between 2007 and 2022 the share of Treasurys as a percentage of banks total assets went from 12% to 20% over the same period the uninsured share of domestic deposits rose from 28% to 45%.
Showing 241 database articles primarily about Financial Markets

World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff

AI Summary. Global institutional investors hedge only 41% of their foreign-currency exposure — the lowest rate since at least 2015 — leaving portfolios heavily exposed to dollar depreciation. A sudden shift in sentiment could trigger a self-reinforcing dollar selloff as unhedged holders rush to reduce exposure simultaneously.

Ruth Carson, Masaki Kondo, and Anya Andrianova Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A Bloomberg analysis finds only 41% of global investors’ foreign-currency exposure is hedged in six major markets, the lowest level since 2015. Foreigners now hold almost $40T of American assets.

Are unhedged dollar positions setting up a market crash?

Core argument: Global institutional investors hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure as of June 30—the lowest share since at least 2015—leaving dollar-denominated assets acutely vulnerable to a sentiment-driven selloff.

Sift through the filings of pension funds and insurers around the world and one thing stands out: some of the biggest holders of US assets have little protection against a weaker dollar, leaving the currency at risk of steeper declines if sentiment suddenly turns. Across markets [Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland for which data is available] investors hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure as of June 30 — the lowest since at least 2015. While not a complete picture, it offers a glimpse into how the sudden rush last year to hedge against dollar losses triggered by President Donald Trump’s global tariff rollout has faded as the US currency slowly stabilized.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global institutional investors hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure as of June 30—the lowest share since at least 2015—leaving dollar-denominated assets acutely vulnerable to a sentiment-driven selloff.
  2. The retreat from peak hedging activity reflects fading demand for dollar-loss protection after the U.S. currency stabilized following the tariff-driven shock, compressing a key buffer against renewed depreciation.

Related Articles:

  • Financial Innovation and the International Monetary System — The U.S. dollar accounts for 59% of international payment values routed through SWIFT and ~90% of global foreign exchange turnover, while the Chinese renminbi has risen to 9% of foreign exchange turnover by displacing other major currencies, not the dollar.
  • The Global Balance Sheet 2026: Imbalance And Divergence — Paper wealth — asset price gains detached from real investment — drove nearly 60% of global household wealth growth in 2025, up from one-third historically. Only 20% came from net new real investment, compared to a 30% historical average.
  • Momentum, Rotation and the Value in Growth — Noting US underperformance relative to the world since the start of 2025, and the fact that the 5 largest US stocks now have a P/E only marginally above that…
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

What Are U.S. Treasury Markets Really Telling Us? Part II

AI Summary. Two-thirds of the 2.54 percentage point rise in the 10-year Treasury yield since early 2022 reflects a higher term premium rather than higher expected short rates. The term premium had turned negative by 2015 as the Federal Reserve absorbed large volumes of long-term Treasury and mortgage-backed securities, suppressing interest rate risk pricing.

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Lustig presents a decomposition that attributes 156bp of the 254bp rise in the 10-year yield since March 2022 to an increase in the term premium, which he associates with the additional duration risk borne by investors as the Fed reduced its balance sheet.

Is the Treasury market pricing structural change or temporary Fed policy reversal?

Core argument: Term premium accounts for 1.56 percentage points — nearly two-thirds — of the 2.54-point rise in the 10-year Treasury yield since March 2022, dwarfing the 98-basis-point contribution from rising expected short rates.

I plot a decomposition of the increase in the 10-year yield into a term premium component and a future short rate component. According to this measure, a big chunk —1.56 pps (or nearly 2/3 rds)— of the 2.54 pps increase in the 10-year yield since March 2022 is actually due to an increase in the term premium. That premium (the red line in the figure) turned negative around 2015, and [when] it bottomed out in 2020, yields (black line) were trading 135 bps below the path of future short rates (blue line). That’s not entirely surprising: The Fed was absorbing a large share of Treasury issuance at the long end of the yield curve —as well as MBS issuance— effectively removing a great deal of interest rate risk from the market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Term premium accounts for 1.56 percentage points — nearly two-thirds — of the 2.54-point rise in the 10-year Treasury yield since March 2022, dwarfing the 98-basis-point contribution from rising expected short rates.
  2. The term premium bottomed at -1.355% in 2020, when Fed absorption of long-end Treasury and MBS issuance stripped duration risk from the market and pushed yields 135 basis points below the expected path of short rates.
  3. The term premium’s steady climb since 2022 signals that investors now demand compensation for bearing interest rate risk rather than paying for the privilege, reversing a multi-year structural distortion created by quantitative easing.

Related Articles:

  • What Are Bond Markets Telling Us? — U.S. bond market indicators, including long-term inflation expectations and default insurance prices, show no meaningful rise in concern about government insolvency or debt sustainability.
  • What Are US Treasury Markets Really Telling Us? Part I — Lusting agrees with Krugman that low CDS prices on Treasurys argue against default panic, but finds them a weak signal. Constructing synthetic Treasuries from…
  • America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t — The safety premium that investors historically paid for US government bonds over equivalent alternatives has compressed toward zero and, at longer maturities, reversed — with global investors now pricing foreign government bonds as safer than US Treasurys.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
    • Inflation
  • Monetary Policy

Is the AI Buildout Pushing Up Yields?

AI Summary. Heavy corporate investment in new technology can shift businesses from net savers to net borrowers, absorbing household savings and widening the current account deficit, as occurred during the early-2000s technology boom.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
August 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Brooks argues, “The AI buildout isn’t why government bond yields are rising,” noting the US non-financial corporate sector was a net saver as of Q1 2026, which suggests government deficit spending is driving up long yields.

Does massive technology investment shift corporations from savers to borrowers?

Core argument: Government dissaving—not corporate capital expenditure—is the primary driver of U.S. domestic savings consumption and current account deterioration.

The chart shows quarterly data for the US saving-investment balance going back to 1990. This is an identity that apportions the current account balance into net saving in various sectors of the economy. Households tend to be net savers, as is the financial sector and non-financial corporates. The government tends to be a net borrower. The last time we had a lot of excitement about technological innovation and higher productivity growth was in the “IT bubble” of the early 2000s, which saw non-financial corporates flip from being net savers to borrowers, i.e. the capex buildout at the time was very large and - for a few years - accounted for the entire current account deficit. Nothing like that’s happening now. It’s government dissaving, i.e. the budget deficit, that’s eating up resources, while the non-financial corporate sector stayed a net saver in data through the first quarter of this year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Government dissaving—not corporate capital expenditure—is the primary driver of U.S. domestic savings consumption and current account deterioration.

Related Articles:

  • AI Is Driving Up Treasury Yields: ‘It Just Touches Everything’ — Heavy corporate bond issuance driven by AI investment has reduced demand for long-term government debt, pushing 10-year Treasury yields up ~0.3 percentage points as investors rotate into higher-yielding corporate bonds.
  • The Other US Capex Question — Weak non-AI business investment in the U.S. is driven primarily by near-zero labor force growth from tightened immigration policy, not by AI spending crowding out capital, since corporate savings are sufficient to fund both simultaneously.
  • Corporate America Is Minting Money—and Not Just in Tech and Finance — S&P 500 earnings per share are growing above 13% year-over-year for the sixth consecutive quarter, with sales rising at the fastest pace since late 2022 and margins expanding across most sectors. The gap between earnings-per-share growth and net income growth has narrowed to under 1 percentage point, indicating profit gains
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Bessent Bounce Starts to Emerge in Long Bond Market Metrics

AI Summary. The gap between long-term government bond yields and equivalent swap rates has narrowed to its smallest in months, reflecting increased investor willingness to hold long-dated government debt following expanded buybacks of longer-dated bonds.

Greg Ritchie and Elizabeth Stanton Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Modest compression of the spreads between Treasury yields and synthetic “swap” securities (~5.5bp for the 30 year and ~3bp for the 10 year) suggest Bessent’s Treasury purchase program has had a degree of success at lowering long-term government yields.

Are investors returning to long-term government bonds?

Core argument: Treasury Secretary Bessent’s appointment triggered a long-bond rally, narrowing the 30-year swap spread to its tightest level since February and compressing the 10-year swap spread by 3 bps to ~38 bps.

Since Bessent’s announcement, Treasuries have outperformed equivalent-maturity swaps, narrowing the 30-year spread to the smallest since February. Swaps are popular with some investors as an alternative to owning bonds; the gap between [swap rates] and US government yields [gauges] how willing [investors] are to hold Treasuries instead. The 10-year swap spread has compressed too, with the gap three basis points smaller at around 38 basis points. Still, the recent drop has only dented a years-long rise in long-term US government borrowing costs. The 10-year US yield inched up 3bp to 4.66% after touching 4.75% last week. “While conducting buybacks at the long end of the yield curve may technically decrease yields, higher structural US budget deficits, which [require] a significant supply of Treasuries to finance the US debt, [are] not changing anytime soon,” said Libby Cantrill, head of public policy at Pimco.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Treasury Secretary Bessent’s appointment triggered a long-bond rally, narrowing the 30-year swap spread to its tightest level since February and compressing the 10-year swap spread by 3 bps to ~38 bps.
  2. The 10-year U.S. yield remains elevated at 4.66%, just 9 bps below last week’s 4.75% peak, as Bessent’s appointment has only dented a years-long structural rise in long-term borrowing costs.
  3. Pimco’s Libby Cantrill argues that long-end Treasury buybacks may technically suppress yields but leave the underlying driver — structural U.S. budget deficits requiring sustained heavy issuance — entirely unchanged.

Related Articles:

  • Let the Bond Market Speak — Treasury intervention in a functioning bond market suppresses the price signal that transmits collective market information to decision makers, removing the mechanism by which orderly volatility performs its intended economic function.
  • US 30-Year Bonds Erase Gains From Treasury’s Buyback Surprise — US government bond yields have returned to near two-decade highs despite a buyback program targeting long-dated debt, indicating that investor concern over rising government borrowing remains unresolved.
  • America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t — The safety premium that investors historically paid for US government bonds over equivalent alternatives has compressed toward zero and, at longer maturities, reversed — with global investors now pricing foreign government bonds as safer than US Treasurys.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP

America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t

AI Summary. The safety premium that investors historically paid for US government bonds over equivalent alternatives has compressed toward zero and, at longer maturities, reversed — with global investors now pricing foreign government bonds as safer than US Treasurys.

Hanno Lustig Aspen Economic Strategy Group
Date Posted:
August 21, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Lustig shows the premium investors pay for Treasurys over substitutes such as AAA corporate debt and G10 sovereign debt has compressed post 2020. “Investors are now indifferent between [Treasurys] and close substitutes.”

Are global investors losing confidence in US government debt safety?

Core argument: The U.S. Treasury safety premium has compressed to near zero post-2022 and at points reversed, signaling that markets no longer treat Treasurys as unambiguously superior to credit-risk-adjusted corporate equivalents.

The top panel uses the credit risk-adjusted AAA-Treasury spread. We use the CDS to strip the default-risk compensation out of the corporate-bond yield. What remains is a clean estimate of the safety premium that investors pay for Treasurys over otherwise-equivalent corporate exposure. Post-2022, it has compressed toward zero, and at points, has reversed. The bottom panel uses the Treasury Premium, defined as the difference between the synthetic-dollar foreign sovereign yield and the US Treasury yield at the same maturity. The synthetic-dollar foreign yield is constructed by swapping the coupon payments on foreign G10 sovereign bonds into dollars using the foreign-exchange forward market. This eliminates currency risk over the life of the bond, so the resulting dollar cash-flow stream is directly comparable to a US Treasury yield of the same maturity. At longer maturities, global investors now seem to prefer the safety of foreign G10 bonds.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. Treasury safety premium has compressed to near zero post-2022 and at points reversed, signaling that markets no longer treat Treasurys as unambiguously superior to credit-risk-adjusted corporate equivalents.
  2. At longer maturities, global investors now price dollar-hedged G10 sovereign bonds above U.S. Treasurys, marking a structural erosion of the safe-haven premium that has historically anchored U.S. borrowing costs.

Related Articles:

  • The United States Capital Structure — Government bondholders hold the riskiest position in the U.S. fiscal structure, absorbing adverse shocks through inflation or financial repression, while entitlement recipients function as senior claimants whose payments are politically protected.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — US government bonds, normally safe assets, become risky in times of war because of negative real returns due to bursts of inflation. As in the fiscal theory of…
  • U.S. Treasury Investors Are Long in AI — U.S. government debt acts as a leveraged bet on long-run productivity growth, because tax revenue rises automatically with faster growth while spending commitments stay flat. Each 0.1 percentage point increase in permanent productivity growth raises the fundamental value of government debt by $1.3tn, implying a 71 basis point decline in
  • Financial Markets
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Yen Intervention = US Self-Preservation

AI Summary. Japan holds $1tn in U.S. government bonds — the largest foreign position globally — giving the U.S. a strong incentive to support a stronger yen rather than risk Japan selling those bonds or raising rates sharply enough to redirect domestic capital away from U.S. debt markets.

Katie Martin Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

To shield Treasuries from selloffs and higher yields, the US prefers its own yen support tools: ESF yen purchases as a signal and the Fed’s rarely used FIMA facility, lending Japan dollars against Treasuries to forestall direct Japanese Treasury sales.

Does the U.S. need a stronger yen to protect its debt markets?

Core argument: Japan’s $1 trillion in U.S. Treasury holdings—the world’s largest foreign position at ~4% of total outstanding—give the U.S. a direct strategic interest in defending the yen, as Japanese dollar sales would intensify pressure on a 10-year yield already at 4.7%.

Japan has two traditional routes to push up the battered yen. One is a massive rise in Japanese interest rates, and the other is massive sales of dollars — i.e., of US Treasuries. Neither would be good news for the US. Japanese yields are already seriously elevated by historical standards — 2.8% on the 10-year and 4% on the 30-year. The US is just not in a position to lose a big buyer of Treasuries when its own 10-year yield is tickling 4.7% and the 30-year is well over 5. And it certainly can’t tolerate a big seller of Treasuries, in the form of Japanese authorities selling dollars, hoping to prop up the yen. (Japan’s Treasury holdings already lead the world, at $1tn, or just below 4% of the total outstanding.) Much better to stand behind Japan and hope to scare off the yen sellers. Recent use has been made of the Exchange Rate Stabilization Fund [ESF] to signal that intent. Bessent has also said he will encourage the Fed to bump up Fima, the Fed’s international repo facility, in the coming months. This tool has rarely been wheeled out since it was established during the 2020 Covid shock. Its current $60bn per counterparty, per day limit has been reached just once. The fact that US authorities approved the use of this facility suggests the US side sees potential risk that fx intervention could push up US Treasury yields.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan’s $1 trillion in U.S. Treasury holdings—the world’s largest foreign position at ~4% of total outstanding—give the U.S. a direct strategic interest in defending the yen, as Japanese dollar sales would intensify pressure on a 10-year yield already at 4.7%.
  2. U.S. participation in Friday’s joint yen intervention, executed via euros from the Exchange Stabilization Fund, delivers a credible “back off” warning to yen sellers without triggering the Treasury market disruption that direct dollar sales would cause.
  3. Japan’s 10-year yield at 2.8% and 30-year at 4%—elevated by historical standards—redirect domestic capital away from U.S. Treasuries, compounding Washington’s vulnerability at a moment when its 30-year yield exceeds 5%.

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