Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 903
  • Primary focus 492
For whatever topics you select (currently: "Productivity", "Cronyism", "Incentives/Risk-Taking", "Innovation/Research", "Institutional Capabilities", "Intangibles", "Investment", "Startups", "Workforce Reorganization"):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

The Impact of Intangibles on Base Rates

AI Summary. Among Russell 3000 firms, intangible-intensive sectors posted faster median 5-year sales growth than tangible-intensive ones—10.4% for healthcare and 7.9% for technology versus 5.0% for manufacturing—but with wider dispersion, with healthcare ranging from -18.0% to 43.2% against manufacturing's -7.0% to 19.2%.

Michael Mauboussin and Dan Callahan Morgan Stanley
Date Posted:
July 7, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Intangible-intensive firms exhibit faster growth rates than their tangible counterparts, but also face greater risks, with higher standard deviation in growth rates.

Do intangible-intensive sectors grow faster but with wider outcomes?

Core argument: Russell 3000 data for 1984–2020 show median 5-year sales growth of 10.4% in healthcare and 7.9% in technology, versus 5.0% in manufacturing, with intangible-intensive firms growing faster than tangible-intensive ones.

Intangible-intensive firms exhibit faster growth rates than their tangible counterparts, as evidenced by the Russell 3000 data from 1984-2020, where healthcare and technology sectors showed median 5-year sales growth rates of 10.4% and 7.9%, respectively, compared to 5.0% for manufacturing. However, these firms also face greater risks, with a higher standard deviation in growth rates indicating more variability. For instance, healthcare companies had 5-year sales growth rates ranging from -18.0% to 43.2%, while manufacturing ranged from -7.0% to 19.2%. This suggests that while intangibles can drive rapid expansion, they also increase the potential for significant declines, challenging traditional base rate assumptions and offering opportunities for investors to identify high-growth potential companies.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Russell 3000 data for 1984–2020 show median 5-year sales growth of 10.4% in healthcare and 7.9% in technology, versus 5.0% in manufacturing, with intangible-intensive firms growing faster than tangible-intensive ones.
  2. Healthcare firms' 5-year sales growth ranged from -18.0% to 43.2% compared with -7.0% to 19.2% for manufacturing, with a higher standard deviation indicating greater variability among intangible-intensive firms.
  3. The wider growth dispersion of intangible-intensive firms challenges traditional base rate assumptions and offers investors opportunities to identify companies with high growth potential.

New note from Michael Mauboussin highlight the impact of intangible assets, intangible intensive firms grow faster than their tangible counterparts but also face a greater risk of being overtaken by their competitors. Implying a higher standard deviation in the distribution of growth rates for intangible-based versus tangible-based industries.

Implication for base rates is the past distributions are not prologue given the impact of intangibles.

"...suggests two hypotheses that we can test. The first is that intangible-based businesses can grow faster than what the base rate data show...the right tail of the distribution of growth rates is extending outward from the average. Amazon’s results provide anecdotal evidence for this. The second is that we should observe greater variance in the distribution of growth rates for intangible-based businesses. That means that the left tail of the distribution of growth rates is also spreading further from the average. BlackBerry’s 26.7 percent average annual revenue decline in the past decade through February 2021 is a case in point....Companies grow by generating a return on investment. The nature of investment has changed markedly in recent decades, from one dominated by tangible assets to one mostly in the form of intangible assets. Intangible assets have some characteristics that distinguish them from tangible assets, including greater potential economies of scale and higher risk of obsolescence. The good news is that intangible-intensive companies can grow faster than their tangible counterparts. The bad news is they can also become irrelevant and shrink fast. As a consequence, we should see two effects in the data: higher growth and more dispersion in the outcomes. Our analysis of the results from companies in the Russell 3000 from 1984-2020 reveals both of these. The base rate of sales growth is getting stretched from the average in both the positive and negative direction. There are two main lessons for investors. First, it is important to be mindful of the potential shift in the base rate as the result of the rise of intangibles. Second, skillful investors may be able to identify the companies that will grow faster than expected, hence providing the potential for attractive returns...."

Evidence: “.. We calculated the median sales growth rate for companies in each of those categories using the constituents of the Russell 3000 from 1984-2020. We also examined the standard deviation, a measure of the dispersion, of the distributions. Exhibit 1 showsthe results for the full sample.

Michael Mauboussin and Dan Callahan, "The Impact of Intangibles on Base Rates," Morgan Stanley, June 23, 2021,
https://www.morganstanley.com/im/publication/insights/articles/article_theimpactofintangiblesonbaserates.pdf

The sales growth rates, measured either as the median or average, consistently go from highest for companies that are most intangible-asset intentive to lowest for those that are least intensive. While the short-term numbers are noisy, the relationship holds true over 1-, 3-, 5-, and 10-year periods. Consider the median compound annual sales growth rates over five-year periods. Growth was 10.4 percent for healthcare, 7.9 percent for technology, 6.0 percent for consumer, and 5.0 percent for manufacturing. The median across all companies was 6.5 percent. This supports the first hypothesis. The standard deviation of the growth rates follows the same pattern. Where intangible asset intensity is high, the standard deviation is also high. Assuming these distributions are normally distributed, an imperfect but illustrative assumption, about two-thirds of healthcare companies had 5-year sales growth rates between -18.0 and 43.2 percent. The comparable figures for manufacturing companies were -7.0 and 19.2 percent. This is consistent with the second thesis....One silver lining was the ability of digital companies, built largely on intangible assets, to thrive in the chaos. We examined the sales growth rates of the companies in the Russell 1000, the largest one thousand companies in the U.S., to see which companies fared well. Healthcare and technology, the industries with the highest intangible asset intensity, represented over 60 percent of the top 20, 50, and 100 growers despite being only 29 percent of the universe (see exhibit 2)...."

The Impact of Intangibles on Base Rates: Extended Excerpt Image 1

  • Productivity
    • Institutional Capabilities
    • Intangibles
  • Comparisons
    • Sector
Previous articleJuly 7, 2021Why More Highway Spending Wont Rev Up the EconomyNew highway spending in the US is unlikely to yield long-term economic gains, as the country already has an extensive road network.Next articleJuly 7, 2021Bidens Plan for an Entitlement SocietyThe American Families Plan would add over $1tn to the national debt over the next decade, as proposed revenue measures fall short of covering its costs. 57% of married-couple households would receive federal benefits.
Showing 492 database articles primarily about either Productivity, Cronyism, Incentives/Risk-Taking, Innovation/Research, Institutional Capabilities, Intangibles, Investment, Startups, or Workforce Reorganization
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove 'Database'

US Labor Productivity Increases at Fastest Pace in a Year

AI Summary. US labor productivity, measured as nonfarm business output per hour, rose at a 3.6% annualized rate, up from an upwardly revised 2.1% pace, while unit labor costs fell 0.7%. The acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics data.

Julia Fanzeres Bloomberg
Date Posted:
November 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Nonfarm business productivity grew at a 3.6% annualized rate in Q3, the fastest pace in a year. Real hourly compensation rose 1.1%, while the labor share fell to 53%, the lowest in data going back to 1947.

Is a capital spending boom lifting worker productivity?

Core argument: US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.

US labor productivity accelerated in the third quarter at the fastest pace in a year, suggesting a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared. Productivity, or nonfarm business output per hour, increased at a 3.6% annualized rate after an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics showed Thursday. Unit labor costs — what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output — fell 0.7%, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US nonfarm business output per hour rose at a 3.6% annualized rate in the third quarter, the fastest pace in a year, following an upwardly revised 2.1% pace in the prior quarter, according to the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
  2. Unit labor costs, what businesses pay employees to produce one unit of output, fell 0.7% in the third quarter, the first decline since the second quarter of 2025.
  3. The third-quarter productivity acceleration suggests a capital spending boom is translating into greater efficiency at a time when input costs have soared.

Related Articles:

  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • Higher Utilisation Explains The Recent Surge In Productivity Growth — Measured total factor productivity growth is estimated to come almost entirely from higher input utilisation rather than underlying efficiency gains, based on a method that infers unobserved capital and labour utilisation from movements in hours per worker. On this evidence, recent productivity gains reflect "working harder" rather than "working smarter.
  • US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits — US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected

AI Summary. The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.

Greg Jensen Bridgewater Associates
Date Posted:
October 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Bridgewater estimates that AI equities are pricing in ~3.5% annual productivity growth, while real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market are slightly below current levels. They conclude: “Either AI stocks or broader macro markets are very meaningfully mispriced.”

Do AI stock valuations and broader markets imply incompatible growth expectations?

Core argument: AI equities are priced for roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth, more than is estimated as needed to make US debts sustainable, and across a reasonable range of assumptions imply trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past.

Different markets are pricing very different futures; most are far from pricing an unrecognizable world. The AI boom has contributed tens of trillions of dollars of market cap in AI companies. As in any gold rush, trillions of dollars of “picks and shovels” only make sense if a great deal of gold (profits) is found. The pricing of a broader universe of AI companies tells us something about the scale of transformation that is discounted. If we calculate the incremental revenue required to sustain the valuation of AI companies and estimate how much of that can be earned by cannibalizing the revenue of existing companies, we can back out a productivity boost required to generate the rest of the incremental revenues. Today, we estimate that AI equities are discounting something like 3.5% annual productivity growth. That’s more than we estimate is needed for the US to make its debts sustainable. Across a reasonable range of assumptions, we assess AI stocks to be pricing trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past. By contrast, consensus estimates and broader markets imply a world that looks more like the recent past. Making sense of the pricing in AI stocks requires a boom in productivity and growth. Consensus estimates for growth and productivity (from economist and Fed estimates) are slightly lower than current measures, as are rates of real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. AI equities are priced for roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth, more than is estimated as needed to make US debts sustainable, and across a reasonable range of assumptions imply trend nominal GDP growth well above the recent past.
  2. Consensus growth and productivity estimates from economists and the Fed, along with real growth and productivity implied by breakeven earnings in the broader stock market, sit slightly below current measures, describing a world resembling the recent past.
  3. Either AI stocks or broader macro markets are very meaningfully mispriced, since the AI boom has added tens of trillions of dollars of market cap that only makes sense if a great deal of profit is found.

Related Articles:

  • No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector — Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
  • AI and Productivity — The recent pickup in US labor productivity appears driven by higher utilization of existing capital—running factories, server racks, and hotel rooms harder—rather than by firm-level efficiency gains from AI. Adoption remains too thin and the cross-sectional evidence too weak to conclude that AI-driven productivity gains are already widespread.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Growth
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector

AI Summary. Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.

Torsten Slok Apollo
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Citing flat revenue per worker, and profit margin growth for the S&P 493, Slok argues that so far, AI’s diffusion through the economy has delivered “zero financial payoff to corporate America outside of tech.”

Is artificial intelligence boosting revenue and margins outside big tech?

Core argument: Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the Magnificent 7 but flat for the S&P 493, with no signs of AI boosting productivity growth or delivering financial payoff outside the tech sector.

With no impact on the bottom line, mainstream corporate America is pulling back and starting to view token spending not as a source of growth but as a cost center that weighs on margins. VC-backed companies are spending more and more on tokens, but mainstream corporate America does not need the latest model and is unwilling to pay for it. As long as agentic AI and token spending are confined to a small part of the economy, the macroeconomic effects of AI will be very limited. The question looking ahead is whether, even as models become commoditized, mainstream corporate America can turn increasingly cheap intelligence into higher revenue growth and higher profit margins. That may be harder than it sounds. The AI story will be decided in the S&P 493, not the Mag 7, and so far, there is no evidence that revenue growth or margins are improving outside the tech sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the Magnificent 7 but flat for the S&P 493, with no signs of AI boosting productivity growth or delivering financial payoff outside the tech sector.
  2. Mainstream corporate America is pulling back from AI and treating token spending as a cost center that weighs on margins, while VC-backed companies spend increasingly more on tokens.
  3. The macroeconomic effects of AI will remain very limited as long as agentic AI and token spending stay confined to a small part of the economy.

Related Articles:

  • Circularity in AI Shows Up in Token Spending Too — Payment-data analysis finds 80% of the largest corporate AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, indicating that much token spending is funded by venture capital rather than earnings. If AI payoffs are slow, venture returns could suffer and a funding pullback could weaken demand for computing power.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Innovation/Research
  • Productivity

How Much Revenue Does The AI Buildout Need In 2030?

AI Summary. The authors estimate AI capital spending of $560bn in 2026 and, in a high-investment case, $3.5tn of net AI capital in service by 2030, requiring roughly $1.3tn in annual infrastructure revenue once depreciation, operating costs and a 15% return are covered. That implies 7.4x growth from current annualized revenues, with downstream revenues of $1.9–2.6tn.

William Gildea and Azeem Azhar Exponential View
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Beginning with capex projections, Gildea/Azhar derive for their high-growth case a $1.3T annual AI-infrastructure revenue hurdle for 2030. This covers $771B of depreciation and operating costs, plus a 15% return on $3.5T of net capital in service.

How much annual revenue must AI infrastructure generate to justify investment?

Core argument: In a high investment case with $3.5tn of net AI capital in service, the authors estimate AI infrastructure must generate $1.3tn of annual revenue by 2030, requiring 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues.

We estimate AI CapEx to be $560B in 2026, 64% of the total declared by the hyperscalers. Unfinished facilities can’t generate revenue, so the investment bill and the productive asset base will grow at different speeds. [In the high investment case], by 2030 we see $3.5T of net AI capital in service. The largest component [of the revenue hurdle] is the $555B in compute depreciation. We model lifespans at the current 5-6 years. Shell depreciation and OpEx combined contribute about a further $216B to the required revenue hurdle. [Adding a 15% return on net capital brings required annual infrastructure revenue to $1.3T]. Reaching the $1.3T hurdle would represent 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues. For its customers to earn 30-50% gross margins, downstream revenues need to be $1.9-2.6T. [Editor’s note: Van Nieuwerburgh’s far larger figure of $3.7T covers mature revenues from projects completed through 2032, using commissioning capital and a 50% infrastructure operating cash-flow margin. This estimate instead charges depreciation and operating costs plus 15% on net capital in service in 2030. Different horizons and cost conventions prevent a direct comparison. Van Nieuwerburgh also has a much higher capex estimate.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In a high investment case with $3.5tn of net AI capital in service, the authors estimate AI infrastructure must generate $1.3tn of annual revenue by 2030, requiring 7.4x growth (59% CAGR) from today’s annualized revenues.
  2. Compute depreciation of $555bn, modeled on 5-6 year lifespans, is the largest component of the 2030 revenue hurdle, with shell depreciation and operating expenses adding about $216bn and a 15% return on net capital completing the $1.3tn total.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • What Investment Data Implies about the AI Transition — The five largest U.S. technology firms are scaling AI capital spending about 50% a year, from $155bn to a forecast $755bn. Embedding this in a two-sector model with rare productivity booms, the authors estimate AI adds roughly 5, 20, or 58pp to cumulative growth over a seven-year transition, depending on scenario.
  • Rear Window — Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

AI and Entrepreneurship: What is Really Happening?

AI Summary. Entrepreneurship by businesses with employees is flat or declining, including in AI-intensive information and professional services, where establishment entry has been flat or falling and young-firm employment in AI-exposed industries is falling. Applications for likely solo businesses with no employees rose steeply in those AI-intensive sectors, but self-employment as a main job is flat, suggesting side hustles.

Nathan Goldschlag Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Nathan Goldschlag finds that available federal data do not yet establish that AI is boosting entrepreneurship. “Across different cuts of the data, there is no clear evidence of AI affecting entrepreneurship, either for likely employers or nonemployers.”

Is AI driving a boom in new employer businesses?

Core argument: Business applications likely to become employer businesses were flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026, with fewer applications of the kind having the highest chance of becoming an employer business.

Employer entrepreneurship is at best rising modestly, and at worst has been falling for several years already. The number of business applications likely to become an employer business was flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026. Fewer of those applications have been the kind that have the highest chance of becoming an employer. Nonemployer entrepreneurship, or “solopreneurship,” is likely rising, but not as the main job of the solopreneurs. These are probably side hustles. Likely nonemployer business applications rose significantly in 2025 and early 2026. But the share of workers claiming to be self-employed nonemployers in their main job — in other words, business owners with no employees — is flat (though noisy). AI-intensive sectors and industries are no exception. Establishment entry in AI-intensive sectors (information and professional services) has been flat or falling in recent years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Business applications likely to become employer businesses were flat in 2025 and began rising in 2026, with fewer applications of the kind having the highest chance of becoming an employer business.
  2. Likely nonemployer business applications rose significantly in 2025 and early 2026, going vertical in the most AI-intensive sectors of information and professional services, while other sectors kept pace until early 2026 and then flattened.
  3. The share of workers reporting self-employment as nonemployers in their main job is flat, though noisy, including among workers in AI-exposed occupations in 2025 and early 2026.

Related Articles:

  • The Age Of The Solopreneur — A surge in US business formation is being driven by solo entrepreneurs, with growth in AI tool usage and in solopreneur activity in high-AI-adoption sectors suggesting artificial intelligence accounts for a meaningful portion of the increase. The authors argue AI is lowering barriers to starting and growing a business by expanding what one-person firms can do.
  • America Has Become An Entrepreneur’s Paradise — US growth in new-business applications is concentrated in professional services (up 25% over four years), retail (18%), and health care and social assistance (18%) rather than artificial-intelligence startups. The share of applications the Census Bureau deems likely to hire at least one employee has fallen to 30% from 38%.
  • Which Entrepreneurs Boost Productivity? — The authors find that a minority of entrepreneurs are "transformative" — generating disproportionate productivity gains, scoring high on IQ tests, being well-educated, and hiring research and development workers. They argue that economies with more such entrepreneurs and R&D workers sustain higher long-run productivity growth.
  • Startups
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Tech's Trillion-Dollar Internal Inconsistency

AI Summary. Wall Street analysts covering technology project the sector's operating cash flow will more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, a gain of over $1.2tn, while analysts covering the rest of the S&P 500 — technology's customers — project those firms will add far less cash flow. These sector-by-sector forecasts are internally inconsistent.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
September 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Tech analysts expect sector operating cash flow to more than double to ~$2.4T by 2028. Analysts covering other S&P 500 sectors (tech’s customers) see far less cash growth in their sectors. Slok “raises the question of who exactly will be writing all those checks to buy AI services.”

Are tech cash flow forecasts inconsistent with customers' projected growth?

Core argument: Analysts covering the tech sector expect its operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, an increase of over $1.2tn.

Wall Street equity analysts work in sector silos, and when you add up their forecasts, the numbers are internally inconsistent. The analysts covering tech expect the sector's operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4 trillion by 2028, an increase of over $1.2 trillion. Meanwhile, the analysts covering the other sectors in the S&P 500, which are tech's customers, expect those companies to add much less operating cash flow. In other words, the tech silo is betting on a future in which demand for AI and tech services explodes, while the silos covering the companies that would pay for those services see a much more modest outlook. Both cannot be right at the same time. The bottom line is that either tech's customers will generate a lot more cash than their analysts expect, or tech's cash flow forecasts are too optimistic, which raises the question of who exactly will be writing all those checks to buy AI services.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Analysts covering the tech sector expect its operating cash flow to more than double to roughly $2.4tn by 2028, an increase of over $1.2tn.
  2. Analysts covering the other S&P 500 sectors, which are tech's customers, expect those companies to add much less operating cash flow, leaving the combined forecasts internally inconsistent.
  3. Either tech's customers will generate much more cash than their analysts expect, or tech's cash flow forecasts are too optimistic, which raises the question of who will pay for AI services.

Related Articles:

  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • Rear Window — Major cloud providers posted annual revenue growth of 37% at Amazon Web Services, 43% at Microsoft Azure and 82% at Google Cloud, with rising revenue backlogs of $514bn and $496bn respectively at Google Cloud and Amazon Web Services. Earnings growth appears highly contingent on continued hyperscaler capital spending and research, which rose from $460bn to $870bn.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms