How Destructive Is Innovation
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Innovation drove 70% of TFP growth from 2003-2013, while creative destruction contributed 22% and new varieties added ~5%. @PeteKlenow
Daniel Garcia-Macia, Chang-Tai Hsieh and Peter Klenow, "How Destructive Is Innovation," Econometrica, http://klenow.com/DestructiveInnovation_GHK.pdf
Bottomline, “..How much innovation takes the form of creative destruction versus new varieties versus firms improving their own products? How much occurs through entrants versus incumbents? We try to infer the sources of innovation from the employment dynamics of U.S. firms in the nonfarm private sector from 1983 to 2013. We conclude that creative destruction is vital for understanding job destruction and accounts for around one-fourth of growth. Own-product quality improvements by incumbents appear to be the biggest source of growth. Net variety growth contributes much less than quality improvements doOur findings are relevant for innovation policy. According to Atkeson and Burstein (forthcoming), the consumption-equivalent welfare gain from devoting about 1% more of GDP to research every year is between 0.17 and 0.73 percent in a model calibrated similarly to ours (but with endogenous research investments). They estimated the gains would be larger—0.26 to 2.01 percent—if creative destruction played no role in U.S. growth. Creative destruction is a force raising the private return relative to the social return to research, diminishing the gains from promoting research….”
“…. Table IV presents TFP growth due to creative destruction (row 1), new varieties (row 2), and own innovation (row 3). TFP growth due to each source of innovation is the product of arrival rate of innovation and the quality improvement conditional on innovation. We use equation (2) for this calculation.18 The first column shows that TFP growth due to own innovation was about 1% per year in 1983-1993. Growth due to creative destruction was about half that, at 0.44% per year. And new varieties generate growth of 0.23% per year. The rows in Table V show the contribution of each source of innovation to aggregate TFP growth. About 27% of the 1.66% growth rate in the 1983-1993 period comes from creative destruction. Own-variety improvements by incumbents account for 60%. New varieties à la Romer (1990) are the remainder at around 14%.The columns in Table V also decompose aggregate TFP growth into the percentage contribution of entrants versus incumbents using equation (3). In the ten years between 1983 and 1993, incumbents account for 68% of aggregate TFP growth, with entrants contributing the remaining 32%. Aghion, Akcigit, and Howitt (2014) provided complementary evidence for the importance of incumbents based on their share of R&D spending and patents…”
TFP driver estimates, “Table III presents the eight parameter values inferred from the data using the procedure described above. Based on the data moments from 1983 to 1993, we infer a 70% arrival rate of own-variety quality improvements per 5-year period. Conditional on no own innovation, quality improvements through creative destruction occur 30% of the time by other incumbents. Conditional on no own innovation and creative destruction by another incumbent, quality improvement through creative destruction by entrants occur with probability 1. The unconditional probability that a given product improves due to creative destruction by an incumbent is thus 8.9%, and the unconditional probability of creative destruction by an entrant is 21.0%.16 The unconditional probability that a product is improved upon in a 5-year period is thus 100%, of which 69% is from own innovation and 31% is from creative destruction (the latter from entrants or incumbents). The employment-weighted average step size for quality improvements on existing varieties is given by sq = (θ/(θ − (σ − 1)))1/(σ−1). Given that θ = 154 and σ = 4, the average improvement in quality (conditional on innovation) is 7.5%.17 New varieties are only created by entrants, arrive with 12.3% probability per existing variety, and have an average quality that is 31% of the average quality of existing varieties. Overhead costs imply that the average quality of exiting products ψ is 2% of the average quality of existing varieties, and that the probability a variety exits due to overhead cost δo is essentially zero. The net number of varieties thus grows by 12.3% every five years, which matches the growth of total employment and number of firms from 1983 to 1993.
Core of paper, “…Entrants and incumbents can create new products and displace the products of competitors. Incumbents can also improve their existing products. How much of aggregate productivity growth occurs through each of these channels? Using data from the U.S. Longitudinal Business Database on all nonfarm private businesses from 1983 to 2013, we arrive at three main conclusions:First, most growth appears to come from incumbents. We infer this from the modest employment share of entering firms (defined as those less than 5 years old). Second, most growth seems to occur through improvements of existing varieties rather than creation of brand new varieties. Third, own-product improvements by incumbents appear to be more important than creative destruction. We infer this because the distribution of job creation and destruction has thinner tails than implied by a model with a dominant role for creative destruction…”



Ben Comment:Pete Klenow got back to me re breaking TFP growth down into its components (improved processes, improved products, new products). He has a paper called Missing Growth from Creative Destruction (linked in his email below) that argues that TFP (and therefore TFP growth) is mismeasured because it doesn't properly account for new products replacing old (creatively destroyed) products. The idea is that if a product replaces a product it is a *bigger* gain than the gains achieved by product survival. Their empirical section says this effect is about.5 percentage points per year (pretty big, that takes TFP growth from 2 to 2.5 in a given year) but is mostly in hotels and restaurants and doesn't explain the slow down since 2005. I have to say - I don't really buy it, honestly. Because these results are concentrated in Hotel and Restaurants, it just leaves me a little flat. That's not really the kind of innovation (I think) we want to think about. Sure, it's better if there are more better restaurants around so from a standard of living aspect that's important but it's not really innovation. A second paper he referred me to (and linked below) is HOW DESTRUCTIVE IS INNOVATION? This paper is much closer to what we want. From the abstract: "First, most growth appears to come from incumbents. We infer this from the modest employment share of entering firms (defined as those less than 5 years old). Second, most growth seems to occur through improvements of existing varieties rather than creation of brand new varieties. Third, own-product improvements by incumbents appear to be more important than creative destruction."
Above is the table that is analogous to Ufuk's paper. Looking 2003-2013, it looks like CD accounts for 22% (.29/1.32) of TFP, NV accounts for a bout 5% and own innovation accounts for the rest ~ 70% of TFP growth. Compare that to Ufuk's table (pasted below).
Creative destruction in Klenow is equivalent to New Entry in Ufuk. So the big difference is that Klenow and Ufuk estimate very different growth processes within firms, but they estimate very similar amounts of TFP growth coming from new entrants. I find that reassuring. It also looks like 2003-2013, firms were really focused on improving their current stable of products and less interested in expanding into other areas. I doubt anyone has updated these numbers to see if 2014-today looks any different than what we're seeing here.The final paper that Klenow sent looks specifically at the package goods sector and finds most productivity gains come from product innovation. I don't find this particularly insightful since. My assumption is that packaged goods is pretty competitive so there isn't tons of room for better processes or for new start ups: Heinz is Heinz and Heinz knows how to pack and ship their stuff efficiently; the way for this sector to improve is for Heinz to launch a new product. That's pretty intuitive to me but the smaller scope leaves me cold. Anyway - long story short: the two papers that most closely do the calculation we're interested in both estimate that new entrants only contribute ~25% of growth and that about 75% within firm innovations account for the rest. What's not covered is exactly how changes in sectors' competitive structure would affect incentives to drive that 75% of growth. Clearly it's very important. Let me know what you guys think.
Pete Klenow Comment:And in this paper we argue in passingthat all innovation is pretty much product innovation, though we do not confront process innovations head