Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Is Inequality Growing Out Of Control?

AI Summary. Estimates show the U.S. top 1% income share roughly doubled over recent decades, rising from about 10% to 24% before taxes and transfers, while Congressional Budget Office measures that account for taxes and transfers show a smaller increase, from 8% to 17%. Strategic timing of capital gains realizations by the wealthy complicates these trends.

Scott Winship Forbes
Date Posted:
April 24, 2014
Is Database:
Database

Income concentration in the U.S. has shown significant fluctuations over the decades, with the top 1% seeing their income share rise from 10% in 1979 to 24% in 2007, before dropping sharply during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and nearing the 2007 peak by 2012.

Income concentration in the U.S. has shown significant fluctuations over the decades, with the top 1% seeing their income...

Do taxes and transfers change how much top income shares rose?

Core argument: The top 1% share of U.S. income rose from 10% in 1979 to 24% in 2007, fell sharply during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and neared the 2007 peak again by 2012.

Income concentration in the U.S. has shown significant fluctuations over the decades, with the top 1% seeing their income share rise from 10% in 1979 to 24% in 2007, before dropping sharply during the 2007-2009 financial crisis and nearing the 2007 peak by 2012. The Congressional Budget Office (CBO) estimates align closely with these figures, showing a rise from 9% to 21% over the same period. However, these estimates often exclude post-tax and transfer adjustments, which show a smaller increase from 8% to 17%. The role of capital gains, often realized strategically by the wealthy, complicates these trends. Despite these complexities, the overall trajectory suggests a doubling of income concentration over time, raising concerns about the growing economic divide and its implications for policy and economic stability.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top 1% share of U.S. income rose from 10% in 1979 to 24% in 2007, fell sharply during the 2007–2009 financial crisis, and neared the 2007 peak again by 2012.
  2. Congressional Budget Office estimates show the top 1% income share rising from 9% to 21% between 1979 and 2007, but only from 8% to 17% once taxes and transfers are counted.
  3. Capital gains, often realized strategically by the wealthy, complicate measured income concentration trends, though the overall trajectory suggests a doubling of concentration over time.

FYI Link to piece if you want to see his charts: http://www.forbes.com/sites/scottwinship/2014/04/24/is-inequality-growing-out-of-control-2/ Is Inequality Growing Out Of Control? Has income concentration soared in the United States in recent decades? To ask the question is to sound like some sort of inequality truther in today’s post-Occupy world. Many believe the evidence leaves no doubt that income concentration has increased dramatically. Thomas Piketty devotes most of Part Three of his celebrated Capital in the Twenty-First Century to an examination of the inequality trendlines he and others have produced over the past fifteen years. Before we were driven to worry about whether r will exceed g, we shuddered at the unsparing rollercoaster chart made famous by Piketty and his collaborator Emmanuel Saez, showing income concentration rising sharply after its dive earlier in the twentieth century, headed toward some awful stratospheric asymptote. But research on American income concentration, building on Piketty’s paradigm-changing research with Saez, raises substantial doubts about the degree to which income has become more concentrated. According to the Piketty and Saez estimates shown in the familiar chart below, income concentration fell sharply with the Great Crash in 1929 and continued to fall through the 1960s. At the end of the 1970s, income concentration started rising, taking off after 1981. Here I will focus on this period of rising income concentration, though there are interesting issues that deserve further exploration around the pre-1950 estimates too. The figure below shows several different trendlines for the share of aggregate income in the United States accruing to the richest one percent of Americans. The top line is taken from the latest estimates published by Saez on his University of California-Berkeley website. It shows the top one percent’s income share rising from 10 percent in 1979 to 24 percent in 2007. Income concentration dropped sharply between 2007 and 2009, but it was approaching the 2007 peak by 2012, the last year for which estimates are available. A couple features that are common to all of the trendlines in this chart are notable. There is an odd “jag” between 1985 and 1988—the result of investors first selling off assets in 1986 to avoid the higher capital gains taxes included in the Tax Reform Act of 1986, then taking a hit from the stock market crash of 1987. Then there is the clear tendency of the top one percent share to follow the stock market from the 1990s forward. The Piketty-Saez estimates refer to the top one percent of “tax units,” a tax unit being either a tax return or a single adult or married couple who did not file a return. As I mentioned in my last post, one issue with the IRS tax return data used by Piketty and Saez is that tax units are not households. Because the typical tax unit is poorer than the typical household (all those dependents filing tax returns) and because tax units are more numerous than households, one concern is that the Piketty-Saez estimates overstate the more relevant income concentration that exists among households. We can check this by using alternate income concentration estimates created by the Congressional Budget Office in recent years, which conveniently go back to 1979. The CBO figures merge tax return data with information from the Department of Commerce’s Current Population Survey, the study of households used to estimate unemployment rates every month. In an elaborate process, CBO researchers create tax units from the CPS households, match each one up with a similar tax unit in the IRS data, and use elements from both datasets to estimate income for the reconstituted households. According to the CBO estimates of income concentration, shown in the second line in the above chart, the top one percent of individuals in America received 9 percent of pre-tax and -transfer household income in 1979 but 21 percent in 2007—not much different than indicated in the Piketty-Saez series for tax units. The CBO figures include employer provided health insurance in this income measure, unlike the Piketty-Saez estimates, and there are other differences beyond the tax-unit/household distinction. Another feature of the Piketty-Saez estimates that make them less useful for assessing levels of inequality is that incomes are measured prior to government redistribution through transfer programs and the tax code. Pointing to pre-tax and -transfer income concentration to raise concerns about how the poor and middle class are doing ignores the very policies we have to ameliorate inequality (whether one likes those policies or not). Indeed, many cross-national comparisons of inequality within the bottom 99 percent focus on post-tax and -transfer income, where the United States looks worse relative to other countries than it does in terms of pre-tax and -transfer income. Other countries look more egalitarian than we do in terms of this below-the-top-one-percent inequality primarily (though not entirely) because of their government redistribution. Failing to include transfers also means many older taxpayers appear to have very little income because their Social Security and Medicare benefits are missing. The third line in the chart above shows CBO estimates of the top one percent’s income share after transfers are taken into account but before taxes are considered. From 1979 to 2007, the increase in this share was from 9 percent to 19 percent. Finally, the bottom line of the chart shows the top’s share of post-tax and -transfer income, which rose from 8 percent to 17 percent. By moving from the pre-tax and -transfer tax-unit-based estimates of Piketty and Saez to a more comprehensive measure of household income, the 14 point rise in income concentration falls to a 9 point rise. But even the post-tax and -transfer estimates show income concentration doubling over time. However we are not done dissecting these numbers. All of the estimates cited so far include capital gains—the increase (or decline) in the value of a tradable asset one owns—but only some of them, and allocated in a problematic way. Specifically, both the Piketty-Saez estimates and those from the Congressional Budget Office count capital gains only if they are reported on tax returns. Capital gains are generally reported only in the year in which the asset is sold, and only if they are taxable. This creates two problems. First, most gains received by the poor and middle class are not taxable, including typical gains realized from the sale of a home and gains that accrue in retirement accounts such as 401(k)s and IRAs. Second, when capital gains are realized—disproportionately accruing to the top—all of the gains that have accrued over the entire time an asset was owned are counted as income received in a single year. Economists agree that the right way to count income from an asset that appreciates in value is to ignore whether or not the asset is sold; either way, there is a flow of resources that is either consumed or saved. Put another way, Piketty’s fear about wealth accumulation and about the return on wealth (r) exceeding economic growth (g) implicitly recognizes that capital gains enrich people even if they are not realized. The gains to the non-working rich are simply reinvested to take advantage of the high r. They are enriched year-by-year, not all at once upon deciding to sell an asset. This issue of accumulated capital gains being counted in the year they are realized interacts with strategic timing on the part of the wealthy of when gains are realized. Together, they produce the notable peaks in the Piketty-Saez series during the tech-stock boom of the late 1990s and the housing boom of the aughts, along with the drops associated with the bursting of those bubbles. It does not require any gift of imagination to envision the impact on the Piketty-Saez series if extraordinarily wealthy people with assets they have held for ten or twenty years all choose to sell their assets at or near a market peak, thereby realizing large capital gains that were actually accrued over many years. The impact would be particularly large if, oh I don’t know, the number of older Americans—more likely to have long-held assets—was growing. This line of criticism was advanced by Cato Institute scholar Alan Reynolds as early as 2005, but it would be several years before research was conducted to assess the potential impact of the problem. In a 2011 paper, Timothy Smeeding and Jeffrey Thompson used a survey sponsored by the Federal Reserve Board to identify the investment portfolios of households and impute one-year returns to the assets they owned, whether or not those assets were sold. They found steadily rising income concentration between 1989 and 2007, similar to the CBO trend. However, rather than imputing one-year capital gains from the returns typical in the year an asset was held, Smeeding and Thompson used the average returns over the previous 30 years, smoothing out short-run changes in asset valuation and defeating the purpose of focusing on annual income. They also appear to have double-counted realized capital gains. Last year, Richard Burkhauser, Phillip Armour, and Jeff Larrimore unveiled a second attempt to estimate changes in inequality while fully accounting for capital gains. They assigned households in the CPS and the Federal Reserve Board dataset to each other to take advantage of the strengths of both surveys. They imputed capital gains to assets using the returns typical of the previous year rather than a multi-year average. Their results are not the final word, but there is a good chance that they will necessitate a fundamental rethinking of income concentration trends, at least in the United States. In the chart below, I focus on the top five percent’s post-tax and -transfer income share, since the Burkhauser data did not allow them to reliably look at the top one percent. The line running from 1980 to 2010 is from the CBO data and includes taxable realized capital gains as income. It tracks the top one percent trend from the earlier chart very closely (but of course in every year the top five percent receives more than the top one percent). More surprisingly, the Burkhauser estimates for post-tax and -transfer income including taxable realized capital gains track the CBO ones very closely as well, as shown by the green line. (His study could only examine every three years between 1989 and 2007.) In part, the alignment is so close because Burkhauser and his team exercised great care to improve the estimates for the richest people in the CPS, and they also benefitted from the fact that the Federal Reserve Board survey is the rare household study that interviews a relatively large number of rich people in order to get reliable information for the top one percent. The important point is that since the Burkhauser estimates follow the CBO trend so well, we can be confident that his other trends are not simply the result of using inferior household survey data or of the statistical merging of the two datasets he uses. The third line in the chart shows the trend Burkhauser and his colleagues estimated when they imputed annual capital gains to all households based on their asset portfolios, whether or not they sold their assets. The trend is much more volatile, but it is clearly downward. One can pick any of the first three years in the series (1989, 1992, and 1995) and any of the last three years (2001, 2004, and 2007) and seven of the nine possible comparisons indicate income concentration declined. The Burkhauser estimates are likely to understate the share of income going to the top, but they are likely to understate it by a similar amount each year, so the trend need not be affected. When the Burkhauser paper came out, a number of economists, including Saez, were dismissive. Jared Bernstein of the Center on Budget and Policy Priorities concluded that “the results make no sense” and that the authors had “jumped the analytic shark.” Bernstein insisted that the conclusion of declining income concentration was sensitive to the years chosen, but the chart above shows that is only true in a very limited sense. He said that if Burkhauser and team had chosen a post-bubble-burst endpoint the results “would have been completely different.” I have seen the authors’ estimates for 2010—and presented some of them at a conference—and I can report that income concentration remained lower than in 1989, 1995, and 1998. Bernstein also noted that the top one percent of workers had received a rising share of earnings over the period, but the increase was much smaller than indicated in the Piketty-Saez results. He said that the evidence on wealth concentration also showed a rising share going to the top, but the table to which he linked, from the Economic Policy Institute, actually revealed a small decline in the top one percent’s share between 1989 and 2007. Research by Saez and Gabriel Zucman purports to show that wealth concentration has actually been rising, but that conclusion (from a PowerPoint presentation Zucman’s website describes as “preliminary”) contradicts not only the EPI table but a previously published paper by Saez. Bernstein also questions the assumption implicit in the Burkhauser approach that investment returns do not vary by income class. But Saez and Zucman confirm that this appears to be true in fact. Finally Bernstein scoffs that in an appendix table one set of Burkhauser’s results shows that all income groups saw declines in their income (“so…um…where did the economy’s growth go?”). But capital gains—realized or not—are not included in national income accounting because they don’t represent income from new production. It is possible to have economic growth and growth in national income while household incomes defined to include capital gains fall. In the end, it would not surprise me at all if the paper’s conclusion that income concentration fell turns out to be too strong. There is a lot of evidence that income concentration has risen, including income concentration when capital gains are entirely excluded and earnings concentration, as I will show below. Income concentration has risen in numerous countries (though those results are based on tax return data too, so…). Complicated forms of income like exercised stock options are unlikely to be well-reported in the CPS. I agree with Dean Baker of the Center for Economic and Policy Research that an important implication of the Burkhauser paper is that ideally we should probably average multiple years of income together in order to look at inequality trends that incorporate unrealized capital gains. Otherwise year-to-year incomes look much more volatile and could obscure the underlying inequality trend. Unfortunately, that may not be possible with existing datasets. But the Burkhauser paper needs to be reckoned with. Ultimately, at a minimum, his results are likely to lead us to conclude that, at least in the U.S. since 1989, the Piketty-Saez and CBO income concentration estimates have overstated the increase in inequality substantially. Interestingly, a wide array of research has found that inequality between the middle class and poor has not risen meaningfully since the 1980s. Given the problems with estimating capital gains, it is worth considering whether there might be other income concentration measures that do not require grappling with these conceptual and measurement problems. Capital gains accrue mainly to the top, so looking at income concentration measures that fail to take them into account will understate the level of income concentration in America. However, the trends might not necessarily be affected. The chart below provides several trendlines for earnings concentration in the U.S., with the basic Piketty-Saez income concentration series included for context. From 1979 to 2007, the increase in the top one percent of workers’ share of earnings was from 7 percent to 14 percent, and the increase in the tax-unit earnings of the top one percent of tax units was from 6 percent to 12 percent. As with the CBO post-tax and -transfer series, income concentration doubles over the period. There are three points to emphasize from this chart. First, there really is no escaping the issue of capital gains because income from stock options are sometimes treated as earnings, sometimes as capital gains. Since the Tax Reform Act of 1986, stock options have become an increasingly large part of executive compensation. Stock options give their recipient a chance to purchase company stock in the future at a fixed price, so that if the stock appreciates in the meantime, the employee will stand to profit. Options must be held during a vesting period before being exercised. Depending on the type of option, the holding requirements and taxation differ. Non-qualifying stock options generally have a short vesting period, and when options are exercised, the difference between the stock price and the price when the options were granted is taxed as ordinary income, showing up as earnings on tax returns. With incentive stock options, so long as they are not exercised prematurely, the only income taxed is the capital gain that is realized after exercising the options and later selling the stock. The idea behind incentive stock options is that lower capital gains tax rates will be attractive to grantees, and so they will not exercise the option as soon as they could in return for the tax benefit. However the 1986 tax reform lowered the top ordinary income tax rate from 50 percent to 28 percent and raised the top capital gains tax rate. This change had several effects. It caused some grantees of non-qualifying options to delay exercise them until 1988 or later, it caused some grantees of incentive stock options to exercise them early triggering a tax liability under ordinary income rates, and it made non-qualifying options more popular than incentive stock options after 1986. The impact of the tax law changes are evident in the above chart, where the share of earnings received by the top jumps two percentage points between 1986 and 1988. This raises a second point: the richest Americans are especially sensitive to tax law changes, and their responses affect measured trends in income concentration. The 1986 to 1988 jump is even more evident in the income concentration trend for pre-tax and -transfer income after capital gains are excluded entirely (not shown). In addition to the stock option issue, lower individual income tax rates as corporate tax rates stayed in place increased the incentives to organize corporations under Subchapter S of the tax code rather than the traditional Subchapter C. Profits to S-corporation owners appear on individual income tax returns annually rather than on corporate income tax returns. More S-corporations means more income in the tax return data for the richest Americans. These jumps in income concentration are obviously artificial, but it does not follow that the rise in income concentration is an artifact of tax law changes increasing income from non-qualified stock options and S-corporations. In the absence of the 1986 changes, incentive stock options and sale of ownership shares of C-corporations would have generated larger capital gains income. It may be that the primary effect of the 1986 legislation and other tax law changes is to alter the timing of when income is received at the top without affecting the basic increase in income concentration shown in the tax return data. (I have previously argued that these legislative changes likely do affect the measured trend, but I have come to believe that conclusion is unjustified.) Nevertheless, the 1986-to-1988 jump should concern us that the top one percent—or the top one percent of the top one percent, which drives the increase in income concentration—are not only sensitive to opportunities for tax arbitrage but able to take advantage of them in ways that may make tracking trends in their income difficult. In particular, the very richest Americans may be able to take advantage of obscure provisions that hide their incomes from the tax data, and changes in tax law and other economic incentives may provide a misleading picture of trends in top incomes. Since top income tax rates have fallen since the 1970s, the concern is that the incentives for tax avoidance and evasion have fallen. That would cause more income to show up on tax returns rather than being hidden in tax-exempt or tax-deferred forms, or otherwise sheltered from the view of the IRS. In other words, it is possible that part of the apparent increase in income concentration is simply the result of a more transparent picture of incomes at the top. Combine that with the capital gains issue, and it is easy to imagine that Piketty’s view of income concentration trends may be distorted by shortcomings of the data. Finally, note the change in earnings concentration from 1989 to 2007 among tax units—a rise from 9 percent to just 12 percent (and one that is likely overstated because of the rising share of stock options that shows up as earnings in the tax data). Incomes below the top ten percent have grown more in the U.S. than Thomas Piketty thinks, and it may very well be that incomes at the top are growing less than he believes. At the very least, the U.S. is probably less distinctive in its income concentration than Capital in the Twenty-First Century suggests. For that matter, because many of the flaws noted here of tax return data generalize to other countries, readers should approach his conclusions and policy recommendations with healthy skepticism. This is an issue where we need more and better evidence before declaring economic inequality the fundamental policy challenge of our time, let alone a threat to our prosperity.

  • Inequality
  • Comparisons
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  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleApril 23, 2014The Evolution of Income, Consumption, and Leisure Inequality in The US, 1980-2010 NBERIncome inequality rose markedly btw 1980-2010, but consumption inequality remained stable. Leisure inequality also widened, with low-educated men gaining 2.5 hours of leisure per week by 2007, while high-educated men saw a 1.2-hour decline.Next articleApril 29, 2014Accounting for the U.S. Earnings and Wealth InequalityWealth inequality drivers quantified: Estate tax elimination raises output +0.35%, capital +0.87%, Gini index 0.79→0.80. Model shows circumstances, not inheritance, drive US earnings/wealth gaps
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A College-by-College Guide to Which Majors Pay Off — or Don’t

AI Summary. An analysis of federal aid recipients' tax-reported earnings finds the highest-earning bachelor's programs are concentrated at highly selective schools and in computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering. Nursing programs at several California schools produce graduates earning around $150,000 annually, placing them in the top 100 of nearly 25,000 programs analyzed.

Arfa Momin and Ron Lieber New York Times
Date Posted:
October 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
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A HEA Group analysis of the earnings of 2018 and 2019 college graduates four years after graduation finds earnings are widely dispersed across schools in higher-earning fields such as computer science and economics and have a narrow dispersion in lower-earning fields such as English and drama.

Which college majors and schools produce the highest-earning graduates?

Core argument: HEA Group’s analysis of nearly 25,000 bachelor’s programs found computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering majors top the earnings list, with graduates of highly rejective schools including the Ivies, M.I.T., Stanford and U.C.L.A. dominating.

HEA Group tracked students who received federal financial aid and graduated during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 periods. The top of the earnings list is dominated by graduates of highly rejective schools — the Ivies and others, like M.I.T., Stanford and U.C.L.A. The majors that top the list are computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering. The income data come from whatever people reported on their federal tax returns. That means certain stock awards and other potential deferred compensation aren’t part of the totals. Nursing programs at a handful of California schools, including California State University, East Bay; San Francisco State University; and Samuel Merritt University, produce graduates earning around $150,000 annually, putting them in the top 100 out of the nearly 25,000 bachelor’s programs the HEA Group analyzed nationwide. They stick out amid quantitative and science majors from institutions like the California Institute of Technology and Cornell.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. HEA Group’s analysis of nearly 25,000 bachelor’s programs found computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering majors top the earnings list, with graduates of highly rejective schools including the Ivies, M.I.T., Stanford and U.C.L.A. dominating.
  2. Nursing graduates of California State University, East Bay; San Francisco State University; and Samuel Merritt University earn around $150,000 annually, placing those programs in the top 100 amid quantitative and science majors from institutions like the California Institute of Technology and Cornell.
  3. HEA Group tracked federal financial aid recipients who graduated during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 periods, using income reported on federal tax returns, which excludes certain stock awards and other potential deferred compensation.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Have Humans Passed Peak Brain Power? — The share of Americans reporting they read a book in the past year has fallen below half, alongside declining performance in numeracy and problem-solving in most countries. The share of adults unable to use mathematical reasoning to evaluate the validity of statements averages 25% in high-income countries and 35% in the US.
  • Standardized Test Scores and Academic Performance at a Public University System — A study of a large public urban university system finds that high school grade point average is a far stronger predictor of student academic success than SAT scores, contrasting with analyses of highly selective colleges that found the SAT superior. Under-represented minority students were less likely to graduate within six years at every grade point average level.
  • Inequality
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • College
      • Test Scores
    • Wages/Income

To Have and Have Not: The Determinants of Social Status in England, 1600-2026

AI Summary. Analysis of English genealogical records and marriage registries estimates that the underlying correlation in social status across generations is close to 0.8, with status correlation detectable even among relatives nine generations apart. The authors find this persistence unchanged over four centuries, concluding that policies aimed at raising social mobility have not altered it.

Gregory Clark Southern Denmark University
Date Posted:
October 6, 2026
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Database

Clark estimates that the intergenerational correlation of relative socioeconomic status in England remained ~0.8 btw 1600 and 2026. The pattern of correlations across near and distant relatives fits a model of genetic inheritance with strong assortative mating.

How persistent is social status across generations in England?

Core argument: Drawing on a genealogical database of 436,185 English people spanning 1600–2026 and records of about 1.7 million English marriages from 1837–2022, the authors estimate the underlying intergenerational correlation in social status at close to 0.8, higher than conventional measures indicate.

A large genealogical database of [436,185] English people 1600-2026, as well as detailed records of [~1.7mn marriages] in England 1837-2022, [reveals] social status is much more persistent across generations than conventionally measured. The [inferred] underlying correlation in status across generations is close to 0.8, implying that even relatives as distant as nine generations apart still show correlation in social status. [Ratios of correlations among siblings, parents, aunts/uncles and cousins cancel common measurement-error attenuation: raw parent-child correlations average .39, versus .77 for inferred underlying persistence. Independently, surnames selected as elite by 1858-87 wealth yield a per-generation status persistent coefficient of b=.82 for occupational status and .80 for house value]. The strength of status persistence remains unchanged 1600-2026.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Drawing on a genealogical database of 436,185 English people spanning 1600–2026 and records of about 1.7 million English marriages from 1837–2022, the authors estimate the underlying intergenerational correlation in social status at close to 0.8, higher than conventional measures indicate.
  2. The estimated correlation in social status implies that relatives as distant as nine generations apart still show correlated status, with the strength of persistence unchanged from 1600 to 2026.
  3. The authors argue that the Industrial Revolution, the Demographic Transition, the emancipation of women, universal voting, and the modern welfare state have not increased English social mobility rates, and that resources poured into raising mobility have achieved nothing.

Related Articles:

  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • The Myth of Nordic Mobility: Social Mobility Rates in Modern Denmark and Sweden — Correcting for measurement error by using relative rather than absolute correlations among relatives, the authors estimate that educational intergenerational mobility in Denmark and Sweden is much lower than conventionally measured, with parent-child and sibling correlations much higher. They argue Nordic education spending and income compression have at best modestly reduced families' role in children's educational outcomes.
  • For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls: A Lineage of 400,000 English Individuals 1750-2020 Shows Genetics Determines Most Social Outcomes — A study of 402,000 English individuals across 1750–2020 estimates an intergenerational occupational status correlation of 0.88 and a genetic correlation between spouses of 0.76, which the authors interpret as a strong genetic basis for the persistence of social status. The authors argue that highly assortative mating around status genetics limits what policy can do to raise social mobility.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Heritability and Social Interaction in Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from the Population of Twins in the United States

AI Summary. The authors estimate the heritability of labor market outcomes by comparing the excess similarity of same-sex over opposite-sex twins with the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings. They caution that social interaction between twins, assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or indirect parental effects can bias such estimates upward or make them reflect non-genetic influences.

David Card, Jesse Rothstein and Moises Yi National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 16, 2026
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Database
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Analysis of 44,500 twin pairs suggests ~one-third of the variation in log earnings is due to genetic differences – likely an upper bound, because same-sex twins may influence one another and share more similar environments than ordinary same-sex siblings.

How reliable are twin-based estimates of heritability in earnings?

Core argument: The authors identify heritability of U.S. labor market outcomes from a difference-in-differences comparing same-sex versus opposite-sex twins against the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical.

Our model identifies heritability from the difference-in-differences of same-sex vs. opposite-sex twins vs. siblings. [Specifically], the model attributes to genetic differences the excess similarity of same-sex over opposite-sex twins over and above the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical. The ordinary-sibling comparison is intended to remove family influences that differ between sons and daughters. Social interactions may lead to an over-estimate of the genetic component in earnings. The estimated heritability of outcomes may be biased in the presence of assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or violations of the assumption that the home environment is shared to the same degree for MZ as for DZ twins. Even when estimated without bias, heritability need not indicate direct genetic effects – it also may reflect indirect or cultural effects (e.g., effects of the parents’ genes on a child’s outcomes, not operating through the child’s own genes. Twins may [also] influence each other directly – for example in their choice of jobs -- inflating the correlation in their outcomes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors identify heritability of U.S. labor market outcomes from a difference-in-differences comparing same-sex versus opposite-sex twins against the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical.
  2. Social interactions between twins, such as influencing each other’s job choices, may inflate the correlation in their outcomes and lead to an over-estimate of the genetic component in earnings.
  3. Estimated heritability may be biased by assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or unequal sharing of the home environment between identical and fraternal twins, and even unbiased estimates may reflect indirect or cultural effects such as parents’ genes.

Related Articles:

  • IQ Differences of Identical Twins Reared Apart Are Significantly Influenced by Educational Differences — An analysis of 87 identical-twin pairs raised apart with individual IQ and biographical data finds that pairs with similar schooling had an average IQ gap of 5.8 points and a correlation of 0.87, while educationally dissimilar pairs averaged a 12.8-point gap and a 0.75 correlation.
  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • A Chip Off the Old Block? Genetics and the Intergenerational Transmission of Socioeconomic Status — Linking Dutch genetic data to tax records, the authors estimate that moving a person 10 percentiles higher in a genetic index raises their own income by 0.9 percentiles and their child's by 0.7 percentiles. They attribute about 50% of this to transmitted genes and the rest to environmental pathways.
  • Inequality
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Recent Trends in Personal Income & Wage Inequality

AI Summary. In New York City, income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than nationally, with nearly two-thirds of real income growth accruing to the top 1% versus under 40% nationally, a divergence driven predominantly by non-wage income. Real median income fell, and real average income for the bottom 90% was essentially flat.

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller
Date Posted:
September 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is rising income concentration in a major city driven by non-wage income?

Core argument: Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.
  2. Real median income in New York City fell between 2019 and 2024 and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat, with local-price-adjusted purchasing power for the lower 90% of New Yorkers close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally.
  3. The divergence at the top of New York City's distribution is predominantly a story of non-wage income, with wage and salary income widening much more mildly and occupational wage data excluding bonuses showing base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than higher-wage ones.

Related Articles:

  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.
  • The Demographic Trends That Shaped Mamdani’s Win — In New York City's mayoral race, Mamdani's average margin was 30 points in precincts with a median age under 45, and voters under 45 made up 43% of in-person ballots versus 36% in the prior governor's race. He won by over 50 points in neighborhoods where the white population share grew and the Black or Hispanic share declined.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt

AI Summary. US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of World War II, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Employees' share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest since the 1950s, with the decline gaining pace in recent years.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are corporate profits taking a record share of national income from workers?

Core argument: US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
  2. Employees' share of national income from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s, with the decline gaining pace over the past five years and especially the past 12 months.
  3. Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan, said that regardless of the measure used, workers have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time.

Related Articles:

  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards, estimated at 7.6% versus a post-1949 high of 8.2%, while employee pay as a share of non-financial corporate gross value added has fallen from 66% to 56%. One argument holds that subdued demographic growth leads companies to prioritize maximizing margins over expanding capacity.
  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — The measured corporate labor share fell from 63% in 1978 to 58% in 2017, but the authors estimate that tax-driven reclassification of wages as S corporation profit and the shift of high-labor-share firms into partnerships account for about 1.6 percentage points, roughly a third of the decline.
  • Inequality
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics
  • Workforce

The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. An analysis of about 7,000 billionaires over the past 25 years classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it derives from inheritance or from sectors such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials that often depend on political access. The authors find half of global billionaire wealth now comes from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, an all-time high.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Is a growing share of billionaire wealth self-made in competitive industries?

Core argument: For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.
  2. A list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years, assembled from Forbes, Hurun and Gapminder data, classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence and raw materials, which often depend on political access.
  3. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth, which counts inheritors, rose slightly from 2001 to 2014, and the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined since 2021.

Related Articles:

  • AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain — Mentions of billionaires in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to a peak above 20% of all emails sent and have held near 15%, making anti-billionaire messaging a mainstay. Anti-AI populism remains far smaller and is entering Democratic rhetoric not as a jobs or safety issue but as something billionaires are building.
  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
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