Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Incentives And Outcomes

AI Summary. US technology and finance firms offer new engineering graduates higher pay and greater prestige than large industrial companies like Boeing, whereas engineering graduates in France, Japan, China, and Germany take industrial jobs such as Airbus at a fraction of US engineering pay. The author argues this talent pull is a genuine obstacle to re-industrializing the US.

Louis-Vincent Gave Gavekal
Date Posted:
July 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Louis-Vincent Gave notes that while “Airbus can hire the cream of the French, or even European, crop,” established American industrial firms like Boeing may struggle to attract engineering talent due to competition from startups and Wall Street.

Does tech and finance pay pull engineering talent away from US industry?

Core argument: Engineering graduates in France, Japan, China, and Germany take jobs at industrial firms such as Airbus for a fraction of US engineering pay, while US graduates target Google, Microsoft, Meta, Goldman Sachs, or Morgan Stanley.

Shifts in staff compensation stacked the decks against Boeing and other big US industrial companies—at least relative to other industrial powers. In France, for example, graduates of engineering schools will gladly take jobs at Airbus and be paid a fraction of what an engineer makes in the US. The same is true in Japan, China, and Germany. In the US, however, a new engineering graduate today likely has his or her sights on a job at Google, Microsoft, or Meta, or alternatively at Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley. Such jobs offer better pay and more social prestige, along with the promise of stock options and potential riches. Now the SpaceX IPO has turned this dial all the way up to 11. In short, for the past 15 years or so, the US tech industry has sucked most of the oxygen out of the room. This is true for capital allocation and stock market performance, and it follows that the same has also been true for human resources and talent acquisition. This seems like a genuine hurdle to today’s widespread hopes of re-industrializing the US.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Engineering graduates in France, Japan, China, and Germany take jobs at industrial firms such as Airbus for a fraction of US engineering pay, while US graduates target Google, Microsoft, Meta, Goldman Sachs, or Morgan Stanley.
  2. US technology and finance jobs offer better pay and more social prestige than industrial employers, along with stock options and the promise of riches, shifting compensation against Boeing and other large US industrial companies.
  3. The US tech industry has drawn most capital allocation, stock market performance, and talent for roughly 15 years, and the SpaceX IPO intensifies that pull, posing a hurdle to hopes of re-industrializing the US.

Related Articles:

  • Military Officer Quality in the All-Volunteer Force — The authors find a steady decline in U.S. Marine Corps officers' General Classification Test scores, which is statistically associated with the expansion of college attendance and explains 96% of the measured change. They also find a positive association between African American officers and mean test scores, arguing affirmative action has not lowered officer quality.
  • Boeing Battles Brain Drain As Engineers Chase the Allure of Space — The average tenure of a Boeing engineer has fallen from 16.4 years to 12.6 years, according to data from the union representing 12,000 Boeing engineers, with tenure shortening in almost every age bracket. Analysts, recruiters and union officials describe this "brain drain" as a drag on operations that could make launching a new plane harder.
  • Speed Can Reindustrialize America — The US has a relative surplus of low-paid hourly workers and a shortage of high-skill workers, so many less productive US manufacturers could buy a robot but could not attract the talent to program it. China faces the opposite conditions, with underemployed STEM graduates, residency rules complicating coastal factory hiring, and robot programmers earning a fraction of US wages.
  • Workforce
  • Education
    • Test Scores
  • Productivity
    • Incentives/Risk-Taking
    • Innovation/Research
    • Startups
Previous articleJuly 2, 2026OpenAI Proposes Handing Trump Administration 5% StakeOpenAI is considering giving the USG a 5% stake in the firm. OpenAI’s proposal would “involve other US AI companies handing over a similar stake.”Next articleJuly 2, 2026Republicans’ Home-Field Edge for Senate Seems Just Enough for NowAs of today, NYT polling suggests the Democrats’ standard-bearers are leading in two of six competitive Senate seats. Other than in NC, the results are within the margin of error. The Democrats need a net change of four seats to flip the chamber.
Showing 777 database articles primarily about either Workforce, Demographics, Education, Family/Marriage, Gender Pay Gap, Immigration, Inequality, Minimum Wage, Poverty/Crime, Unemployment/Participation, or Wages/Income

Younger Teens Are Now Much Less Likely To Say They Are Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual

AI Summary. U.S. survey data on high school students show the share of 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% to 11% over two years, compared with a decline from 18% to 16% among 12th graders. The drop was concentrated among girls, from 27% to 22%, versus 9% to 7% among boys.

Jean Twenge Generation Tech
Date Posted:
September 29, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Among US high-school students, the LGB share fell btw 2023 to 2025 by 5pp for girls (27% to 22%), and 2pp for boys (9% to 7%). The preceding rise was likewise larger for girls: +128% from 2015 to 2021, versus +99% for boys to 2023.

Are younger teens less likely to identify as lesbian, gay, or bisexual?

Core argument: The share of U.S. 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% in 2023 to 11% in 2025 in the CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey, while 12th graders declined from 18% to 16%.

[New data from the Youth Risk Survey of U.S. 9th to 12th graders from the CDC shows] for 12th graders, 17 and 18 years old, identifying as LGB declines only a few percentage points between 2023 and 2025 (from 18% to 16%). But the headline result is for 9th graders (14 and 15 years old): Identifying as LGB absolutely plummets between 2023 and 2025, from 17% to 11%. That really does look like a free fall. The decline appears to be driven almost entirely by girls. Identifying as LGB dropped from 27% in 2023 to 22% in 2025 among girls, and from 9% to 7% among boys. [In terms of the share of high school students reporting engaging in same-sex activity] most high school students are not sexually active, so this is only a subsample of the larger group. For boys, there’s been a fairly steady rise in same-sex partners, not too different from the pattern of identifying as LGB among boys. The story is different for girls, where having non-heterosexual sex peaked in 2021 and then fell steeply.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of U.S. 9th graders identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual fell from 17% in 2023 to 11% in 2025 in the CDC’s Youth Risk Behavior Survey, while 12th graders declined from 18% to 16%.
  2. The decline appears driven almost entirely by girls, whose LGB identification fell from 27% in 2023 to 22% in 2025, compared with a drop from 9% to 7% among boys.
  3. Among sexually active teens, the share of boys reporting at least one same-sex partner has risen fairly steadily, while for girls it peaked in 2021 and then fell steeply.

Related Articles:

  • Is There Really a Generational Difference in Identifying as Lesbian, Gay, or Bisexual? — General Social Survey data show that increases among young American adults appear in same-sex sexual behavior as well as in identification, with 20% reporting a same-sex partner versus 18.5% identifying as lesbian, gay, or bisexual. The increases are larger among 27- to 41-year-olds.
  • Teens Used To Be Happier. What Changed? — The share of US high school seniors describing themselves as "very happy" peaked at 24.8% and remained around 24.4% before falling to 11.4% at its low, recovering only to 12.7%, well below the 17.9% recorded before the pandemic. The decline coincided with smartphones and social media becoming pervasive.
  • US College Students’ Well-Being — A study of US college students finds moderate-to-severe depression reported by 26% of students at one elite institution, 22% reporting moderate-to-severe anxiety and 10% contemplating suicide. Poorer mental health is associated with being female, little exercise, low grades, and financial aid; financial stress is associated with higher suicidal thoughts.
  • Family/Marriage
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics

Why America’s Prisons Are Shrinking And Racial Gaps Are Closing

AI Summary. Racial disparities in US crime, arrest, and prison admission rates have declined across offence types, driven by reductions among Black Americans. Black-White disparity in drug-offence prison admissions fell from 12x to 2.9x, attributable to a 75% drop in the Black drug admission rate, while declines for violent and property offences were smaller.

Jason Robey and Michael Light Nature Human Behaviour
Date Posted:
September 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

From their respective recent peaks in 2000 and 2006 to 2019, prison admissions for violent crime fell 20% for Whites and 43% for Blacks. Race-specific NIBRS estimates suggest actual violent crime fell 18% and 47%, respectively.

Why are racial gaps in US arrests and imprisonment narrowing?

Core argument: Black–White disparity in drug-offence prison admission rates fell from 12 to 1 in 2000 to 2.9 to 1 in 2019, attributed almost entirely to a 75% drop in the Black prison admission rate for drug offences.

From their respective peaks [2000 for whites, 2006 for blacks], prison admission rates for violent crime fell 20% for Whites and 43% for Blacks. [Because UCR crime totals do not identify offender race, the authors use the National Incident-Based Reporting System (NIBRS), which records offender race as reported by victims, witnesses or police, to allocate national violent-crime totals by race. NIBRS contains about three times as many violent offenders as arrestees. As a check on crimes not reported to police, they use National Crime Victimization Survey victim reports; results are similar.] [Recorded violent crime fell 18% for Whites and 47% for Blacks See Table 2]. For Whites, the decline in prison admissions is primarily a function of a decline in crime and arrests, with case processing dampening the decline. For Blacks, the decline in violent prison admissions is exclusively attributed to a 47% reduction in violent crime, as policing and case processing trends worked against an otherwise larger decline. [Arrests per crime and prison admissions per arrest both rose slightly; See Table 2].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Black–White disparity in drug-offence prison admission rates fell from 12 to 1 in 2000 to 2.9 to 1 in 2019, attributed almost entirely to a 75% drop in the Black prison admission rate for drug offences.
  2. Racial disparities in crime, arrest, and prison admission rates have declined across all offence types since about 2000, largely attributable to reductions in crime, arrests, and imprisonment among Blacks.
  3. Declining drug admissions accounted for 53% of the overall drop in Black prison admission rates, while for Whites 62% of the decline came from property offences, with violent (20%) and drug (19%) admissions contributing roughly equally.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Incarceration Rate Is About To Fall Off A Cliff — The U.S. imprisonment rate stayed below 120 per 100,000 people from the end of World War II until the mid-1970s, then doubled by 1985 and grew about 8% a year, passing 1m prisoners in 1994 and peaking in 2009 — 18 years after violent crime peaked.
  • Number of Young People Accused of Serious Crimes Surges in New York City — New York City Police Department figures show 4,858 major crimes with a minor accused or arrested in the most recent year, up 37% from 3,543 seven years earlier, with robberies and felony assaults continuing to rise. Police officials attribute the increase to a state law diverting most 16- and 17-year-old defendants from adult courts.
  • How Many Are Criminals — In the United States, between one in four and one in three Black men eventually serve prison time, compared with one in seven Hispanic men and roughly one in fifteen non-Hispanic white men. In Denmark, about 9% of men of Danish origin and 27% of men of non-Western origin have a criminal conviction by age 24.
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Workforce

Who’s Ahead in the Global AI Talent Race?

AI Summary. An analysis of authors at a leading AI research conference finds China is the largest originating source of elite AI talent, with its share of researchers holding Chinese undergraduate degrees rising 11 percentage points to 57%, while the US share fell to 13%. The US remains a net importer of AI researchers, gaining 2,145 while China lost 1,729.

Damien Ma and Binyi Yang Carnegie Endowment for International Peace
Date Posted:
September 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Surveying education/employment histories of authors at the Neural Information Processing Systems conference, Ma and Yang infer China educated 57% of elite AI talent as of 2025, versus 13% for the US. Yet the US gained 2,145 researchers y/y while China lost 1,729.

Does China produce the most elite AI talent while America attracts it?

Core argument: Damien Ma and Binyi Yang find China’s share of elite AI talent, defined by undergraduate degrees earned in China, rose 11 percentage points to 57% in 2025 versus 2022, while the U.S. share fell to 13%.

[Using a methodology based on paper authors from the Neural Information Processing Systems conference (NeurIPS) Damien Ma and Binyi Yang find] China has established a commanding lead as the largest originating source of elite AI talent globally. Compared to 2022, the share of Chinese-origin AI talent, defined as those who received undergraduate degrees in China, increased 11 percentage points to 57% in 2025, while the U.S. share fell to 13%. The United States remains a magnet for global AI talent, particularly Chinese talent. Despite U.S.-China tensions, among AI researchers working in the United States, the 2025 share of those holding undergraduate degrees from China rose by 4 percentage points. When it comes to brain gain vs. brain drain, the United States saw a net gain of +2,145 researchers in 2025 while China registered a net loss of -1,729 researchers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Damien Ma and Binyi Yang find China’s share of elite AI talent, defined by undergraduate degrees earned in China, rose 11 percentage points to 57% in 2025 versus 2022, while the U.S. share fell to 13%.
  2. Among AI researchers working in the United States, the share holding Chinese undergraduate degrees rose 4 percentage points in 2025, despite U.S.-China tensions.
  3. The United States recorded a net gain of 2,145 AI researchers in 2025, while China registered a net loss of 1,729, under Ma and Yang’s methodology based on NeurIPS paper authors.

Related Articles:

  • China Lures Home Its Top AI Talent From Silicon Valley — Elite artificial intelligence researchers have left US firms including Google DeepMind and OpenAI for Chinese companies such as ByteDance, Tencent, and Alibaba. Three China- and San Francisco-based headhunters say they relocated more than 30 US-based researchers to China over 12 months, up from low single digits the prior year.
  • China and the Future Of Science — China graduates about 5x as many medical and biomedical students as the US each year, 7x as many engineers, and nearly double the number of science and engineering PhDs, while one-sixth to one-fifth of US science and engineering graduates are themselves Chinese. One study found returning Chinese scientists lead-author 2.5x more papers than peers who stay in the US.
  • Why Europe Produces Nobel Prize Winners but Not Elon Musks — Europe trains more engineering graduates per capita than China and more STEM PhDs than any region outside the United States, yet the only EU-born companies to reach $100bn market value in the past fifty years, Spotify and BioNTech, listed on US exchanges. Europe captures 6% of global AI startup funding versus 61% for the United States.
  • Immigration
  • China
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • College
      • Test Scores

Not Tech, Not Wall Street

AI Summary. The authors estimate that more than half of the rise in the top 1% income share since 1985 — 5.8 of 10.5 percentage points — flowed through pass-through businesses, counting roughly 3m wealthy private business owners with average net worth near $25m running law firms, dealerships, and medical practices.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
September 21, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

More than half the increase in the top 1% income share since 1985 flowed through pass-through businesses to ~ 3mm private business owners with a mean net worth of ~$25mm.

Did most of the top 1% income gain come from private businesses?

Core argument: Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick find that 5.8 of the 10.5 percentage-point rise in the U.S. top 1% income share since 1985 flowed through pass-through businesses, more than half of the increase.

The income that lifted America's top 1% did not come mainly from tech or Wall Street, according to Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick. More than half of the rise in the top 1% income share since 1985, 5.8 of 10.5 percentage points, flowed through pass-through businesses. Zidar and Zwick, counted roughly 3 million wealthy private business owners, with average net worth near $25 million, running law firms, car dealerships, medical practices, commercial contractors and regional restaurant chains, the kind of businesses that make their owners wealthy and well known in their own communities without ever making them nationally famous.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick find that 5.8 of the 10.5 percentage-point rise in the U.S. top 1% income share since 1985 flowed through pass-through businesses, more than half of the increase.
  2. Zidar and Zwick count roughly 3 million wealthy private business owners with average net worth near $25 million, running law firms, car dealerships, medical practices, commercial contractors and regional restaurant chains.
  3. The income that lifted America’s top 1% did not come mainly from tech or Wall Street, according to Zidar and Zwick, but from businesses whose owners are well known locally without becoming nationally famous.

Related Articles:

  • What’s Missing in the Fed’s Data about Ultrarich Portfolios — The Federal Reserve's Distribution of Financial Accounts defines "private business" narrowly as proprietor's equity in noncorporate, nonfinancial businesses, excluding S-corporations, other private corporations, and private equity and hedge fund partnerships, which are lumped into "corporate equities." The Survey of Consumer Finances instead shows private business is roughly 45–50% of top 0.1% wealth.
  • They’re Rich but Not Famous—and They’re Suddenly Everywhere — An analysis of Federal Reserve data estimates about 430,000 U.S. households are worth $30m or more, including roughly 74,000 worth at least $100m, with growth in the number of very rich households outpacing overall population growth over recent decades. Nearly 72% of the top 0.1%'s wealth consists of corporate equities, mutual fund shares, and private businesses.
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US distribution is non-wage income, primarily profits from closely-held, mid-market firms in skill-intensive industries owned by working-age individuals. The authors find private business profit falls by three-quarters after an owner retires or dies prematurely, indicating most top earners are "working rich" deriving income from human capital.
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Family Income Continues to Grow in 2025 Data

AI Summary. Census data show the number of U.S. families with inflation-adjusted incomes above $150,000 grew from under 3m in 1967 to over 31m in 2025, while families earning under $75,000 fell by almost 3m in absolute terms. The share of families with multiple earners has not increased much over that period.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
Date Posted:
September 17, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In 1967, just 5.5% of American families had an inflation adjusted income of $150,000 or more. In 2025, 35.7% did. During that timeframe, the share of families with a real income less than $75,000 declined from 63.4% to 32.8%.

Are more American families reaching higher inflation-adjusted income levels?

Core argument: The number of U.S. families with incomes above $150,000 in 2025 inflation-adjusted dollars rose from fewer than 3 million in 1967 to over 31 million in 2025, according to Census data.

In 1967 there were fewer than 3 million families with incomes over $150,000 (in 2025 inflation-adjusted dollars). By 2025, that had grown to over 31 million families. If we look at the highest income threshold in this Census data — over $200,000 — the number of families has grown from just 1 million in 1967 to over 20 million in 2025. And there are fewer lower-income families too: the number of families under $75,000 shrunk, not just as a proportion of the total but even in absolute terms by almost 3 million families from 1967 to 2025. Of course, some of these families do have more earners than in 1967, though we shouldn’t overstate that too much. Using other data from Census, we can see that the share of families with multiple earners hasn’t increased much since 1967, and especially hasn’t since the mid-1990s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The number of U.S. families with incomes above $150,000 in 2025 inflation-adjusted dollars rose from fewer than 3 million in 1967 to over 31 million in 2025, according to Census data.
  2. Families earning over $200,000, the highest income threshold in the Census data, grew from about 1 million in 1967 to over 20 million in 2025.
  3. Families with incomes under $75,000 declined by almost 3 million in absolute terms from 1967 to 2025, while Census data show the share of families with multiple earners has not increased much since 1967, and especially not since the mid-1990s.

Related Articles:

  • Income in the United States: 2025 — Median U.S. household income rose 2.6% to $87,460, the highest level on record in data going back to 1967. Median income increased 3% for White households, 2.9% for non-Hispanic White households, and 4.8% for Black households, while changes for Asian and Hispanic households were not statistically significant.
  • The Middle Class Is Shrinking Because of a Booming Upper-Middle Class — Analyses showing a shrinking middle class typically use relative income thresholds that rise with median income, so they can register decline even when living standards rise across the distribution. Using an absolute definition, the authors find the core middle class shrank because the upper-middle class grew from 10% of families to 31%, doubling its income share.
  • Who Sees Themselves as Working Class? — Survey data indicate 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans. Identification is highest among blue-collar workers at 77%, versus 61% in other occupations, and ranges from 52% of Asian adults to 62% of White adults.
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Poverty in the United States: 2025

AI Summary. The official U.S. poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2%, a third consecutive annual decline and among the lowest on record, with 34.5m people in poverty. Poverty rates hit historic lows for Hispanic individuals, down 1.2 points to 13.9%, and children under 18, down 1.0 point to 13.4%.

Christina Bijou and Emily Shrider U.S. Census Bureau
Date Posted:
September 17, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to the Census Bureau, the poverty rate in the US fell .5pp in 2025 to 10.2%, one of the lowest rates on record. The poverty rate for children fell to a historical low of 13.4%. Census’s income measure does not include taxes or non-cash government transfers.

Is the U.S. poverty rate falling to record lows?

Core argument: The official U.S. poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2% in 2025, the third consecutive annual decline and one of the lowest rates on record, with 34.5 million people in poverty.

In 2025, the official poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2%, the third consecutive annual decline and one of the lowest rates on record. There were 34.5 million people in poverty in 2025. Poverty rates for Hispanic individuals and children under age 18 both fell to historic lows in 2025. Between 2024 and 2025, the poverty rate for Hispanic individuals fell 1.2 percentage points to 13.9%. The child poverty rate fell 1 percentage point to 13.4%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The official U.S. poverty rate fell 0.5 percentage points to 10.2% in 2025, the third consecutive annual decline and one of the lowest rates on record, with 34.5 million people in poverty.
  2. The poverty rate for Hispanic individuals fell 1.2 percentage points to 13.9% between 2024 and 2025, a historic low.
  3. The poverty rate for children under age 18 fell 1.0 percentage point to 13.4% in 2025, a historic low.

Related Articles:

  • Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023 — Extending a consistent poverty measure back to 1939, the authors estimate US absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5% between 1939 and 1963, driven by growth in market income rather than government transfers net of taxes. Poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty than before.
  • Evaluating the Success of the War on Poverty since 1963 Using an Absolute Full-Income Poverty Measure — The authors estimate that an absolute full-income poverty measure, which counts a fuller set of income sources and adjusts thresholds only for inflation, fell from 19.5% to 1.6%, versus an official decline to 10.5%. They also find relative poverty reductions modest and government dependence more than doubled among working-age adults.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Poverty/Crime
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income
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