Edward Conard

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Democrats Thought They Bottomed Out in Rural, White America. It Wasnt the Bottom

AI Summary. Rural, white voters have continued to shift toward Republicans, with rural areas moving 19 percentage points toward Republicans between 1999 and 2019, outpacing urban shifts toward Democrats. In Virginia's gubernatorial race, the Republican candidate won 70% in mountainous regions and 76% among white voters without college degrees, exceeding Trump's 2020 shares of 63% and 62%.

Astead Herndon New York Times
Date Posted:
November 12, 2021
Is Database:
Database

In VA Democrats Lost Ground With Rural Whites “The Bottom For The Democratic Party Is Zero”.

In VA Democrats Lost Ground With Rural Whites “The Bottom For The Democratic Party Is Zero”.

Are rural, white voters still shifting further toward Republicans?

Core argument: Republican Glenn Youngkin won 70% of the vote in Virginia's mountainous regions in the governor's race, up from Trump's 63% in 2020, and 76% among white voters without college degrees versus Trump's 62%.

In Virginia, Republican Glenn Youngkin's gubernatorial victory highlighted the Democrats' deepening struggles with rural, white voters. Youngkin secured 70% of the vote in Virginia's mountainous regions, up from Trump's 63% in 2020, and won 76% among white voters without college degrees, compared to Trump's 62%. This shift underscores a broader trend where rural areas have moved 19 percentage points toward Republicans from 1999 to 2019, outpacing urban shifts toward Democrats. The Democratic Party's challenge is exacerbated by cultural disconnects and economic grievances in rural communities, where rising gas prices, inflation, and stagnant wages fuel conservative leanings. As rural America continues to drift rightward, the Democratic Party faces the daunting prospect of further electoral losses unless it addresses these economic and cultural divides.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Republican Glenn Youngkin won 70% of the vote in Virginia's mountainous regions in the governor's race, up from Trump's 63% in 2020, and 76% among white voters without college degrees versus Trump's 62%.
  2. Rural areas shifted 19 percentage points toward Republicans from 1999 to 2019, outpacing the movement of urban areas toward Democrats.
  3. Cultural disconnects and economic grievances in rural communities, including rising gas prices, inflation and stagnant wages, fuel conservative leanings, leaving Democrats facing further electoral losses unless they address these divides.

"...Mr. Youngkin carried Virginia’s mountains with 70 percent of the vote, up from Mr. Trump’s 63 percent last year, according to exit polling. And among white voters without college degrees, Mr. Youngkin won 76 percent — a stark improvement from Mr. Trump’s 62 percent in 2020 and higher than in 2016, as well....Republicans have never had a demographic stronghold as reliable as Black voters have been for Democrats, a group that delivers as many as nine out of 10 votes for the party. But some Democratic leaders are now sounding the alarm: What if rural, white voters — of which there are many — start voting that reliably Republican?....The belief was, in part, that the party had already bottomed out there, especially during the Trump era, when Republicans had run up the numbers of white voters in rural areas to dizzying new heights. Virginia, however, is proof: It can get worse. In 2008, there were only four small Virginia counties where Republicans won 70 percent or more of the vote in that year’s presidential race. Nowhere was the party above 75 percent. This year, Mr. Youngkin was above 70 percent in 45 counties — and he surpassed 80 percent in 15 of them.... “In rural America the bottom for the Democratic Party is zero,” said Ethan Winter, a senior analyst at the group Data for Progress, who studies voter behavior. “I am serious about this.”...Rural, white voters in the past in the North had historic ties to the labor movement and an affinity for the Democratic Party. Increasingly, Mr. Winter said, those voters are more akin culturally to their neighbors to the South than to their local cities and suburbs. Tom Bonier, one of the Democratic Party’s leading experts on voter data and the chief executive of TargetSmart, agreed. “You look at places in the Deep South where the white, rural vote is approaching 90 percent Republican,” he said. “That’s absolutely the concern.”...”

Astead Herndon and Shane Goldmacher, "Democrats Thought They Bottomed Out in Rural, White America. It Wasn’t the Bottom,"New York Times, November 6, 2021, https://www.nytimes.com/2021/11/06/us/rural-vote-democrats-virginia.html

Democrats Thought They Bottomed Out in Rural, White America. It Wasn’t the Bottom.

HOT SPRINGS, Va. — The increasingly liberal politics of Virginia had been a sore spot for residents of this conservative town of 499 people nestled in the Allegheny Mountains. But this past week, as Republicans stormed to marquee victories powered in part by turnout in rural areas like Bath County, local voters cheered.

“We got our Virginia back,” said Elaine Neff, a 61-year-old resident. “And we haven’t had a win in a long time.”

Ms. Neff said she cried from a mix of happiness and relief after the election. She does not want to take the coronavirus vaccine and believes Glenn Youngkin, the winning Republican candidate for governor, will relax state mandates. Outside a nearby grocery store, Charles Hamilton taunted the Democrats.

“We’re a county of old country folk who want to do what they want,” said Mr. Hamilton, 74. “They found out the hard way.”

In the jigsaw puzzle that is electoral politics, Democrats have often focused their energy on swingy suburbs and voter-rich cities, content to mostly ignore many white, rural communities that lean conservative. The belief was, in part, that the party had already bottomed out there, especially during the Trump era, when Republicans had run up the numbers of white voters in rural areas to dizzying new heights.

Virginia, however, is proof: It can get worse.

In 2008, there were only four small Virginia counties where Republicans won 70 percent or more of the vote in that year’s presidential race. Nowhere was the party above 75 percent. This year, Mr. Youngkin was above 70 percent in 45 counties — and he surpassed 80 percent in 15 of them.

“Look at some of those rural counties in Virginia as a wake-up call,” said Steve Bullock, the Democratic former governor of Montana who made a long-shot 2020 presidential run, partly on a message that his party needed to compete in more conservative parts of the country. “Folks don’t feel like we’re offering them anything, or hearing or listening to them.”

Mr. Youngkin not only won less populated areas by record margins — he was outpacing former President Donald J. Trump’s 2020 showing in even the reddest counties, including by six percentage points in Bath County — but he also successfully rolled back Democratic gains in the bedroom communities outside Washington and Richmond, where many college-educated white voters had rejected Republicanism under Mr. Trump.

The twin results raise a foreboding possibility for Democrats: that the party had simply leased the suburbs in the Trump era, while Republicans may have bought and now own even more of rural America.

Republicans have never had a demographic stronghold as reliable as Black voters have been for Democrats, a group that delivers as many as nine out of 10 votes for the party. But some Democratic leaders are now sounding the alarm: What if rural, white voters — of which there are many — start voting that reliably Republican?

“It’s not sustainable for our party to continue to tank in small-town America,” said Representative Cheri Bustos, the Illinois congresswoman who led the House Democratic campaign arm in 2020.

“We’ve got a branding problem as Democrats in way too many parts of our country,” said Ms. Bustos, who is retiring from a downstate and heavily rural Illinois seat that Mr. Trump carried twice. She called it “political malpractice” and “disrespectful to think it’s OK to run up the score in big cities and just neglect the smaller towns.”

There is no easy solution.

Many of the ideas and issues that animate the Democratic base can be off-putting in small towns or untethered to rural life. Voters in Bath County, many of whom are avid hunters and conservative evangelicals, have long opposed liberal stances on gun rights and abortions. Some Democrats urge the party to just show up more. Some believe liberal ideas can gain traction, such as universal health care and free community college. Others urge a refocus on kitchen-table economics like jobs programs and rural broadband to improve connectivity. But it is not clear how open voters are to even listening.

Representative Dean Phillips, a Democrat who flipped a Republican-held seat outside Minneapolis in 2018, said that when it comes to issues that concern rural America, his party is afflicted with a “disease of disinterest.”

He especially lamented how his party’s strategists routinely tell candidates “to fish where the Democratic fish are instead of taking that canoe out a little further out on the lake.”

“For a party that predicates itself on inclusivity,” he added, “I’m afraid we’re acting awfully exclusive.”

Mr. Phillips called for Democrats to include “geographic equity” in their agenda along with racial and economic equity, noting that he is a proud member of the state’s Democratic Party, which is formally known as the Democratic-Farmer-Labor Party. “I’m a D.F.L.-er and yet the F’s and the L’ers aren’t voting for us,” he said.

The rural share of the vote in America has been steadily shrinking, but remains sizable enough to be politically potent. National exit polling in 2020 estimated that one in five voters lived in rural or small-town America. The Democratic data firm TargetSmart, which categorized voters based on population density, labeled 30 percent of the electorate as rural.

But while some Democratic politicians now recognize the scope of their rural problem, the words of voters in Bath County expose the difficulty in finding solutions. In interviews with a dozen white, rural voters who backed Mr. Youngkin, policy was less important than grievance and their own identity politics. And the voters, fueled by a conservative media bubble that speaks in apocalyptic terms, were convinced that America had been brought to the brink by a litany of social movements that had gone too far.

A monument to Confederate soldiers stands next to the sheriff’s office in Warm Springs, a visual representation of the cultural gap between its residents and the Democratic base. The town is accessible only by a two-lane highway that winds through mountains near the West Virginia border. It’s best known for The Homestead, a luxury resort built in the late 1800s that has hosted golf tournaments, conferences for the United Nations and presidents, including William Howard Taft and Theodore Roosevelt.

Ms. Neff, who owns a hardware store adorned with images of Mr. Trump as Rambo and the Terminator, was in Washington on Jan. 6 to support the former president — but refused to go into further detail. Citing false evidence, she called the coronavirus vaccine a “poison” and said she worried that Democrats were planning extermination camps of Mr. Trump’s supporters.

Karen Williams, a Bath County resident who manages vacation rentals, said she resented the current Virginia governor, Ralph Northam, a Democrat, for keeping schools shut down during the pandemic, embracing progressive policies focused on race and removing Confederate statues and monuments. She called this an example of critical race theory, a graduate-level academic framework that has become shorthand for a contentious debate on how to teach race and racism in schools.

White children “are no longer allowed to be kids, we’re treating them like little monsters,” Ms. Williams said.

Mr. Hamilton, a veteran of the Vietnam War, said his vote for Mr. Youngkin was really a proxy vote for Mr. Trump. Of President Biden, he said, “the best thing that can happen is to get him and that woman out of there.”

John Wright, a 68-year-old retiree, said he listened only to pro-Trump programming.

“I don’t care if the media said the moon was full of cheese, and there was an astronaut who brought back some cheese,” Mr. Wright said. “If the media said it, I won’t believe it.”

Some of these voters are simply out of reach for Democrats, incompatible with the party’s embrace of Black Lives Matter, transgender rights and #MeToo.

But the politically urgent problem for Democrats is that rural America has moved faster and further from them in the last 20 years than urban America has moved away from Republicans. From 1999 to 2019, cities swung 14 percentage points toward the Democrats, according to a 2020 Pew Research Center report. At the same time, rural areas shifted by 19 percentage points toward the Republicans. The suburbs remained essentially tied.

Amanda Litman, the executive director of Run for Something, which looks for Democrats to run for local offices nationwide, said it could be challenging to recruit candidates in deep red small towns — and to lure money into what are most likely losing causes.

“We just have to try and lose by less,” she said. “And ‘investing to lose by less’ is not a fun sell to Democratic donors. But it is what it is.”

Those Democrats who do run in conservative territory often distance themselves from the national party brand. When Monica Tranel, a Democrat, kicked off her bid for Montana’s new congressional seat over the summer, she lamented how few of the people she grew up with still vote Democratic. “They feel like Democrats look down on rural America,” she said in her campaign launch video.

Ben Tribbett, a Democratic strategist in Virginia, has watched his party’s vote share in rural areas wither for three decades.

“I don’t know what our message is there,” Mr. Tribbett said. “Which is a problem, because I’m supposed to be creating content for political campaigns.”

Just how much further can the party fall?

“In rural America the bottom for the Democratic Party is zero,” said Ethan Winter, a senior analyst at the group Data for Progress, who studies voter behavior. “I am serious about this.”

Rural, white voters in the past in the North had historic ties to the labor movement and an affinity for the Democratic Party. Increasingly, Mr. Winter said, those voters are more akin culturally to their neighbors to the South than to their local cities and suburbs.

Tom Bonier, one of the Democratic Party’s leading experts on voter data and the chief executive of TargetSmart, agreed. “You look at places in the Deep South where the white, rural vote is approaching 90 percent Republican,” he said. “That’s absolutely the concern.”

Mr. Youngkin carried Virginia’s mountains with 70 percent of the vote, up from Mr. Trump’s 63 percent last year, according to exit polling. And among white voters without college degrees, Mr. Youngkin won 76 percent — a stark improvement from Mr. Trump’s 62 percent in 2020 and higher than in 2016, as well.

In Bath County, a smaller group of voters cited economic concerns for why the area has become more conservative. They spoke of a time in almost mythical terms, when both parties had a foothold in the region — before rising gas prices, inflation and stagnant wages.

Sharon Lindsay, a 69-year-old librarian, said people were offended that today’s liberals assume their area is inherently racist or bigoted. “We know they wrote us off,” Ms. Lindsay said. “They never talk to us. We never see them. And we see Republicans all the time.”

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How Americans Voted in 2026

AI Summary. Estimates of US voter behavior combine interviews with 26,706 voters nationally, re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters after they cast ballots, precinct- and county-level results, validated turnout for 44% of voters, and state voter registration files.

Nate Cohn New York Times
Date Posted:
November 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Relative to the 2024 presidential vote, the NYT’s preliminary estimates show the 2026 House margin among white non-college voters (39% of the electorate) moving 14pp toward Democrats, and among nonwhite non-college voters (18%) moving 23pp. Among the main age, race, gender and education groups, the largest shift was among 18–29-year-olds (12% of voters), at 32pp.

How are estimates of voter behavior constructed?

Core argument: The New York Times’ Voter Trends estimates of how Americans voted in 2026 draw on interviews with 26,706 voters nationally conducted as part of The Times/Siena Poll, which forms the basis of its understanding of who voters backed.

Times Voter Trends relies on extensive, detailed data from the following sources. Our estimates will get even better as we get more data. Interviews with 26,706 voters nationally as part of The Times/Siena Poll. This data forms the basis of our understanding about who voters cast a ballot for. Re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters nationally after they cast their ballot. Recontacting poll respondents after they vote helps us better understand turnout and late shifts. Granular results from precincts and townships nationally. We collect the most detailed election results from as many states as possible to understand voting patterns in different communities. In areas without precinct-level results, we use precinct-level estimates from The Needle and county-level results from The Associated Press. Validated turnout for 44% of voters nationally. We will never know who everybody voted for, but knowing specifically who voted gives our estimates additional precision. Voter files for every state and district. The voter file is a list of all registered voters that is our starting point for The Times/Siena Poll and these estimates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The New York Times’ Voter Trends estimates of how Americans voted in 2026 draw on interviews with 26,706 voters nationally conducted as part of The Times/Siena Poll, which forms the basis of its understanding of who voters backed.
  2. The Times re-interviewed more than 7,000 voters nationally after they cast ballots, which it says helps it better understand turnout and late shifts, and validated turnout for 44% of voters nationally to add precision to its estimates.
  3. The Times uses granular precinct and township results where available, and in areas without precinct-level results relies on precinct-level estimates from The Needle and county-level results from The Associated Press.

Related Articles:

  • The Fastest-Growing Metros Are Also Electoral Tossups — Classifying metropolitan areas by the vote margin between the two major presidential candidates, job growth is weakest on average in strongly Democratic-leaning metros and healthiest in closely divided "purple" metros. The authors caution that representation is determined by states and congressional districts rather than metro areas, and voters weigh more than economics.
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Government transfers rose from 8.2% of Americans' total personal income in 1970 to 17.6% in 2022, making them the third largest income source after work and investments. The share of U.S. counties drawing a quarter or more of personal income from transfers rose from under 1% in 1970 to 53% in 2022.
  • Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections — An analysis of U.S. counties estimates that where wages grew faster than prices, voters supported the incumbent party more, while counties with larger real wage losses than average shifted more toward the opposition. A one-standard-deviation larger real wage loss is associated with shifts of roughly 0.10 and 0.19 percentage points in vote share and margin.
  • Politics

Now You Can See Everything

AI Summary. Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won, putting an estimated 37.5 GW of planned capacity at risk of a pause and another 15 GW subject to conditions such as grid cost-sharing, water limits, and ended tax incentives. The 37 GW expected in 2027, 75% already under construction, is largely unaffected.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
November 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Before the election, 96 GW of data center capacity was expected to come online in 2028. Based on the positions of incoming governors, Cembalest estimates 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” and another 15 GW to “conditions,” together more than half of the total.

Are local ballot measures putting planned data center capacity at risk?

Core argument: Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.

The biggest market issue may be AI over the medium term; nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with only exception in North Dakota. What we’re now watching: governor imposed constraints on new builds. This is not an issue for the 37 GW expected to be delivered in 2027, 75% of which is under construction. It’s more an issue for the 96 GW expected in 2028. Based on election results, 37.5 GW may be subject to a “pause” with another 15 GW subject to “conditions”. While pauses are the more impactful outcome, conditions can be onerous: requiring data centers to pay grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, imposing water limits, setting requirements for onsite backup power, mandating labor requirements and banning non-disclosure agreements during permitting (most of which seem sensible to me). If the data center buildout starts to slow at some point, upgrading to better NVIDIA chips might be the only way to generate more tokens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won or is winning, with North Dakota the only exception, and based on those results 37.5 GW of planned capacity may face a “pause” and another 15 GW conditions.
  2. The 37 GW of data center capacity expected in 2027, 75% of which is under construction, is less exposed to local opposition than the 96 GW expected in 2028.
  3. Conditions imposed on data centers can include paying grid costs to protect ratepayers, ending tax incentives, water limits, onsite backup power requirements, labor mandates, and bans on non-disclosure agreements during permitting.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • Global Views: Downside Growth Risks — The growth boost from the artificial intelligence boom is projected to peak around late 2026 or early 2027, with AI investment as a share of GDP slowing and the estimated 0.4pp wealth-effect lift to US consumer spending fading. Across US nonmanufacturing industries, AI adoption shows a statistically significant negative correlation with employment growth and positive correlation with unemployment.
  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • Politics
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

AI Summary. Survey data indicate 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans. Identification is highest among blue-collar workers at 77%, versus 61% in other occupations, and ranges from 52% of Asian adults to 62% of White adults.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Do most Americans identify as working class across income and education levels?

Core argument: 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.
  2. Workers in blue-collar occupations identify as working class at a rate of 77%, compared with 61% of those in other occupations.
  3. About 62% of White and 59% of Hispanic adults view themselves as working class, as do roughly 54% of Black and 52% of Asian adults.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Inequality

The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

AI Summary. An analysis of X (formerly Twitter) posts finds that the share of sentences expressing anger rose among both Democratic- and Republican-affiliated users, with Republicans starting from a higher baseline of about 38% versus 27% for Democrats and reaching roughly 50%. The increase was larger among Democrats, narrowing the partisan gap.

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Is anger rising among partisans on social media?

Core argument: Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.
  2. Democratic-affiliated X users start with anger in about 27% of sentences, then rise sharply after the 2016 election by much more than Republicans, narrowing the partisan gap by 2019.
  3. Both partisan anger series plateau from 2019 to 2022, with Democratic anger declining slightly after Biden's election while remaining well above pre-2016 levels.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

AI Summary. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

Do highly educated, lower-income voters identify as very liberal?

Core argument: In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.
  2. Composite CES data show only 19% of Americans with bachelor's degrees or higher had household incomes of $60,000 or below, while DSA survey respondents were twice as likely to fall into that category.
  3. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" are those with postgraduate degrees and household incomes of $30,000 to $60,000 per year, an unusual pairing since education and income are usually substantially positively correlated.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
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America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

AI Summary. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Has American confidence in capitalism and democracy declined?

Core argument: Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.
  2. Only 12% of Americans say democracy is working very or extremely well, 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics, and 35% are fairly sure the nation offers good jobs and the American dream.
  3. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the Democratic share, and nearly half said America stands above all other countries, compared with 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Related Articles:

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  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
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