Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
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How A Power Shortage Could Short-Circuit Nvidia’s Rise

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 28, 2025
Is Database:
Database

If half of the Nvidia chips sold btw February 2024 and February 2026 are employed in the US, that alone will increase power demand 25 GW. The US added 27GW of energy production in 2023.

If half of the Nvidia chips sold btw February 2024 and February 2026 are employed in the US, that alone will increase power...
Analysts predict that between February 2024 and February 2026 Nvidia will have sold some 6m Blackwells and 5.5m GBS. Assume that half of these end up in America, in line with its home market’s historical revenue share. If installed and operated at capacity, those chips would raise American power demand by 25 gigawatts. That is almost twice as much as all of America’s utility-scale producers added in 2022 and not far off the 27GW they managed in 2023. And that is not counting next-generation Rubin chips Nvidia plans to launch next year, or AI racks sold by rivals such as AMD, not to mention other power sinks such as electric cars. Between 2022, when ChatGPT ignited the AI boom, and the 12 months to June this year, the combined capital spending of America’s 50 biggest listed electricity providers rose by 30%, to $188bn—a compound annual increase of 7%, adjusting for inflation. According to S&P Global, a data provider, they are planning to add new plants with a collective capacity of 123GW, on top of the 565GW currently in operation. Bernstein estimates a potential power shortfall in America of 17GW by 2030 if the chips get more energy efficient, and 62GW if they don’t. Morgan Stanley puts the gap at 45GW by 2028.

Related Articles:

  • Heliocentrism — Over the past 10 years, $9T has been spent globally on electrification, however Michael Cembalest points out that renewables’ share of final energy…
  • AI Demand Drives Record Electricity Supply Costs In Largest US Market — PJM, the largest grid operator whose coverage includes “data center alley” in VA, announced a 22% y/y increase in the cost of procuring energy…
  • Power Check: Watt’s Going On With The Grid? — Bank of America forecasts US electrical demand will increase at a 2.5% CAGR btw 2024 and 2035 relative to its 0.5% CAGR btw 2014 and 2024. Only ⅓ of the…
  • Energy
  • Productivity
    • Investment
Previous articleAugust 27, 2025China Seeks To Triple Output Of AI Chips In Race With The USChina is responding to American chip export restrictions by undertaking a massive expansion of domestic chip manufacturing, attempting to triple the country’s current output by the end of 2026.Next articleAugust 28, 2025Back to the Barricades, and the Bond SpreadsThe 10-year French OATS spread over German bunds yields is nearing the highs sparked by last year’s political crises. France’s finance minister warned that the country may need an IMF bailout like that of the UK in 1976.
Showing 48 database articles primarily about Energy

U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past

Lutz Kilian, Michael Plante and Alexander Richter Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas
Date Posted:
June 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Kilian, et al find that the impact of an energy shock on US real GDP growth has fallen to 1/20th of what it would have been in 1980, due both to the declining share of oil in GDP and the US transition from net importer to net exporter.

The 2026 disruption of global oil supplies has been more than twice as large as the peak disruption during the 1973 oil crisis, the largest oil supply shortfall on record before 2026. It has been widely noted that the shale oil revolution has allowed the U.S. to greatly reduce its dependence on imports of crude oil and refined products. Whereas the U.S. economy had been a major net importer of oil and oil products since the 1970s, the U.S. became a net exporter in late 2019, if only by a small margin (Chart 2, panel A). In addition, oil and oil product expenditures as a share of GDP substantially declined from a high near 8% in 1980 to 3% in 2024 (Chart 2, panel B). Reduction of world oil supply [as in the 2026 Iran War] would have caused annualized U.S. real GDP growth to decline by 5.6pp in 1980; the same event today reduces growth by only 0.3pp, one-twentieth of the 1980 decline (Chart 3). Our analysis demonstrates that the US contraction in response to a geopolitical oil supply disruption was similar to that in the rest of the world in 1980. This is no longer the case. A global oil supply disruption of 15% today causes a decline in annualized real GDP growth of 1.7pp in the rest of the world, compared with only 0.3pp in the U.S.—roughly one-sixth of the response in the rest of the world.

Related Articles:

  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — As measured by useful final energy consumption in 2024, nuclear provided 6% of America’s 44.5 exajoules, renewables 9%, and fossil fuels 85%. The corresponding…
  • 12 Insights About Venezuela And The “Donroe Doctrine” — The oil intensity of US GDP declined 52% btw 1990 and 2024, but remains almost twice that of Germany and France. As of 2023, 90% of energy consumption for…
  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China’s annual generation of electrical power is 2.5x that of the US. China is self-sufficient in electricity via coal and renewables, whereas the US is…
  • Energy
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Global Market Views: Shortages

AI Summary. Reduced geopolitical risk has compressed risk premia across assets, lifting equities, commodity currencies, and emerging markets, while supply shortages in commodities and AI infrastructure sustain capital flows and keep volatility elevated even as prices rise.

Dominic Wilson and Kamakshya Trivedi Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:
May 19, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Goldman estimates the market is now pricing US growth at 2.5%, past their own 2027 forecast of 2.2%. After the Iran-ceasefire relief rally, AI-related equities are quietly taking credit for substantial macro benefits that haven’t been delivered yet.

Does reduced geopolitical risk mask persistent supply constraints in commodities and technology?

Core argument: Shortage-driven volatility dynamics result in simultaneous equity price increases and rising market volatility, creating asymmetric upside amid fundamental uncertainty.

The Iran ceasefire and the reduction in deep downside tails have allowed the market to look ahead and compress risk premia across a range of assets. That type of narrowing in the distribution is often associated with sharp market gains in situations of fundamental uncertainty, and this has proved to be the case again. Despite oil prices and yields staying elevated, a broad range of assets—including US equities, high carry/commodity FX, and EM—have recovered smartly, and renewed AI optimism has pushed those exposures to new cycle highs. The common element is that shortages—in commodities and the AI supply chain—are driving capital flows. Those tensions mean that even if we avoid the worst tails, we are likely to see volatility rise alongside further equity price increases.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Shortage-driven volatility dynamics result in simultaneous equity price increases and rising market volatility, creating asymmetric upside amid fundamental uncertainty.
  2. Global Market Views: Shortages.
  3. The Iran ceasefire and the reduction in deep downside tails have allowed the market to look ahead and compress risk.

Related Articles:

  • Shattered Assumptions And The Energy Quandary — Prior to the war, investors had largely stopped hedging energy-driven inflation. Gave argues that now “the true hedge to equity positions is no longer fixed…
  • Gold Heads for Longest-Ever Losing Streak on Iran War Turmoil — Gold has fallen ~15% since the start of the Iran War but remains positive for the year, having returned to its January level. The decline is being attributed…
  • Global Economics Comment: Global Economic Impacts of the War in Iran — GS infers from the 14% rise in oil prices to $80 since late February that the Strait of Hormuz will be closed for 5–6 more weeks, with a .02pp rise in prices…
  • Energy
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets

This Time is Different (from 2022) — The Impact of Higher Energy Prices on European Manufacturing Industries

AI Summary. A new European energy price shock is projected to reduce industrial production by 2% by end-2027, half the 4% hit from the 2022/23 gas crisis, because this shock is oil-driven and globally distributed, reducing the competitive disadvantage European energy-intensive industries previously faced relative to Asia.

Niklas Garnadt Goldman Sachs
Date Posted:
April 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Per GS, the current energy shock will lower Europe’s industrial production by ~2%, ½ the ~4% decline that occurred during the 2022 shock. As the current shock is global, also hitting Asia, Europe does not face the competitive disadvantage it did in 2022.

Core argument: European industrial production faces a 2% hit by end-2027 from oil price shocks, half the 4% impact from 2022–23 Russian.

[We] project that higher oil and gas prices [will] lower Euro Area industrial production by almost 2% by end-2027 relative to our pre-conflict baseline, with negative IP growth later this year but a return to positive growth in 2027. This compares to an estimated drag of 4% during the energy crisis of 2022/23. The current price shock is expected to be smaller and less persistent, while the decoupling from Russian pipeline gas that began in 2022/23 has been sustained. The 2022/23 crisis was fundamentally driven by a sharp reduction in Russian pipeline gas supply to Europe and impacted a narrow set of highly gas-intensive industries particularly hard. The current shock is primarily an oil supply one that tends to reduce industrial production more broadly. However, in 2022/23, energy market shifts were largely focused on Europe, leading to major cost disadvantages for energy-intensive industries, particularly relative to China, and a surge in import competition. This time, energy price pressures are more global, with Asia appearing to be affected to a similar (or even greater) extent. European energy-intensive industries therefore look less exposed to competitiveness pressures.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. European industrial production faces a 2% hit by end-2027 from oil price shocks, half the 4% impact from 2022–23 Russian.
  2. Oil-driven shocks impact capital goods and export sectors broadly, whereas 2022–23 gas crisis concentrated damage on gas-intensive industries, shifting vulnerability.
  3. Global energy price pressures on Asia limit European competitiveness losses versus 2022–23, when regional energy cost disparities drove import substitution.

Related Articles:

  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — An EC study of European competitiveness finds that EU gross value-added per hour worked increased by 0.7%/year from 2000-19, vs. 1.2%/year in the US. “Europe…
  • Salem’s Lot: Gulf War Update; The Purge Of Senior US Military Officers; A US Fossil Fuel Reliance Fever Dream — The United States is not insulated from global oil price shocks, as domestic prices for crude oil, gasoline, and other refined fuels have risen as much as or more than prices in Europe and Asia when major shipping routes are disrupted.
  • Europe is Pricing Itself Out of Existence — .@MacrostrategyP argues that the EU has “traded growth for ideology” with “renewable electricity price 5x that of conventional electricity.” In March 2024…
  • Energy
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The Hormuz Blockade Is as Much About China as Iran

AI Summary. A blockade cutting Iranian oil revenue from $175m to ~$10m per day has historical precedent but has not produced negotiating concessions, as Iran previously sustained similar revenue losses without changing its position.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
Date Posted:
April 14, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Before the war, Iran was earning ~$100mm a day from oil exports, which rose to ~$175mm during the war, before the blockade. The US “maximum pressure” campaign of 2018–2021 had reduced Iran’s oil revenue to ~$10mm a day without changing Tehran’s behavior.

How does the Hormuz blockade impact China's role in the region?

Core argument: Iranian crude revenue surged 75% to $175m daily since Feb. 27, yet prior sanctions reducing exports to 250,000 barrels daily.

According to my back-of-the-envelope calculations, Iran was making about $100 million a day selling its crude before the war. Since Feb. 27, that’s risen to around $175 million a day. If the US enforces the blockade, the Iranian economy will suffer an enormous blow on top of the war destruction. But whether that economic hit translates into a softer negotiation approach remains to be seen. Targeting Iranian oil revenue has been tried before — and it failed. In 2020-2021, when Trump launched a maximum pressure campaign of sanctions, Iranian crude exports dropped to fewer than 250,000 daily barrels for several months just as oil prices were depressed due to the impact of the pandemic. Even allowing for some exports slipping under the radar, Iran was earning no more than $10 million a day selling crude — and it still didn’t buckle.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Iranian crude revenue surged 75% to $175m daily since Feb. 27, yet prior sanctions reducing exports to 250,000 barrels daily.
  2. A Hormuz blockade targeting Iranian oil drives economic pressure, but 2020–2021 maximum sanctions demonstrated sanctions alone don’t guarantee policy concessions.

Related Articles:

  • Are We Running Out Of Oil — Disruption to a critical oil shipping route is creating severe shortages of petrochemical raw materials in Asia, with supplies of naphtha and liquefied petroleum gas already at critically low levels across multiple countries.
  • Salem’s Lot: Gulf War Update; The Purge Of Senior US Military Officers; A US Fossil Fuel Reliance Fever Dream — The United States is not insulated from global oil price shocks, as domestic prices for crude oil, gasoline, and other refined fuels have risen as much as or more than prices in Europe and Asia when major shipping routes are disrupted.
  • Shattered Assumptions And The Energy Quandary — Prior to the war, investors had largely stopped hedging energy-driven inflation. Gave argues that now “the true hedge to equity positions is no longer fixed…
  • Energy
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U.S. Crude Oil Production Rose In 2025, Setting New Record

AI Summary. U.S. crude oil production reached a record 13.6 million barrels per day in 2025, driven by efficiency improvements despite reduced rig activity and lower oil prices.

Naser Ameen Energy Information Administration
Date Posted:
April 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

American crude production expanded 3% in 2025 to a new record of 13.6mm bpd. The rig count fell 5% in the lower 48 states as productivity improved.

Core argument: U.S. crude oil production reached a record 13.6 million barrels per day in 2025, growing by 3%.

U.S. crude oil production grew by 3%, or 350,000 barrels per day (b/d), in 2025, setting a new annual production record of 13.6 million b/d. Production from the Lower 48 states excluding the Gulf of America (L48) accounted for 11.3 million b/d, or 83% of the total U.S. crude oil production in 2025. The rest of the production came from Federal Gulf of America (GOA) and Alaska. In 2025, the number of active rigs per month in L48 was 5% less than in 2024 and 1% fewer wells were drilled. Despite less rig activity and fewer wells, efficiency improvements that we saw in 2024 continued through 2025 and resulted in a slight increase in crude oil production, with new wells producing 2.9 million b/d of crude oil and wells drilled prior to 2025 producing 8.3 million b/d. Rig and well activity fell in 2025 compared with 2024 because West Texas Intermediate (WTI) crude oil prices fell from $77/barrel (b) in 2024 to $65/b in 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. crude oil production reached a record 13.6 million barrels per day in 2025, growing by 3%.
  2. Production from the Lower 48 states accounted for 83% of total U.S. crude oil output in 2025.
  3. Despite fewer active rigs and wells, efficiency improvements led to increased production levels.

Related Articles:

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  • Energy

Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
March 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

As measured by useful final energy consumption in 2024, nuclear provided 6% of America’s 44.5 exajoules, renewables 9%, and fossil fuels 85%. The corresponding numbers for China’s 87.7 exajoules were nuclear 2%, renewables 13%, and fossil fuels 85%. Coal was 54% of China’s consumption and oil 18%, relative to 8% and 30%, respectively for the US.

Energy is lost as waste heat in conversion of fuel energy to motion in internal combustion engines, and in conversion of heat to electricity. For example, if you use primary energy to estimate how much electric power is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, you would overestimate the power needed since electric motors are 80%-90% efficient at converting electricity to motion compared to 18% efficiency for gasoline cars. A better approach [is estimating] the energy net of waste heat that is actually consumed by end-users; this would help avoid overly high projections of fossil fuel demand in a more electrified world due to this “primary energy fallacy.” A few years ago I constructed a measure of useful final energy (UFE) that I use for my energy charts. With this approach, we can get closer to useful final energy actually consumed by end users. [For example the US consumed 45 exajoules (EJ) of useful final energy in 2024 compared to 95 EJ of primary energy.]

Related Articles:

  • New U.S. Electric Generating Capacity Expected To Reach A Record High in 2026 — The US will add 86GW of new utility-scale electrical generation capacity to the power grid in 2026, a record high. Solar will make up 51% of the planned 2026…
  • Electricity 2026 — Since 2024, global electricity demand has outpaced GDP, which it had previously tracked – a “trend shift” in the relation between the two. IEA forecasts…
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