Edward Conard

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  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
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Slowing Women's Labor Force Participation: The Role of Income Inequality

AI Summary. Labor force participation among married women with college degrees stopped rising after the early 1990s, a stall the authors attribute to a negative income effect from higher earnings among married men rather than to changes in fertility. The authors estimate this accounts for one-third of the gender wage gap among college graduates relative to trend.

Stefania Albanesi National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
January 31, 2022
Is Database:
Database

Higher earnings among married men led to a decline in their spouses’ workforce participation, a trend linked to rising income inequality, according to @StefaniaAlbanesi @nberpubs. @nberpub.

Did rising husbands' earnings stall college-educated wives' labor force participation?

Core argument: Labor force participation of married women with college degrees stopped rising after 1993, leaving a notable gap relative to single women, coinciding with a rise in income inequality.

The labor force participation of married women, particularly those with college degrees, has stalled since the early 1990s, coinciding with a rise in income inequality. This trend is linked to the "negative income effect," where higher earnings among married men led to a decline in their spouses' workforce participation. The participation rate for married women with college degrees stopped increasing after 1993, with a notable gap remaining compared to single women. The rise in top incomes for men increased the skill premium for this group, but not for married women, contributing to a widening gender wage gap. This phenomenon accounts for one-third of the gender wage gap among college graduates relative to trend. The decline in labor force participation growth was most pronounced for women married to men in the top 10% of the earnings distribution, indicating that changes in fertility are not the primary driver of this trend.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Labor force participation of married women with college degrees stopped rising after 1993, leaving a notable gap relative to single women, coinciding with a rise in income inequality.
  2. The stall is linked to a negative income effect, in which higher earnings among married men led to declines in their spouses' participation, accounting for one-third of the gender wage gap among college graduates relative to trend.
  3. The decline in labor force participation growth was most pronounced among women married to men in the top 10% of the earnings distribution, suggesting that changes in fertility are not the primary driver.

Intuitive NBER finds a relationship btw high earning husbands and well educated women’s propensity to work“…The entry of married women into the labor force and the rise in women’s relative wages are amongst the most notable economic developments of the twentieth century. The growth in these indicators was particularly pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s, but it stalled since the early 1990s, especially for college graduates. In this paper, we argue that the discontinued growth in female labor supply and wages since the 1990s is a consequence of growing inequality. Our hypothesis is that the growth in top incomes for men generated a negative income effect on the labor supply of their spouses, which reduced their participation and wages. We show that the slowdown in participation and wage growth was concentrated among women married to highly educated and high income husbands, whose earnings grew dramatically over this period. We then develop a model of household labor supply with returns to experience that qualitatively reproduces this effect. A calibrated version of the model can account for a large fraction of the decline relative to trend in married women’s participation in 1995-2005 particularly for college women. The model can also account for the rise in the gender wage gap for college graduates relative to trend in the same period…”

The basic story“…The entry of married women into the labor force and the rise in women’s relative earnings are amongst the most notable economic phenomena of the twentieth century (Goldin (2006)). These trends were particularly pronounced in the 1970s and 1980s, when full-year participation of married women grew from 38% in 1975 to a peak of 60% in 1996 and the male to female ratio in hourly wages dropped from 1.60 to 1.34. Since then, these indicators have stalled, as shown in figure 1. Moreover, this development is particularly pronounced for highly educated women. The labor force participation of married women with college degree and the gender wage gap of college workers saw no improvement since the early 1990s until the Great Recession. These observations are puzzling in light of the continued rise in women’s educational attainment relative to men and their entry into professional high-earning occupations…. We document a break in the trend for the labor force participation rate of married women in the early 1990s. The rate of labor force participation of married women increased by about 2 percentage points per year in the post war period up until this point, with a stronger growth for women with a college degree, converging rapidly to the participation rate of single women in the same education group. This convergence stopped in the early 1990s. The labor force participation rate for single women with less than college was approximately 5 percentage points higher than for married women in this education group in 1993-2007, whereas for women with college degree, the participation rate for single women remained 10 percentage points higher than for married women over the same period. The gap in labor force participation rate between single and married women dropped slightly during the Great Recession, mainly due to a decline in the participation rate of single women, and there was no further convergence after 2012, as the economy recovered. We then examine labor supply and wages of married women by their own and their husbands’ education, as well as their husbands’ income. We find that the decline in the growth of labor force participation of married women is primarily concentrated among those with a college husband and is positively related to husband’s income. Due to positive assortative matching, this channel disproportionally affected women with a college degree. Turning to wages, we find that the growth in top incomes for married men is associated with an increase in the skill premium for this group, whereas there was no comparable increase of the skill premium for married women. We also show that there was no difference in the skill premium by gender for single workers. To reinforce this observation, we examine the evolution of the gender wage gap by educational attainment for married workers. We find that the gender wage gap completely stopped converging for workers with a college degree in the early 1990s, though it declined somewhat after the Great Recession. For non-college workers, the gender wage gap continued closing until the early 2000s, even if the participation of married high school women was also flat over this period….”

This phenomenon accounts for 1/3 of gender wage gap (relative to trend) among college graduates, “…We calibrate the model to match key empirical moments in 1980, such as the distribution of household income and spousal earnings and wives’ labor force participation by household type. We conduct experiments to gauge the quantitative relevance of our hypothesis. Specifically, we increase the exogenous common component of the skill premium to match the observed rise in the male skill premium in the data in the 1990s. Our findings suggest that the rise in the skill premium can account for more than half of the decline relative to trend in married women’s participation in 1995-2005, and more than two thirds of the decline for college women. The model can also account for one third of the rise in the gender wage gap for college graduates relative to trend in the same period….”

The supporting Evidence

“…Figure 2 illustrates the joint evolution of labor force participation for married women and the gender wage gap by educational attainment.As shown in Panel (A), the labor force participation of married women with a college degree has mostly stalled since the early 1990s, with a small transitory increase for college workers during the Great Recession. For high school women, the growth in participation drops substantially starting in the early 1990s, but is still mostly positive. High school women also experience a temporary surge in participation during the Great Recession, after which their participation declines. Albanesi (2019) shows that female labor supply displays a strong countercyclical component, interpreted as resulting from household insurance against the risk of earnings loss of their male partners, who are more sensitive to business cycle risk. Ellieroth (2019) finds that temporary rise in female labor force participation during recessions results from a decline in the employment to non-participation flow of married women. We focus most of our analysis on the years previous to the Great Recession, to avoid the effect of this major cyclical event. Turning to the gender wage gap, measured as the male to female ratio of hourly earnings, Panel (A) shows that for college workers it decreased rapidly until 1992 and it stalled during the 1990s and early 2000s, only reaching values lower than those in 1992 after the Great Recession. A similar but less stark pattern occurred for high school workers, as shown in Panel (B). As shown in figure 3, panel (A), the flattening of labor force participation starting in the early 1990s is limited to married women. Participation of single women has been mostly stable throughout the sample period. Panel (B) shows the labor force participation rates of married women by age groups. One striking observation from these figures is that prime age married women have lower participation rates than older women, suggesting that the aging of the population is not related to this phenomenon…”

Slowing Women's Labor Force Participation: The Role of Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 1


“…Husband’s EarningsFigure 4 shows the labor force participation rate of women by their husband’s decile in the male earnings distribution. The wives of higher earning husbands are much less likely to work than the wives of lower earning husbands….”

Slowing Women's Labor Force Participation: The Role of Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 2


“…Figure 5 shows the labor force participation rates of married women, by household education types. There is a steep increase in participation until 1993, and after that there is a change in trend for all married women, regardless of education level. However, the slowdown is more pronounced for married women with a college degree, since the slope during the previous decades was steeper than for women without college. The participation of women married to college husbands stopped increasing after 1993…”

Slowing Women's Labor Force Participation: The Role of Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 3


“…Figure 6 shows the evolution of the skill premium, measured as the ratio of average hourly wages of college to non-college workers, where as in the rest of the analysis, we restrict attention to full-time, full-year workers. The rise in the skill premium since the early 1990s until the Great Recession was greater for male than for female workers. The skill premium rose by 19% from 1:52 to 1:82 between 1991 and 2008 for men, while it only increased by 9% from 1:5 to 1:63 for women over the same period. This difference accelerated from the mid 1990s on, and resulted in a growing gender gap in skill premium since 1993 until the Great Recession. Even though the gender gap in skill premium decreased during the Great Recession, a positive gap still remains…”

Slowing Women's Labor Force Participation: The Role of Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 4


“…We show that the evolution of the skill premium after the mid 1990s derives from a rise in compensation to skilled workers, as opposed to real wage loses of unskilled workers. Figure 7 shows the evolution of real average hourly wages by percentile of the wage distribution for full-time, full-year male workers (panel A) and for full-time, full-year female workers (panel B). The average real wages of male workers in the bottom half of the wage distribution fell since the beginning of the sample until the mid 1990s, and remained mostly stable since then. The wages for male workers at the top of the distribution increased since the early 1990s. For female workers, average wages increased over the entire sample period in most deciles, except the bottom one. The most notable change happening around the early 1990s comes from an increase in the average wages of the top earners…”

Slowing Women's Labor Force Participation: The Role of Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Fertility

“..We first consider changes in fertility. Women with children are less likely to participate in the labor force, and hence increases in fertility could reduce labor force participation of married women. However, we can rule out this explanation as the only cause of the observed behavior of female labor force participation. As shown in figure 9, the decline in the growth rate of labor force participation was similar for women with and without children. Most importantly, the evolution in the labor force participation of married women depends on the characteristics of their spouse, since the decline in the rate of growth of participation was largest for women married to men in the 90th percentile of the earnings distribution, followed by those married to men in the 50thpercentile and in the 10th percentile. We conclude from this pattern that changes in fertility are not the main driving force behind the observed change in participation trends….”

Slowing Women's Labor Force Participation: The Role of Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 6


Stefania Albanesi and María José Prados, "Slowing Women's Labor Force Participation: The Role of Income Inequality," National Bureau Of Economic Research, January 2022, https://www.nber.org/papers/w29675

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Previous articleJanuary 31, 2022Inflation and the Power of NarrativeReal wage growth has been a complex narrative shaped by inflation & economic shifts. Despite strong job growth, real wages are likely down on a 2-year basis, influenced by narratives rather than personal financial experiences.Next articleJanuary 31, 2022Superstar ReturnsAccording to @FederalReserveBank of New York, superstar cities have seen higher housing price appreciation over 150 years, but total returns are lower due to higher rent returns in non-superstar cities.
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Easy A’s, Less Pay: The Long-Term Effects of Grade Inflation

AI Summary. The authors estimate that students assigned teachers who inflate average grades have lower future test scores, high school graduation, college enrollment, and earnings, with a one standard deviation increase in a teacher's average grade inflation reducing the present value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872. Inflating passing grades instead raises graduation with limited long-run effects.

Jeffrey Denning, Rachel Nesbit, Nolan Pope and Merrill Warnick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
March 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
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Data from Los Angeles and Maryland linking high school, postsecondary, and earnings records suggest that one class-year with a teacher with 1 SD higher mean grade inflation reduces the PDV of their students’ lifetime earnings by ~$213,872.

How does teacher grade inflation affect students' long-term outcomes and earnings?

Core argument: The authors estimate that assignment to a teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872 per year.

We develop two teacher-level measures of grade inflation: one measuring average grade inflation (the year-specific teacher fixed effect showing the teacher’s average contribution to grades after controlling for the student's contemporaneous performance in the focal subject as measured by the corresponding subject test score as well as prior test scores, prior grades, and other background characteristics), and another measuring a teacher's propensity to give a passing grade [which affects primarily students near the bottom of the distribution]. A [separate] cognitive value-added measure [included in the regressions] is a teacher fixed effect capturing how much a teacher raises students' standardized test scores relative to what would be predicted from the students' prior test scores and background characteristics. Grade-inflating teachers have moderately lower cognitive value-added and slightly higher noncognitive value-added. The two [grade-inflation] measures differentially impact students' long-term outcomes. Being assigned a higher average grade inflating teacher reduces a student's future test scores, the likelihood of graduating from high school, college enrollment, and ultimately earnings. A teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value [PDV] of lifetime earnings of their students by $213,872 per year.  In contrast, passing grade inflation reduces the likelihood of being held back and increases high school graduation, with limited long-run effects. [Figure 7 in the gallery].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that assignment to a teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872 per year.
  2. Higher average grade inflation by teachers lowers students' future test scores, high school graduation likelihood, college enrollment, and earnings, while passing-grade inflation instead reduces grade retention and raises high school graduation with limited long-run effects.
  3. Grade-inflating teachers have moderately lower cognitive value-added, measured as a teacher's contribution to standardized test scores beyond what students' prior scores and background characteristics predict, and slightly higher noncognitive value-added.

Related Articles:

  • Steeper At The Top: Cognitive Ability and Earnings in Finland and Norway — Administrative data on over 350,000 men each in Finland and Norway show a convex relationship between earnings rank and cognitive ability measured by military conscription tests: top-percentile earners score about 1 standard deviation above median earners, who score about 0.5 above bottom-percentile earners. The lowest scores are almost absent among top earners.
  • Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations — Data on over 5,000 German fighter pilots show performance rose markedly as pilots approached the eligibility threshold for each medal in a tiered awards ladder and slumped immediately after receiving it, with the effect repeating at each successive rung. The authors estimate the ladder added 3,000–5,000 aerial victories, 5–10% of the total.
  • Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II — Analysis of over 5,000 German World War II fighter pilots finds that public peer recognition was associated with higher victory scores among skilled pilots without higher mortality, while average pilots gained little in victories but died at higher rates. The authors conclude status-based awards can have uneven effects in high-risk settings.
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Master’s Programs Are Cash Cows for Universities. Do They Pay Off for Students?

AI Summary. Adjusting for time spent, tuition costs, and completion probability drastically reduces the estimated return on a master's degree, leaving master's programs with the lowest adjusted return among degree types. Averages mask wide variation: business master's degrees show a negative return on average, while top programs' graduates can earn millions more.

Mark Schneider American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
September 10, 2024
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Database
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Important

Mark Schneider @AEIecon reviews the ROI of master’s degree programs and finds “vast differences among fields of study and among programs in the same field of study.” He argues that policymakers need to provide accurate ROI metrics to applicants.

Do master's degrees pay off for students after accounting for costs?

Core argument: Adjusting lifetime earnings gains for time spent in school, the cost of the degree, and the probability of completion drastically reduces the return to master's students and places master's degrees last on adjusted ROI.

The absolute increase in lifetime earnings is the average gain in income between students completing the degree and the counterfactual earnings of similarly situated students without the degree. Incorporating the time spent getting a master’s degree, the cost of obtaining the degree, and the probability of completing a program generates an “adjusted ROI.” Taking these costs into account drastically reduces the return to the student—and puts the return for master’s degrees dead last. [But] Averages Hide Lots of Information. Business is the single largest field of study for master’s students; but, on average, business master’s degrees have a negative ROI. But graduates from the top performing programs—including Dartmouth, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of Pennsylvania— can earn millions more than graduates from other business programs. Students who choose badly could experience a negative ROI of over $1 million. Even in computer science, the field with the highest overall ROI, graduates from some programs experienced negative ROIs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adjusting lifetime earnings gains for time spent in school, the cost of the degree, and the probability of completion drastically reduces the return to master's students and places master's degrees last on adjusted ROI.
  2. Business, the single largest field of study for master's students, has a negative ROI on average, while graduates of top-performing programs at Dartmouth, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania can earn millions more than graduates of other business programs.
  3. Students who choose badly could experience a negative ROI of over $1 million, and even in computer science, the field with the highest overall ROI, graduates of some programs experienced negative ROIs.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.
  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • Multidimensional Human Capital and the Wage Structure — The wage return to cognitive skills has declined, from about 10% higher hourly wages per standard deviation of test score in the 1980s and early 1990s to 4.5% in the 2000s and early 2010s, while returns to a bachelor's degree rose. Social skill-intensive occupations grew as a share of US jobs, with faster real wage growth.
  • College
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    • Education

Human Capital Spillovers and Health: Does Living Around College Graduates Lengthen Life?

AI Summary. Living in an area with more college graduates is associated with lower mortality even after accounting for individuals' own education, and more than half of that correlation can be explained by area differences in smoking and obesity rates. The authors find evidence for both regulatory policies such as workplace smoking bans and peer effects about the harms of smoking.

Jacob Bor, David Cutler, Edward Glaeser and Ljubica Ristovska National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 25, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Bor, @Cutler_econ, Glaeser, and @lj_ristovska find a strong negative correlation between the % of college graduates in an area and all-cause mortality, even after controlling for individual education.

Does living around college graduates lengthen life?

Core argument: The authors find a strong, robust relationship between area human capital and mortality that persists after controlling for individual education, with more than half the correlation explained by differences in smoking and obesity rates across areas.

[There is] a strong and robust relationship between area human capital and mortality, even after controlling for individual education. More than half of the correlation between area human capital and mortality can be explained by differences in smoking rates and obesity rates across areas, and that [these effects are] strong even after controlling for individual education. More than half of the correlation between area human capital and mortality can be explained by differences in smoking rates and obesity rates across areas. We find empirical evidence for [both] regulatory policies such as workplace smoking bans, and peer effects about the harms of smoking. Health-related behaviors are particularly sensitive to human capital spillovers among younger individuals, implicating the role of changing social norms around smoking and obesity across generations in the widening geographic gaps in health between high and low human capital areas.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors find a strong, robust relationship between area human capital and mortality that persists after controlling for individual education, with more than half the correlation explained by differences in smoking and obesity rates across areas.
  2. The authors find empirical evidence for both regulatory policies, such as workplace smoking bans, and peer effects regarding the harms of smoking.
  3. Health-related behaviors are particularly sensitive to human capital spillovers among younger individuals, implicating changing social norms around smoking and obesity across generations in the widening geographic health gaps between high and low human capital areas.

Related Articles:

  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.
  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — The mortality gap between American adults with and without a four-year college degree widened across three periods—falling mortality for both with larger gains for graduates, then diverging, then rising faster for the less educated during the pandemic—reaching an 8.5-year difference in adult life expectancy. Americans with a degree, treated as a separate country, would rank just below Japan.
  • How Disadvantage Became Deadly in America — The author calculates that the average age of death among the shortest-lived 10% of Americans is 36, versus 55 in the Netherlands and 57 in Sweden, after falling by about eight years over the past decade. Wealthy Americans live equally long regardless of local opioid use and gun violence, while poor Americans in those areas live far shorter lives.
  • College
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Comments On: "Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA" By Anne Case and Angus Deaton

AI Summary. Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.

Caroline Hoxby Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 10, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Caroline Hoxby argues that Anne Case and Angus Deaton’s recent findings on the divergence btw Americans with a BA and those without is largely driven by a compositional shift that has occurred as more Americans have graduated college.

Does selection explain the widening mortality gap by education?

Core argument: Selection is plausibly responsible for most or even all of the widening mortality gap between American adults with and without a BA, according to this commentary on Anne Case and Angus Deaton's work.

I find it entirely plausible that selection accounts for most or even all of the widening mortality gap. Measures of achievement have not risen among 12 graders and other high school students for essentially the entire period since we started to measure them in a consistent way (i.e. since the early 1970s). However, the share who obtain a BA degree has increased quite dramatically over the same period. An NLSY [National Longitudinal Survey Youth] exercise shows that non-BAs are increasingly negatively selected. A comparison between the NLSY79 (1979) and the NLSY97 (1997) shows that the distribution of ASVAB [Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery] percentiles of non-BAs is shifted to the left for 97 vis-a-vis 79.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Selection is plausibly responsible for most or even all of the widening mortality gap between American adults with and without a BA, according to this commentary on Anne Case and Angus Deaton's work.
  2. Comparing the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth cohorts of 1979 and 1997, the distribution of ASVAB percentiles among adults without a BA is shifted leftward for 1997, suggesting non-BAs are increasingly negatively selected.
  3. Measures of achievement among 12th graders and other high school students have not risen since consistent measurement began in the early 1970s, while the share obtaining a BA degree rose dramatically over the same period.

Related Articles:

  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — The mortality gap between American adults with and without a four-year college degree widened across three periods—falling mortality for both with larger gains for graduates, then diverging, then rising faster for the less educated during the pandemic—reaching an 8.5-year difference in adult life expectancy. Americans with a degree, treated as a separate country, would rank just below Japan.
  • Why Are Americans Dying So Young? — One in 25 American five-year-olds is projected not to reach age 40, making deaths among the young a defining feature of US mortality. These deaths are overwhelmingly caused by external factors such as drug overdoses, gun violence, and dangerous driving.
  • Who Won the Cold War? Part II — Americans born around 1990 had higher death rates in their 20s than peers in affluent allied countries, and the gap widened across young adulthood. By age 29, US mortality for that cohort was about 2x New Zealand's, 2.5x France's, 3x Japan's, and 4x Italy's or Spain's.
  • College
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    • Demographics
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      • K-12

Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges

AI Summary. Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.

Raj Chetty, David Deming and John Friedman National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 24, 2023
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Database
Is Important:
Important

.@OppInsights finds that the “Ivy-Plus” (Ivy League, plus UChicago, Duke, MIT, Stanford) admit students from the highest income families scoring in the top 1% of SAT/ACT at far greater rates than those from lower-income families.

Why are high-income students likelier to attend highly selective private colleges?

Core argument: Children from top-1% families are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, Chicago) as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores.

Children from families in the top 1% are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, and Chicago) as those from middle-class families with comparable SAT/ACT scores. Two-thirds of this gap is due to higher admissions rates for students with comparable test scores from high-income families; the remaining third is due to differences in rates of application and matriculation. The high-income admissions advantage at private colleges is driven by three factors: (1) preferences for children of alumni, (2) weight placed on non-academic credentials, which tend to be stronger for students applying from private high schools that have affluent student bodies, and (3) recruitment of athletes, who tend to come from higher-income families. Highly selective public colleges that follow more standardized processes to evaluate applications exhibit smaller disparities in admissions rates by parental income than private colleges that use more holistic evaluations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Children from top-1% families are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, Chicago) as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores.
  2. Two-thirds of that attendance gap comes from higher admissions rates for high-income students with comparable test scores, and the remaining third from differences in application and matriculation rates.
  3. The high-income admissions advantage at private colleges reflects preferences for alumni children, weight on non-academic credentials that tend to be stronger among applicants from affluent private high schools, and recruitment of athletes, while highly selective public colleges using more standardized evaluation show smaller disparities by parental income.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.
  • Multidimensional Human Capital and the Wage Structure — The wage return to cognitive skills has declined, from about 10% higher hourly wages per standard deviation of test score in the 1980s and early 1990s to 4.5% in the 2000s and early 2010s, while returns to a bachelor's degree rose. Social skill-intensive occupations grew as a share of US jobs, with faster real wage growth.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — United States Income, Wealth, Consumption, and Inequality Diana Furchtgott-Roth
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Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think

AI Summary. Wage inequality has risen while the college wage premium has stagnated, with wages at the 95th percentile gaining substantially as real income for the median male college graduate stagnated or declined. This pattern challenges the view that education is a primary driver of rising economic inequality.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
May 11, 2022
Is Database:
Database

@PaulKrugman, according to his Wonk Out piece, the gap btw median male college graduate wages and the 95th percentile has widened since 2000, with the latter seeing substantial gains while the former’s real income has stagnated or declined.

Is education a primary driver of rising wage inequality?

Core argument: Wage inequality has risen since 2000 while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the view that education is a primary driver of economic inequality.

Since 2000, wage inequality has risen while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the notion that education is a primary driver of economic inequality. Data shows that the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median male college graduate has widened, with the former seeing substantial gains while the latter's real income has stagnated or declined. This suggests that a college degree is no longer a reliable path to financial success for many, contradicting the belief that college-educated individuals are part of the economic elite. The disparity highlights that factors beyond education, such as structural economic changes, play a significant role in rising inequality. This insight is crucial for policymakers considering student debt relief and broader economic reforms, as it underscores the need to address systemic issues rather than focusing solely on educational attainment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wage inequality has risen since 2000 while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the view that education is a primary driver of economic inequality.
  2. The gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median male college graduate has widened, with top earners posting substantial gains while median college-graduate real income stagnated or declined.
  3. The stagnation of college-graduate incomes suggests that policymakers weighing student debt relief and broader economic reforms should address structural economic changes rather than educational attainment alone.

The Economic Policy Institute had a very useful analysis of this data just before the pandemic. Between 1979 and 2000, there was a rough match between growth in one measure of overall inequality — the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median worker — and its estimate of the average wage premium for college-educated workers. Since 2000, however, wage inequality has continued to rise, while the college premium has barely changed... my own version of this observation, comparing growth of incomes of households at the 95th percentile with those of the median male college graduate. Now, Americans at the 95th percentile don’t consider themselves rich, because they aren’t, surely as compared with C.E.O.s, hedge funders and so on. Nonetheless, they have seen substantial gains. On the other hand, the typical college graduate — who is, remember, someone who made it through and received an accredited degree — hasn’t.

Paul Krugman, "Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think,"Krugman Wonks Out, April 29, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/29/opinion/college-student-loan-debt.html

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think

President Biden says that he is taking a “hard look” at student debt relief, which probably means that some significant relief is coming. For one thing, Biden promised relief during the 2020 campaign. For another, it’s one progressive priority he can address by executive action, which is important given the extreme difficulty of getting anything through an evenly divided Senate.

How much relief will he offer? I have no idea. How much relief should he offer? I’m for going as big as political realities allow, but I understand that too generous a debt write-off might produce a backlash. And I have no confidence that I know where the line should be drawn.

What I think I do know is that much of the backlash to proposals for student debt relief is based on a false premise: the belief that Americans who have gone to college are, in general, members of the economic elite.

The falsity of this proposition is obvious for those who were exploited by predatory for-profit institutions that encouraged them to go into debt to get more or less worthless credentials. The same applies to those who took on educational debt but never managed to get a degree — not a small group. In fact, around 40 percent of student loan borrowers never finish their education.

But even among those who make it through, a college degree is hardly a guarantee of economic success. And I’m not sure how widely that reality is understood.

What is widely understood is that America has become a far more unequal society over the past 40 years or so. The nature of rising inequality, however, isn’t as broadly known. I keep encountering seemingly well-informed people who believe that we’re mainly looking at a widening gap between the college-educated and everyone else.

This story had some truth to it in the 1980s and 1990s, although even then it didn’t account for the huge income gains at the top of the distribution — the rise of the 1 percent and even more among the 0.01 percent. Since 2000, however, most college graduates have actually seen their real incomes stagnate or even decline.

The Economic Policy Institute had a very useful analysis of this data just before the pandemic. Between 1979 and 2000, there was a rough match between growth in one measure of overall inequality — the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median worker — and its estimate of the average wage premium for college-educated workers. Since 2000, however, wage inequality has continued to rise, while the college premium has barely changed:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Furthermore, not all college graduates have had the same experience. Some have done pretty well, but many have seen no gains at all:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 2


I have my own version of this observation, comparing growth of incomes of households at the 95th percentile with those of the median male college graduate:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Now, Americans at the 95th percentile don’t consider themselves rich, because they aren’t, surely as compared with C.E.O.s, hedge funders and so on. Nonetheless, they have seen substantial gains. On the other hand, the typical college graduate — who is, remember, someone who made it through and received an accredited degree — hasn’t.

So here’s how I see it: Much of the student debt weighing down millions of Americans can be attributed to false promises.

Some of these promises were scams pure and simple; think Trump University. Even those who weren’t outright cheated, however, were pulled in by elite messaging assuring them that a college degree was a ticket to financial success. Too many didn’t realize that their life circumstances might make it impossible to finish their education — it’s hard for comfortable, upper-middle-class Americans to realize how difficult staying in school can be for young people from poorer families with unstable incomes. Many of those who did manage to finish found that the financial rewards were far smaller than they expected.

And all too many of those who fell victim to these false promises ended up saddled with large debts.

Of course, there are many Americans who have suffered from rising inequality. I wouldn’t argue that college debtors are greater victims than, say, truck drivers who have seen their real wages plunge or families stuck in declining rural areas and small towns. And we should be helping all of these people.

Unfortunately, most things we could and should be doing for Americans in need — like extending the expanded child tax credit — can’t be done in the face of 50 Republican senators, plus Joe Manchin. Student debt relief, by contrast, is something President Biden can do. So he should.

  • College
  • Workforce
    • Education
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income
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