“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council

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Germany Backs Donald Trump Goal For Nato To Spend 5% Of GDP On Defence

Anne-Sylvaine Chassany and John Paul Rathbone Financial Times

Date Posted:: May 15, 2025
Is Database:: Database

Germany will aim to raise spending on defense to 5% of GDP by 2032 by increasing “hard military spending” from this year’s 2% to 3.5%, while adding 1.5% of GDP of “related spending, including infrastructure and cyber security.”

Speaking at a meeting in Antalya on Thursday, German foreign minister Johann Wadephul said Berlin was “following” Trump on his demand that Nato allies reach a 5% goal. Currently the alliance has a 2% spending target. Wadephul also signalled that the way the country would meet the target would be by embracing a proposal by Nato secretary-general Mark Rutte. The Dutchman has called for Nato members to reach 3.5% of GDP on “hard military spending” by 2032, to which he has suggested adding 1.5% of GDP on “related spending” including infrastructure and cyber security.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

German foreign minister Johann Wadephul said in Antalya that Berlin is "following" Donald Trump's demand that NATO allies spend 5% of GDP on defence, up from the alliance's current 2% target.
NATO secretary-general Mark Rutte has called for members to reach 3.5% of GDP on "hard military spending" by 2032, and has suggested adding 1.5% of GDP on "related spending" including infrastructure and cyber security.
Wadephul signalled that Germany would meet the 5% goal by embracing Rutte's proposal.

Defense Spending: Macroeconomic Consequences and Trade-Offs

Hippolyte Balima, Jared Bebee, Colombe Ladreit, Andresa Lagerborg, et al. International Monetary Fund

Date Posted:: April 8, 2026
Is Database:: Database

An IMF report notes defense spending booms are associated with an increase in TFP “over longer horizons, consistent with evidence showing that the R&D component of defense spending can boost innovation and crowd in private R&D spending.”

Defense spending booms [periods when the two-year moving average of defense spending increases 1pp of GDP] in peacetime are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP and by a short-lived rise in inflation. Consistent with a large share of the stimulus being allocated to personnel and operating expenses, government consumption rises by about 9% within three years. Total investment shows a comparable positive response, reflecting both higher public investment in defense equipment and infrastructure and increased private investment, particularly in defense-related industries. Turning to the external sector, stimulus-driven demand leads to wider external imbalances, as both the current account and trade balance deteriorate. Imports accelerate—reflecting leakages from defense spending and stronger demand for foreign goods—while exports remain broadly unchanged. Defense spending booms are associated with a subsequent increase in the stock of capital, in line with the documented boost to investment, and an increase in total factor productivity, which may be explained by changes in capacity utilization and learning by necessity, as firms adapt to surging demand by improving productivity when facing capacity constraints. Total factor productivity [loses] its statistical significance once capacity utilization is controlled for. However, defense spending booms are followed by greater total factor productivity over longer horizons, consistent with evidence showing that the R&D component of defense spending can boost innovation and crowd in private R&D spending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Peacetime defense spending booms, defined as a 1pp of GDP rise in the two-year moving average of defense spending, are followed by a sizable increase in real GDP, a short-lived rise in inflation, and a roughly 9% increase in government consumption within three years.
Defense spending booms widen external imbalances, with both the current account and trade balance deteriorating as imports accelerate on leakages from defense spending and stronger demand for foreign goods while exports remain broadly unchanged.
Defense spending booms are associated with a subsequent increase in the capital stock and in total factor productivity, though the productivity effect loses statistical significance once capacity utilization is controlled for, while greater total factor productivity follows over longer horizons.

The Cold War and the U.S. Labor Market

Ilyana Kuziemko, Donato Onorato and Suresh Naidu National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: March 31, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Defense spending played a major role in sustaining tight labor markets for low-skill workers following the Second World War. Drops in procurement spending between the 1950s and the 1990s explain between 18 and 30% of the decline in manufacturing employment.

We have shown that in the decades immediately following World War II, the Cold War was a major factor sustaining tight labor markets. On the labor demand side, military procurement increased demand for manufacturing workers and put downward pressure on the share of income flowing to the richest households. We can explain roughly between 18 and 30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under ten percent of the rise in top-ten inequality by the 1950s to 1990s decline in procurement spending. We thus conclude that Cold War procurement—while under-studied in the modern, quantitative economics literature on inequality—played a major role in sustaining tight labor markets for low-skill workers in the decades immediately after World War II and creating political coalitions in support of hawkish foreign policy and military expenditure. Figure 8 panel (a) shows that manufacturing employment is highly sensitive to defense spending, consistent with our state-year evidence. As is well known, manufacturing booms during World War II, but, less discussed, plummets in the years between World War II and Korea. After bouncing back during Korea, it slowly declines alongside the declining defense share of GDP until both series experience an uptick during Vietnam. Overall, the relationship remains highly significant even after taking out a linear time trend and dropping the World War II period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The authors estimate the 1950s–1990s decline in U.S. military procurement spending explains roughly 18–30% of the decline in manufacturing and just under 10% of the rise in top-ten inequality.
The authors conclude that Cold War military procurement raised demand for manufacturing workers, pressured the share of income flowing to the richest households downward, and sustained tight labor markets for low-skill workers after World War II.
U.S. manufacturing employment booms in World War II, plummets before Korea, rebounds during Korea, then declines alongside the defense share of GDP until an uptick during Vietnam, a relationship that remains highly significant after removing a linear time trend.

The First 36 Hours of War Consumed Over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli Munitions

Macdonald Amoah, Morgan Bazilian, and Jahara Matisek Foreign Policy

Date Posted:: March 6, 2026
Is Database:: Database

A Colorado School of Mines analysis of the munitions used in the first 36 hours of the war estimates the “mineral bill” and highlights the current and target timelines to replenish these systems, noting critical minerals “cannot be surged.”

Beyond the sheer volume of munitions, the loss of high-value assets introduces another layer of complexity. The destruction of two advanced U.S. radars, the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain, highlights a problem where the total weight of the “mineral bill” is less of a concern than the extreme fragility of the supply chain and the extensive timelines for replacement. Per our analysis, for the AN/FPS-132, it will take five to eight years for Raytheon to build a new radar at a cost of $1.1 billion. Meanwhile, Lockheed Martin will require at least 12 to 24 months and an estimated $50 million to $75 million to replace the AN/TPS-59, based on the original Bahrain Foreign Military Sales contract adjusted for inflation. The biggest issue for the defense industrial base will be sourcing the 77.3 kilograms of gallium needed for both systems, a material for which China controls 98% of the global supply. This is not to mention the 30,610 kilograms of copper that will also be needed, a commodity facing surging demand from the technology sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The first 36 hours of the war consumed over 3,000 U.S.-Israeli munitions, and two advanced U.S. radars were destroyed: the AN/FPS-132 in Qatar and the AN/TPS-59 in Bahrain.
By the authors' analysis, replacing the AN/FPS-132 will take Raytheon five to eight years at a cost of $1.1 billion, while Lockheed Martin needs at least 12 to 24 months and an estimated $50 million to $75 million for the AN/TPS-59.
Sourcing the 77.3 kilograms of gallium needed for both radars is, by the authors' assessment, the biggest issue for the defense industrial base, since China controls 98% of global supply; the systems also require 30,610 kilograms of copper.

How Russia’s Fatalities Compare With Ukraine’s

Economist Staff The Economist

Date Posted:: February 25, 2026
Is Database:: Database

The Economist estimates one in 25 Russian men btw the ages of 18 and 49 have been killed or wounded in Ukraine since 2022. CSIS estimates Ukrainian casualties at one in 16. Russian losses are escalating; today it is “losing more men than it can recruit.”

Our model suggests that Russian casualties are now between 1.1m and 1.4m, of whom 230,000-430,000 are dead. That would mean one in 25 Russian men between the ages of 18 and 49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the start of the full-scale war. There are too few reliable estimates of Ukrainian deaths to construct a similar meta-estimate. One single estimate, published on January 27th by CSIS, a think-tank, put total Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 as of December, including 100,000-140,000 dead. Though much lower than Russia’s casualties in absolute terms, as a share of its population it is higher—equivalent to about one in 16 Ukrainian men aged 18-49 before the war. These figures exclude civilian deaths, for which reliable data are scarcer still. Ukrainian losses appeared heaviest early in the war: American officials estimated that 70,000 soldiers had already been killed by August 2023. Russia’s campaign, by contrast, has only grown bloodier. Some estimates suggest that it is now losing roughly 1,000 soldiers a day. Our modelling shows that as many may have died in the past year as in the first three combined. It is losing more men than it can recruit.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

The Economist's model puts Russian casualties at 1.1m–1.4m, including 230,000–430,000 dead, implying that one in 25 Russian men aged 18–49 may have been killed or severely wounded since the full-scale war began.
CSIS estimated total Ukrainian casualties at 600,000 as of December, including 100,000–140,000 dead, a lower absolute figure than Russia's but a higher share of population, equivalent to about one in 16 prewar Ukrainian men aged 18–49.
Some estimates put Russia's losses at roughly 1,000 soldiers a day, and The Economist's modelling suggests as many may have died in the past year as in the first three combined, more men than Russia can recruit.

Drones Are Key to Winning Wars Now. The U.S. Makes Hardly Any.

Farah Stockman New York Times

Date Posted:: July 14, 2025
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

China’s DJI can manufacture millions of drones a year; about 500 American drone manufacturers are collectively building fewer than 100,000 drones annually.

DJI accounts for about 70% of all commercial drones sold globally for hobby and industrial use, such as aerial photography, package delivery and weather research. The company declined to share market data, but industry experts estimate that DJI’s output far exceeds that of any other drone manufacturer. “No one even comes close,” said Bobby Sakaki, chief executive of UAS NEXUS, a drone industry consultant. “DJI can make millions of drones per year. That is a hundred times more than anybody in the United States can make.” About 500 companies manufacture drones in the United States, producing fewer than 100,000 a year, according to Ryan Carver, communications manager for the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International, a nonprofit organization of industry professionals.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

DJI accounts for about 70% of all commercial drones sold globally for hobby and industrial uses such as aerial photography, package delivery and weather research, with industry experts estimating its output far exceeds that of any other drone manufacturer.
About 500 U.S. companies manufacture drones and together produce fewer than 100,000 a year, according to Ryan Carver of the Association for Uncrewed Vehicle Systems International.
Bobby Sakaki, chief executive of drone industry consultant UAS NEXUS, says DJI can make millions of drones per year, a hundred times more than any manufacturer in the United States can make.

Underestimating China

Kurt Campbell and Rush Doshi Foreign Affairs

Date Posted:: April 28, 2025
Is Database:: Database

“China possesses scale, and the [US] does not.” @RushDoshi argues the US can balance China only by “transforming its alliance architecture” to gain scale by pooling the collective capacity of the EU, India, and Japan, which “China cannot match alone.”

China’s productive capacity is three times as large as that of the United States—a decisive advantage in military and technological competition—and exceeds that of the next nine countries combined. In the two decades after China joined the World Trade Organization, its share of global manufacturing quintupled to 30% while the U.S. share halved to roughly 15%; the United Nations has estimated that, by 2030, the imbalance will grow to 45% and 11%. China leads in many traditional industries—producing 20x as much cement, 13x as much steel, three times as many cars, and twice as much power as the United States—and increasingly in advanced sectors as well. To achieve scale, Washington must transform its alliance architecture from a collection of managed relationships to a platform for integrated and pooled capacity building across the military, economic, and technological domains. In practical terms, that might mean Japan and Korea help build American ships and Taiwan builds American semiconductor plants while the United States shares its best military technology with allies, and all come together to pool their markets behind a shared tariff or regulatory wall erected against China.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

China's productive capacity is three times that of the United States and exceeds that of the next nine countries combined, which the article calls a decisive advantage in military and technological competition.
In the two decades after China joined the World Trade Organization, its share of global manufacturing quintupled to 30% while the U.S. share halved to roughly 15%; the United Nations has estimated the gap will widen to 45% versus 11% by 2030.
China produces 20 times as much cement, 13 times as much steel, three times as many cars, and twice as much power as the United States, and increasingly leads in advanced sectors as well.

Germany will aim to raise spending on defense to 5% of GDP by 2032 by increasing “hard military spending” from this year’s 2% to 3.5%, while adding 1.5% of GDP of “related spending, including infrastructure and cyber security.”

Will Germany back a higher NATO defence spending target?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

An IMF report notes defense spending booms are associated with an increase in TFP “over longer horizons, consistent with evidence showing that the R&D component of defense spending can boost innovation and crowd in private R&D spending.”

How do defense spending booms affect output, inflation, and productivity?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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Defense spending played a major role in sustaining tight labor markets for low-skill workers following the Second World War. Drops in procurement spending between the 1950s and the 1990s explain between 18 and 30% of the decline in manufacturing employment.

How much did falling military procurement drive manufacturing decline and inequality?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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A Colorado School of Mines analysis of the munitions used in the first 36 hours of the war estimates the “mineral bill” and highlights the current and target timelines to replenish these systems, noting critical minerals “cannot be surged.”

Do replacement timelines constrain radar rebuilding more than materials cost?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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The Economist estimates one in 25 Russian men btw the ages of 18 and 49 have been killed or wounded in Ukraine since 2022. CSIS estimates Ukrainian casualties at one in 16. Russian losses are escalating; today it is “losing more men than it can recruit.”

How do Russian and Ukrainian war casualties compare?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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China’s DJI can manufacture millions of drones a year; about 500 American drone manufacturers are collectively building fewer than 100,000 drones annually.

Does China outproduce the US in drone manufacturing?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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“China possesses scale, and the [US] does not.” @RushDoshi argues the US can balance China only by “transforming its alliance architecture” to gain scale by pooling the collective capacity of the EU, India, and Japan, which “China cannot match alone.”

How can the US match China's manufacturing scale?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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