Edward Conard

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  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
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Differences in Rent Growth by Income 1985-2019 and Implications for Real Income Inequality

AI Summary. Rent rose 81% for the top income quintile and 72% for the bottom, while lower-income households spent a larger share of consumption on housing; overall prices rose 136% for the top quintile and 143% for the bottom. The authors conclude real income inequality widened despite these small inflation differences.

Daryl Larsen Federal Reserve Board
Date Posted:
November 12, 2021
Is Database:
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From 1985 to 2019, rent rose 81% for the top income quintile and 72% for the bottom, yet lower-income households faced greater inflation due to higher housing costs. A 143% price index increase for lower earners versus 136% for top earners widened real income inequality.

Did real income inequality widen despite similar inflation rates across income groups?

Core argument: Rent rose 81% for the top income quintile and 72% for the bottom quintile between 1985 and 2019, while lower income households spent a larger fraction of their consumption on housing.

From 1985 to 2019, rent increased by 81% for the top income quintile and by 72% for the bottom quintile, with lower income households spending a larger fraction of their consumption on housing. Despite minor rent growth differentials, all households have allocated a growing share of their consumption to housing over time. In the first half of the period, higher rent growth for top earners was offset by lower income groups' larger housing expenditure share, resulting in similar inflation rates across groups. In the latter half, slightly higher inflation for lower income groups emerged due to their larger housing service share. Overall, the general price index rose by 136% for the top quintile and 143% for the bottom, indicating that real income inequality expanded significantly despite these inflation differences.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Rent rose 81% for the top income quintile and 72% for the bottom quintile between 1985 and 2019, while lower income households spent a larger fraction of their consumption on housing.
  2. The general price index rose 136% for the top quintile and 143% for the bottom between 1985 and 2019, indicating that real income inequality expanded despite these inflation differences.
  3. Higher rent growth for top earners was offset by lower income groups' larger housing expenditure share early in the 1985-2019 period, yielding similar inflation rates across groups, with slightly higher inflation for lower income groups emerging later.

"...This note takes a step towards measuring differential inflation rates across income groups by examining how quality-adjusted changes in rent have differed for households across the income distribution from 1985 to 2019. Rent is an especially important component of household spending to consider because housing services account for more than 25 percent of the household spending basket in the Consumer Price Index, and the price of housing services is measured using rent. Moreover, it would not be surprising to find material differences in rent growth across the income distribution, since housing costs have been rising more in locations where high-income households tend to live. For example, Moretti (2013) finds that rent growth from 1980 to 2000 was faster in metropolitan areas where college-educated people tend to live than in those where high-school educated people tend to live. We measure the rent changes facing households in different income groups by calculating changes in rent for individual housing units in the American Housing Survey and grouping rent growth observations according to the income of the resident. We find that rent growth differentials across groups were fairly minor overall. Rent growth was slightly faster for households at the top of the income distribution from 1985 to 2001, but this differential disappeared in the second half of the sample. Cumulating over the entire period, rent increased by 81 percent at the top quintile, and by 72 percent at the bottom quintile....Figure 5 shows these expenditure shares. Lower income households spend a larger fraction of consumption on housing, and all households have spent a growing fraction of consumption on housing over time...."

Differences in Rent Growth by Income 1985-2019 and Implications for Real Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Implications for General Inflation by Income Quintile

We can create a general price index for each income group by assuming that the prices of all other goods and services purchased by households are the same across income groups. We use the Tornqvist price index formula below:

(1) 1+πit−1,t=exp(sih,t−1+sih,t2ln(pih,tpih,t−1)+(1−sih,t−1)+(1−sih,t)2ln(pxh,tpxh,t−1))(1) 1+πt−1,ti=exp(sh,t−1i+sh,ti2ln(ph,tiph,t−1i)+(1−sh,t−1i)+(1−sh,ti)2ln(pxh,tpxh,t−1))

Where πit−1,tπt−1,ti is the inflation rate for income group ii between time period t−1t−1 and time tt, sih,tsh,ti is the housing expenditure share out of all household expenditures for income group ii in time tt, pih,tph,ti is the price index for housing for income group ii in time tt, and pxh,tpxh,t is the price index for other goods and services in time tt. For the price of housing services, we use an index created from the median rent growth rates of each income group. We calculate housing expenditure shares for each income group using data from the Consumer Expenditure Survey. In keeping with the CPI methodology, these expenditure shares are based on rental expenditures of renter households and the owners' estimate of the rent for their home for owner-occupied households. After calculating a housing expenditure share for each household, we take averages by year and income quintile. Figure 5 shows these expenditure shares. Lower income households spend a larger fraction of consumption on housing, and all households have spent a growing fraction of consumption on housing over time.

Differences in Rent Growth by Income 1985-2019 and Implications for Real Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 2


To implement equation 1 we also need an estimate of the non-housing price index. We calculate this index using the following data for all households as published as a part of the CPI program: the price indexes for tenants' rent, owners' equivalent rent of primary residence, and all items; and the expenditure shares for rent of primary residence and owners' equivalent rent of primary residence. We use the CPI index formula to back out the price index for non-housing goods and services.

One final issue to address is that we are using median rent growth to reflect the rent inflation experienced by each income group, whereas the CPI is designed to reflect average inflation experiences. Since median rent growth tends to be below the average (as we showed in Figure 2), simply using the medians for the price of housing services used in equation 1 would result in a general price index with lower growth than the CPI. We address this issue by calculating the difference between median rent growth in the AHS (across all income groups) and the growth rate of the CPI for tenants' rent for each two-year period. Then we add this difference to the median rent growth for each income quintile.8 Thus, the average rent inflation rate across income quintiles will be the same as in the CPI, while we preserve the differences across income groups calculated in the AHS.

Table 3 reports the general inflation estimates by household income group. In the first half of the sample, the estimates turn out to be quite similar across groups. Even though the higher income groups tended to experience higher rent growth, lower income groups tended to spend a larger fraction of their consumption on housing. Since rent growth even for the bottom quintile was faster than inflation for other goods and services, the higher consumption share for the bottom quintile boosts the general inflation rate for that group by more than the top income quintile. This effect turns out to roughly offset the higher rent growth faced by the higher income quintile during this period. In the second half of the period, the general inflation rate is a bit higher for lower income groups, owing to both their slightly faster rent growth and their higher share of housing services in consumption. Cumulating over the entire sample period, the differences across income groups are relatively small.

Differences in Rent Growth by Income 1985-2019 and Implications for Real Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 3


An important caveat to this result is that inflation for non-housing goods and services could differ by income group. Research using scanner data, which mostly reflects retail goods like food, beverages, and housekeeping supplies, has found that inflation tended to be about 1 percentage point per year lower for the top income quintile than the bottom income quintile during the period 2004-2015 (Jaravel 2019, Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2017). These results suggest that inflation differences across income groups would be larger if other goods and services were taken into account.

Concluding thoughts

Differences in the price of housing services and the fraction of expenditures devoted to housing have not led to material differences in inflation across income groups over the past three decades. This result may be fairly surprising given prior research that has found substantial differences in housing costs in areas where high income households tend to live relative to areas where low income households tend to live (Moretti 2013; Gyourko, Mayer and Sinai 2013). It turns out that these geographic differences in housing costs overstate the rent growth differences faced by households in different income groups. One plausible explanation could be that lower income households are more likely to move out of areas with rising rents, bringing down average rent growth in areas where these households are observed living relative to the rent growth that we calculate absent this migration response. Also, households could sort differentially across neighborhoods within metropolitan areas in a way that reduces differences in rent growth across groups relative to the rent differences across metropolitan areas. Relatedly, rent growth tends to differ between single-family and multifamily units, even within the same neighborhood (Adams and Verbrugge 2021), which could lead to differences across income groups since higher income households are more likely to live in single-family homes. More research to understand why differential rent growth across metropolitan areas has not led to material differences in rent growth across the income distribution would be fruitful.

This article adds to the body of research that has investigated differences in prices paid or inflation rates faced by households across the income distribution (Argente and Lee 2020, Jaravel 2019, Kaplan and Schulhofer-Wohl 2017). However, the scanner data used in prior research accounts for only about 10 percent of the household consumption basket and rent accounts for an additional 25 to 30 percent, leaving more than half of the household consumption bundle for which differential inflation rates by income group have still been unexplored. More research should be done for these other types of household consumption to improve our understanding of how much and why inflation differs by income group.

References

Adams, Brian and Randal Verbrugge. 2021. "Location, Location, Structure Type: Rent Divergence within Neighborhoods" Federal Reserve Bank of Cleveland Working Paper 2103.

Garner, Thesia J. and Randal Verbrugge. 2009. "Reconciling User Costs and Rental Equivalence: Evidence from the US Consumer Expenditure Survey." Journal of Housing Economics 18: 172-192.

Gyourko, J., Mayer, C. and Sinai, T., 2013. Superstar cities. American Economic Journal: Economic Policy, 5(4),pp.167-99.

Heston, Alan and Alice O. Nakamura. 2009. "Questions about the Equivalence of Market Rents and User Costs for Owner Occupied Housing." Journal of Housing Economics 18: 273-279.

Jaravel, Xavier. 2019. "The Unequal Gains from Product Innovations: Evidence from the US Retail Sector" Quarterly Journal of Economics 715-783.

Kaplan, Greg and Sam Schulhofer-Wohl. 2017. "Inflation at the Household Level" Journal of Monetary Economics 91: 19-38.

Moretti, Enrico. 2013. "Real Wage Inequality" American Economic Journal: Applied Economics 5(1): 65-103.

Semega, Jessica, Melissa Kollar, Emily A. Shrider and John F. Creamer. 2020. "Income and Poverty in the United States: 2019". Current Population Reports, US Census Bureau.

________________________________

* The analysis and conclusions set forth are those of the authors and do not indicate concurrence by other members of the research staff or the Board of Governors. Return to text

1. Specifically, rent is used to calculate changes in the price of housing services faced by both renters and owner-occupants. Return to text

2. The purchase price of a home reflects the price to invest in housing, not the price of housing services. Similarly, owner expenditures such as mortgage and property tax payments reflect the price of owning the asset, not the price of consuming housing services. Although the user cost of owning a home should equal the price of housing services in theory, in practice some components of the user cost are difficult to measure. Return to text

3. Rent is topcoded at about the 97th percentile in each year. For 1997 and later years, the topcode is equal to the average rent among topcoded observations. For earlier years, the topcode is equal to the 97th percentile. To make the early years consistent with the later years, we multiply the pre-1997 topcode value by 1.5, since the post-1997 topcode values are roughly 50 percent higher than the rent at the 97th percentile. Return to text

4. Specifically, we regress the natural logarithm of rent on year indicators, the housing characteristics, and the indicators for metropolitan area. We calculate the residual from this regression, adding back in the estimated coefficients on the year indicators. The table reports the percent change in the average residual by income group. Return to text

5. There is no indicator for renovation prior post-2013. We also drop imputed rent values. Return to text

6. These cutoffs are an annualized log change of -0.21 at the bottom and 0.29 at the top. Return to text

7. This gap diminishes if we do not trim the top and bottom 5 percent of rent changes, but without the trimming average rent growth is extremely volatile year to year. Return to text

8. This difference is about 1 percentage point, on average. Return to text

Differences in Rent Growth by Income 1985-2019 and Implications for Real Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 4


Figure 4 shows rent growth experiences in the AHS broken out by quintile of household income. We report median rent growth because the distribution of rent growth has a long upper tail, so average rent growth does not reflect the experience of most households in that quintile. In most years prior to 2003, rent growth was generally a little higher for the higher income groups, but this difference disappears in the second half of the sample. Table 2 reports that on average, the annualized rent growth rate for the fifth income quintile was 0.4 percentage points higher than the first quintile from 1985 to 2001. From 2001 to 2019, rent growth at the top was slightly lower than rent growth at the bottom. Cumulating over the entire 34-year period, rent rose by only 9 percentage points more for the top quintile than for the bottom quintile. Meanwhile, rent growth for the middle three quintiles was in between the growth rates for the top and bottom quintiles. Thus, on net the dispersion in rent growth across income groups was pretty minor over our sample period.

Daryl Larsen, and Raven Molloy, "Differences in Rent Growth by Income 1985-2019 and Implications for Real Income Inequality," Federal Reserve Board, November 5, 2021, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/notes/feds-notes/differences-in-rent-growth-by-income-1985-2019-and-implications-for-real-income-inequality-20211105.htm

Differences in Rent Growth by Income 1985-2019 and Implications for Real Income Inequality

Introduction

Large and growing income differentials in the US have generated a mounting interest in income inequality among economists. The average income in the highest quintile of households increased by about 70 percent in real terms from 1985 to 2019, whereas the average income of the lowest quintile only increased by 20 percent during this period (Semega et al. 2020). However, these estimates of real incomes use the same price index to deflate nominal incomes, which requires the assumption that all households faced the same changes in the prices of goods and services that they purchase. Differences in the types of goods and services consumed, the geographic location of the purchase, or the type of store or outlet where purchased could all contribute to meaningful differences in price inflation faced by households in different income groups.

This note takes a step towards measuring differential inflation rates across income groups by examining how quality-adjusted changes in rent have differed for households across the income distribution from 1985 to 2019. Rent is an especially important component of household spending to consider because housing services account for more than 25 percent of the household spending basket in the Consumer Price Index, and the price of housing services is measured using rent.1 Moreover, it would not be surprising to find material differences in rent growth across the income distribution, since housing costs have been rising more in locations where high-income households tend to live. For example, Moretti (2013) finds that rent growth from 1980 to 2000 was faster in metropolitan areas where college-educated people tend to live than in those where high-school educated people tend to live.

We measure the rent changes facing households in different income groups by calculating changes in rent for individual housing units in the American Housing Survey and grouping rent growth observations according to the income of the resident. We find that rent growth differentials across groups were fairly minor overall. Rent growth was slightly faster for households at the top of the income distribution from 1985 to 2001, but this differential disappeared in the second half of the sample. Cumulating over the entire period, rent increased by 81 percent at the top quintile, and by 72 percent at the bottom quintile.

To assess the implications for a general measure of inflation, we allow the price of housing services to vary by income quintile and assume that the prices of all other goods and services are the same across groups. We also allow the expenditure share on housing services to vary by income quintile, since lower income households tend to spend a larger fraction of their consumption on housing than higher income households. In the first half of our sample, the differences in consumption baskets roughly offset the differences in rent growth across groups, leading to essentially no difference in general price inflation by income. In the second half of the sample, we estimate slightly higher inflation for lower income groups owing to their larger share of housing services. Cumulating over the entire period, the general price index rose by 136 percent for the top income quintile and by 143 percent for the bottom quintile. These differences are fairly minor relative to the widening in nominal income inequality during this period. Thus, on the whole, we find that accounting for differences in the price of housing services faced by households at different income levels does not change the conclusion that real income inequality expanded substantially over the past three decades.

The Case for Examining Rent

Even though only about one-third of households are renters, the Consumer Price Index uses rent to estimate changes in the price of housing services for all households because the price of housing services is not directly observable for owner-occupants.2 Specifically, for owner-occupied homes changes in rent of tenant-occupied units are weighted to more closely reflect the owner-occupied stock. In practice, this re-weighting has had little effect on the long-run trends in the estimated price of housing services. The index for rent paid by tenants increased by an average annual rate of 3.2 percent from 1985 to 2020, while the index for owners' equivalent rent increased by an average annual rate of 3.1 percent over this period. Consequently, in this note we will use rent paid by tenants to proxy for the price of housing services of all households, whether renters or owner-occupants.

One concern with the focus on rent is that there are fewer renters in higher segments of the income distribution. As shown by Figure 1, only 12 percent of households in the top income quintile in 2019 were renters. Because renting is so uncommon for this group, the rents that are observed may be a poor proxy for the price of housing services of owner-occupied homes in this group. Indeed, research has found that the ratio of rent to prices tends to be lower for high-value homes, signaling that these two types of units may not be comparable for high-income households (Garner and Verbrugge 2009, Heston and Nakamura 2009). That said, because the average growth rate of owners' equivalent rent was almost the same as the average growth rate of tenants' rent over our sample period, we maintain that changes in the rents paid by high-income households should provide a reasonable proxy for the changes in the price of housing services at the top of the income distribution, at least for the purpose of calculating long-run average growth rates in a CPI-type framework.

Differences in Rent Growth by Income 1985-2019 and Implications for Real Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 5


Rent in the American Housing Survey

The American Housing Survey is a nationally-representative panel that tracks housing units over time. We calculate the annual rent payments for each renter household based on the reported rent and reported frequency of rent payments.3 To establish some basic facts about rent payments across the income distribution, we first regress the natural logarithm of rent on a set of indicators for each quintile of the income distribution, omitting the bottom quintile. The regression also includes a set of year indicators to abstract from the general rise in prices. The first column of Table 1 reports the results and shows that higher income households tend to pay much higher rent than lower income households. Of course, higher income households live in larger, higher quality housing units so one should not interpret these results as reflecting differences in the price of housing services. In the second column, we add controls for housing characteristics such as unit size, number of bathrooms, and the resident's rating of unit quality. These controls reduce the rent differentials across groups, but they are still large. These results suggest that households in higher income groups pay significantly more rent than households in lower income groups, even for a similar quality of housing. However, higher income households may be located in areas with higher quality amenities, in which case the higher rents would be providing them with a greater quantity of housing services. The AHS is only large enough to identify 15 metropolitan areas in all of the survey years. As shown in column 3, adding indicators for these metro areas only reduces the rent differences across income groups a bit further. It is difficult to know the extent to which unobserved housing characteristics or locations (within metro area as well as across other metro areas that are not identified in the AHS) might be contributing to the remaining differences across groups.

Differences in Rent Growth by Income 1985-2019 and Implications for Real Income Inequality: Extended Excerpt Image 6


Because the focus of our analysis is on rent growth, next we calculate growth in average rent by income group from 1985 to 2019. Income quintiles are defined by calculating the household's location in the national distribution of income in each year. Consistent with prior research, households in the highest income group have experienced faster rent growth than households in the lower income groups. Interestingly, smallest rent increases were experienced by the second and third quintiles. In columns 2 and 3, we control for housing unit characteristics and metropolitan area.4 Adding these controls reduces the growth rates for all groups, illustrating that increases in average rent partly reflect increases in housing consumption and a population shift towards high-amenity locations. Moreover, adding these controls reduces the variation in growth across groups. This result hints that holding unit quality and location fixed is important for uncovering the true changes in the price of housing services over time. Consequently, we next turn to calculations of rent growth for individual housing units, which will provide a more comprehensive way of controlling for these factors.

Rent Growth by Income Quintile

In the American Housing Survey, each housing unit is interviewed every two years. Our strategy is to calculate 2-year changes in rent for each housing unit in the sample and then group housing units according to the income of the household living in the unit in the first period. We classify housing units according to income in the first period because our goal is to estimate rent changes faced by households. Even if a household moves out and is replaced by a household with a different income, we view the first household as having faced the rent change of that housing unit. Importantly, because the American Housing Survey follows the same housing units over time, we can compute rent changes regardless of whether the resident household remains or moves out. We drop observations for units that experienced a major alteration or repair between survey years, as changes in rent would reflect changes in the quality of the unit in addition to changes in the price of housing services.5 We also drop observations below the 5th percentile and above the 95th percentile of the rent change distribution because these units also likely underwent some sort of change in quality.6 Because the survey was re-drawn in 2015, there are no units that were observed in both 2013 and 2015 and therefore we cannot calculate rent changes for that 2-year period.

Figure 2 compares the annualized growth rates in average rent in our sample to the growth rate of the CPI for tenants' rent. The average rent growth rate in the AHS tends to be fairly similar to the CPI, although it is a little lower in most 2-year periods.7 The median growth rate in the AHS has a time series pattern that is more similar to the CPI than the average AHS growth rate, although it is even lower than the average AHS growth rate. Figure 3 compares average rent growth by metropolitan area for the 15 metropolitan areas that can be identified in both datasets. The correlation is fairly high, with metropolitan areas like New York and Seattle having experienced among the strongest rent growth in both datasets, and metro areas like Detroit and Dallas having experienced the slowest rent growth. We conclude that the rent inflation experienced by the households in the AHS is a reasonable reflection of the housing services component of the CPI, although in our analysis below we will correct for the differential growth rates in the two data sources.

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Showing 160 database articles primarily about Inequality

A College-by-College Guide to Which Majors Pay Off — or Don’t

AI Summary. An analysis of federal aid recipients' tax-reported earnings finds the highest-earning bachelor's programs are concentrated at highly selective schools and in computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering. Nursing programs at several California schools produce graduates earning around $150,000 annually, placing them in the top 100 of nearly 25,000 programs analyzed.

Arfa Momin and Ron Lieber New York Times
Date Posted:
October 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

A HEA Group analysis of the earnings of 2018 and 2019 college graduates four years after graduation finds earnings are widely dispersed across schools in higher-earning fields such as computer science and economics and have a narrow dispersion in lower-earning fields such as English and drama.

Which college majors and schools produce the highest-earning graduates?

Core argument: HEA Group’s analysis of nearly 25,000 bachelor’s programs found computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering majors top the earnings list, with graduates of highly rejective schools including the Ivies, M.I.T., Stanford and U.C.L.A. dominating.

HEA Group tracked students who received federal financial aid and graduated during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 periods. The top of the earnings list is dominated by graduates of highly rejective schools — the Ivies and others, like M.I.T., Stanford and U.C.L.A. The majors that top the list are computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering. The income data come from whatever people reported on their federal tax returns. That means certain stock awards and other potential deferred compensation aren’t part of the totals. Nursing programs at a handful of California schools, including California State University, East Bay; San Francisco State University; and Samuel Merritt University, produce graduates earning around $150,000 annually, putting them in the top 100 out of the nearly 25,000 bachelor’s programs the HEA Group analyzed nationwide. They stick out amid quantitative and science majors from institutions like the California Institute of Technology and Cornell.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. HEA Group’s analysis of nearly 25,000 bachelor’s programs found computer science, mathematics and electrical engineering majors top the earnings list, with graduates of highly rejective schools including the Ivies, M.I.T., Stanford and U.C.L.A. dominating.
  2. Nursing graduates of California State University, East Bay; San Francisco State University; and Samuel Merritt University earn around $150,000 annually, placing those programs in the top 100 amid quantitative and science majors from institutions like the California Institute of Technology and Cornell.
  3. HEA Group tracked federal financial aid recipients who graduated during the 2017-18 and 2018-19 periods, using income reported on federal tax returns, which excludes certain stock awards and other potential deferred compensation.

Related Articles:

  • Do Adults Have the Skills They Need to Thrive in a Changing World? — An international assessment of adult skills describes numeracy proficiency levels ranging from counting objects and adding small whole numbers at the lowest level, to extracting information from tables and graphs and performing basic arithmetic with money and percentages at Level 1, up to analysing complex mathematical information and critically evaluating whether data support a claim at Level 5.
  • Have Humans Passed Peak Brain Power? — The share of Americans reporting they read a book in the past year has fallen below half, alongside declining performance in numeracy and problem-solving in most countries. The share of adults unable to use mathematical reasoning to evaluate the validity of statements averages 25% in high-income countries and 35% in the US.
  • Standardized Test Scores and Academic Performance at a Public University System — A study of a large public urban university system finds that high school grade point average is a far stronger predictor of student academic success than SAT scores, contrasting with analyses of highly selective colleges that found the SAT superior. Under-represented minority students were less likely to graduate within six years at every grade point average level.
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To Have and Have Not: The Determinants of Social Status in England, 1600-2026

AI Summary. Analysis of English genealogical records and marriage registries estimates that the underlying correlation in social status across generations is close to 0.8, with status correlation detectable even among relatives nine generations apart. The authors find this persistence unchanged over four centuries, concluding that policies aimed at raising social mobility have not altered it.

Gregory Clark Southern Denmark University
Date Posted:
October 6, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Clark estimates that the intergenerational correlation of relative socioeconomic status in England remained ~0.8 btw 1600 and 2026. The pattern of correlations across near and distant relatives fits a model of genetic inheritance with strong assortative mating.

How persistent is social status across generations in England?

Core argument: Drawing on a genealogical database of 436,185 English people spanning 1600–2026 and records of about 1.7 million English marriages from 1837–2022, the authors estimate the underlying intergenerational correlation in social status at close to 0.8, higher than conventional measures indicate.

A large genealogical database of [436,185] English people 1600-2026, as well as detailed records of [~1.7mn marriages] in England 1837-2022, [reveals] social status is much more persistent across generations than conventionally measured. The [inferred] underlying correlation in status across generations is close to 0.8, implying that even relatives as distant as nine generations apart still show correlation in social status. [Ratios of correlations among siblings, parents, aunts/uncles and cousins cancel common measurement-error attenuation: raw parent-child correlations average .39, versus .77 for inferred underlying persistence. Independently, surnames selected as elite by 1858-87 wealth yield a per-generation status persistent coefficient of b=.82 for occupational status and .80 for house value]. The strength of status persistence remains unchanged 1600-2026.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Drawing on a genealogical database of 436,185 English people spanning 1600–2026 and records of about 1.7 million English marriages from 1837–2022, the authors estimate the underlying intergenerational correlation in social status at close to 0.8, higher than conventional measures indicate.
  2. The estimated correlation in social status implies that relatives as distant as nine generations apart still show correlated status, with the strength of persistence unchanged from 1600 to 2026.
  3. The authors argue that the Industrial Revolution, the Demographic Transition, the emancipation of women, universal voting, and the modern welfare state have not increased English social mobility rates, and that resources poured into raising mobility have achieved nothing.

Related Articles:

  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • The Myth of Nordic Mobility: Social Mobility Rates in Modern Denmark and Sweden — Correcting for measurement error by using relative rather than absolute correlations among relatives, the authors estimate that educational intergenerational mobility in Denmark and Sweden is much lower than conventionally measured, with parent-child and sibling correlations much higher. They argue Nordic education spending and income compression have at best modestly reduced families' role in children's educational outcomes.
  • For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls: A Lineage of 400,000 English Individuals 1750-2020 Shows Genetics Determines Most Social Outcomes — A study of 402,000 English individuals across 1750–2020 estimates an intergenerational occupational status correlation of 0.88 and a genetic correlation between spouses of 0.76, which the authors interpret as a strong genetic basis for the persistence of social status. The authors argue that highly assortative mating around status genetics limits what policy can do to raise social mobility.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Heritability and Social Interaction in Labor Market Outcomes: Evidence from the Population of Twins in the United States

AI Summary. The authors estimate the heritability of labor market outcomes by comparing the excess similarity of same-sex over opposite-sex twins with the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings. They caution that social interaction between twins, assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or indirect parental effects can bias such estimates upward or make them reflect non-genetic influences.

David Card, Jesse Rothstein and Moises Yi National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Analysis of 44,500 twin pairs suggests ~one-third of the variation in log earnings is due to genetic differences – likely an upper bound, because same-sex twins may influence one another and share more similar environments than ordinary same-sex siblings.

How reliable are twin-based estimates of heritability in earnings?

Core argument: The authors identify heritability of U.S. labor market outcomes from a difference-in-differences comparing same-sex versus opposite-sex twins against the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical.

Our model identifies heritability from the difference-in-differences of same-sex vs. opposite-sex twins vs. siblings. [Specifically], the model attributes to genetic differences the excess similarity of same-sex over opposite-sex twins over and above the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical. The ordinary-sibling comparison is intended to remove family influences that differ between sons and daughters. Social interactions may lead to an over-estimate of the genetic component in earnings. The estimated heritability of outcomes may be biased in the presence of assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or violations of the assumption that the home environment is shared to the same degree for MZ as for DZ twins. Even when estimated without bias, heritability need not indicate direct genetic effects – it also may reflect indirect or cultural effects (e.g., effects of the parents’ genes on a child’s outcomes, not operating through the child’s own genes. Twins may [also] influence each other directly – for example in their choice of jobs -- inflating the correlation in their outcomes.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors identify heritability of U.S. labor market outcomes from a difference-in-differences comparing same-sex versus opposite-sex twins against the corresponding difference among ordinary siblings, adjusting for the estimated share of same-sex twins who are identical.
  2. Social interactions between twins, such as influencing each other’s job choices, may inflate the correlation in their outcomes and lead to an over-estimate of the genetic component in earnings.
  3. Estimated heritability may be biased by assortative mating, genetic dominance, population stratification, or unequal sharing of the home environment between identical and fraternal twins, and even unbiased estimates may reflect indirect or cultural effects such as parents’ genes.

Related Articles:

  • IQ Differences of Identical Twins Reared Apart Are Significantly Influenced by Educational Differences — An analysis of 87 identical-twin pairs raised apart with individual IQ and biographical data finds that pairs with similar schooling had an average IQ gap of 5.8 points and a correlation of 0.87, while educationally dissimilar pairs averaged a 12.8-point gap and a 0.75 correlation.
  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • A Chip Off the Old Block? Genetics and the Intergenerational Transmission of Socioeconomic Status — Linking Dutch genetic data to tax records, the authors estimate that moving a person 10 percentiles higher in a genetic index raises their own income by 0.9 percentiles and their child's by 0.7 percentiles. They attribute about 50% of this to transmitted genes and the rest to environmental pathways.
  • Inequality
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Recent Trends in Personal Income & Wage Inequality

AI Summary. In New York City, income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than nationally, with nearly two-thirds of real income growth accruing to the top 1% versus under 40% nationally, a divergence driven predominantly by non-wage income. Real median income fell, and real average income for the bottom 90% was essentially flat.

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller
Date Posted:
September 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is rising income concentration in a major city driven by non-wage income?

Core argument: Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Nearly two-thirds of New York City's real income growth between 2019 and 2024 accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally, a result that holds when volatile capital gains are excluded.
  2. Real median income in New York City fell between 2019 and 2024 and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat, with local-price-adjusted purchasing power for the lower 90% of New Yorkers close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally.
  3. The divergence at the top of New York City's distribution is predominantly a story of non-wage income, with wage and salary income widening much more mildly and occupational wage data excluding bonuses showing base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than higher-wage ones.

Related Articles:

  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.
  • The Demographic Trends That Shaped Mamdani’s Win — In New York City's mayoral race, Mamdani's average margin was 30 points in precincts with a median age under 45, and voters under 45 made up 43% of in-person ballots versus 36% in the prior governor's race. He won by over 50 points in neighborhoods where the white population share grew and the Black or Hispanic share declined.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt

AI Summary. US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of World War II, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data. Employees' share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest since the 1950s, with the decline gaining pace in recent years.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are corporate profits taking a record share of national income from workers?

Core argument: US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. US pre-tax corporate profits reached an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data.
  2. Employees' share of national income from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s, with the decline gaining pace over the past five years and especially the past 12 months.
  3. Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan, said that regardless of the measure used, workers have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time.

Related Articles:

  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards, estimated at 7.6% versus a post-1949 high of 8.2%, while employee pay as a share of non-financial corporate gross value added has fallen from 66% to 56%. One argument holds that subdued demographic growth leads companies to prioritize maximizing margins over expanding capacity.
  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — The measured corporate labor share fell from 63% in 1978 to 58% in 2017, but the authors estimate that tax-driven reclassification of wages as S corporation profit and the shift of high-labor-share firms into partnerships account for about 1.6 percentage points, roughly a third of the decline.
  • Inequality
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics
  • Workforce

The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. An analysis of about 7,000 billionaires over the past 25 years classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it derives from inheritance or from sectors such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials that often depend on political access. The authors find half of global billionaire wealth now comes from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, an all-time high.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Is a growing share of billionaire wealth self-made in competitive industries?

Core argument: For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time, half the wealth of the world's billionaires is reasonably fairly earned, with the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors reaching an all-time high over the past decade.
  2. A list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years, assembled from Forbes, Hurun and Gapminder data, classifies wealth as "uncompetitive" when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence and raw materials, which often depend on political access.
  3. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth, which counts inheritors, rose slightly from 2001 to 2014, and the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined since 2021.

Related Articles:

  • AI is the Democratic Party’s Next Villain — Mentions of billionaires in Democratic fundraising emails quadrupled to a peak above 20% of all emails sent and have held near 15%, making anti-billionaire messaging a mainstay. Anti-AI populism remains far smaller and is entering Democratic rhetoric not as a jobs or safety issue but as something billionaires are building.
  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Information technology created investment opportunities exceeding the supply of properly trained talent, while trade with low-wage economies, low-skilled immigration, trade deficits, and aging demographics eased constraints on low-skilled labor and risk-averse savings. The author argues this framework, rather than rising cronyism, explains high returns to success, slowing productivity growth, and low interest rates.
  • Inequality
  • Politics
  • Workforce
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