Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
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France Tried Soaking the Rich. It Didnt Go Well

Noah Smith Bloomberg
Date Posted:
November 14, 2019
Is Database:
Database

French Wealth Tax likely cost French State 2x revenue in terms of lost income tax.

France's wealth tax, implemented from 1982-1986 and 1988-2017, imposed a top rate of 1.5%-1.8% on fortunes over €13m ($14.3m), raising only a few billion euros at its peak, or about 1% of total tax revenue. However, it led to the exodus of at least 10,000 wealthy individuals, primarily to Belgium, resulting in a significant loss of income and other taxes. French economist Eric Pichet estimated that the wealth tax cost the government nearly twice the revenue it generated. This outcome highlights the potential pitfalls of high wealth taxes, as the loss of affluent taxpayers can outweigh the benefits, suggesting that broader tax strategies might be more effective in addressing inequality without causing capital flight.

"...France had a wealth tax from 1982 to 1986 and again from 1988 to 2017. The top rate was between 1.5% and 1.8%, with the total tax rate on fortunes larger than 13 million euros ($14.3 million) hovering at about 1.4%. This is much less than the 6% top rate proposed by Warren (not to mention the 8% proposed by her fellow candidate, Senator Bernie Sanders), but it's close to the 2% rate Warren would impose on fortunes larger than $50 million....The revenue it raised was rather paltry; only a few billion euros at its peak, or about 1% of France’s total revenue from all taxes. At least 10,000 wealthy people left the country to avoid paying the tax; most moved to neighboring Belgium, which has a large French-speaking population. When these individuals left, France lost not only their wealth tax revenue but their income taxes and other taxes as well. French economist Eric Pichet estimates that this ended up costing the French government almost twice as much revenue as the total yielded by the wealth tax...."

Noah Smith, "France Tried Soaking the Rich. It Didn’t Go Well.,"Bloomberg, November 14, 2019, https://www.bloomberg.com/opinion/articles/2019-11-14/france-s-wealth-tax-should-be-a-warning-for-warren-and-sanders

France Tried Soaking the Rich. It Didn’t Go Well.

In recent years, several prominent economists have brought attention to the problem of growing inequality. These scholars include Thomas Piketty, author of the best-selling book “Capital in the Twenty-First Century,” and Emmanuel Saez and Gabriel Zucman, who in a new book chronicle the rise in American wealth inequality. All three embrace the same solution: much higher taxes. Piketty has declared that billionaires should be taxed out of existence, and he called for a global wealth tax, while Saez and Zucman helped Democratic presidential candidate Elizabeth Warren design her proposal for a U.S. wealth tax. Piketty and Saez have also suggested taxing top incomes at a rate of more than 80%.

Other economists have struggled to evaluate dramatic proposals like this. Studies on the effects of taxation when rates are moderate might not be a good guide to what happens when rates are very high. Economic theories tend to make a host of simplifying assumptions that might break down under a very high-tax regime. Historical experience is of some help, because the U.S. had very high top income taxes in the 1950s, but economic conditions could be very different now.

One way to predict the possible effects of the taxes is to look at a country that tried something similar: France, where Piketty, Saez and Zucman all hail from.

During the past few decades, as income inequality rose in most rich countries, it stayed relatively constant in France. The biggest reason is government redistribution in the form of taxes and social-welfare spending. France leads its rich-country peers, including the legendarily egalitarian Scandinavian countries, on both measures:

France Tried Soaking the Rich. It Didnt Go Well: Extended Excerpt Image 1


France, therefore, shows that inequality, at least to some degree, is a choice. Taxes and spending really can make a big difference.

But there’s probably a limit to how much even France can do in this regard. The country has experimented with both wealth taxes and very high top income taxes, with disappointing results.

France had a wealth tax from 1982 to 1986 and again from 1988 to 2017. The top rate was between 1.5% and 1.8%, with the total tax rate on fortunes larger than 13 million euros ($14.3 million) hovering at about 1.4%. This is much less than the 6% top rate proposed by Warren (not to mention the 8% proposed by her fellow candidate, Senator Bernie Sanders), but it's close to the 2% rate Warren would impose on fortunes larger than $50 million.

The wealth tax might have generated social solidarity, but as a practical matter it was a disappointment. The revenue it raised was rather paltry; only a few billion euros at its peak, or about 1% of France’s total revenue from all taxes. At least 10,000 wealthy people left the country to avoid paying the tax; most moved to neighboring Belgium, which has a large French-speaking population. When these individuals left, France lost not only their wealth tax revenue but their income taxes and other taxes as well. French economist Eric Pichet estimates that this ended up costing the French government almost twice as much revenue as the total yielded by the wealth tax. When President Emmanuel Macron ended the wealth tax in 2017, it was viewed mostly as a symbolic move.

Another French experiment was the so-called supertax, a 75% levy on incomes of more than 1 million euros. Introduced by socialist President François Hollande in 2012, the supertax added to the exodus of wealthy individuals, most notably actor Gerard Depardieu and Bernard Arnault, chairman of LVMH Moet Hennessy Louis Vuitton. Star soccer players threatened to go on strike, and there was fear that France would become a wasteland for entrepreneurs. Meanwhile, the supertax raised much less money than even the wealth tax had -- only 160 million euros in 2014. The unpopular tax was repealed two years after its adoption.

France’s experiments with taxing the wealthy at very high rates didn’t raise much money and didn’t prove politically sustainable. The flight of wealthy individuals from the country probably helped reduce inequality on paper, but it's not clear that their departure left France better off.

It’s possible that similar tax experiments in the U.S. might be more successful than in France. The U.S. economy is much larger than France’s; although a French business owner who moves to Belgium can still do business and move about freely within the European Union, an American mogul who moves to Canada might find access to one of the world’s largest markets restricted. That might allow the U.S. to raise more money from high taxes than France ever could.

But it’s also worth noting that France’s wealth tax and supertax ultimately weren’t that important. Despite repealing the supertax, France managed to increase government revenue and to reduce inequality. The end of the wealth tax will probably be a similar story. France simply didn’t need these flamboyant taxes on the rich to have very high levels of taxation and social spending. That means the U.S. probably doesn’t need them either. Tax increases across the board -- on top incomes, capital gains, estates, pass-through businesses, corporations, and so on -- might not excite populist firebrands, but they’re probably a more effective strategy for fighting inequality.

  • Inequality
  • Comparisons
    • Cross-country
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
Previous articleNovember 13, 2019Innovation in Europe: Changing the game to regain a competitive edgeEurope allocates 53% of its R&D to the automotive sector, yet its global share of superstar firms has halved since 1999. Europe’s private R&D investment is only 19% of the global total, trailing behind China & the US.Next articleNovember 14, 2019Warren Wealth Tax Could Slow Economy, Early Analysis FindsA preliminary analysis by the Penn Wharton Budget Model suggests Warren’s Wealth Tax could reduce annual economic growth from 1.5% to 1.3% over a decade, a slowdown 3x that of Trump’s tax cuts.
Showing 156 database articles primarily about Inequality

US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt

AI Summary. U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.

Myles McCormick Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Corporate profits have risen to 18% of national income, their highest share since 1947, while labor’s share has fallen to 60%, a low not seen since the 1950s. The decline in labor’s share has accelerated over the past year.

Are record corporate profits coming at workers' expense?

Pre-tax earnings hit an annualised $4.8tn in the second quarter, or 18% of national income, according to Bureau of Economic Analysis data, the highest share since the aftermath of the second world war. Employees’ share from wages and benefits fell to 60%, the lowest level since the 1950s. “Regardless of what measure you look at, workers, in terms of employee compensation, have been receiving an increasingly small share of national income over time,” said Abiel Reinhart, an economist at JPMorgan. The decline in labour’s share of income has gained pace in the past five years and especially over the past 12 months.

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  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
  • Inequality
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The Rise Of The Deserving Rich

AI Summary. Billionaire wealth from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has reached an all-time high, with fairly earned wealth now accounting for half of total billionaire wealth globally, while wealth from politically connected industries has declined since 2021.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
July 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

An Economist analysis of the wealth of 7,000 billionaires finds that over the past decade, the share of billionaire wealth “derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high.”

Does self-made wealth now dominate billionaire fortunes globally?

Core argument: For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.

Drawing on data from Forbes, a magazine, Hurun, a research firm, and Gapminder, a Swedish foundation, we have assembled a list of about 7,000 billionaires from the past 25 years. We call a billionaire’s wealth “uncompetitive” when it mainly comes from industries such as gambling, construction, defence, and raw materials. These sectors often depend on political access. We count inheritors in the “uncompetitive” category. From 2001, when our data begin, to 2014, the uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth rose slightly. Yet over the past decade, the share derived from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors has surged to an all-time high. For the first time, half the wealth of the world’s billionaires is reasonably fairly earned. And since 2021, the total wealth derived from uncompetitive sectors has declined.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. For the first time in the 25-year dataset, half of global billionaire wealth derives from self-made entrepreneurs in competitive sectors, marking a structural shift away from politically connected and inherited fortunes.
  2. The uncompetitive share of billionaire wealth—spanning gambling, construction, defence, raw materials, and inheritance—rose modestly from 2001 to 2014 but has declined in absolute terms since 2021.
  3. Inherited wealth, though typically lawfully held, represents a policy failure in wealth distribution, as heirs’ fortunes reflect birth advantage rather than competitive value creation.

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  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — Inequality is mostly the result of an increasing premium on returns from risk and high-skilled labor ushered in by technological disruption and the feedback…
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Another Reason the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes!

AI Summary. A shift of ~$200bn in worker pay into corporate profits as stock-based compensation could explain roughly one-third of the long-run decline in labor's share of income, as stock ownership allows high earners to receive tax-preferred pay recorded as profits rather than wages.

Owen Zidar and Eric Zwick The Everywhere Millionaire
Date Posted:
July 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Zidar & Zwick suggest about one‑third of the post‑1970s drop in labor’s share is due to stock‑based pay to workers, in addition to the one‑third they already attribute to pass‑through income. That leaves only around one‑third for genuine shifts in technology, power, etc.

Does tax-preferred stock compensation explain the labor share decline?

Core argument: $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.

In our data for 2017, after adjustments for the rise of pass-throughs, we report employee compensation of $7.2 trillion and corporate value added of $12.2 trillion. The unadjusted corporate profits number (which excludes partnership profits) is $1.7 trillion. If we could find around $200 billion of “missing” labor compensation, that would account for about a third of the fall in the labor share since the late 1970s. Thus, if workers owned a bit above 10% of those corporate profits via stock compensation, then that would cover the difference. Distributing this amount across the top 10% of public company employees, of which there are 4.2 million, this ownership would imply an additional $40,000 or so in pay. The aggregate numbers are thus quite plausible in terms of how much pay might have shifted to corporate profits serving as tax-preferred payments to high earners.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. $200bn in missing labor compensation since the late 1970s drives roughly one-third of the labor share decline, reflecting tax-advantaged stock.
  2. Top 10% of public company employees ($40k additional implicit pay via equity ownership) concentrate gains that would equal $200bn aggregate.
  3. $12.2tn corporate value added vs. $7.2tn employee compensation reveals labor’s shrinking claim on output, as tax-preferred equity arrangements redirect worker.

Related Articles:

  • Why the Labor Share Keeps Falling: Taxes! — Tax code changes account for roughly one-third of the decline in the worker share of U.S. business income since 1978, as firms shift from corporate to pass-through structures to reclassify wages as profits and reduce tax burdens.
  • Human Capitalists — Equity Based Compensation ~45% Of Total Comp Of High-Skilled Labor, Including It In Labor Share Cuts Decline of Labor Share Since The 1980’s By 60%.
  • Capitalists in the Twenty-First Century — Most income at the top of the US income distribution is non-wage income, primarily derived from private business profits, according to @MatthewSmith…
  • Inequality
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income

Do Past Wealth Gaps Explain Modern Inequality? Evidence From Immigration To The United States

AI Summary. European immigrants who arrived with nearly no wealth converged to similar wealth levels as earlier European settlers within a few generations, while Black, Cuban, Mexican, and Puerto Rican households remained substantially behind, indicating that initial wealth gaps do not uniformly predict long-run inequality across all groups.

Brian Marein Wake Forest University
Date Posted:
June 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Except possibly at the very top of the distribution which SIPP cannot measure, the wealth of “new” Southern and Eastern European immigrants to the US has fully caught up with “old” immigrants. Wealth converges quickly once earnings inequality vanishes.

Does initial wealth explain persistent inequality across immigrant groups?

Core argument: By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.

Inferring the determinants of long-run inequality from group-level data is complicated by the arrival of 30 million Europeans during the Age of Mass Migration (roughly 1850 to 1924), who are by construction included in average white wealth despite having no direct claim to the wealth accumulated by earlier Americans. By1920, nearly half of white adults were either foreign-born or had foreign-born parents. Using the United States Immigration Commission Reports (commonly known as the Dillingham Commission Reports), I document that immigrants at the turn of the twentieth century arrived with almost no wealth. [Thus] a large share of the white population started from a substantial wealth disadvantage. Northwestern Europeans comprised the overwhelming majority of earlier immigrants, dating back to the initial European settlement of North America, while Southern and Eastern Europeans predominated at the turn of the twentieth century. If initial wealth disadvantages persisted across generations, one would expect households of Southern or Eastern European ancestry to possess less wealth than those of Northwestern European ancestry, since their families arrived later and started with substantially fewer resources. In fact, they do not. On average, they are wealthier.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. By 1920, 50% of white adults were foreign-born or had foreign-born parents, yet Southern and Eastern European descendants achieved wealth.
  2. European immigrants arrived at the turn of the twentieth century with nearly zero wealth, yet their descendants’ wealth distributions converged.
  3. White ancestry groups exhibit nearly identical wealth distributions by 1980–1990 despite staggered arrival times spanning 270+ years, while Black, Cuban.

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  • 00 to 2022 — Gregory Clark @PNASNews finds that social status in England was strongly correlated across generations between 1600 and 2022, consistent with a theory of…
  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Raj Chetty @OppInsights finds that a white child born into the bottom household income quintile in 1992 had a 29.7% chance of remaining there, up from 24.9% in…
  • Inequality
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    • Immigration
    • Mobility/Assortative Mating

The Great $110 Trillion Wealth Transfer Won’t Happen Any Time Soon

AI Summary. Bequeathable wealth in the U.S. rose from 256% to 424% of GDP between 1997 and 2021, with 97% of that increase concentrated in households headed by someone 55 or older. The wealthiest 10% of that age group drove 75% of the total gain, meaning inherited wealth is becoming increasingly concentrated

Rachel Louise Ensign and James Benedict Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
May 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The age at which Americans are inheriting money has risen. According to Federal Reserve surveys, btw 1998 and 2010, Americans in their late 50s were most likely to report receiving an inheritance; by 2013–2022, that age had ticked up to the mid 60’s.

Will the concentration of inherited wealth impact economic equality?

Core argument: Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.

Fed data [indicates] that what is known as the bequeathable wealth rose from 256% of gross domestic product in 1997 to 424% in 2021, the last year of available data. A staggering 97% of that increase was due to wealth gains in households where the head of household was 55 or older. Older Americans may keep accumulating wealth, especially if the stock market keeps rising. But some will spend it on living costs and expensive long-term care, leaving less for heirs. When they die, many will leave their money to their spouses, who are often in their same generation. This year, around $1.3 trillion is expected to be passed onto spouses, compared with about $2 trillion to heirs in Gen X and younger generations, according to projections from research firm Cerulli Associates.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bequeathable wealth surged to 424% of GDP in 2021 from 256% in 1997, with 97% of gains concentrated in households.
  2. The wealthiest 10% of households age 55+ captured 75% of total bequeathable wealth gains since 1997, resulting in widening inequality.
  3. Boomers accumulated $1tn+ in wealth during Q4 alone, outpacing all other generational groups, as stock and business valuations drive outsized.

Related Articles:

  • A Preliminary Report on Taxing the Great Wealth Transfer: Revenue and Distributional Effects of Taxes on Estates, Inheritances, and Unrealized Capital Gains at Death — Bequeathable wealth/GDP has risen from 256% to 424% over 1997- 2021, but the current estate tax law yields ~$0 revenue. @BrookingsInst researchers propose an…
  • Is Inherited Wealth Bad? — Existing data show ~80% of private wealth in early 20th-century Europe was inherited. In France and Sweden that fell to ~40% by 1975, but has since risen. In…
  • How To Get Rich in 2025 — As baby boomers die, inheritances as a share of US output are over 10% which is just off a post-WW II high. For every $100 paid in wages, the dead leave behind…
  • Inequality
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Has Generational Progress Stalled? Income Growth Over Five Generations of Americans

AI Summary. Generational income growth in the United States has slowed across five successive generations, with each cohort earning less relative to the previous one by their late 30s.

Kevin Corinth and Jeff Larrimore Demography
Date Posted:
April 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As measured by the 36–40 cohort across generations, Americans’ real market income has continued to rise but at a slower pace. Accounting for taxes and transfers partially offsets the slowdown in the growth of market income.

Core argument: Income growth for Americans in their late 30s declined 50% from the Silent Generation (born 1928–1945) to Millennials (born 1981–1996).

We zoom in on a focal age range in peo­ple’s late 30s—an age at which we observe the five gen­er­a­tions from the Greatest Generation (born 1901–1927) through the Millennial Generation (born 1981–1996)—and assess both whether gen­er­a­tional prog­ress is positive and the extent to which the rate of growth is speeding up or slowing down. Focusing first on median market income, there are two notable takeaways that apply for both the individual/couple and the household sharing units.The first is that generational progress has clearly slowed since the Baby Boom Generation, although it remains positive. Second, despite the perception that slowing generational progress is a recent phenomenon, the substantial slowdown did not start with Millennials but began a generation earlier with Generation X. Looking at the patterns formed in household market income by generation, the income of Baby Boomers in their late 30s was 31% above that for similarly aged adults in the Silent Generation. Progress slowed substantially for Generation X—their incomes increased by 10% relative to Baby Boomers—and then ticked up for Millennials, whose incomes rose by 15% relative to Generation X. Although market income is an important indicator of progress, it does not reflect the full set of resources that individuals have available for consumption. The slowdown in generational progress is softened when accounting for taxes and transfers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Income growth for Americans in their late 30s declined 50% from the Silent Generation (born 1928–1945) to Millennials (born 1981–1996).
  2. Wage growth deceleration across five generations results in widening inequality, with top earners capturing disproportionate income gains while median earners.
  3. Workforce participation shifts and wage stagnation for Millennials vs. prior generations lead to delayed wealth accumulation and reduced intergenerational economic.

Related Articles:

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  • Inequality
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    • Wages/Income
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