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The Voters Who Helped Democrats Keep the Senate

AI Summary. In Pennsylvania's Senate race, the Democratic candidate won by about 5 percentage points, improving on the prior Democratic presidential margin across nearly the whole state. His gains averaged 7 points in counties at least 60% white without a college degree, versus 3 points elsewhere.

Geoffrey Skelley FiveThirtyEight
Date Posted:
January 4, 2023
Is Database:
Database

.@FiveThirtyEight analyst @geoffreyvs finds that Fetterman’s margin of victory was provided by non-college white voters: Fetterman polled 7pp better than Biden in counties dominated by non-college whites.

Did Democrats gain most among white voters without college degrees?

Core argument: John Fetterman defeated Republican Mehmet Oz by about 5 percentage points in Pennsylvania's Senate race, improving on Biden's margin across almost the entire state.

John Fetterman bettered Biden’s margin across almost the entire state on his way to defeating Republican Mehmet Oz by about 5 percentage points, his largest improvements over Biden tended to be in red-leaning counties with higher shares of white residents without a college degree. In counties with a population that’s at least 60 percent white without a college degree — which together produced about 36 percent of the state’s 2022 vote — Fetterman’s margin was 7 points better than Biden’s, on average, compared with just 3 points better elsewhere.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. John Fetterman defeated Republican Mehmet Oz by about 5 percentage points in Pennsylvania's Senate race, improving on Biden's margin across almost the entire state.
  2. In Pennsylvania counties at least 60 percent white without a college degree, which together produced about 36 percent of the state's 2022 vote, Fetterman's margin averaged 7 points better than Biden's, compared with 3 points better elsewhere.
  3. Fetterman's largest improvements over Biden tended to come in red-leaning counties with higher shares of white residents without a college degree.

“…In counties with a population that’s at least 60 percent white without a college degree — which together produced about 36 percent of the state’s 2022 vote — Fetterman’s margin was 7 points better than Biden’s, on average, compared with just 3 points better elsewhere….”

Geoffrey Skelley, “The Voters Who Helped Democrats Keep the Senate,” FiveThirtyEight, December 19, 2022, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/biden-coalition-2022-senate-democrats/

The Voters Who Helped Democrats Keep the Senate

Coming into the 2022 midterm elections, the Democratic Party wasn’t sure what to do with its standard-bearer. With his poor approval rating, President Biden wasn’t a hot commodity on the campaign trail, as Democrats — facing an electoral environment that history suggested would be unfavorable — feared losing both chambers of Congress.

But after all the votes were tallied, Democrats retained control of the Senate by winning the chamber’s four most important races, holding onto seats in Arizona, Georgia and Nevada and picking up an open seat in Pennsylvania. The candidates who won these races didn’t do so by remaking the Democratic coalition in their states. In fact, county-level data suggests that their performances mostly tracked along Biden’s performance in the 2020 presidential election, which saw him carry all four states by narrow margins.

Where these Democratic candidates did gain ground suggests that they largely replicated Biden’s coalition while also making some small but specific inroads. In Pennsylvania counties with lots of white voters without a college degree, in some heavily Hispanic parts of Arizona, in the Atlanta metropolitan area in Georgia — Democrats won Senate seats by exceeding the margins Biden used to win each state in 2020. And even in Nevada, where Democratic Sen. Catherine Cortez Masto’s margin of victory was smaller than Biden’s, her performance in more affluent areas with larger numbers of white voters with a college degree suggests that she made up enough ground to offset her slightly smaller margins in lower-turnout and more racially diverse areas.

To examine how these various trends played out in each state, we took a look at the county-level results and how the Democratic winners’ margins compared to Biden’s in 2020. We also dug into how these changes related to demographic and population data from the U.S. Census Bureau.1 County-level data can’t always provide a clear picture of how different groups voted, so we also spent some time looking beneath the county level — at congressional district- or precinct-level results — to explore some of the key factors that propelled Democrats to victory.

Out of this quartet, the one Democratic pickup was the open seat in Pennsylvania, which saw a striking reversion of a recent trend in American elections: white voters without a college degree increasingly opting for Republican candidates. Indeed, while Democratic Sen.-elect John Fetterman bettered Biden’s margin across almost the entire state on his way to defeating Republican Mehmet Oz by about 5 percentage points, his largest improvements over Biden tended to be in red-leaning counties with higher shares of white residents without a college degree, as the chart below shows.

This pattern proved vital to the result because white voters without a college degree make up a big chunk of the Keystone State’s electorate. Three in four Pennsylvanians are white, putting the state in the top half of the whitest states in the country, and almost two in three of them do not have a bachelor’s degree. Former President Trump won the state in 2016, in part due to gains among voters in this group, and came just shy of defeating Biden there in 2020.

But Fetterman’s improvement wasn’t an accident, as his campaign spent a lot of time and effort appealing to blue-collar white voters in places where Democrats have lost ground in recent years. In counties with a population that’s at least 60 percent white without a college degree — which together produced about 36 percent of the state’s 2022 vote — Fetterman’s margin was 7 points better than Biden’s, on average, compared with just 3 points better elsewhere. It’s hard to know how much Oz’s profile as a Hollywood-connected television celebrity also played into these results. Fact is, Oz may have been an especially weak candidate when it came to appealing to less affluent voters in more rural areas, where Fetterman made some of his most sizable gains compared to Biden. But overall, Fetterman’s improvement in farther-flung places mattered because it reduced the GOP’s ability to run up massive margins outside the state’s two major metropolitan areas, which Republicans need in order to have a path to victory in Pennsylvania.

This focus coupled successfully with Fetterman’s profile as a former mayor of a struggling post-industrial town in the Pittsburgh area, which produced especially strong results for Fetterman in the western part of the state. Not only is western Pennsylvania whiter than the eastern part of the state, but parts beyond Allegheny County (Pittsburgh) were once more Democratic-leaning before becoming much redder in recent years. Thanks to his campaign and background, Fetterman’s margin was 8.5 points better than Biden’s across the entire Pittsburgh metropolitan statistical area, including double-digit overperformances in some of the area’s more peripheral and red-leaning counties.3 Now, Fetterman didn’t flip any of these counties, but he significantly reduced the Republican margin across most parts of the state’s western half. For instance, Greene County in the state’s southwest corner still went for Oz by 30 points, but Trump won it by 43 points in 2020.

At the same time, Fetterman’s winning performance didn’t necessarily involve massive engagement from every part of the Biden coalition. Fetterman ran about even with Biden’s 2020 showing in the larger Philadelphia metropolitan area, which was partly due to reduced turnout among Black voters. Philadelphia proper saw notably lower participation compared with 2018, the previous midterm, whereas the total number of votes cast was up almost everywhere else in the state. Nevertheless, Fetterman also did almost 5 points better than Biden in areas of the state outside of the Philadelphia and Pittsburgh metropolitan areas, showing the wide breadth of his outperformance.

Similar to Fetterman, Sen. Mark Kelly of Arizona won his race by holding together most of Biden’s coalition while also making small gains elsewhere. His 5-point victory over Republican Blake Masters came in part because he won a high level of support among Latino voters, a Democratic-leaning group that shifted somewhat toward Republicans in the 2020 presidential election — a trend the GOP had hoped to build on in 2022. As the chart below shows, Kelly improved on Biden’s margins most everywhere, but there was no relationship between the share of a county’s Latino population and how much Kelly outperformed Biden.4 Take the two counties that have majority-Hispanic populations: Kelly performed 3 points better than Biden in Santa Cruz (which is 83 percent Hispanic) and ran about even with Biden in Yuma (65 percent).

But about three-fourths of the state’s voters live in Maricopa County (Phoenix) and Pima County (Tucson), so the topline numbers in those counties may not tell us much about the Latino vote specifically (the counties are 32 and 38 percent Latino, respectively). So we have to look within those counties to get a clearer understanding of how the state’s Latino population voted. For instance, in the Maricopa-based 3rd Congressional District — Arizona’s most heavily Latino seat (58 percent by voting-age population) — Kelly did about 4 points better than Biden did in 2020, according to Daily Kos Elections. This suggests that, at the very least, Kelly probably didn’t lose much — if any — ground among Latino voters.

This takeaway is confirmed by Equis Research, a Latino-focused political firm that compared their modeled race and ethnicity voter data to precinct-level results in Maricopa. Equis found that as the share of the Latino population in a precinct grew, Kelly’s performance improved at about the same rate as Biden’s had in 2020. And across majority Latino precincts in Maricopa, Equis calculated that Kelly did about 1 point better than Biden.

Kelly also made further inroads in competitive or red-leaning areas in Phoenix with larger white populations. Within Maricopa County, Kelly did 5 to 7 points better than Biden in the 1st, 4th, 5th and 8th congressional districts (all but the 5th are entirely in Maricopa). These districts vary quite a bit in terms of partisanship, too, as the 1st and 4th are both highly competitive and the 5th and 8th districts are both solidly red. Considering registered Republicans in Maricopa turned out at a slightly higher rate than registered Democrats, Kelly’s performance suggests he may have won over some right-leaning (or formerly right-leaning) voters to outperform Biden’s 2020 showing.

Staying in the Southwest, Nevada also provided another key hold for Democrats in the Senate. Unlike the Democratic winners in Pennsylvania, Arizona and Georgia, Cortez Masto didn’t outperform Biden’s 2020 numbers statewide, but she did just enough to come out on top against Republican Adam Laxalt by 0.8 points statewide after Biden carried the state by 2.4 points in 2020. She did this by holding onto similar levels of support in places with large Latino populations and by performing on par (or slightly better) in areas with more college-educated white voters, who have been moving toward Democrats nationally.

But as always, Nevada came down to the vote tallies in Clark County (Las Vegas) and Washoe County (Reno), and in the end, Cortez Masto managed to lose a little ground in the former while staying even with Biden in the latter. And because Clark and Washoe contributed the vast majority of the statewide vote, Cortez Masto didn’t benefit much — but also didn’t hurt her chances — by running a tad better than Biden in the rest of the state.

Nevada has very few counties with sizable populations, so analyzing the state’s vote means moving below the county level to some extent. The three largest cities in Nevada — Las Vegas, Henderson and North Las Vegas — are all based in Clark County, and using precinct-level data, we can see that Cortez Masto did a tad better than Biden in wealthier and whiter Henderson while losing a little ground in the more racially and ethnically diverse Las Vegas and North Las Vegas. While she lost Henderson, a more well-educated GOP-leaning city that’s 60 percent white, Cortez Masto actually did 1 point better than Biden. And though she easily carried Las Vegas (42 percent white) and North Las Vegas (just 24 percent), Cortez Masto’s margin of victory was 1 point lower than Biden in the former and 2 points lower in the latter.

These are small differences, to be sure, but given the closeness of the race, every little shift mattered. Moreover, Cortez Masto performed almost identically to Biden in Washoe County as a whole, which looks similar to Henderson, another sign that whiter, wealthier and more educated areas in the two major metropolitan centers of the state didn’t break for the GOP but instead helped Cortez Masto stay in office. Turnout was also part of the story, however, as Clark had the sharpest drop in vote share amongst all Nevada counties compared with 2020’s vote totals, and more diverse places like Las Vegas and North Las Vegas saw steeper declines than whiter and more affluent areas like Henderson.

Still, this doesn’t mean Latino voters, who make up close to 30 percent of the state’s population, weren’t vital to Cortez Masto’s reelection. Equis Research examined the precinct-level vote in Clark and found that, crucially, Cortez Masto’s support in heavily Latino precincts was almost identical to Biden’s backing in the same places. As we saw throughout the country in 2020, Biden underperformed 2018 and 2016 Democratic numbers among Hispanics in Clark, but Cortez Masto avoided letting things slip further, which could have cost her reelection.

In Georgia’s Dec. 6 runoff, Democratic Sen. Raphael Warnock defeated Republican Herschel Walker by nearly 3 points after neither candidate won an outright majority in November. While the urban and suburban counties in Arizona, Nevada and Pennsylvania were crucial to the Democratic wins in those states, Georgia may have provided the best demonstration for how a Democratic candidate’s strong performance in such places led to victory.

Using FiveThirtyEight’s urbanization index,5 we can see that the more densely populated a county, the better Warnock tended to do compared to Biden’s 2020 margin. Most notably, Warnock increased Democratic vote share across the Atlanta metro area, including running up margins in the city’s increasingly diverse suburbs — a national trend we’ve seen in major population centers and one that helped Biden win the presidency two years ago.

Warnock’s improvement speaks to the proliferation of parts of the Democratic coalition in the Atlanta area, including a growing base of Black voters and a shift among white college-educated voters toward the party, but also meaningfully large Latino and Asian communities in parts of the region, too. The results also demonstrate how increased diversity in formerly lily-white suburban counties like Cobb and Fayette has changed the politics of such places dramatically.

Warnock’s most impressive showing was in the 11 counties of the Atlanta Regional Commission, which constituted almost half of Georgia’s vote in the 2022 runoff. Warnock won this region by almost 34 points, a 6-point improvement on Biden’s performance. Most of the region’s vote came from four principal counties: DeKalb and Fulton, which contain the city of Atlanta, and Cobb and Gwinnett, which are big suburban counties that sit north of Atlanta. Warnock outperformed Biden’s marks in each county by 5 to 7 points, despite a fair bit of variation in the racial and ethnic makeup of these places: DeKalb and Fulton have majority and plurality Black populations, respectively; Gwinnett’s population is roughly one-third white, one-quarter Black and one-fifth Latino; and Cobb’s population is half white and a quarter Black.

But his improvement over Biden showed up elsewhere in the Atlanta metro area, too. This included strong performances in two fairly different counties just south of the city: Warnock outperformed Biden by 7 points in Clayton County, which is 69 percent Black, but he also outdid Biden by 6 points in Fayette, a majority white and increasingly competitive county next door.

Outside of Atlanta and its environs, Warnock’s improvement over Biden was spottier, but he still tended to do better in counties surrounding other smaller cities in the state, such as Augusta, Columbus, Macon and Savannah, which are also comparatively more urban or suburban than much of the state. For his part, Walker did better than Trump in many places, but as the chart conveys, most of them were rural and less populous, which together couldn’t remotely make up for Walker’s losses in the more populous parts of the state.

The political environment will shift and change before we get to the 2024 election, but these performances show how Democrats can win if they maintain backing from the party base, gain support in increasingly diverse suburbs and campaign even in more rural and whiter places that have moved toward the GOP. It’s of course not all up to Democrats, as Republicans will need to pick stronger statewide candidates who can challenge Democrats’ ability to make inroads among more GOP-leaning constituencies. But at least in 2022, these four Democrats largely retained most of Biden’s coalition and at times added to it, which ensured Democrats continued control of the Senate in the next Congress.

  • Politics
Previous articleJanuary 4, 2023Google and Meta’s Advertising Dominance Fades as TikTok, Streamers EmergeAccording to data from Insider Intelligence, Google and Facebook’s share of digital advertising was 48.4% in 2022, and is expected to decline to 44.9% in 2023, as Amazon, TikTok, and digital streamers gain share. @WSJNext articleJanuary 4, 20232022 Review: How Republicans Lost Despite Winning the Popular Vote.@Nate_Cohn of @NYT notes that Republicans won the national House vote 51% to 48% but lost statewide in key Senate races where they won the statewide House vote, as candidates backed by former President Trump ran far behind mainstream Republicans in PA, AZ, GA, and NV.
Showing 187 database articles primarily about Politics

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

AI Summary. Survey data indicate 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans. Identification is highest among blue-collar workers at 77%, versus 61% in other occupations, and ranges from 52% of Asian adults to 62% of White adults.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Do most Americans identify as working class across income and education levels?

Core argument: 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 60% of U.S. adults say the term "working class" describes them well, an identity adopted across income and educational groups, including half of those with a bachelor's degree and half of upper-income Americans.
  2. Workers in blue-collar occupations identify as working class at a rate of 77%, compared with 61% of those in other occupations.
  3. About 62% of White and 59% of Hispanic adults view themselves as working class, as do roughly 54% of Black and 52% of Asian adults.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Inequality

The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

AI Summary. An analysis of X (formerly Twitter) posts finds that the share of sentences expressing anger rose among both Democratic- and Republican-affiliated users, with Republicans starting from a higher baseline of about 38% versus 27% for Democrats and reaching roughly 50%. The increase was larger among Democrats, narrowing the partisan gap.

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Is anger rising among partisans on social media?

Core argument: Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Anger among Republican-affiliated X users reaches roughly 50% of sentences by 2025, up from about 38% at the start of the period, continuing to rise during Biden's presidency.
  2. Democratic-affiliated X users start with anger in about 27% of sentences, then rise sharply after the 2016 election by much more than Republicans, narrowing the partisan gap by 2019.
  3. Both partisan anger series plateau from 2019 to 2022, with Democratic anger declining slightly after Biden's election while remaining well above pre-2016 levels.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.
  • Politics

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

AI Summary. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" hold postgraduate degrees but household incomes of $30,000–$60,000 a year, an unusual combination given that education and income are typically positively correlated. In the Democratic Socialists of America's most recent member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000.

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

Do highly educated, lower-income voters identify as very liberal?

Core argument: In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the Democratic Socialists of America's 2021 member survey, 80% of members aged 25 or older held bachelor's degrees while 45% reported household incomes below $60,000 per year.
  2. Composite CES data show only 19% of Americans with bachelor's degrees or higher had household incomes of $60,000 or below, while DSA survey respondents were twice as likely to fall into that category.
  3. US voters most likely to identify as "very liberal" are those with postgraduate degrees and household incomes of $30,000 to $60,000 per year, an unusual pairing since education and income are usually substantially positively correlated.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • Politics

America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

AI Summary. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 12% say democracy is working very or extremely well, and 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Has American confidence in capitalism and democracy declined?

Core argument: Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very or somewhat well, down from 60% about a decade ago, according to a Wall Street Journal-NORC survey.
  2. Only 12% of Americans say democracy is working very or extremely well, 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics, and 35% are fairly sure the nation offers good jobs and the American dream.
  3. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the Democratic share, and nearly half said America stands above all other countries, compared with 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Related Articles:

  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — The authors construct an index of "zero-sum thinking" — the belief that one group's economic gains come at another's expense across ethnic groups, citizens versus non-citizens, and countries in international trade. Among both moderate and strong Democrats, those in the top quartile of zero-sum thinking voted for Donald Trump at a disproportionately high rate.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — A study comparing survey responses of citizens and parliamentarians across 27 European countries finds that policymaking reflects voters' economic attitudes well, but the average parliamentarian is about one standard deviation more culturally liberal than the national mean voter. The author finds this cultural gap spans nearly all issues, countries, and established parties, and that right-wing populists fill it.
  • Politics

America Used To Be Exceptionally Patriotic. Now We're Below Average

AI Summary. Gallup polling shows the share of Democrats who are extremely proud to be American has fallen from an average of 58% to 14%. Republicans report higher pride overall, but their responses also shift with which party holds the presidency, ranging from an average of 79% down to 60% and back to 74%.

Eli McKown-Dawson and Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.

Has American pride declined and shifted with the ruling party?

Core argument: The share of Democrats extremely proud to be American fell from an average of 58% during George W. Bush's second term to 30% during Trump's first term and 14% in the most recent Gallup poll.

During George W. Bush’s second term, an average of 58% of Democrats were extremely proud to be American according to Gallup, as was an identical share of independents — though Republicans were higher. The rough parity between Democrats and independents lasted through Barack Obama’s second term, but the share of extremely proud Democrats fell to an average of 30% during Trump’s first term and was just 14% in the most recent Gallup poll. Although Republicans are generally more patriotic, their opinions can shift based on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue too. The share of Republicans extremely proud to be American fell from 79% on average during Bush’s second term to 60% during Biden’s term. What happened after Trump retook office? It jumped right back up to 74%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The share of Democrats extremely proud to be American fell from an average of 58% during George W. Bush's second term to 30% during Trump's first term and 14% in the most recent Gallup poll.
  2. Republicans extremely proud to be American averaged 79% during Bush's second term, fell to 60% during Biden's term, and rebounded to 74% after Trump retook office, according to Gallup.
  3. Gallup found Democrats and independents at an identical 58% extremely proud to be American during Bush's second term, with that rough parity lasting through Obama's second term.

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  • A Note on Factors Influencing Trust in Government — Using survey data for 34 OECD countries, the authors estimate that higher real income per capita, social spending, decentralization, and economic freedom raise trust in government, while inflation, unemployment, debt per capita, human capital, and a larger elderly population share lower it. Their estimates place a heavier weight on inflation than unemployment.
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — The United States averaged annual GDP growth above 3% for decades, but 2% or less is now more likely. Over ten years, the author estimates that gap amounts to a $3.36tn larger economy, $3.7tn more tax revenue, and 6m more jobs, shifting public psychology from abundance toward scarcity.
  • Politics

Texas Is Becoming America Inc’s Centre Of Gravity

AI Summary. Texas leads all US states in business investment and population growth, created roughly a fifth of all net new US jobs from 2020 to 2025, and is on course to overtake California as America's largest state economy. Other states are copying its approach, including plans to eliminate corporate income taxes and offer shovel-ready mega-sites.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
June 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to CBRE, at least 184 American firms, including Tesla and Caterpillar, moved their headquarters to Austin, Dallas or Houston btw 2020 and 2025. During that period, Texas drove ~20% of all net job creation in the US.

Is Texas becoming the center of American business investment and growth?

Core argument: Texas created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the United States from 2020 to 2025, and no state receives more business investment or adds more people to its population.

On May 27th the shareholders of ExxonMobil approved a plan to cut its ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where it has long had its headquarters. The oil giant is not alone. Texas is steadily establishing itself as America Inc’s new centre of gravity. No state receives more business investment or is adding more people to its population. From 2020 to 2025 it created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the country. It is only a matter of time before Texas overtakes California as the largest economy in America. Texas’s success should worry those in New York and California monitoring their tax take. At the same time it has spawned a raft of imitators. Legislators in North Carolina have passed a plan to get rid of its corporate-income tax by 2030. Tennessee has copied Texas’s strategy of offering firms shovel-ready mega-sites. Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Texas created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the United States from 2020 to 2025, and no state receives more business investment or adds more people to its population.
  2. ExxonMobil's shareholders approved a plan to cut ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where the oil giant has long had its headquarters.
  3. Other states are imitating Texas: North Carolina's legislators passed a plan to eliminate its corporate-income tax by 2030, Tennessee offers firms shovel-ready mega-sites, and Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.

Related Articles:

  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — County-level mapping of net domestic migration within the United States shows some counties gained net movers equal to 10% or more of their 2020 population while others lost an equivalent share, excluding international moves.
  • Fifty Shades of Growth — Boom Belt" states combine high birth rates with low death rates, led by Utah at 13.2 births and 6.3 deaths per 1,000 residents for a natural increase of 6.9 per 1,000. Texas records about 12.7 births versus 9.1 deaths per 1,000, with roughly half its population growth from natural increase.
  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — New York state's share of US taxpayers reporting over $1m in income fell from 12.7% in 2010 to 8.7% in 2022, and the Citizens Budget Commission estimates state and city income tax receipts from that group would have been $13bn higher had the share held. Job growth has concentrated in lower-paid health care and social assistance.
  • Politics
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Growth
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