Edward Conard

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Regs Will Increase Until Liquidity Improves

AI Summary. Regulatory changes are argued to be worsening the ability of the U.S. Treasury market to absorb large government debt issuance, as mandatory clearing of Treasury repurchase agreements raises leveraged investors' financing costs through higher collateral requirements. Mutual funds are meanwhile encouraged by regulation to use Treasury futures rather than buy Treasury securities outright, pointing to continued declines in liquidity.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
November 21, 2023

.@FedGuy12 writes that a recent SEC proposal for mandatory repo clearing will likely reduce Treasury liquidity by increasing the cost of repo.

Are new regulations reducing liquidity in the Treasury market?

Core argument: Three insights from the Fed's Treasury market conference point to a continued structural decline in Treasury market liquidity, with dealer balance sheet constraints having moved beyond those solvable through central clearing.

The Fed’s recent Treasury market conference offered three notable insights that suggest Treasury market liquidity will continue its structural decline. First, dealer balance sheet constraints have moved from ones that could be solved through central clearing to those that would require other adjustments. Secondly, mandatory Treasury repo clearing may reduce market liquidity by raising the cost of financing due to higher collateral haircuts. Lastly, mutual funds may not become significant marginal investors in cash Treasuries as regulations encourage them to invest using Treasury futures. The official sector appears to be making adjustments that will make it more difficult for the market to absorb the upcoming deluge of Treasury issuance. At a high level, cash Treasuries can be held by investors using borrowed money or cash investors. The leveraged investors are more nimble participants as cash investor participation depend on asset inflows or the liquidation of other asset holdings. Going forward it looks like the costs of leveraged financing will increase due to mandatory cleared repo and a limited supply of repo financing that is constrained by regulatory costs. Major investors that could participate in the cash market remain incentivized to instead use Treasury futures. The Treasury market looks to continue its trend of becoming less liquid and more volatile.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Three insights from the Fed's Treasury market conference point to a continued structural decline in Treasury market liquidity, with dealer balance sheet constraints having moved beyond those solvable through central clearing.
  2. Mandatory Treasury repo clearing may reduce liquidity by raising financing costs through higher collateral haircuts, while regulatory costs constrain the supply of repo financing for leveraged investors.
  3. Mutual funds may not become significant marginal investors in cash Treasuries, as regulations encourage them to gain exposure through Treasury futures instead.

Related Articles:

  • Resilience Redux in the US Treasury Market — The authors argue that large, persistent US federal deficits and limited dealer balance-sheet flexibility will cause outstanding Treasury debt to grow rapidly relative to the market's capacity to intermediate trades, absent significant changes in market structure. They contend broad central clearing, all-to-all trading, real-time post-trade reporting, capital-regulation changes, and transparent official purchase programs could strengthen market capacity and resilience.
  • How Has Treasury Market Liquidity Evolved in 2023? — Treasury market liquidity has tracked its historical relationship with interest rate volatility, indicating liquidity has not been unusually poor given the level of rate volatility, though the two-year note shows somewhat higher-than-expected price impact. The market's capacity to smoothly handle large trading flows remains a concern for policymakers and market participants.
  • Liquidity Event — U.S. Treasuries remain the world's most liquid security, but daily cash trading volumes have not kept pace with the growth in issuance, leaving the market structurally less liquid. Principal trading firms account for 20% of cash market volumes yet withdraw when volatility rises, making their liquidity provision illusory.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy
Previous articleNovember 21, 2023When Will Balance Sheet Runoff End and How Will the Fed Know When to Stop?A @GoldmanSachs forecast argues the FOMC will not moderate the pace of balance sheet reductions until late 2024. They write that the reduction is “likely already anticipated by financial markets” and therefore fully reflected in current rates.Next articleNovember 21, 2023What We Know About Unauthorized Immigrants Living In The U.S.10.5mm unauthorized immigrants lived in the US in 2021, under the 2007 peak of 12.2mm. This represented about 3% of the total U.S. population and 22% of the foreign-born population, among the lowest shares since the 1990s.
Showing 7 database articles primarily about Banking

The Disparate Outcomes of Bank‑ and Nonbank‑Financed Private Credit Expansions

AI Summary. Bank and nonbank credit often move in opposite directions, and the authors find they predict downside growth risk differently: a one-standard-deviation increase in bank credit raises the probability of real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 2.5 percentage points against a 6% baseline, while the same increase in nonbank credit lowers it by 1.9 percentage points.

Nina Boyarchenko and Leonardo Elias Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
August 22, 2024
Is Database:
Database

A @NewYorkFed analysis of 33 countries over 1966-2020 finds 1 s.d. higher growth rate in bank credit increases the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 2.5 percentage points, while nonbank credit has the opposite effect.

Do bank and nonbank credit booms predict different downside growth risks?

Core argument: A 1 standard deviation increase in bank credit growth raises the probability of year-on-year real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 2.5 percentage points, against a 6% baseline probability in the authors' sample.

Credit extended by the banking and nonbanking sector[s] do not always move together. One type of lending is [often] expanding while the other is contracting, which suggests a substitution between bank and nonbank lending. Overall booms in private credit can be driven by either. We find that bank and nonbank credit expansions predict differentially the downside risk to growth—that is, the probability of extreme negative real GDP growth realizations. The blue line in the chart shows that the likelihood of an extreme negative real GDP growth realization —which we define as year-on-year real GDP growth below -2%— increases following expansions in bank credit for horizons of one to three years, while at the same horizon, growth in nonbank credit actually lowers the probability of a large drop in real GDP growth. In particular, a 1 s.d. Increase in bank credit increases the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 2.5 ppts relative to a baseline 6% probability in our sample. In contrast, a 1 s.d. higher growth rate in nonbank credit lowers the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 1.9 ppts.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 1 standard deviation increase in bank credit growth raises the probability of year-on-year real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 2.5 percentage points, against a 6% baseline probability in the authors' sample.
  2. A 1 standard deviation higher nonbank credit growth lowers the probability of real GDP growth below -2% two years later by 1.9 percentage points, the opposite sign from bank credit expansions at horizons of one to three years.
  3. Bank and nonbank credit do not always move together, with one often expanding while the other contracts, which the authors read as substitution between the two, and private credit booms can be driven by either.

Related Articles:

  • Corporate Debt, Boom-Bust Cycles, and Financial Crises — Using a dataset on sectoral credit exposure for 115 economies, the authors find corporate debt accounts for two-thirds of credit expansion before financial crises and three-quarters of nonperforming loans during busts, and that corporate debt expansions predict crises similarly to household debt. Recoveries are slower after corporate debt booms.
  • Credit Allocation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations — Credit expansions disproportionately channel credit to non-tradable sector firms and households, and the authors find that the sectoral allocation of credit predicts future GDP paths and the likelihood of systemic banking crises. Credit growth to non-tradable industries predicts boom-bust output patterns and elevated financial fragility, while credit to tradable industries is associated with higher future productivity growth.
  • Private Credit: Characteristics and Risks — Private credit loans are negotiated bilaterally outside traditional regulatory requirements and are illiquid because no secondary market exists, leaving investors expected to hold them to maturity or face steep losses if they need to exit. Scarce data on this growing form of nonbank lending makes assessing its risks difficult.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets

Deposit Insurance, Uninsured Depositors, and Liquidity Risk During Panics

AI Summary. Commercial banks located near a post office that accepted federally insured deposits were more likely to close during the Great Depression, and this effect weakened sharply after deposit insurance was extended to commercial banks. The authors interpret this as a competitive liquidity effect arising from incomplete insurance coverage.

Matthew Jaremski and Steven Sprick Schuster National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 9, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Jaremski and Schuster document that before the establishment of the FDIC, deposits fled to the safety of local insured postal banks, illustrating that lack of universal deposit coverage amplifies run risk. @ssprickschuster

Does incomplete deposit insurance coverage make uninsured banks more likely to fail?

Core argument: Matching balance sheets from over 16,000 commercial banks before the Great Depression with post offices that accepted deposits, the authors find banks operating near a deposit-accepting post office were more likely to close between 1929 and 1935.

Before the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became active in 1934, the only federally insured deposit accounts available to American households were through the U.S. Postal Savings System. To examine the role that postal savings played on bank closure, we collect the balance sheets of over 16,000 commercial banks just before the start of the Great Depression and match them with information on which post offices accepted deposits. We find banks that operated nearby a post office that accepted deposits were more likely to close between 1929 and 1935. The effect of postal savings is severely weakened after deposit insurance was installed across commercial banks in 1934. This lends evidence to the theory that we are capturing a competitive liquidity effect due to the lack of universal coverage.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Matching balance sheets from over 16,000 commercial banks before the Great Depression with post offices that accepted deposits, the authors find banks operating near a deposit-accepting post office were more likely to close between 1929 and 1935.
  2. Before the FDIC became active in 1934, the U.S. Postal Savings System offered the only federally insured deposit accounts available to American households.
  3. The effect of nearby postal savings on bank closure weakened substantially after deposit insurance was extended to commercial banks in 1934, which the authors read as evidence of a competitive liquidity effect stemming from the lack of universal coverage.

Related Articles:

  • The Evolution of Banking in the 21st Century: Evidence and Regulatory Implications — An examination of 25 years of US banking trends finds deposits—especially uninsured deposits—have grown rapidly while banks have shifted from information-intensive lending toward longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities and long-term Treasuries. The authors argue these trends favor strengthening liquidity regulation over expanding deposit insurance to reduce bank-run risk.
  • Ameridollars — Dollar deposits in U.S. banks are de facto fully protected by the U.S. government, but that protection does not extend to the trillions of dollar deposits held at foreign banks, which are supervised by home-country regulators that typically cannot insure dollar deposits. Even U.S. branches of foreign banks tend to lack federal deposit insurance.
  • In Today’s Banking Crisis, Echoes of the ’80s — Unrealized securities losses at recently failed banks reflect the risk of borrowing short and lending long, echoing thrifts that became insolvent as the Federal Reserve raised rates; between 1980 and 1994, 1,617 banks and 1,295 thrifts closed or received government assistance. Uninsured depositors fled fast enough to limit losses, illustrating market discipline.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

The Secular Decline of Bank Balance Sheet Lending

AI Summary. Traditional bank balance sheet lending has declined as a share of credit intermediation, with credit increasingly channeled through arms-length transactions such as securitization. A structural model attributes falling lending shares to lower securitization costs, savers' behavior driving bank balance sheet size, and implicit bank costs and subsidies shaping balance sheet composition.

Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski and Amit Seru National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 5, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Bank balance sheet lending has declined from 60% of total private lending in 1970 to 35% in 2023. Private credit is increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization. @NBERpubs

Why has bank balance sheet lending declined as a share of credit?

Core argument: Traditional bank-led credit intermediation has declined sharply since the 1970s, with private credit increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization.

The role of traditional bank-led intermediation has declined sharply since the 1970s. Private credit is increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization. A structural model explores what can explain these shifts [and simulates] implications for macroprudential policies. Declines in securitization cost account for changes in aggregate lending quantities. Savers, rather than borrowers, are the main drivers of bank balance sheet size. Implicit banks’ costs and subsidies explain shifting bank balance sheet composition. Together, these forces explain the fall in the overall share of informationally sensitive bank lending in credit intermediation. Raising capital or liquidity requirements decreases lending in both early (1960s) and recent (2020’s) scenarios, but the effect is less pronounced in the latter. The substitution of bank balance sheet loans with debt securities in response to these policies explains why we observe only a fairly modest decline in aggregate lending despite a large contraction of bank balance sheet lending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Traditional bank-led credit intermediation has declined sharply since the 1970s, with private credit increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization.
  2. A structural model attributes changes in aggregate lending quantities to declines in securitization costs, bank balance sheet size mainly to savers rather than borrowers, and shifting balance sheet composition to implicit bank costs and subsidies.
  3. Raising capital or liquidity requirements decreases lending in both 1960s and 2020s scenarios, though less markedly in the latter, as substitution of bank balance sheet loans with debt securities limits the decline in aggregate lending.

Related Articles:

  • The Evolution of Banking in the 21st Century: Evidence and Regulatory Implications — An examination of 25 years of US banking trends finds deposits—especially uninsured deposits—have grown rapidly while banks have shifted from information-intensive lending toward longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities and long-term Treasuries. The authors argue these trends favor strengthening liquidity regulation over expanding deposit insurance to reduce bank-run risk.
  • Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero-Interest Bank Reserve Requirements — Fiscal dominance requires governments to fund deficits at the margin with non-interest-bearing debt, and the revenue from inflation taxation—both expected and unexpected—is limited. The authors argue a US fiscal dominance episode could end the payment of interest on bank reserves and restore requirements that banks hold large zero-interest reserves against deposits.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

The Evolution of Banking in the 21st Century: Evidence and Regulatory Implications

AI Summary. An examination of 25 years of US banking trends finds deposits—especially uninsured deposits—have grown rapidly while banks have shifted from information-intensive lending toward longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities and long-term Treasuries. The authors argue these trends favor strengthening liquidity regulation over expanding deposit insurance to reduce bank-run risk.

Samuel Hanson, Victoria Ivanshina, Laura Nicolae, Jeremy Stein, Adi Sunderam and Daniel Tarullo Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
Date Posted:
April 4, 2024
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Deposits – especially uninsured deposits that create run risk – have risen sharply, while banks with the most rapid growth in deposits have shifted assets away from lending towards longer-term MBS and Treasuries. @lauramnicolae

Should regulators strengthen liquidity rules rather than expand deposit insurance?

Core argument: Bank deposits, especially uninsured deposits, have grown rapidly on the liability side of bank balance sheets over the last twenty-five years, according to an examination of banking industry trends.

To inform the ongoing discussion of the appropriate regulatory response to [such events as] the failures of three regional banks 2023, we examine trends in the banking industry over the last twenty-five years. On the liability side of bank balance sheets, deposits—and especially uninsured deposits—have grown rapidly. On the asset side, there has been a notable shift away from the information-intensive lending traditionally associated with banks and towards longer-term securities such as MBS and long-term Treasuries. We assess the main regulatory options to reduce the risk of destabilizing bank runs—expanding deposit insurance and strengthening liquidity regulation— and argue that the industry trends we document favor the latter option. Regulators may be more comfortable tightening liquidity requirements on uninsured deposits, insofar as the substantial increase in those deposits in recent decades has not been correlated with an increase in information-intensive lending.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Bank deposits, especially uninsured deposits, have grown rapidly on the liability side of bank balance sheets over the last twenty-five years, according to an examination of banking industry trends.
  2. On the asset side, banks have shifted away from the information-intensive lending traditionally associated with them and toward longer-term securities such as mortgage-backed securities and long-term Treasuries.
  3. Documented industry trends favor strengthening liquidity regulation over expanding deposit insurance to reduce the risk of destabilizing bank runs, since the increase in uninsured deposits has not been correlated with an increase in information-intensive lending.

Related Articles:

  • All Clear — Data and commentary indicate the banking panic has ended and had only a limited effect on credit availability, with overall bank lending little changed and still growing, reflecting problems at a few poorly managed banks rather than a systemic crisis. Recognition that the banking sector is not collapsing has already prompted some repricing of expected interest rate cuts.
  • Frankenstein’s Monster — Unrealized losses on bank balance sheets are consistent with a rising interest rate cycle and become a problem only when large deposit outflows force those losses to be realized. Lending rules allowing banks to borrow against securities at book value help, but do not address underwater loans or deposits leaving for higher money market yields.
  • In Today’s Banking Crisis, Echoes of the ’80s — Unrealized securities losses at recently failed banks reflect the risk of borrowing short and lending long, echoing thrifts that became insolvent as the Federal Reserve raised rates; between 1980 and 1994, 1,617 banks and 1,295 thrifts closed or received government assistance. Uninsured depositors fled fast enough to limit losses, illustrating market discipline.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

Manufacturing Demand

AI Summary. Banks' Treasury holdings have fallen as a share of assets to historically low levels, with banks preferring loans, higher-yielding securities, reserves, and agency mortgage-backed securities to meet liquidity requirements. Revising bank capital rules to revamp the leverage calculation could boost market liquidity and make banks significant Treasury buyers.

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
March 13, 2024
Is Database:
Database

.@FedGuy12 endorses a proposed adjustment to the Basel III leverage calculations that would increase demand for Treasuries from US banks as future issuances surge.

Would changing bank capital rules turn banks into major Treasury buyers?

Core argument: Banks' Treasury holdings as a share of bank assets remain historically low, having been steadily reduced from World War II levels even as Treasury issuance climbed.

Banks were huge investors in Treasuries during World War II, but steadily reduced their holdings even as Treasury issuance climbed. The share of bank assets in Treasuries remains historically low as banks have preferred to make loans or invest in higher yielding securities. While banks are required to hold high quality liquid assets, they have chosen to meet those requirements with reserves and Agency MBS rather than Treasuries. A revision to Basel in the form of a revamped leverage calculation would not only boost liquidity across markets, but also potentially make banks significant investors in Treasuries just in time to meet increased future issuance.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Banks' Treasury holdings as a share of bank assets remain historically low, having been steadily reduced from World War II levels even as Treasury issuance climbed.
  2. Banks have preferred making loans or buying higher yielding securities over Treasuries, and have satisfied their high quality liquid asset requirements with reserves and Agency mortgage-backed securities instead.
  3. A revamped leverage calculation under a Basel revision could boost liquidity across markets and potentially make banks significant investors in Treasuries in time to meet increased future issuance.

Related Articles:

  • Fiscal Dominance and the Return of Zero-Interest Bank Reserve Requirements — Fiscal dominance requires governments to fund deficits at the margin with non-interest-bearing debt, and the revenue from inflation taxation—both expected and unexpected—is limited. The authors argue a US fiscal dominance episode could end the payment of interest on bank reserves and restore requirements that banks hold large zero-interest reserves against deposits.
  • Living with High Public Debt — High public debt ratios are likely to persist because large sustained primary budget surpluses are politically unrealistic, real interest rates are already very low, faster global growth is hard to engineer, inflation is not a sustainable route to reducing debt, and financial repression is less feasible amid liberalized markets.
  • In 2023 Foreign Demand for Long Term Treasuries Exceed Net Issuances — Foreign demand for long-term US Treasuries, at just over $450bn, exceeded the Treasury's net long-term issuance of just over $400bn, with that demand not coming from China. Net long-term issuance lagged the fiscal deficit—roughly 1.5% of GDP versus 6%—leaving the increase in the stock of long-term "safe" US assets modest.
  • Banking
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy

Monetary Policy and Innovation

AI Summary. The authors estimate that a 100bps monetary tightening reduces investment in intellectual property by about 1%, research and development spending at public firms by about 3%, venture capital investment by up to 25%, and patenting in important technologies by up to 9%.

Yueran Ma and Kaspar Zimmermann Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Date Posted:
August 29, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Historically monetary tightening has had an impact on risk capital: 100bps of tightening is associated with a 1-3pp decline in R&D spending and a 25% decline in VC investment over the following 1-3 year period.

Does monetary tightening reduce research, venture capital, and patenting?

Core argument: A 100bps monetary tightening shock lowers investment in intellectual property products in the national accounts by about 1%, a magnitude comparable to the decline in traditional physical investment, and cuts R&D spending among Compustat public firms by about 3%.

We normalize the shock to tightening by 100bps. Investment in intellectual property products (IPP) in the national accounts (NIPA) declines by about 1%. The magnitude is comparable to the decline in traditional investment in physical assets. R&D spending in Compustat data for public firms declines by about 3%. VC investment is more volatile, and declines by as much as 25% at a horizon of 1 to 3 years after the monetary policy shock. Patenting in important technologies declines by up to 9% 2 to 4 years after the shock. An aggregate innovation index constructed using estimates of the economic value of patents also declines by up to 9%. Based on estimates of the output and total factor productivity (TFP) sensitivity to the aggregate innovation index, a 9% decline in the index can contribute to 1% lower real output and 0.5% lower TFP 5 years later.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. A 100bps monetary tightening shock lowers investment in intellectual property products in the national accounts by about 1%, a magnitude comparable to the decline in traditional physical investment, and cuts R&D spending among Compustat public firms by about 3%.
  2. Venture capital investment is more volatile, declining by as much as 25% one to three years after a 100bps tightening shock, while patenting in important technologies falls by up to 9% two to four years after.
  3. An aggregate innovation index built from estimates of the economic value of patents declines by up to 9%, which, based on estimated output and TFP sensitivities, can contribute to 1% lower real output and 0.5% lower total factor productivity five years later.

Related Articles:

  • Data Update 2 for 2023: A Rocky Year for Equities — The implied equity risk premium on the S&P 500 rose from 4.24% to 5.94% over the course of 2022, placing it near the top of its range since 1960, while the expected return on stocks of 9.82% is its highest since 1995. Whether the market is fairly valued turns on whether that risk premium is too high or too low.
  • Banking
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Financial Markets
  • Monetary Policy
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