Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
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The Tricking Up Excess Savings

Adrien Auclert, Matthew Rognlie and Ludwig Straub National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
February 21, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Excess savings from deficit-financed fiscal transfers influence the economy for up to 5 years as they trickle up to individuals with lower marginal propensities to consume.

Excess savings from deficit-financed fiscal transfers are expected to influence the economy for up to five years, as they gradually move up the wealth distribution to individuals with lower marginal propensities to consume (MPCs). This process, known as "trickling up," implies that the impact of these savings on aggregate demand is more prolonged than previously assumed. In a closed economy, unless the government reduces the debt used for these transfers, excess savings persist even as households spend them. Tight monetary policy can modestly accelerate this process by mitigating the effects on demand, but the duration of excess savings and their impact on output remains significantly longer than conventional wisdom suggests. The effect is particularly pronounced when MPCs are lower, highlighting the importance of understanding savings distribution in macroeconomic forecasting.

Matt Rognlie @ludwigstraub @a_auclert argue that it will take up to five years for excess savings to work though the systems as individuals with higher marginal propensity to consume generate income for individuals with higher savings rates.

“…Deficit-financed fiscal transfers generate excess savings. One person’s spending is another person’s income. As we show, taking this fact into account implies that excess savings from debt-financed transfers have much longer-lasting effects than a naive calculation would suggest. In a closed economy, unless the government pays down the debt used to finance the transfers, excess savings do not go away as households spend them down. Instead, the effect of excess savings on aggregate demand slowly dissipates as they “trickle up” the wealth distribution to agents with lower MPCs. Tight monetary policy speeds up this process, but this effect is likely to be quantitatively modest. The partial equilibrium scenario summarizes the conventional wisdom according to which the effect of excess savings will dissipate in a few quarters. By contrast, our benchmark scenario suggests that these effects will stick around for roughly 5 years….”

Core of paper

“…Because excess savings and their distribution across the population intuitively matter for aggregate demand, economists have paid a considerable amount of attention to estimating both. In this paper, we provide a tractable Heterogeneous Agent New Keynesian model that explicitly maps the distribution of excess savings to the path of output, and that explains the process by which their effect dissipates. We use this framework to estimate the likely contribution of excess savings to aggregate spending in the coming years under various assumptions about the marginal propensities to consume (MPCs) of agents holding the savings and scenarios for monetary policy. Our framework recognizes that one person’s spending is another person’s income. As we show, taking this fact into account implies that excess savings from debt-financed transfers have much longer-lasting effects than a naive calculation would suggest. In a closed economy, unless the government pays down the debt used to finance the transfers, excess savings do not go away as households spend them down. Instead, the effect of excess savings on aggregate demand slowly dissipates as they “trickle up” the wealth distribution to agents with lower MPCs. Tight monetary policy speeds up this process, but this effect is likely to be quantitatively modest….”

Implication For US Economy Post-Pandemic

“…Table 1 summarizes our results by displaying the duration of output and excess savings for the middle class and the rich under each of our scenarios. The partial equilibrium scenario summarizes the conventional wisdom according to which the effect of excess savings will dissipate in a few quarters. By contrast, our benchmark scenario suggests that these effects will stick around for roughly 5 years. These numbers are larger if MPCs are lower, and are robust to plausible alternative calibrations. Rational expectations about the future boom make the response much larger on impact due to current spending out of anticipated income, which turns out to speed up the trickling up process. Tight monetary policy, on the other hand, also speeds up tickling up, but it does so by mitigating the effects of excess savings on demand. In either case, however, the duration of excess savings and output remains more than twice as long as the conventional wisdom suggests….”

Adrien Auclert, Matthew Rognlie and Ludwig Straub, “The Tricking Up Excess Savings,” National Bureau of Economic Research, January 2023, https://www.nber.org/papers/w30900

  • Inflation
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
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Showing 111 database articles primarily about Inflation

Choking Iran's Economy Is the Least Bad Way to End the War

AI Summary. Iran's economy is contracting at its fastest rate in roughly 40 years, with inflation above 50%, food costs doubling year-over-year, and the national currency near worthless.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Inflation in Iran is running at at least ~69%, its highest annual rate in 70 years. The black market exchange value of a rial hit a record low of ~1.85mm rials to the dollar, relative to 50,000 per dollar five years ago.

Is economic collapse the only path to ending the conflict?

Core argument: Iran’s inflation rate exceeds 50% annually — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — while food and essential goods costs have doubled year over year, severely compressing household purchasing power across the economy.

[Iran's] economy is on track to suffer the biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. Inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records start nearly 70 years ago. Worse, the cost of food and other necessities has already doubled from a year ago. Its currency, the rial, is worthless. In the black market, the exchange rate has collapsed to a record low of about 1.85 million rials to the dollar; five years ago, roughly 50,000 rials were enough to buy a greenback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Iran’s inflation rate exceeds 50% annually — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — while food and essential goods costs have doubled year over year, severely compressing household purchasing power across the economy.
  2. Iran’s GDP is on track for its steepest annual contraction since the mid-1980s Iran-Iraq War nadir, a deterioration that surpasses every recessionary episode across four intervening decades.

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  • Soaring Diesel Prices Rip Across The US Economy — Diesel prices have reached $5.47 per gallon, near an all-time high, as global supply disruptions push the cost of refining diesel above crude oil to record levels.
  • For the Oil Market, the Strait of Hormuz Isn’t Closed — At least 5m barrels of oil per day continue to transit the Strait of Hormuz, with the true volume likely higher as growing oil spills from tanker attacks indicate ongoing vessel traffic despite efforts to close the waterway.
  • U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past — Kilian, et al find that the impact of an energy shock on US real GDP growth has fallen to 1/20th of what it would have been in 1980, due both to the declining…
  • Inflation
  • Energy
  • GDP
  • Politics
  • Security

A Return To Monetarism?

AI Summary. Excessive money growth reliably signals inflationary pressure regardless of whether its source is monetary or fiscal policy, because any fiscal expansion that increases money supply is captured in price-gap models tracking monetary aggregates.

Peter Ireland, Stephen Miran and Nouriel Roubini Hudson Bay Capital
Date Posted:
July 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Ireland, Miran, and Roubini compare the actual price level to the predictions of an equilibrium model relating prices to money supply. Predicted inflation hit a 60-year high in 2020–21, months before inflation surged and then crashed once the Fed hiked.

Does excess money growth always predict inflation regardless of its source?

The graphs in Figure 3 show quite clearly how the surge in money growth starting in 2020 and continuing in 2021 put enormous upward pressure on inflation, to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period. And while the large and negative price gaps that followed in 2022 and 2023 are likewise indicative of strong disinflationary pressures applied through subsequent monetary tightening, one can’t see these graphs without asking: Had Federal Open Market Committee members been monitoring measures of money growth with the help of the P-star [price target based on monetary aggregates] model, might they have ended QE and raised interest rates sooner and more quickly, thereby avoiding at least some of the post-2020 inflation? Of course, massive fiscal expansion was another driver of the post-2020 surge in inflation, as suggested by fiscal theories of the price level. The model simply observes that regardless of its originating source, excessive money growth signals that inappropriate macroeconomic policies are fueling higher inflation. Fiscal expansions that expand money supply will be reflected in a P-star model.

Related Articles:

  • Money and Inflation — Jesper Rangvid argues that monetarist theory would have predicted deflation from the recent contraction in the M2 money supply. Continuing inflation leaves him…
  • State Dependence of Monetary Policy During Global Supply Chain Disruptions — Bai, et al present evidence that btw 2017 and 2023, monetary tightening reduced US inflation relatively more than output during periods of global supply chain…
  • What Next for r*? A Capital Market Equilibrium Perspective On The Natural Rate of Interest — In a base model, steady state r* is still ~0, suggesting that “secular stagnation” may not be a thing of the past. AI expansion and inflation risk could each…
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Home Alone: Inflation And The New Fed Chair

AI Summary. Current inflation conditions — including labor market tightness, price pressures, supply chain stress, and the output gap — align more closely with historical conditions that prompted the Federal Reserve to raise rates than to cut them. Averaging multiple monetary policy benchmarks points to an optimal interest rate range of 4.00%–4.85%

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
May 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Cembalest notes labor market tightness, price pressures in the manufacturing sector and the implied output gap are “much closer to conditions that have historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates rather than to lower them.”

Does current inflation warrant higher rates than the Fed currently plans?

Core argument: Monetary policy rules average a 4.00–4.85% Fed Funds range vs. the current 3.50–3.75%, indicating tightening bias drives futures pricing toward.

Inflation indicators the Fed watches include labor market tightness, price pressures in the manufacturing sector, supply chain tightness and the “output gap” which measures how far actual growth is above/below potential growth. [The two] charts plot these four variables at the time of prior Fed decisions to increase or cut policy rates; green dots indicate when the Fed cut, red dots indicate when the Fed tightened and yellow circles show today’s values. In other words: current values are much closer to conditions that have historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates rather than to lower them. That may be why the futures curve is now pricing in Fed hikes instead of the cuts that were priced in at the start of the year. Superwonky: averaging several different monetary rules of thumb (Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, forward-looking) yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00% - 4.85% compared to the current range of 3.50% - 3.75%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Monetary policy rules average a 4.00–4.85% Fed Funds range vs. the current 3.50–3.75%, indicating tightening bias drives futures pricing toward.
  2. Labor market tightness, manufacturing price pressures, supply chain constraints, and positive output gaps align with historical rate-increase conditions, leading markets.

Related Articles:

  • US Consumer Sentiment Slides to Record Low on Price Concerns — US consumer sentiment has fallen to a record low, driven by rising price expectations of 4.8% over the next year and 3.9% over the long term.
  • The Dangerous Brew That’s Rattling Bond Markets — Government borrowing across major economies has reached unprecedented peacetime levels, with U.S. deficits averaging 6.2% of GDP from 2023–2026 versus 4.1% in the early 2000s. Since 2020, economic shocks have consistently pushed inflation higher rather than lower, forcing long-term interest rates up and adding an estimated $
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — US government bonds, normally safe assets, become risky in times of war because of negative real returns due to bursts of inflation. As in the fiscal theory of…
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

US Consumer Sentiment Slides to Record Low on Price Concerns

AI Summary. US consumer sentiment has fallen to a record low, driven by rising price expectations of 4.8% over the next year and 3.9% over the long term.

María Paula Mijares Torres Bloomberg
Date Posted:
May 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The Michigan Consumer Sentiment Index hit a record low in May, falling ~10% month over month. Consumers foresee prices advancing 4.8% over the next year. Inflation and high gas prices have long been major causes of sentiment drops.

Are rising price expectations undermining consumer confidence?

Core argument: Michigan consumer sentiment fell 5 pts to 44.8, undershooting all economist forecasts, driving heightened recession risk perceptions.

The University of Michigan’s final May sentiment index decreased 5 points to 44.8 from April. The gauge was weaker than all projections in a Bloomberg survey of economists as well as the preliminary reading of 48.2. Consumers expect prices to rise an annualized 3.9% over the next five to 10 years, up from 3.5% in April and the highest in seven months. They also saw costs advancing 4.8% over the next year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Michigan consumer sentiment fell 5 pts to 44.8, undershooting all economist forecasts, driving heightened recession risk perceptions.
  2. Five-to-10-year inflation expectations surged to 3.9% from 3.5% month-over-month, the highest in seven months, leading to eroded purchasing power confidence.
  3. One-year price expectations of 4.8% vs. 3.9% long-term forecasts signal consumers expect near-term cost acceleration to outpace eventual moderation.

Related Articles:

  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — US consumer sentiment is significantly lower than expected based on unemployment and inflation. Alternative measures of inflation that include borrowing costs…
  • The Dangerous Brew That’s Rattling Bond Markets — Government borrowing across major economies has reached unprecedented peacetime levels, with U.S. deficits averaging 6.2% of GDP from 2023–2026 versus 4.1% in the early 2000s. Since 2020, economic shocks have consistently pushed inflation higher rather than lower, forcing long-term interest rates up and adding an estimated $
  • $50 Trillion Safe-Haven Debt Market Upended by Iran War Inflation — The $50tn market for Group of Seven sovereign bonds is under pressure as investors price in persistent inflation, driving long-term yields to their highest level in two decades. Rising government debt and unresolved post-pandemic price pressures are compounding the risk, forcing expectations of higher interest rates to contain inflation.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Politics

Where Did All the Affordable Cars Go?

AI Summary. The average new car costs ~$50,000, with sub-$20,000 options nearly extinct, while repair costs have risen 15%, making car ownership unaffordable for budget consumers. Removing import barriers on lower-cost foreign vehicles would expand access, as comparable Chinese models sell for ~$20,000 less than U.S. equivalents while offering superior performance

Clifford Winston New York Times
Date Posted:
April 15, 2026
Is Database:
Database

In 2012, there were ~12 new cars available for around $25,000 in real terms in the US. Today, there are only 4 new cars available at that price point. Clifford Winston notes allowing Chinese imports would likely increase that number to 11.

How Can Lower-Cost Foreign Vehicles Improve Car Affordability?

Core argument: Average new car prices reached $50,000, up from sub-$20,000 availability a decade ago, driving affordability crisis for budget consumers.

The average transaction price for a new car now sits around $50,000. In December, it became just about impossible to find one for less than $20,000. For anyone on a budget, an aging car is a trap. Auto repair costs jumped 15% in the last year alone, driven by the complexity of modern sensors and labor shortages. An average trip to the mechanic now costs roughly $840. To fix the problem, policymakers must overturn what has been for decades the third rail in American politics. It is time to stop coddling Detroit automakers [and open] the American market to cars made in China and elsewhere. Chinese cars aren’t just cheaper than the American alternatives. They’re often better. Take BYD’s slightly more upscale Seal sedan. It’s similar to Tesla’s Model 3, introduced nine years ago. But the Seal costs roughly $20,000 less than the Model 3. The Seal’s premium model offers substantially more horsepower, and its battery not only lasts longer, it can also be 80% charged in just 37 minutes. The Seal isn’t just a budget alternative; it is a more advanced machine.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average new car prices reached $50,000, up from sub-$20,000 availability a decade ago, driving affordability crisis for budget consumers.
  2. Auto repair costs jumped 15% annually to $840 per visit, as sensor complexity and labor shortages result in escalating ownership.

Related Articles:

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  • Inflation Is Down, But Americans Still Feel an Affordability Squeeze — The US price level has risen 26% since January 2020, leaving Americans’ average weekly real wages up only 3.7% over five years.
  • Help for the Heartland? The Employment and Electoral Effects of the Trump Tariffs in the United States — Tariffs implemented during the 2018-2019 trade war were “at best a wash, and may have been mildly negative” in terms of employment, but increased political…
  • Inflation
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
    • Trade (not deficits)
  • Politics

Inflation Is Down, But Americans Still Feel an Affordability Squeeze

Mark Niquette, Jennah Haque and Jade Khatib Bloomberg
Date Posted:
February 19, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The US price level has risen 26% since January 2020, leaving Americans’ average weekly real wages up only 3.7% over five years.

The average American’s weekly pay has risen 31% over the past six years. That’s faster than prices across that period, so Americans in the aggregate aren’t losing ground — but inflation wiped out most of their income gains. For low earners, who saw the fastest wage growth after the pandemic, the last year or so has been tougher and they’re now lagging behind. [Grocery] prices are up about 30% since January 2020, about in line with average wage growth. But Americans had gotten used to paying roughly the same at the supermarket each week in the pre-pandemic years. Lately, they’ve been forced to stomach a bigger bill with almost every visit. A double-punch has pushed homeownership out of reach for many Americans: First the pandemic-era surge in prices, and then a steep run-up in mortgage rates. A young married couple now needs 70% of their annual household income to afford the average down payment, according to Goldman Sachs economist Elsie Peng, up from 58% in 2019 and 45% in 2000. [Further], the average principal and interest payment has doubled since early 2020, according to the National Association of Realtors. Employee premiums for family health insurance have risen 23% in the past five years to almost $6,900 on average. And more than 20 million people who rely on Affordable Care Act plans face a hike in their premiums after Congress let Covid-era subsidies expire.

Related Articles:

  • The Cost of Money is Part of the Cost of Living: New Evidence on the Consumer Sentiment Anomaly — US consumer sentiment is significantly lower than expected based on unemployment and inflation. Alternative measures of inflation that include borrowing costs…
  • Why Do We Dislike Inflation? — New survey research shows that people dislike inflation because they believe that it is associated with declining real wages and falling living standards…
  • A Mystery in Fixed Income — U.S. 10-year yields are higher today than at the start of the Fed’s cutting cycle in September 2024. Sløk notes that the “pattern of rising long-term interest…
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income
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