Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
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Joshua Brault and Hashmat Khan

AI Summary. Income inequality is associated with a statistically significant negative relationship (at the 1% level) with determinants of the natural rate of interest, consistent with the theory of indebted demand. The authors find minimal correlation between income inequality and the trend growth rate of natural output, with estimates not statistically different from zero.

Joshua Brault Straub
Date Posted:
September 9, 2021
Is Database:
Database

Evidence supports “indebted demand” theory, showing income inequality exerts downward pressure on natural rates of interest (r*).

Does income inequality push down the natural rate of interest?

Core argument: Brault and Khan find a negative relationship between income inequality and other determinants of the natural rate of interest, significant at the 1% level, supporting the theory of indebted demand.

The theory of indebted demand suggests that income inequality exerts downward pressure on natural rates of interest (r*). Analysis reveals a strong negative relationship between income inequality and other determinants of r*, significant at the 1% level, supporting this theory. Figure 3's decomposition of the natural rate shows minimal correlation between income inequality and the trend growth rate of the natural rate of output, with OLS estimates not statistically different from zero. However, the significant negative relationship between income inequality and other determinants of r* underscores the impact of inequality on economic dynamics, aligning with Mian, Straub, and Sufi's 2021 findings. This evidence highlights the macroeconomic implications of rising income inequality, emphasizing its role in shaping interest rate trends and economic policy considerations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Brault and Khan find a negative relationship between income inequality and other determinants of the natural rate of interest, significant at the 1% level, supporting the theory of indebted demand.
  2. Brault and Khan's decomposition of the natural rate shows minimal correlation between income inequality and the trend growth rate of the natural rate of output, with OLS estimates not statistically different from zero.
  3. Brault and Khan's evidence on inequality and the determinants of r* aligns with Mian, Straub, and Sufi's 2021 finding that income inequality exerts downward pressure on natural rates of interest.

"...Our interpretation of the Mian, Straub and Sufi (2021) story is that if inequality is exerting downward pressure on natural rates of interest, this should appear in the latter component of the natural rate, zt. To this end, Figure 3 presents the decomposition of the natural rate where we plot the relationships between: (1) income inequality and the estimated trend growth rate of the natural rate of output; and (2) income inequality and other determinants of r?, that is, zt. The top panel in Figure 3 quite clearly shows a minimal relationship between income inequality and trend growth rates of the natural rate of output. OLS estimates of income inequality on trend growth rates are not statistically different from zero by any conventional standard. In sharp contrast, the bottom panel of Figure 3 shows a strong negative relationship between other determinants of the natural rate of interest and income inequality. This relationship is significant at the 1% level. Our findings lend support to the central prediction of the theory of indebted demand proposed in Mian, Straub and Sufi (2021), that income inequality is putting downward pressure on natural rates of interest...."

Joshua Brault and Hashmat Khan: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Joshua Brault and Hashmat Khan, "Some International Evidence on Indebted Demand," Carleton University, September 2, 2021, https://carleton.ca/economics/wp-content/uploads/cewp21-10.pdf

Ed Comment: “I’m not sure I understand the paper on inequality and interest rates, which I would like to include. Four questions. First, is the regression/data US or worldwide? Second, how do they separate the fact that as the world, chiefly China, has gotten richer, it has also saved more? Similarly, as the US has gotten richer the world has also saved more, flooded the US with risk-averse savings, and the rate has declined. They are correlated, but is it causal? How do they stake their claim that it’s casual? Third, I’m not sure I understand the 2 graphs. Of the top graph, the text says: “Figure 3 quite clearly shows a minimal relationship between income inequality and trend growth rates of the natural rate of output.” I thought the (mian) theory is that richer people save more rather than consume. We lack uses for investing all the savings (in effect a Keynesian paradox of thrift). So the interest rate declines to equilibrate. Is so, then doesn’t (the growth in) demand have to decline to reduce the rate? If declining rates equilibrate the supply and demand for savings, why do we care? An increase in savings would increase investment, which would presumably accelerate growth/increase productivity/raise standards of living. It only seems like a problem if it produces a Keynesian paradox of thrift, i.e. if demand declines (is correlated with inequality). Help me understand their story. Fourth, how do they differentiate between risk-averse savings that results in debt and risk-bearing equity? let’s say I insist on holding more low-risk debt for every dollar of risky equity I invest. (risk-bearing investors hold about 70% equity, not 100%) Low rates might be a “necessary evil,” and the resulting slowdown from any paradox of thrift might be offset by an acceleration of growth (relative to the counterfactual). I’m not sure how to interpret the results.”

Ben/Steve Comment:” Ed: First, is the regression/data US or worldwide? Ben: The Brault/Khan note that was in the newsletter today is a comment on a Mian, Straub, and Suffi “Indebted Demand” paper (attached) The regression run in this comment is on international data (Australia, Canada, EuroZone, Norway, UK, and US). The indebted demand paper also uses international data but averages the data across countries. There is another Mian, Straub and Suffi paper called “The saving glut of the right and the rise in debt”. Steve did a write up of that paper before I joined. (Also attached) That paper focuses on the US. Ed: Second, how do they separate the fact that as the world, chiefly China, has gotten richer, it has also saved more? Similarly, as the US has gotten richer the world has also saved more, flooded the US with risk-averse savings, and the rate has declined. They are correlated, but is it causal? How do they stake their claim that it’s casual? Ben:The short answer here is: they don’t. First, China and other countries developing countries (India, etc) don’t even appear in the data. Secondly they use time fixed effects to control for global trends like those you’re describing. “Indebted Demand” uses “motivating facts” (not causal estimation) to motivate its model and then inequality drives interest rates within the model. This paper is not really an empirical exercise. Finally, in the savings glut of the rich, Mian, Straub, and Suffi have this explicit warning: "we acknowledge up front that there is no specific source of exogenous variation in the rise in inequality used in this study,” which is to say, these are not causal estimates.Ed: Third, I’m not sure I understand the 2 graphs. Of the top graph, the text says: “Figure 3 quite clearly shows a minimal relationship between income inequality and trend growth rates of the natural rate of output.” I thought the (mian) theory is that richer people save more rather than consume. We lack uses for investing all the savings (in effect a Keynesian paradox of thrift). So the interest rate declines to equilibrate. Is so, then doesn’t (the growth in) demand have to decline to reduce the rate? If declining rates equilibrate the supply and demand for savings, why do we care? An increase in savings would increase investment, which would presumably accelerate growth/increase productivity/raise standards of living. It only seems like a problem if it produces a Keynesian paradox of thrift, i.e. if demand declines (is correlated with inequality). Help me understand their story. Ben:For the graphs: Equation 1 in Brault/Khan paper says the natural rate of interest is the growth rate (g) plus other stuff (what they call z). The first panel shows the relationship between inequality and g and the second panel shows the relationship between inequality and z. The relationship between inequality and z is very strong and that’s what puts the downward pressure on the interest rate. The story really comes from the two Mian, Straub and Suffi papers previously mentioned. Their story is that, as the rich save more, they finance the consumption of the rest of the people in the economy. So the rich having lots of money is more of a supply story and less of a demand story in the lending markets (as you pointed out by describing the paradox of thrift). However, what Mian, Straub and Suffi are pointing out is that for every dollar saved by a rich guy, there is a dollar borrowed by a poorer guy (approximately, there are non-consumption-financing savings and equity etc, but to a first approximation). These borrowed dollars are exactly why demand (for goods and services) doesn’t go down. Ed: how do they differentiate between risk-averse savings that results in debt and risk-bearing equity? Ben: Today’s note doesn’t deal with anything like this. Both Mian, Straub and Suffi papers look at the net- debt position of rich households vs the net debt position of poorer households. This measure nets out equity - both intermediation and risk bearing equity - but doesn’t make distinctions finer than this. Steve: this all connects to research that Mian/Straub/Sufi presented at Jackson Hole (attached) that argues that the rise in inequality, rather than demographics has driven down the interest rates. The basic mechanism is the rich have a greater propensity to save and the resulting risk adverse capital drives down r*, note this study looks at the United States (so it’s not accounting for incoming hot money) Bottom line, "...Downward pressure on the natural rate of interest (r*) is often attributed to an increase in saving. This study uses microeconomic data from the SCF+ to explore the relative importance of demographic shifts versus rising income inequality on the evolution of saving behavior in the United States from 1950 to 2019. The evidence suggests that rising income inequality is the more important factor explaining the decline in r*. Saving rates are significantly higher for high income households within a given birth cohort relative to middle and low income households in the same birth cohort, and there has been a large rise in income shares for high income households since the 1980s. The result has been a large rise in saving by high income earners since the 1980s, which is the exact same time period during which r* has fallen. Differences in saving rates across the working age distribution are smaller, and there has not been a consistent monotonic shift in income toward any given age group. Both findings challenge the view that demographic shifts due to the aging of the baby boom generation explain the decline in r*...."
Ed Comment: “Two thoughts First what matters is at the margin. So the savings of the rich may increase, but if (productive) investment also rises then we don’t get the effects that concern M&S (increased consumption or Keynesian paradox of thrift). It only matters when savings are greater than investment. Savings could be greater than investment if we run trade deficits for example AND rich people save more. But it might be the case that, were it not for trade deficits savings would not be greater than investment. From my prior readings, Mian and Sufi, seemed eager/determined to attribute all the increase to a rise in domestic inequality. That seems distorted/overstated to me. I believe the rich save a greater share of their income. (Surprisingly, others have argued otherwise.) I think it matters greatly whether they are risk averse or risk underwriting. If savers are risk averse, they deposit money in the bank (or money markets) and it predominantly end up funding mortgages, which can increase consumption (now it increased government debt, which also increases consumption but not via the free market). Or if savers invest in risky equity, it can result in a speculative boom, which can accelerate innovation, as we read about recently, So, it could be the case that rich Americans are saving but their savings are fueling a speculative boom while (at the margin) risk-averse offshore savers fund mortgages, gov debt, and ultimately consumption. To make a credible case that the rich/growing domestic inequality are to “blame,” we have to show that 1) it’s Americans, not risk-averse offshore savers who are funding consumption and 2) that the value of any speculative boom is less than the problems stemming form an offsetting rise in domestic risk-averse savings. That is, speculators may logically hedge the risk of speculation by holding risk-averse savings. So the slow down from unborrowed savings may be less than the acceleration of the speculative boom. My hunch is that, were it not for trade deficits, the system would largely be in equilibrium. My sense of M&S is that they are either stupid (don’t see these issues) or don’t care because they have an ax to grind. For example, the correlate things to inequality while ignoring trade deficits. I’m not say that’s the case. I’m asking how they think through the issues I’m raising.”

Steve Comment: “In none of M&S stuff that I’ve read they have drawn or acknowledge a distinction btw risk adverse capital (ze Germans) and risk seeking equity (USA!) I thinkthis Mian quoteis helpful in understanding their worldview, “What is savings? We all know what it is at a personal level: I get 100$ check and might save 20$ out of it But what is savings in the aggregate? Say for the world as a whole? That's where it gets tricky. e.g. people talk about a "global saving glut". But can we measure it? Not really - at least not in a direct sense The reason is that when a person (say Adam) "saves", someone else (say Eve) uses that saving, i.e. "dissaves", by borrowing it and spending it for one purpose or another So, aggregate total saving is always exactly zero! Now you might say, that according to the world bank worldwide saving is about 25% of GDP historically. What is that number about? Well it is just an accounting convention! Someone somewhere decided (for some good reasons at the time), that if Eve spends Adam's savings on capital goods (i.e. "investment"), then we will not count it as dissaving. So what you get is an accounting identity: Saving = Investment What the world bank data is telling us is that historically Eve borrows and spends about 25% of GDP on investment goods. Now imagine something starts to change Adam starts to save more and more, call it his "saving glut" He needs Eve to borrow his additional savings He convinces her to do that, but only after making it cheaper for her to borrow by lowering his interest rate However, Eve is not interested in spending her additional borrowing on capital goods, or investment Instead Eve decides to "consume" it - throws a party, goes on vacation, that sort of stuff The accounting convention will start counting Eve's additional spending as dissaving What this all means is that even though Adam *is* saving a lot more than before, total saving measured by our accounting standards will remain the same. Yes, there is a "saving glut" - But aggregate national accounts will not show it! So if you really wanted to see the saving glut, you will have to see it indirectly You will see it as a rise in total credit (remember Eve is borrowing more and more), as a fall in interest rate, and as a rise in Adam's personal savings I think this is the world we actually live in now Adam is the top 1% And I have no idea why Eve does not invest more, but consumes her additional borrowing ps: in recent years government has been borrowing and spending on Eve's behalf... but same thing more or less”..."
Ed Comment: “A few thoughts. A lot of value gets captured by real estate. So eve may not save, but her real estate may nevertheless permanently rise in value as owners save, invest, take risk and innovate. She may borrow against the increased value of her home and consume the proceeds to adjust her desired amount of savings An investor might own stocks in companies that pour money into risky investments, and seem over valued. They may hold cash as an offset to manage their risk levels. I start by assuming the world is fairly logical. People determined to change the world/defeat the status quo start by assuming the world is mistaken/broken. They are confident they can out think markets/the economy, as if they could out-think nature and evolution. Most likely they are wrong because the world is too complex and their analysis is too simple to accurately account for all the tradeoffs.”

  • Inflation
  • Comparisons
    • Cross-country
    • Historical
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
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Showing 114 database articles primarily about Inflation

The Anatomy of Tariff Pass-Through into Consumer Prices

AI Summary. Federal Reserve Bank of New York researchers estimate that about 26% of a uniform tariff passes through into non-oil consumer goods prices over twelve months, with roughly 64% of that effect coming directly from higher import prices and the rest through domestic producers' input costs and markups. Pass-through into import prices is nearly immediate, while domestic price responses build gradually.

Mary Amiti,Sebastian Heise and David Weinstein Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
October 7, 2026
Is Database:
Database

FRBNY estimates that a uniform 10% tariff raised consumer-goods prices 2.6% after 12 months: 1.7pp directly via imported final goods, and 0.9pp mainly via higher imported-input costs for domestically produced goods, with the latter effect building over 9–12 months.

How much of a tariff reaches consumer prices within a year?

Core argument: Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.

Tariff pass-through into U.S. import prices is nearly complete. Instrumenting realized duty rates with statutory tariffs to account for endogenous sourcing and exemptions, tariff pass-through into consumer-goods import prices is about 90.5%; a 10% increase in the duty rate raises import prices about 9.1%. At twelve months, a uniform 10% tariff raises consumer-goods prices 2.639%: 1.694pp through the direct channel, 0.770pp through marginal costs, and 0.175pp through strategic complementarity. Import-price pass-through is essentially immediate, while domestic prices adjust gradually; the contribution of the two indirect channels roughly doubles between six and twelve months, with much of the overall adjustment occurring within nine to twelve months. For the actual 2025–26 tariffs, the direct channel accounts for about 70% of the estimated effect; the marginal-cost channel accounts for about 22%, with strategic complementarity accounting for the remainder. Because the regressions include date fixed effects, the tariff contribution is identified relative to less-exposed goods and should be read as illustrative rather than as the absolute contribution to aggregate goods CPI.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Amiti, Heise, and Weinstein estimate that a uniform tariff passes through to non-oil consumer goods prices at roughly 26 percent over twelve months, with a 10 percent tariff raising prices 2.6 percentage points, 1.7 points of it via the direct import channel.
  2. The two indirect channels — marginal costs from imported inputs (0.77 percentage points) and strategic complementarity in domestic markups (0.17 points) — account for 36 percent of the total effect and roughly double between six and twelve months after tariff implementation.
  3. Applied to the actual 2025–26 tariff schedule, the authors estimate the cumulative tariff contribution to goods CPI reached about 2.9 percentage points by February 2026, with import-price pass-through near 90 percent and retail pass-through of 0.56.

Related Articles:

  • The State of U.S. Tariffs July 24, 2026 — The average statutory US tariff rate stands at 11.1% and, under current law including scheduled increases, is projected to reach 11.8% by year-end. The authors estimate current-law tariffs will raise consumer prices by about 0.7% and generate roughly $1.9tn over ten years, with revenue somewhat lower after accounting for tariffs' negative effect on economic output.
  • Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs? — The authors estimate that 94% of U.S. tariff costs were borne domestically over the first eight months of 2025, with a 10% tariff associated with only a 0.6 percentage point decline in foreign export prices. Pass-through into U.S. import prices later declined to 86%, shifting more of the burden to foreign exporters.
  • Demand-Driven Inflation — Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP
    • Trade (not deficits)

Demand-Driven Inflation

AI Summary. Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.

Domenico Giannone and Giorgio Primiceri Bookings Papers on Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Giannone and Primiceri revisit the relative role of supply vs. demand shocks in generating the post-Covid inflation. Because aggregate demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic data are flat, supply shocks alone would not have generated large inflation in the absence of added demand stimulus.

Did outward demand shifts, not supply shocks alone, drive recent inflation?

Core argument: Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.

Demand and supply curve slopes are estimated from pre-pandemic data using the essentially definitional restriction that supply shocks move prices and output in opposite directions along demand curves, while demand shocks move them together along supply curves; the plotted slopes represent Bayesian posterior medians rather than uniquely identified estimates. The estimated demand curves are relatively flat in both the US and euro area [Figure 7], reflecting the central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation. With those slopes, adverse supply shifts cause large output losses but comparatively little inflation. [To successfully explain] the combination of inflation and output observed in 2022 therefore requires demand to shift outwards too. Strong demand, including unusually accommodative monetary policy [on top of strong fiscal expansion], cushioned the output losses while increasing inflation [Figure 7]. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area. That combination is suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, whereas an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output. [Figure 9].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Demand curves estimated from pre-pandemic US and euro-area data are relatively flat, reflecting central banks’ strong pre-pandemic responses to inflation, so adverse supply shifts produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation.
  2. Explaining the 2022 combination of inflation and output requires an outward shift in demand, with strong demand — including unusually accommodative monetary policy atop fiscal expansion — cushioning output losses while raising inflation.
  3. In 2021–22, both inflation and GDP as subsequently revised exceeded forecasts in the US and euro area, a combination suggestive of unexpectedly strong demand, since an adverse supply surprise alone would raise inflation but lower output.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Why Did Inflation Rise And Fall In 2021-24? Channels And Evidence From Expectations — Across countries, unexpectedly higher government deficits relative to earlier International Monetary Fund forecasts are associated with unexpectedly higher inflation, measured by each factor's contribution to the increase in public debt, a relationship the author finds statistically significant. This evidence is consistent with a fiscal channel for inflation.
  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Is The World Really Drowning In Debt?

AI Summary. The Institute of International Finance reports global debt as a share of output rose less than 10 percentage points between 2018 and mid-2026, peaking at 337% in early 2021 before falling 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. Inflation eroded the debt burden, as it did in the UK after the Second World War.

Martin Wolf Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Wolf notes that the global debt-to-GDP ratio rose by less than 10pp btw 2018 and June 2026: after peaking at 337% in early 2021, it fell by 27pp by the end of 2023, as inflation boosted nominal GDP and eroded the value of existing debt.

Does inflation reduce the global debt burden?

Core argument: IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.

The IIF shows that between 2018 and June 2026, the rise in the ratio of global debt to output was less than 10 percentage points. The story is striking: the ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021, before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023. What was this magical “debt-buster”? Good old-fashioned (and supposedly “unexpected”) inflation. This is — to put it mildly — not the first time inflation has wiped out debt. It was, to take one of countless examples, an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt. For countries able to print the money in which their debt is denominated, that is often what happens.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. IIF data show the global debt-to-output ratio reached a post-Covid peak of 337% in early 2021 before falling by 27 percentage points by the end of 2023, with inflation identified as the force that eroded it.
  2. Between 2018 and June 2026, the IIF shows the ratio of global debt to output rose by less than 10 percentage points.
  3. Inflation has wiped out debt before, forming an important part of the UK’s elimination of its post-second-world-war debt, and often does so for countries able to print the currency in which their debt is denominated.

Related Articles:

  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • The Coming Great Repression? — Across countries and over time, higher public debt burdens are associated with lower relative returns on government bonds, the opposite of standard risk-premium predictions. The authors estimate financial repression—making banks captive bond buyers and loading them with low-return reserves—contributed 90.7 percentage points of GDP to Britain's postwar debt reduction, versus 20.3 from surprise inflation.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Inflation
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Choking Iran's Economy Is the Least Bad Way to End the War

AI Summary. Iran's economy is on track for its largest annual contraction since the mid-1980s, with inflation above 50% — the highest in nearly 70 years of records — and food and other necessities costing double a year earlier. Its currency has fallen to a record low of about 1.85m rials per dollar on the black market.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Inflation in Iran is running at at least ~69%, its highest annual rate in 70 years. The black market exchange value of a rial hit a record low of ~1.85mm rials to the dollar, relative to 50,000 per dollar five years ago.

Is Iran's economy contracting at its fastest rate in decades?

Core argument: Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.

[Iran's] economy is on track to suffer the biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s. Inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records start nearly 70 years ago. Worse, the cost of food and other necessities has already doubled from a year ago. Its currency, the rial, is worthless. In the black market, the exchange rate has collapsed to a record low of about 1.85 million rials to the dollar; five years ago, roughly 50,000 rials were enough to buy a greenback.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Iran's economy is on track for its biggest annual contraction since the nadir of the Iran-Iraq War in the mid-1980s.
  2. Iranian inflation is running well above 50%, the highest annual rate since records began nearly 70 years ago, with the cost of food and other necessities already double year-ago levels.
  3. The rial has fallen to a record low of about 1.85 million to the dollar on the black market, compared with roughly 50,000 rials per dollar five years ago.

Related Articles:

  • Soaring Diesel Prices Rip Across The US Economy — US diesel pump prices reached $5.47 a gallon, approaching a nominal record of $5.82 ($6.64 adjusted for inflation), after rising 8% in a month as wars in the Middle East and Europe constrain production and global supplies. The gap between diesel and crude oil prices has hit a record high.
  • For the Oil Market, the Strait of Hormuz Isn’t Closed — Tanker tracking data identify at least 5m barrels a day of oil still transiting the Strait of Hormuz, and allowing for vessels crossing undetected the true figure could reach 7m–9m. Growing oil spills visible on satellite imagery indicate attacks on tankers alongside efforts to keep the waterway open.
  • U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past — The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.
  • Inflation
  • Energy
  • GDP
  • Politics
  • Security

A Return To Monetarism?

AI Summary. The author argues that a surge in money growth beginning in 2020 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the sample period since 1967, and that subsequent monetary tightening produced strong disinflationary pressures. Had policymakers tracked money growth using a price-target model, they might have tightened sooner and avoided some of the inflation.

Peter Ireland, Stephen Miran and Nouriel Roubini Hudson Bay Capital
Date Posted:
July 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Ireland, Miran, and Roubini compare the actual price level to the predictions of an equilibrium model relating prices to money supply. Predicted inflation hit a 60-year high in 2020–21, months before inflation surged and then crashed once the Fed hiked.

Would tracking money growth have helped policymakers tighten sooner?

Core argument: The money growth surge beginning in 2020 and continuing into 2021 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period, according to the graphs in Figure 3.

The graphs in Figure 3 show quite clearly how the surge in money growth starting in 2020 and continuing in 2021 put enormous upward pressure on inflation, to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period. And while the large and negative price gaps that followed in 2022 and 2023 are likewise indicative of strong disinflationary pressures applied through subsequent monetary tightening, one can’t see these graphs without asking: Had Federal Open Market Committee members been monitoring measures of money growth with the help of the P-star [price target based on monetary aggregates] model, might they have ended QE and raised interest rates sooner and more quickly, thereby avoiding at least some of the post-2020 inflation? Of course, massive fiscal expansion was another driver of the post-2020 surge in inflation, as suggested by fiscal theories of the price level. The model simply observes that regardless of its originating source, excessive money growth signals that inappropriate macroeconomic policies are fueling higher inflation. Fiscal expansions that expand money supply will be reflected in a P-star model.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The money growth surge beginning in 2020 and continuing into 2021 put upward pressure on inflation to a degree unprecedented in the post-1967 sample period, according to the graphs in Figure 3.
  2. The large negative price gaps of 2022 and 2023 indicate strong disinflationary pressures from subsequent monetary tightening, raising the question of whether FOMC members using the P-star model would have ended quantitative easing and raised interest rates sooner and more quickly.
  3. Massive fiscal expansion was another driver of the post-2020 inflation surge, as suggested by fiscal theories of the price level, and fiscal expansions that expand the money supply are reflected in a P-star model.

Related Articles:

  • Money and Inflation — The M2 money supply has contracted for the first time in sixty years, shrinking at an annual rate of nearly 5%, yet inflation has remained high rather than turning to deflation. The author argues this undercuts the claim that money supply growth drives inflation, since the same logic implies severe deflation should now follow.
  • State Dependence of Monetary Policy During Global Supply Chain Disruptions — The authors present descriptive evidence that global supply chain disruptions were associated with elevated transportation costs, goods supply-demand imbalances, and a surge in goods prices, steepening the aggregate supply curve. In the disrupted state, a contractionary monetary policy shock produces muted responses in real output and spare capacity but a substantially stronger decline in goods prices.
  • What Next for r*? A Capital Market Equilibrium Perspective On The Natural Rate of Interest — A capital-market equilibrium model estimates that the steady-state safe natural rate of interest across advanced economies has fallen from about 5% to about 0%, driven by slower growth, demographics, higher mark-ups, and rising risk premia. The author estimates that artificial-intelligence-driven growth and heightened inflation risk could each raise it by about 1 percentage point.
  • Inflation
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Home Alone: Inflation And The New Fed Chair

AI Summary. Current readings on labor market tightness, manufacturing price pressures, supply chain tightness and the output gap resemble conditions that have historically preceded Federal Reserve rate increases rather than cuts, and futures markets are pricing in hikes. Averaging several monetary policy rules implies a policy rate of 4.00%–4.85% versus the current 3.50%–3.75%.

Michael Cembalest J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
May 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Cembalest notes labor market tightness, price pressures in the manufacturing sector and the implied output gap are “much closer to conditions that have historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates rather than to lower them.”

Do current inflation indicators point toward rate hikes rather than cuts?

Core argument: Averaging several monetary policy rules — Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, and forward-looking — yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00%–4.85%, above the current 3.50%–3.75% range.

Inflation indicators the Fed watches include labor market tightness, price pressures in the manufacturing sector, supply chain tightness and the “output gap” which measures how far actual growth is above/below potential growth. [The two] charts plot these four variables at the time of prior Fed decisions to increase or cut policy rates; green dots indicate when the Fed cut, red dots indicate when the Fed tightened and yellow circles show today’s values. In other words: current values are much closer to conditions that have historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates rather than to lower them. That may be why the futures curve is now pricing in Fed hikes instead of the cuts that were priced in at the start of the year. Superwonky: averaging several different monetary rules of thumb (Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, forward-looking) yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00% - 4.85% compared to the current range of 3.50% - 3.75%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Averaging several monetary policy rules — Taylor rules, inertial, alternative r*, and forward-looking — yields a Fed Funds range of 4.00%–4.85%, above the current 3.50%–3.75% range.
  2. Labor market tightness, manufacturing price pressures, supply chain tightness, and the output gap sit much closer to conditions that historically prompted the Fed to raise policy rates than to cut them.
  3. The futures curve is pricing in Fed hikes rather than the cuts priced in at the start of the year.

Related Articles:

  • US Consumer Sentiment Slides to Record Low on Price Concerns — The University of Michigan's consumer sentiment index fell 5 points to 44.8, a record low and weaker than all economist projections in a Bloomberg survey. Consumers expect prices to rise 3.9% annually over the next five to 10 years, up from 3.5%, and 4.8% over the coming year.
  • The Dangerous Brew That’s Rattling Bond Markets — U.S. inflation has remained above the Federal Reserve's 2% target since 2022 while government borrowing runs high and companies borrow heavily to fund AI build-out. Even so, the 30-year Treasury yield reached a 19-year high of 5.18% while the 10-year yield, at 4.67%, sat below its October 2023 level.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy
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