Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
Upside of Inequality Oxford Unintended Consequences
Buy the Books
  • Macro Roundup
  • About Roundup
  • About Ed Conard
  • Highlights
  • Topics
  • Subscribe
Edward Conard
  • twitter
  • facebook
  • linkedin
  • youtube
  • Email
  • Text Message (SMS)
  • Twitter/X
  • LinkedIn
  • Facebook
  • WhatsApp Message
Subscribe to Macro Roundup Emails
  • Mentions 519
  • Primary focus 128
Showing 128 database articles primarily about Wages/Income
Currently filtering by:
  • Remove Wages/Income
  • Remove "primary topics only" restriction
  • Remove 'Database'
Show all 7,201 articles
For whatever topics you select (currently: Wages/Income):
Choose search scope

Your importance filter 'Database' shows fewer articles.

Remove filters to see full article counts

The Plateauing of Cognitive Ability Among Top Earners

Marc Keuschnigg, Arnout van de Rijt and Thijs Bol European Sociological Review
Date Posted:
February 6, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Evidence from Sweden finds a strong relationship between cognitive ability and earnings up to annual earnings of ~$64k. There are no significant differences among the top three income percentiles. @ECSR_Soc

The figure above shows cognitive ability levels expressed with annual wage on the horizontal axis. Cognitive ability plateaus at high levels of occupational success. Precisely in the part of the wage distribution where cognitive ability can make the biggest difference, its right tail, cognitive ability ceases to play any role. Cognitive ability plateaus around €60,000 [$64,200] at under a standard deviation above the mean. There are no significant differences in ability between the three top income percentiles, despite there being 594 cases in each percentile bin and despite those in the 100th percentile earning more than double the wage of those in the 98th percentile.  Past a certain wage threshold, having a higher wage is no longer telling of cognitive ability. The average score individuals in the top percentile achieved as adolescents on the cognitive-ability test is 7.15 ± 0.11 (95% confidence interval). On a stanine scale this amounts to less than a standard deviation (+0.86) above average.

Evidence from Sweden finds a strong relationship between cognitive ability and earnings up to annual earnings of ~$64k. There are no significant differences among the top three income percentiles.

Description automatically generated “…The figure above shows cognitive ability levels expressed with annual wage on the horizontal axis. Cognitive ability plateaus at high levels of occupational success. Precisely in the part of the wage distribution where cognitive ability can make the biggest difference, its right tail, cognitive ability ceases to play any role. Cognitive ability plateaus around €60,000 [$64,200] at under a standard deviation above the mean. There are no significant differences in ability between the three top income percentiles, despite there being 594 cases in each percentile bin and despite those in the 100th percentile earning more than double the wage of those in the 98th percentile. Past a certain wage threshold, having a higher wage is no longer telling of cognitive ability. The average score individuals in the top percentile achieved as adolescents on the cognitive-ability test is 7.15 ± 0.11 (95% confidence interval). On a stanine scale this amounts to less than a standard deviation (+0.86) above average. …”

The Evidence

Cognitive ability

“…We draw on standardized test results of cognitive ability among male conscripts. The Swedish military enlistment procedure consisted of a series of physical, psychological, and intellectual tests all men had to take at age 18–19. Motivation for participation in military service was not a factor for evaluation as avoiding enlistment by obtaining low-ability scores was not possible (Lindqvist and Vestman, 2009). Early-life measurement of cognitive ability circumvents endogeneity problems which may arise when using ability scores measured after job market entry (e.g. Aldén, Hammarstedt and Neuman, 2017): One can plausibly assume that learning on the job is steeper in highly paid jobs and that these learning effects may reduce the role of innate ability in later-life cognitive skills. The enlistment procedure included an assessment of cognitive ability similar to the AFQT used in the United States (Carlsson et al., 2015), which was found a better predictor of wages than IQ test scores (Borghans et al., 2016). There were separate paper and pencil tests for verbal understanding, technical comprehension, spatial ability, and logic. Each test consisted of 40 items presented in order of increasing difficulty and speed (Carlstedt and Mårdberg, 1993) and grades from each dimension were combined into a normally distributed stanine scale ranging from 1 to 9 (Lindqvist and Vestman, 2009). This measure has been frequently used in medical studies (e.g. Åberg et al., 2009) and in the social sciences, for example for assessing managers’ intelligence (Adams, Keloharju and Knüpfer, 2018), entrepreneurs’ balance in skill sets (Aldén, Hammarstedt and Neuman, 2017), the importance of social origin in achieving promotions to managerial positions (Bihagen, Nermo and Stern, 2013), and the effect of smart teachers on student performance (Grönqvist and Vlachos, 2016). With only minor revisions implemented over the years, this procedure evaluated the same four underlying dimensions of ability throughout the full observation period….”

Labour-market success

“…We consider two success measures, individuals’ average annual wage and their average occupational prestige during a 11 year career window (age 35–45) centred on the age of 40 (Haider and Solon, 2006). We measure annual gross wage—directly reported by employers to the Swedish tax authorities—in hundreds of thousands of Swedish krona (roughly equivalent to units of 10,000 present-day Euros). We include years of part-time employment and of zero-income, and our measure includes bonuses paid out as additional, directly taxable wage income. We adjust annual wages for inflation (using an OECD consumer price index for Sweden, with base year 2012) to make wages comparable between individuals who entered the labour market in different calendar years where the same nominal incomes represent different levels of purchasing power. See Figure 2B and Table 1 for descriptives of the wage variable. To demonstrate the robustness of our findings, we change to snapshot annual wages in individuals’ 2nd, 10th, and 20th year of labour-market participation in Appendix A. Because these snapshots do not require a balanced panel of individuals with 11 years of labour-market participation, we can include up to 238,000 earners in these analyses. Our second measure of labour-market success is occupational prestige, measured on the International Socio-Economic Index (ISEI) scale, where higher values indicate occupations with greater social status (Ganzeboom, De Graaf and Treiman, 1992). We obtain ISEI scores from employees’ registered occupation which are available for 49,022 employees. Following the above operationalization, we measure individuals’ multi-year average occupational prestige (see Appendix A for prestige in the 2nd, 10th, and 20th career year). Ranging from 16 (farm workers) to 90 (judges), ISEI averages 48.9 and density peaks at low (e.g. industrial workers, construction workers), intermediate (e.g. office clerks, policemen), and sub-top levels (e.g. accountants, engineers; see Figure 2C)…”

Results

“…Figure 3A shows the conditional mean, geometric mean, and median wage for each cognitive-ability score. The figure reproduces the positive effect of ability on wage identified in earlier work (Coward and Sackett, 1990; Herrnstein and Murray, 1994; Ng et al., 2005; Strenze, 2007; Jokela et al., 2017). The rank correlation between ability and wage equals ρ = 0.400 (P < 0.001; N = 59,387). The monotonicity of the relationship in Figure 3A is consistent with previous studies (Lubinski, 2016; Gensowski, 2018) rejecting the claim that past a certain threshold having even higher cognitive abilitydoes not matter (Gladwell, 2008). The most able Swedish men can expect to make more money than less able others. The substantive magnitude of the relationship is, however, modest, as the worst scoring men on average still earn more than a third of the salary of the best scoring men. The most cognitively able individuals clearly cannot expect outlandish labour-market returns (Rosen, 1981; Frank and Cook, 1995; Borghans and Groot, 1998; Neal and Rosen, 2000; Brynjolfsson and McAfee, 2011; Mankiw, 2013). Figure 3B flips the axes, conditioning ability on wage to allow an evaluation of the comparative intelligence of top earners. Each dot represents the average ability level for a wage percentile. The figure reveals a marked contrast between the body and the tail of the wage distribution, with a strong correspondence at intermediate wage levels, while above a certain wage level average ability plateaus at an average of around 7.25. This plateauing of the wage–ability relation occurs at approximately SEK600,000 annual wage (about €60,000). In the three top wage percentiles, that earn between SEK800,000 and SEK8,400,000 annually, the relationship even slightly reverses. As in our model simulations (Figure 1C), there are no significant differences in ability between the three top income percentiles, despite there being 594 cases in each percentile bin and despite those in the 100th percentile earning more than double the wage of those in the 98th percentile. This result supports our hypothesis, and it suggests that the inverse of Gladwell’s (2008) claim does hold: Past a certain wage threshold, having a higher wage is no longer telling of cognitive ability. The average score individuals in the top percentile achieved a adolescents on the cognitive-ability test is 7.15 ± 0.11 (95 per cent confidence interval). On a stanine scale this amounts to less than a standard deviation (+0.86) above average. Figure 3C shows the same 100 cognitive ability levels but this time expressed with wage percentiles on the horizontal axis. The upper part of the distribution exhibits the predicted concave pattern, just as it does in Figure 3B. This lends further support to our hypothesis.

“…Figure 4 shows results when using occupational prestige instead of wage as measure of career success. Results are similar as for wage: Figure 4A shows that expected prestige monotonically increases in cognitive ability, with extremely intelligent people having the best job-market prospects. Yet when ability is conditioned on occupational prestige in Figure 4B, we find no systematic pattern in how average cognitive ability varies between those with ISEI scores 70 and above. Individuals in these professions (judges, lawyers, professors, and doctors) achieved an average cognitive- ability test score of 7.13 ± 0.04, which is less than a standard deviation (+0.80) above the mean….”

Marc Keuschnigg, Arnout van de Rijt and Thijs Bol, “The Plateauing of Cognitive Ability Among Top Earners,” European Sociological Review, 28 January 2023, https://academic.oup.com/esr/advance-article/doi/10.1093/esr/jcac076/7008955

  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
Previous articleFebruary 3, 2023Chinese Military Announces YJ-21 Missile Abilities in Social Media Post Read as Warning to US Amid Tension in Taiwan StraitThe PLA used a social media post to announce the performance of its new anti-ship missile with a terminal speed of Mach 10, claiming the missile cannot be intercepted by any anti-missile weapons systems. @SCMPNewsNext articleFebruary 6, 2023Lessons from the Great Reflation.@generaltheorist notes that during the pandemic for every additional $1T in currency and deposits, American households saw $6T in non-monetary wealth driven by equities and real estate.
Showing 127 database articles primarily about Wages/Income

How Many Big Macs Does Your Salary Buy?

AI Summary. U.S. workers earn the most Big Macs annually (10,215), but Swiss workers lead on an hourly basis at 7 Big Macs per hour versus the U.S. at 6, reflecting longer American working hours rather than higher hourly wages.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.

Does working longer hours mask stagnant American wage growth?

Core argument: American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.

On an annual basis, America continues to top our McWages rankings. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year; Switzerland and Australia are in second and third place, respectively. But American working hours are supersized, too. On an hourly basis, Switzerland comes out on top: the average worker there earns the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with America’s six. Australia ranks third, at five burgers for every hour worked.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.
  2. Switzerland leads all nations in hourly McWage purchasing power at seven Big Macs per hour, with Australia third at five, demonstrating that top annual earnings and top hourly compensation do not always coincide.

Related Articles:

  • The Big Mac Index At 40 — Global currency misalignments are at their widest since the mid-1990s, driven by post-2021 U.S. inflation, an undervalued Chinese currency, and a weakening Japanese yen that has made consumer goods cheaper in Japan than in China.
  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — The gap in hours worked between Americans and non-Americans has narrowed by half since the 1990s, driven by declining U.S. work hours as expanded government health benefits reduced the need to work, while rising wages and lower barriers to employment increased hours worked in other advanced economies.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce

US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins have expanded ~250 basis points over the past year, approaching all-time highs, as 23% profit growth far outpaced 8% growth in corporate value added. Labor's share of income is hitting new lows, confirming that margin expansion—not faster economic growth—is the primary driver of record profit levels.

Abiel Reinhart J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

US corporate profit margins rose ~250bp y/y in Q2 and are approaching an all-time high. Reinhart notes that tech and communications services drove ~58% of recent S&P 500 profit growth, even as the sectors have been “steadily losing employment since late 2022.”

Are record corporate profits driven by growth or margin expansion?

Core argument: Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) were very robust in both 2Q (41% [annual rate]) and over the last year (23%). Excluding post-recession spikes, we haven’t seen a year this strong since the mid-2000s. Higher margins [were] the key driver [of profit growth], as 23% y/y domestic profit growth was far in excess of the 8% increase in corporate value added. Profit margins (pre-tax profits divided by value added) increased close to 250bp over the last year, and are approaching all-time highs, whereas the labor share is hitting new lows.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Related Articles:

  • US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt — U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
  • Politics
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
  • Workforce

Consumer Checkpoint: The Great Convergence

AI Summary. Spending and wage growth have largely converged across income groups, with lower- and middle-income households posting after-tax wage growth of 5.2% and 4.2% year-over-year, narrowing a previously wide gap — though the top 5% of earners continue to outpace all others.

David Michael Tinsley, Joe Wadford, Liz Everett Krisberg, Vanessa Cook, et al. Bank of America
Date Posted:
August 11, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Over the last two years, after-tax wage growth for the top 5% has outpaced the rest of the distribution. BofA internal data show after-tax wage growth for the lowest income tercile has surpassed that of the top 5% for the first time since December 2024.

Are lower-income households finally catching up in wage growth?

Core argument: The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.

We have discussed the “K-shaped” divide between higher- and lower-income households’ spending and wage growth. But since May, our data has shown a significant narrowing in this gap. As of July, spending and wage growth have largely converged across income cohorts, with the exception of the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace the rest. A similar dynamic was evident in discretionary spending. In our view, one factor behind the narrowing spending growth gap is stronger after-tax wage growth. For lower- and middle-income households, after-tax wage growth rose to 5.2% YoY and 4.2% YoY, respectively, in July.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.
  2. After-tax wage growth for lower-income households reached 5.2% YoY in July versus 4.2% for middle-income households, with stronger after-tax gains identified as a primary driver of narrowing discretionary spending gaps across cohorts.

Related Articles:

  • What the World Cup Revealed About America — U.S. households with retirement savings and home equity have been insulated from inflation, as $15tn in annual spending by 45 million such households—driven by wealth gains rather than income—has sustained GDP growth well above rates seen in comparable economies.
  • K-Shaped Economy? — Using internal Stripe payment data, Tedeschi finds that spending growth of households in low-income zip codes has outpaced that of households in high-income…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Income Shocks and Intrahousehold Dynamics: Evidence from a Guaranteed Income Experiment

AI Summary. Guaranteed income transfers reduce total household earnings by more than the transfer amount, as other household members—particularly partners—work fewer hours and are less likely to advance in their jobs.

Elizabeth Rhodes, David Broockman, Eva Vivalt, Patrick Krause, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
August 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In a randomized guaranteed-income experiment, giving one adult a transfer of $1,000/month for two years cut the other household members’ income by ~$1,700/year. Partners worked less and advanced less at work, while schooling and training among others rose.

Does guaranteed income reduce household work effort beyond the transfer amount?

Core argument: Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.

Figure 4 summarizes treatment effects on the standardized family-level indices. The transfers’ effects reshaped the income and employment of other household members. The gap between participant income and total household income fell by about $1,700 per year (s.e. $800). The decline appears to reflect lower earnings among other household members. Effects on employment outcomes are consistent with this interpretation. Partner promotions and transitions to better jobs decrease significantly, but these effects are very small in magnitude. Partner hours and employment show more meaningful declines but are not significant in the unconditional analysis. Several other measures provide supporting evidence of negative effects on labor supply. Net transfers—the value given [to extended family] minus the value received—increased by roughly $135 per year. Estimates for household stability, decision-making, and the division of labor cluster near zero.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.
  2. Guaranteed income transfers reduced partner labor supply, with statistically significant declines in promotions and job transitions, though effect sizes were small.
  3. partner hours and employment showed larger but statistically insignificant declines.

Related Articles:

  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Parenting and Children — A randomized experiment giving 1,000 parents an unconditional $1K/month over 3 years found essentially no differences in family outcomes; treated children…
  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Consumption and Household Balance Sheets: Experimental Evidence from Two US States — An experiment giving 1,000 individuals $1k per month for 3 years raised spending on housing as well as consumption, but also increased indebtedness, suggesting…
  • The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States — Giving low income individuals $12,000/year for 3 years resulted in reduced market income of $1,500/year, due to a 2ppt reduction in labor force participation…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
    • Unemployment/Participation

The Impact of AI on the U.S. Labor Market

Sania Edlich and Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
July 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A difference-in-differences design finds 6.7% slower real-wage growth in AI-exposed occupations since 2023 than in low-exposure ones, with no detectable job loss. The largest effects were for the lowest quartile (-10.7%) and service occupations (-24.3%).

We examine the wage and employment effects of AI adoption across U.S. occupations using observed usage data from the Anthropic Economic Index rather than the theoretical exposure measures that dominate prior work. Using a difference-in-differences design with occupation and year fixed effects across 321 matched occupations from 2015 to 2025, we find that high-exposure occupations experience a 6.7% decline in real wage growth post-2023 with no detectable employment effects. The effect is concentrated among the lowest earners: service workers face a 24.3% decline and the bottom wage quartile a 10.7% decline, while top earners show no significant effect.Today, 5.8 million workers are affected, but as AI adoption deepens across corporate America, this figure is likely to grow substantially, with significant implications for income inequality and labor market policy in the years ahead. Only 321 of roughly 800 BLS occupations were matched, and the post-2023 period may be partially confounded by post-pandemic labor market dynamics. [Editor’s note: Figure 3 shows both wage and employment growth and decline among high-exposure workers, but the exposure measure combines automated and augmentative use, and thus cannot distinguish substitution from complementarity.]

Related Articles:

  • AI and the Fable of the ATMs — ATM’s reduced demand for tellers per bank branch, but this was offset by an increased number of branches due to deregulation. Kedrosky notes, “aggregate…
  • Looking for the Ladder — The downtick in hiring in AI-exposed occupations started 6 months prior to the release of ChatGPT, and is “perfectly” aligned with the start of Fed rate hikes…
  • Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox — Aging societies face structural labor shortages that create permanent incentives to automate, making demographics a long-run driver of AI deployment. Technology-producing economies benefit twice: by offsetting domestic labor scarcity and by exporting automation solutions to every other aging society.
  • Wages/Income
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Unemployment/Participation

Cognitive Ability in Labor and Capital Markets

AI Summary. Higher cognitive ability predicts both higher capital income and higher investment returns, with the return advantage reflecting skill rather than risk-taking, as high-ability individuals earn better risk-adjusted returns while holding lower-risk portfolios.

Spencer Bastani, Kristina Karlsson, Jonas Kolsrud and Daniel Waldenström Uppsala University
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Cognitive ability positively predicts capital as well as labor income, with the capital-income gradient ~3x as large in % terms. This reflects both higher saving rates and higher risk-adjusted returns, neither fully explicable by earnings.

Does cognitive ability generate superior investment returns independent of risk?

Core argument: Cognitive ability’s capital income gradient is 3x steeper than labor income gradient in log specifications, driven by higher saving rates.

We document three results. First, cognitive ability predicts capital income. Figure 2 plots mean log income and mean income rank against the nine cognitive ability scores reporting test performance on a 1–9 scale, with both series normalized to zero at the lowest score. In the log specification (Panel a), the capital income gradient is roughly three times steeper than the labor income gradient. In the rank specification (Panel b), the ordering reverses: the labor income gradient is steeper, because the heavy right tail of capital income compresses rank differences. Figure 3 provides a complementary perspective, plotting average cognitive ability across percentiles of the labor and capital income distributions. [The relationship between ability and rank flattens at the top of the labor distribution but strengthens at the top of the capital distribution.] Second, the capital-income gradient is only partially explained by labor income: a decomposition shows that ability is associated with higher saving rates and investment returns through channels beyond labor income. Third, the investment return channel is consistent with skill rather than risk compensation, as high-ability individuals earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns while holding portfolios with lower systematic risk.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cognitive ability’s capital income gradient is 3x steeper than labor income gradient in log specifications, driven by higher saving rates.
  2. High-ability individuals earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns while holding lower-risk portfolios, indicating skill-based rather than risk-based compensation in capital markets.
  3. Ability-income associations persist across genders and remain largely unexplained by education, occupation, or family background, suggesting intrinsic cognitive factors drive.

Related Articles:

  • Cognitive Skills Beyond Childhood — Data from a British birth cohort followed since 1958 show that cognitive skills early in life predict wages at age 50 better than cognitive skills at age 50…
  • Steeper At The Top: Cognitive Ability and Earnings in Finland and Norway — The top-earning men in Finland and Norway score 1 standard deviation higher in cognitive ability than median earners. The ability curve is steepest at the top…
  • Toward An Understanding Of The Returns To Cognitive Skills Across Cohorts — Wage returns to cognitive skill have declined for white men who took the Armed Forces Qualifying Test (AFQT) in 1997 relative to 1979, driven primarily by a…
  • Wages/Income
  • Education
    • Test Scores
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
© Copyright 2026 Coherent Research Institute · All Rights Reserved · Privacy · Terms