Do large industry price run-ups predict lower future returns or crashes?
Core argument: Greenwood, Shleifer, and You identified 40 U.S. industry run-ups from 1926 to 2014 and 107 international sector run-ups from 1985 to 2014, defining a run-up as a cumulative return of 100% or more, absolute and relative to the market, over two years.
Greenwood, Shleifer, and You defined a run-up as a cumulative return of 100% or more, both absolute and relative to the market, over the prior two years for a value-weighted portfolio of stocks within an industry. Further, they specified that the industry’s absolute return had to be up 50% or more over the previous five years. The run-up started the first month that the conditions were met. They identified 40 such run-ups in the U.S. from 1926 to 2014 and 107 in international sectors from 1985 to 2014. Their headline finding was that Fama is right in the sense that a run-up does not predict unusually low future returns, on average. Exhibit 13 shows the results for run-ups of U.S. industries. On the left are the 24 months prior to the first month in which the industry’s return crosses their threshold of a run-up, and on the right is the price performance for the following 48 months. Just over half of the run-ups had a crash, defined as a 40% drawdown from any price in the two years following the first run-up. The average return of all episodes after run-ups was not dissimilar to the market overall, though run-ups increased the probability of a crash, and signals along the way, including volatility, turnover, and equity issuance, helped predict it. A separate paper found that crashes often followed sharp increases in invested capital, a measure of investment intensity.

