The best evidence available suggests that the dollar share in China’s reserves has been broadly stable since 2015 (if not a bit before). If a simple adjustment is made for Treasuries held by offshore custodians like Belgium's Euroclear, China’s reported holdings of US assets look to be basically stable at between $1.8 and $1.9 trillion. After netting out China's substantial holdings of U.S. equities, China's holdings of U.S. bonds, after adjusting for China's suspected Euroclear custodial account, have consistently been around 50% of China's reported reserves. Nothing all that surprising.
Related: Is China the Source of Higher US Long Rates? and Shadow Reserves — How China Hides Trillions of Dollars of Hard Currency
What’s causing this interest rate spike? You might be tempted to see rising rates as a sign that investors are worried about inflation. But that’s not the story. We can infer market expectations of inflation from breakeven rates, the spread between interest rates on ordinary bonds and on bonds indexed for changes in consumer prices; these rates show that the market believes that inflation is under control. What we’re seeing instead is a sharp rise in real interest rates — interest rates minus expected inflation. At this point, real interest rates are well above 2%, up from yields usually below 1% before the pandemic. And if these higher rates are the new normal, they have huge and troubling implications. My instinct is to say that the bond market is overreacting to recent data and that high interest rates, like high inflation, will be transitory.
Related: Living with High Public Debt and Did the U.S. Really Grow Out of Its World War II Debt? and American Gothic
Each month life insurers receive insurance premium payments and pension funds receive employee contributions that they invest. These inflows are then filtered through investment policies and then allocated into a range of assets, including Treasuries. Over the past few years, this has translated into Treasury purchases at an annual rate of around $100b. This does not come close to meeting the trillions in coupons that will be issued each year for the foreseeable future. Real money managers will not be the marginal buyer of Treasuries that the market is looking for.
Related: Resilience Redux in the US Treasury Market and Maxing Out and Who Has Been Buying U.S. Treasury Debt?
The greater challenge facing US fiscal policy is not new: the US is running a primary (ex-interest) deficit much larger than has been the case historically, and it is happening at a point in the business cycle when the deficit would normally be smaller than usual. When interest expense rose sharply in the 1980s, fiscal policymakers reacted by shrinking the primary (ex-interest) deficit. The largest fiscal adjustment from that period, enacted in 1993, would be sufficient if enacted now to offset the additional interest expense we project (relative to 2021) after 5 years. The average interest rate on federal debt is likely to remain at or below the rate of nominal GDP growth for the next decade, and this relationship is likely to be more benign than the historical average over the next five years.
Related: Maxing Out and Resilience Redux in the US Treasury Market and Living with High Public Debt
Most of the exploding interest costs resulted from borrowing when interest rates were low. We estimate that nearly 60% of our debt originated when the average interest rate on ten-year Treasury notes was less than 3%, while 75% of current debt originated when three-month Treasuries paid less than 3%. That debt, borrowed at low rates, is now being rolled over into Treasuries paying interest rates between 4.5 and 5.6%. Though borrowing seemed cheap during those periods, policymakers failed to account for rollover risk, and we are now facing the cost.
Related: U.S. Deficit Explodes Even As Economy Grows and Interest Expense: A Bigger Impact on Deficits than Debt and Interest Costs Will Grow the Fastest Over the Next 30 Years
Treasury auction sizes will increase on average 23% in 2024 across the yield curve. This forecast comes from the Treasury Borrowing Advisory Committee’s neutral issuance scenario. The 37% increase in issuance of 3-year notes and the 28% increase in issuance of 5-year notes will in 2024 stress-test demand for Treasuries in the belly of the curve. This dramatic growth in the supply of the risk-free asset is “pulling dollars away” from other fixed-income assets, including investment grade credit, as investors substitute away from spread products toward Treasuries. The bottom line is that the world only saves a limited amount of dollars every year, and the significant growth in the size of the Treasury market is at risk in 2024 of crowding out demand for other types of fixed income.
Related: Resilience Redux in the US Treasury Market and Maxing Out and The High Cost of Borrowing at Low Rates
Here’s a view of the 1995-2005 boom, in which I show the natural log of productivity — so that a straight line corresponds to steady growth — and plot a continuation of the growth rate from 1973 to 1995 (the red line), so that you can see how actual growth compared. By the time the productivity surge tapered off, productivity was about 12% higher than the previous trend would have led you to expect it would be. Since A.I. is arguably an even more profound innovation than the technologies that drove the 1995-2005 boom, 15% isn’t at all unreasonable. If optimistic estimates of the boost from the technology are at all right, growth will be much higher than conventional estimates of the economy’s long-run sustainable growth rate, like those of the Federal Reserve, which put it at around 1.8% over the next decade. [If that’s the case] debt won’t be a big concern after all — especially because faster growth will boost revenue and reduce the budget deficit.
Related: Integrating the Goldman AI Report Into Our Views and The Outlook for Long-Term Economic Growth and AI, Mass Evolution, and Weickian Loops
We provide estimates of the impacts of the early termination of pandemic-era UI benefits in several states in 2021 that had expanded their generosity (FPUC) and the groups of workers eligible for benefits (PUA), relative to those that did not terminate those benefits early. Using CPS data, we present difference-in-difference estimates that the flow of unemployed workers into employment increased by around 12-14pp following early termination. Among prime-age workers, the effect is about two-thirds the size of the unemployed-to-employed flow among control states during the February–June 2021 period. We show that state-level unemployment rates fell following early exit from FPUC and PUA. Finally, we present evidence that early termination reduced the share of households that had no difficulty meeting expenses. The welfare implications of the early termination of FPUC and PUA are therefore ambiguous.
Related: Unemployment Is Low, Welfare High. What Gives? and Calomiris on Gramm Ekelund and Early on Income Distribution
A large chunk of the upward revisions to GDP data came from increases in real fixed investment, which was raised by more than 6.4% and saw its cumulative growth since early 2019 increase from 5.8% to 8.7%. That means the investment and construction boom we’ve seen over the last few years has actually been stronger than first reported—with manufacturing, housing, software, and power investments all being revised upward. The revisions to software data and methodologies, which included updates that now treat a portion of labor from an expanded pool of workers in various tech occupations as in-house investments, raised real private fixed software investment by 12%. This also spilled over into higher estimates of public-sector software investments, both inside and outside of the defense sector, and upward revisions to the real output of the US information industry.
Related: An American Investment Boom Would Be Good for the World and Making Manufacturing Great Again and What Have We Learned About the Neutral Rate?
Every five to 10 years, the World Values Survey asks people in dozens of countries where they would place themselves on a scale from the zero-sum belief that “people can only get rich at the expense of others”, to the positive-sum view that “wealth can grow so there’s enough for everyone”. The average response among those in high-income countries has become 20% more zero-sum over the last century. Moreover, two distinct rises in the prevalence of zero-sum attitudes have coincided with two slowdowns in gross domestic product growth, one in the 1970s and another in the past two decades. The same pattern holds within individual countries. Britons and Americans have become significantly more likely to believe that success is a matter of luck rather than effort precisely as income growth has slowed.
Related: Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of U.S. Political Divides and Is the Surge to the Left Among Young Voters a Trump Blip or the Real Deal? and Millennials are Shattering the Oldest Rule in Politics
Zero-sum thinking is associated with more preference for liberal economic policies in general and with stronger political alignment with the Democratic Party and weaker alignment with the Republican Party. We also find that zero-sum thinking is linked empirically to important political crises experienced in the United States. Specifically, we find that individuals who view the world in zero-sum terms are more likely to believe that the conspiracy theory QAnon holds some truth for U.S. politics. We also find that zero-sum thinking is linked with empathy and understanding for the January 6, 2021 attack on the U.S. Capitol Building, an act that is more justifiable and seen as being less harmful if one presumes the world is zero-sum (rather than positive/negative sum).
Related: Are We Destined For A Zero-Sum Future? and Is the Surge to the Left Among Young Voters a Trump Blip or the Real Deal? and Millennials are Shattering the Oldest Rule in Politics
US exposure to foreign supply chains is much bigger than it appears at face value, but it is not that big on the macro level. By any measure, the US buys at least 80% of all industrial inputs from domestic sources. Thus, at an aggregate level, its foreign exposure is hardly alarming. However, while this may be reassuring, it is important to note that supply chain disruptions rarely occur at the macro level. The 80% figure was not relevant when the US auto sector shuttered factories due to a lack of semiconductors, or when buying home office electronics became problematic due to a demand surge and logistic snarls. Taking account of the Chinese inputs into all the inputs that American manufacturers buy from other foreign suppliers – what we call look through exposure – we see that US exposure to China is almost four times larger than it appears to be at face value.
Related: Setser On Rumors Of Decoupling and How America Is Failing To Break Up With China and US-China Trade is Close to a Record, Defying Talk of Decoupling
This paper hypothesizes that the decline of the Rust Belt was due in large part to the persistent labor market conflict that was prevalent throughout the region’s main industries. [Labor conflict] results in lower investment and productivity growth, which causes employment to move from the Rust Belt to the rest of the country. The model also features rising foreign competition as an alternative source of the Rust Belt’s decline. Quantitatively, labor conflict accounts for around half of the decline in the Rust Belt’s share of manufacturing employment. Consistent with the data, the model predicts that the Rust Belt’s employment share stabilizes by the mid 1980s, once labor conflict subsides. Rising foreign competition plays a more modest role quantitatively, and its effects are concentrated in the 1980s and 1990s, after most of the Rust Belt’s decline had already occurred.
Related: Autoworkers Have Good Reason to Demand a Big Raise and American Labor’s Real Problem: It Isn’t Productive Enough and EV Boom Remakes Rural Towns in the American South
As measured in the CES data, manufacturing average hourly wages for all employees were 3% above wages in the private sector in 2006, a difference commonly known as the manufacturing wage premium. Since then, manufacturing wages have averaged gains of 2.3% per year, while wages in the private sector have risen 2.6% per year. While manufacturing workers used to receive a premium relative to workers in other sectors, that premium has disappeared in recent years for most manufacturing jobs. Our results indicate that the decline in unionization rates is responsible for more than 70% of the drop in the manufacturing wage premium. Notably, the unionization effect remains significant even after accounting for a large set of worker and sectoral characteristics.
Related: American Labor’s Real Problem: It Isn’t Productive Enough and The World Is In The Grip Of A Manufacturing Delusion and Unpacking the Boom in U.S. Construction of Manufacturing Facilities
Gross investment has typically been 20-25% of GDP over time, although in recent years it’s been closer to the lower end of that range. From the 1950s up into the 1980s, net investment was (very roughly) 10% of GDP. Thus, it was plausible to say that in a typical year, a little more than half of gross investment went to replace capital that was wearing out, and a little less than half of gross investment was actually new, net investment growing the capital stock. But in the last decade or so, gross investment has been about 20% of GDP, and net investment has fallen to about 5% of GDP. In other words, gross investment as a share of GDP has fallen a bit, but not too much. The real change is that about three-quarters of investment is now going to replace capital that has worn out, so net investment is much lower.
Related: Capital Allocation
The Treasury market may be entering a period of volatility as leveraged investors have stalled in their purchases and the next marginal buyer has not yet arrived. When the Fed and commercial banks stepped away from the Treasury market, hedge funds stepped in and bought cash Treasuries in size as part of a cash futures basis trade. The financing for that trade is sourced through dealer repo, which grew rapidly and then stalled. While dealers themselves have access to virtually unlimited financing from the Fed, the size of their activity is constrained by balance sheet costs. If the leveraged buyers are reaching financing limits, then a new marginal Treasury buyer must emerge to absorb the sizable upcoming issuance.
Related: Resilience Redux in the US Treasury Market and Who Has Been Buying U.S. Treasury Debt? and Raising Anchor
Rather quietly, inflows from official investors came close to generating about half of the net inflows needed to sustain the United States' current account deficit (over the last 4qs of data, q3 23 may be different). A lot of the inflow over the last 4qs (q3 22 to q2 23) has gone into equities and bank deposits so it doesn't get the attention of Treasury flows. But q2 23 Treasury inflows were substantial as well. Total foreign demand for LT US bonds (official and private, including private demand for corporate bonds) exceeded the US current account deficit in q1 2023. The fall in reported foreign holdings last year though got a lot more attention. The IMF's data for global reserves isn't available (yet) for q2, but central banks added to their dollar holdings in q1 (and likely q2). They are getting a lot of coupon payments on their existing stock-- and reinvesting I assume.
Related: Setser On Chinese "De-Dollarizing" and Saudi Arabia's PIF and the New Petrodollar Recycling and Shadow Reserves — How China Hides Trillions of Dollars of Hard Currency
I would suggest that substantial and accumulating deficits and debts are a substantial threat to national security and national power. A reasonable calculation would suggest that our budget prospects are vastly worse than they were at the time of the Clinton administration's successful budget actions and substantially worse than they were at the time of the Simpson-Bowles efforts. The budget deficits a decade out comfortably in double digits as a share of GDP now seem a reasonable projection with primary deficits quite likely in the 5% of GDP range. This is without the assumption of the need for vast mobilization for meeting contingencies, military or non-military. And I think it is reasonable to ask the question. How long can or will the world's greatest debtor be able to maintain its position as the world's greatest power?
Related: Summers and Blanchard Debate the Future of Interest Rates and Interest Rates Hit 16-Year Record and Is a U.S. Debt Crisis Looming? Is it Even Possible?
US equities account for nearly 70% of the MSCI World index; the next five largest — in Japan, UK, France, Canada, and Germany — total less than 20%. The top 10 constituent equities of the MSCI World index, which are all US companies including Apple at number one and ExxonMobil at number 10, aggregate to more than 20%. To put it bluntly, the 10 most valuable US equities are larger than the market capitalisations of Japan, UK, France, Canada, and Germany combined. In effect, the US has scaled up the largest companies in the world in its own public markets, creating a colossal pool of recyclable equity capital residing in domestic and non-US investor portfolios. This has created a virtuous cycle of new listings from US and overseas issuers attracted by the depth and liquidity of that equity pool.
Related: Europe Has Fallen Behind America and the Gap is Growing and Why Europe’s Stock Markets Are Failing to Challenge the US and From Strength To Strength
While Treasuries remain the most liquid security in the world, they are structurally becoming less liquid. The average daily cash transactions in Treasuries has not come close to scaling with the overall growth in issuance. Although average daily cash volumes have increased slightly in recent years to $700b, that increase is in part due to the activity of principal trading firms whose strategy is to profit from small intraday fluctuations in price. These firms account for 20% of cash market volumes, but they disappear when volatility picks up so their provision of liquidity is illusory. Excluding their participation, cash market activity would be progressively thinning relative to the steady growth in issuance.
Related: Living with High Public Debt and Raising Anchor and Resilience Redux in the US Treasury Market
The US Equal Employment Opportunity Commission requires companies with 100 or more employees to report their workforce demographics every year. Bloomberg obtained 2020 and 2021 data for 88 S&P 100 companies and calculated overall US job growth at those firms. In total, they increased their US workforces by 323,094 people in 2021, the first year after the Black Lives Matter protests — and the most recent year for which this data exists. The overall job growth included 20,524 White workers. The other 302,570 jobs — or 94% of the headcount increase — went to people of color. Many people just starting out in their career are from growing Black, Hispanic, and Asian populations, who are entering the workforce just as more tenured White employees retire. That, however, can’t fully account for changes, particularly at the top of the corporate ladder.
Related: Biggest Pay Raises Went to Black Workers, Young People and Low-Wage Earners and Rebound in Immigration Comes to Economy’s Aid and Immigrants & Their Kids Were 70% of U.S. Labor Force Growth Since 1995
Using testing data from over two million students in nearly 10,000 schools in 49 states (plus the District of Columbia), we investigate the role of remote and hybrid instruction in widening gaps in achievement by race and school poverty. We find that remote instruction was a primary driver of the widening gaps. Math gaps did not widen in areas that remained in person (although reading gaps did). We estimate that high-poverty districts that went remote in 2020–2021 will need to spend nearly all of their federal aid on helping students recover from pandemic-related academic achievement losses.
Related: Parents Don’t Understand How Far Behind in School Their Kids Are and NAEP Long-Term Trend Assessment Results: Reading and Mathematics
Figure 1 shows that the median forecast of professional economists for one-year-ahead consumer price index (CPI) inflation has become less sensitive to actual CPI inflation. The figure shows the results of regressions measuring the strength of the relationship between one-year-ahead expected CPI inflation (vertical axis) and the contemporaneous four-quarter CPI inflation rate (horizontal axis). For the period from 1949 through the end of 1998, the blue line indicates a strong relationship with a slope of 0.71, implying that the median inflation forecast adjusts nearly one-for-one with actual inflation. The regression yields a much smaller slope of 0.18 for the period from 1999 through the second quarter of 2023 (red line), implying very little forecast adjustment in response to actual inflation.
Related: What We’ve Learned About Inflation
US households saved some $1.1 trillion less than previously thought over the past six years, according to revised government data released Thursday. The Bureau of Economic Analysis now calculates that Americans stashed away an average 8.3% of their disposable income annually from 2017 through 2022, down from a previously estimated 9.4%. The reduction stems from an accounting adjustment that lowered personal income from mutual funds and real estate investment trusts.
Commercial real-estate insurance costs have risen 7.6% annually on average since 2017, according to Moody’s Analytics. Costs to insure rental-apartment buildings rose 14.4% annually on average in Dallas, 13% in Los Angeles and 12.6% in Houston. Some owners struggle to find anyone willing to insure their buildings, Moody’s said. Intensifying natural disasters are a big reason for the increase, particularly in cities vulnerable to wildfires, floods or storms. The cost of reinsurance has also increased, trickling down to higher property insurance rates. Meanwhile, inflation has pushed up the cost of repairing or rebuilding damaged properties.
Related: Analyzing State Resilience to Weather and Climate Disasters and Rising Insurance Costs Start to Hit Home Sales and How a Small Group of Firms Changed the Math for Insuring Against Natural Disasters
The 5.3 point shift between 2016 and 2020–just enough to tilt the state to Biden—was driven by three factors: 2016 third-party voters switching to Biden in 2020, Black population growth and white population decline, and persuasion, primarily among high-income, high-education voters. The total shift in Georgia due to persuasion is about 3.1 points—and 2.2 points comes from the changes in the composition of the electorate. Georgia as a whole is not demographically favorable to Donald Trump: unlike the upper Midwest, there are fewer white working-class voters left for him to flip, and a lot of cross pressured college-educated white Republicans. If Trump’s path with suburban whites is closed off, Trump has another option: continuing to chip away at Democratic margins among African Americans, as current polls suggest he might. Trump would likely need a bigger breakthrough with Black voters than he’s gotten to date to fully counteract the effect of the state’s Black population growth.
Related: The Road to A Political Realignment in American Politics and Consistent Signs of Erosion in Black and Hispanic Support for Biden and How to Interpret Polling Showing Biden’s Loss of Nonwhite Support
While Treasuries remain the most liquid security in the world, they are structurally becoming less liquid. The average daily cash transactions in Treasuries has not come close to scaling with the overall growth in issuance. Although average daily cash volumes have increased slightly in recent years to $700b, that increase is in part due to the activity of principal trading firms whose strategy is to profit from small intraday fluctuations in price. These firms account for 20% of cash market volumes, but they disappear when volatility picks up so their provision of liquidity is illusory. Excluding their participation, cash market activity would be progressively thinning relative to the steady growth in issuance.
Related: Living with High Public Debt and Raising Anchor and Resilience Redux in the US Treasury Market
Stabilizing the federal debt at 100% of GDP over the long term—which would far exceed the post-1960 average of 45% of GDP—would require non-interest savings beginning at 2% of GDP and ramping up to 5% of GDP over the next three decades. (The resulting interest savings from a smaller debt would provide the rest of the savings.) These figures assume the renewal of the 2017 tax cuts (as there is strong bipartisan support for extending the tax cuts for the bottom-earning 98% of earners) but do not assume any additional spending expansions, tax cuts, or economic crises—all of which would also have to be fully offset to meet this debt target. In short, the non-interest savings required to stabilize the debt will almost surely rise past 5% of GDP when accounting for additional spending and tax-cut legislation. Taxing the rich cannot close more than a small fraction of this gap.
Related: Taxing Billionaires: Estate Taxes and the Geographical Location of the Ultra-Wealthy and American Gothic and The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies
This year, average monthly growth in the foreign-born labor force is about 65,000 higher compared with 2022 on a seasonally adjusted basis, a Goldman Sachs analysis found. After plunging at the start of the pandemic, the size of the foreign-born labor force has rebounded, nearing 32 million people in August. Foreign-born workers’ share of the labor force—those working or looking for work—reached 18% in 2022, the highest level on record going back to 1996, according to the Labor Department. It has climbed further this year to an average of 18.5% through August, not adjusted for seasonal variation.
Related: Immigrants & Their Kids Were 70% of U.S. Labor Force Growth Since 1995 and Immigration Playing a Key Role in the Labor Market and Immigration and U.S. Labor Market Tightness: Is There a Link?
The hype around the “Magnificent 7” stocks [Alphabet, Amazon, Apple, Meta, Microsoft, Nvidia, and Tesla] that have driven the stock market this year is reminiscent of the dot.com era, which ended with a spectacular crash. However, there are two reasons why today’s developments seem less worrying: The rise of hyped stocks was more extreme in the Dot.com era, as was the rise of the rest of the market. While today’s situation is exceptional, with seven stocks accounting for nearly 30% of the total value of the S&P 500, the rule in the past has been that only a few stocks generated most of the value creation of the stock market in the US and internationally.
Related: 7 or 493 Stocks: What Matters for the S&P 500? and Birth, Death, and Wealth Creation and Mr. Toad's Wild Ride: The Impact Of Underperforming 2020 and 2021 US IPOs
We calculate net global stock market wealth creation of $US 75.7 trillion btw 1990 and 2020. Wealth creation is highly concentrated. Five firms (0.008% of the total) with the largest wealth creation during the January 1990 to December 2020 period (Apple, Microsoft, Amazon, Alphabet, and Tencent) accounted for 10.3% of global net wealth creation. The best-performing 159 firms (0.25% of total) accounted for half of global net wealth creation. The best-performing 1,526 firms (2.39% of the total) can account for all net global wealth creation. Skewness in compound returns is even stronger outside the U.S. The present sample includes 46,723 non-U.S. stocks. Of these, 42.6% generated buy-and-hold returns measured in U.S. dollars that exceed one-month U.S. Treasury bill returns over matched horizons. By comparison, 44.8% of the 17,776 U.S. stocks in the present sample outperformed Treasury bills.
Related: Birth, Death, and Wealth Creation and More Bang for Your Buck and The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies
Using a measure of nonfinancial corporate profits from the national income accounts [before tax profits with capital consumption adjustment] we find that nonfinancial corporate profit margins, or profits over gross value added, increased sharply to about 19% in 2021 Q2 and slipped back to 15% in 2022 Q4, compared to about 13% in 2019 Q4. Our analysis shows that much of the increase in aggregate profit margins following the COVID-19 pandemic can be attributed to (i) the unprecedented large and direct government intervention to support U.S. small and medium-sized businesses and (ii) a large reduction in net interest expenses due to accommodative monetary policy. Without the historically outsized government fiscal intervention and accommodative monetary policy, non-financial profit margins during 2020-2021 would have been more in line with past episodes of large economic downturns.
Related: The Curious Incident of the Elevated Profit Margins and "Greedflation" and the Profits Equation
Americans’ inflation-adjusted median household income fell to $74,580 in 2022, declining 2.3% from the 2021 estimate of $76,330, the Census Bureau said Tuesday. The amount has dropped 4.7% since its peak in 2019. Wage growth for the typical worker outstripped inflation starting in December 2022, with inflation-adjusted wages rising about 3% in July, according to data from the Atlanta Fed Wage Tracker and the Labor Department.
Related: Jason Furman On Employment Cost Index and Real Wage Growth at the Individual Level in 2022 and The Unexpected Compression: Competition at Work in the Low Wage Economy
The decline in marriage and the rise in the share of children being raised in a one-parent home has happened predominantly outside the college-educated class. Over the past 40 years, while college-educated men and women have experienced rising earnings, they continue to get married, often to one another, and to raise their children in a home with married parents. Meanwhile at the same time, the earnings among adults without a college degree have stagnated or risen only a bit. And these groups have become much less likely to marry and more likely to set up households by themselves.So just mechanically, these divergent trends in marriage and family structure mean that household inequality has widened by more than it would have just from the rise in earnings inequality.
Related: US Births Are Down Again, After the COVID Baby Bust and Rebound and Wage Inequality and the Rise in Labor Force Exit: The Case of US Prime-Age Men and Bringing Home the Bacon: Have Trends in Men’s Pay Weakened the Traditional Family?
The chart shows the % of Black families that are in three income groups, using total money income data. The data is adjusted for inflation. The progress is dramatic. In 1967, the first year available, half of Black families had incomes under $35,000. By 2022 that number had been cut in half to just one quarter of families (the 2022 number is the lowest on record, even beating 2019). Twenty-five percent is still very high, especially when compared to White, Non-Hispanics (it’s about 12 percent), but it’s still massive progress. It’s even a 10-percentage point drop from just 10 years ago. And Black families haven’t just moved up a little bit: the “middle class” group (between $35,000 and $100,000) has been pretty stable in the mid-40 percentages, while the number of rich (over $100,000) Black families has grown dramatically, from just 5% to over 30%.
Related: U.S. Incomes Fall for Third Straight Year and Who Won the Cold War? Part I
Recent studies from the US, Sweden, and Finland all demonstrate that although most people who move directly into new unsubsidised housing may come from the top half of earners, the chain of moves triggered by their purchase frees up housing in the same cities for people on lower incomes. The US study found that building 100 new market-rate dwellings ultimately leads to up to 70 people moving out of below-median income neighbourhoods, and up to 40 moving out of the poorest fifth. Those numbers don’t budge even if the new housing is priced towards the top end of the market. It’s a similar story in the American Midwest, where Minneapolis has been building more housing than any other large city in the region for years, and has abolished zones that limited construction to single-family housing. Adjusted for local earnings, average rents in the city are down more than 20% since 2017, while rising in the five other similarly large and growing cities.
Related: On the Move: Which Cities Have The Biggest Housing Shortage? and A $100 Billion Wealth Migration Tilts US Economy’s Center of Gravity South and Young Families Have Not Returned to Large Cities Post-Pandemic
Sweden, which has applied for Nato membership, announced on Monday that it planned to raise defense spending by more than 25% to meet the military alliance’s target of 2% of GDP. Currently, only 11 of 31 members do. Persuading voters of the sacrifices required to make such commitments a reality represents a seismic reordering of the budget and electoral priorities. In Denmark, the government opted to fund its increase in public spending by cancelling a public holiday — to much chagrin from voters. "Leaders have signed up to a generational shift in defence policy. But I do wonder if they fully understand, or have told their finance ministers,” a senior Nato official said.
Related: The Age-Old Question: How Do Governments Pay For Wars? and The Cost of the Global Arms Race and Military Briefing: Ukraine War Exposes ‘Hard Reality’ of West’s Weapons Capacity
Unexpected changes in monetary policy can slow the pace of economic activity much more persistently than is commonly believed. In response to a 1% increase in interest rates, output would be about 5% lower after 12 years than it would otherwise be. To provide some context for these numbers, consider some data for the United States. In response to a similar 1% increase in interest rates, after 12 years TFP would be about 3% lower and capital would be about 4% lower. When we separate our interest rate experiments into those that resulted in rate hikes versus those that resulted in lower interest rates, we see that there is no free lunch. The blue line shows that lower interest rates have mostly temporary effects that vanish after a few years, as traditional theories predict.
Related: Loose Monetary Policy and Financial Instability and Monetary Policy and Innovation
According to the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget the federal deficit is projected to roughly double this year, as bigger interest payments and lower tax receipts widen the nation’s spending imbalance despite robust overall economic growth. After the government’s record spending in 2020 and 2021 to combat the impact of covid-19, the deficit dropped by the greatest amount ever in 2022, falling from close to $3 trillion to roughly $1 trillion. But rather than continue to fall to its pre-pandemic levels, the deficit then shot upward. Budget experts now project that it will probably rise to about $2 trillion for the fiscal year that ends Sept. 30. Jason Furman said the current jump in the deficit is only surpassed by “major crises,” such as World War II, the 2008 financial meltdown or the coronavirus pandemic.
Related: Living with High Public Debt and There Is No "Stealth Fiscal Stimulus" and US Fiscal Alarm Bells Are Drowning Out a Deeper Problem
Spending per Medicare beneficiary has nearly leveled off over more than a decade. The trend can be a little hard to see because, as baby boomers have aged, the number of people using Medicare has grown. The reason for the per-person slowdown is a bit of a mystery. Some of the reductions are easy to explain. The Affordable Care Act in 2010 reduced Medicare’s payments to hospitals and to health insurers that offered private Medicare Advantage plans. Congress also cut Medicare payments as part of a budget deal in 2011. But most of the savings can’t be attributed to any obvious policy shift. Economists at the Congressional Budget Office described the huge reductions in its Medicare forecasts between 2010 and 2020. Most of those reductions came from a category the budget office calls “technical adjustments,” which it uses to describe changes to public health and the practice of medicine itself.
Related: America’s Entitlement Programmes Are Rapidly Approaching Insolvency and Why Medicare and Social Security Are Sustainable and Interest Costs Will Grow the Fastest Over the Next 30 Years