Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
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Stop Worrying About the Death of the Humanities

Adam Kirsch Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
April 27, 2019
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English departments have lost 20% of their majors over the past decade.

English departments have lost 20% of their majors over the past decade.
Over the past decade, English departments have experienced a 20% decline in majors, reflecting a broader trend in humanities disciplines since the 2008 financial crisis. This shift is partly due to rising college costs, with students gravitating towards STEM fields, which promise higher earnings. For instance, biology majors at the University of Pennsylvania increased by 25% from 2005 to 2014. Despite this academic decline, public engagement with humanistic pursuits remains robust. The National Endowment for the Arts reported a 3.6% rise in arts attendance from 2012 to 2017, and poetry readership more than doubled among young adults. This suggests that while universities may not be the primary custodians of humanistic culture, interest in these fields persists outside academia.

“…Colleges across America are beginning to prepare for graduation season, but in some corners of campus, you’re more likely to hear sounds of dread than of celebration. These are the humanities departments—English, history, philosophy, classics and others—where enrollments have dropped precipitously since the financial crisis of 2008. “This wasn’t a gradual decline; it was more like a tidal wave,” as the president of Macalester College, Brian C. Rosenberg, told the Atlantic last fall. At the University of Wisconsin-Madison, for instance, the number of students graduating with humanities degrees fell from 1,830 in 2008 to 1,025 in 2016. Nationwide, according to the National Center for Education Statistics, English departments have lost some 20% of their majors over the last 10 years. Meanwhile, students are flocking to STEM subjects: At the University of Pennsylvania, the number of students majoring in biology went up 25% between 2005 and 2014…”

Adam Kirsch, “Stop Worrying About the ‘Death’ of the Humanities,”Wall Street Journal, April 26, 2019, https://www.wsj.com/articles/stop-worrying-about-the-death-of-the-humanities-11556290279

Stop Worrying About the ‘Death’ of the Humanities

Colleges across America are beginning to prepare for graduation season, but in some corners of campus, you’re more likely to hear sounds of dread than of celebration. These are the humanities departments—English, history, philosophy, classics and others—where enrollments have dropped precipitously since the financial crisis of 2008. “This wasn’t a gradual decline; it was more like a tidal wave,” as the president of Macalester College, Brian C. Rosenberg, told the Atlantic last fall. At the University of Wisconsin-Madison, for instance, the number of students graduating with humanities degrees fell from 1,830 in 2008 to 1,025 in 2016. Nationwide, according to the National Center for Education Statistics, English departments have lost some 20% of their majors over the last 10 years. Meanwhile, students are flocking to STEM subjects: At the University of Pennsylvania, the number of students majoring in biology went up 25% between 2005 and 2014.

These trends started to spark alarm around five years ago, when observers began to talk about the “death,” “decline” or “crisis” of the humanities. Since then, alarm has turned into something more like panic. “Who is going to save the humanities?” wondered Michael Massing in the New York Review of Books earlier this month, echoing last summer’s headline in the Chronicle of Higher Education: “The Humanities as We Know Them Are Doomed. Now What?”

Yet strangely, when you look outside the gates of the university, the fate of the humanities doesn’t look so bleak. When it comes to the wider American public, there has been no apparent decline of interest in humanistic pursuits. A Pew Research Center study found that the percentage of Americans who read print books has fallen slightly, from 71% in 2011 to 63% in 2018; over the same period, however, more Americans read e-books and listened to audiobooks. Last year, the National Endowment for the Arts reported that attendance at arts activities increased by 3.6% between 2012 and 2017, while the number of Americans who reported reading poetry increased by an amazing 76%, more than doubling among readers aged 18 to 24.

This disconnect suggests that talk of the death of the humanities is founded on a certain confusion about what the humanities are and where they live. Pursuits such as literature, art and philosophy are fundamental expressions of human nature. While they have taken very different forms in different times and places, no civilization has been without them, and there is no reason to think that ours will be the first.

Universities are not responsible for, or capable of, creating a living humanistic culture.

But only in a few societies have these pursuits been formal subjects of academic study, and only quite recently, in historical terms, has the university been seen as the most natural place for them to reside. Universities are not responsible for, or capable of, creating a living humanistic culture. Scholarship is an important part of that culture but not its engine; if anything, it is a lagging indicator, where cultural developments that have been generated elsewhere turn up for formal examination.

Naturally, the plight of the academic humanities has prompted a flood of diagnoses and prescriptions. Is the problem the ever-rising cost of college, which makes students feel that they should focus on subjects that will lead to more lucrative careers? As The Journal reported in 2017, the highest-earning majors are all STEM fields. With the average cost of tuition at a four-year private college now more than $35,000 a year, perhaps a degree in the humanities is perceived as an unaffordable luxury.

Has humanities education turned off students by becoming too ideologically monolithic? Research by Samuel J. Abrams, a professor of politics at Sarah Lawrence College, found that liberal professors outnumbered their conservative colleagues nationwide by a ratio of six to one (rising to 28 to one in New England, home to many of the country’s oldest and most prestigious schools). Some academics have started to take this critique seriously: The scholarly group Heterodox Academy was founded in 2015 to promote “viewpoint diversity” among college faculty.

Or maybe the humanities have simply lost confidence in their mission. In her 2005 novel “On Beauty,” Zadie Smith imagined the experience of a young student who arrives at college hoping to find like-minded people who share her love of Rembrandt. Instead, she has a professor who only wants to “interrogate…the mytheme of artist as autonomous individual with privileged insight into the human.” This is comedy, but it is based on a reality that will be familiar to many students and former students of the humanities.

In the 19th century, the English poet and critic Matthew Arnold defined culture as “the best which has been thought and said in the world,” but few humanities professors would now want to claim the authority to say what is best, or even agree that there is such a thing as “the best” art or thought. For reasons both good and bad, the humanities today are largely focused on critique rather than celebration.

Humanistic scholarship fertilized European culture in profound ways, yet the best of that culture was not itself produced in universities.

Whatever its cause, the decline of the academic humanities is often understood as a crisis for American culture, even for American democracy. Much of what students of the humanities learn may not be directly applicable to their lives or careers—very few of us need to know how to identify a school of painting or interpret a poem—but a humanistic education is supposed to teach us how to read critically and think independently, skills that are crucial to democratic citizenship. This is what the critic George Steiner once referred to, skeptically, as the idea that the humanities humanize—that studying literature, art and philosophy makes us better people.

Historically speaking, this is a difficult argument to make. It is easy to cite examples to the contrary—highly educated people who were, for instance, devoted Nazis or Stalinists and who used their learning to buttress their defense of inhumanity. One of the greatest philosophers of the 20th century, Martin Heidegger, was in charge of the Nazification of his university after Hitler came to power.

More broadly, it is hard to argue that the health of our body politic relies on college-level study of the humanities when only a tiny fraction of the population has ever held a humanities degree. History may have the strongest claim of any humanistic discipline to being a civic necessity, so it is sobering that, according to the American Historical Association, the number of degrees awarded in history fell by some 10,000 between 2008 and 2017. But even in 2008, the total was only about 35,000, out of nearly two million degrees awarded in total. Clearly, if we are depending on college history classes to teach Americans basic civic knowledge and ideals, we are doomed to disappointment.

The real connection between culture and the academic humanities is harder to trace. The terms “humanities” and “humanist” arose in the West during the Renaissance, when scholars of ancient Greek and Latin literature and philosophy called what they were doing studia humanitatis—studies of or befitting a human being—to distinguish it from traditional academic subjects like theology.

Humanistic scholarship fertilized European culture in profound ways, yet the best of that culture was not itself produced in universities. The humanists often preferred to write their works in Latin, seeing it as the most appropriate language for serious writing; today, such Neo-Latin works are known only to a few experts. Meanwhile, Renaissance writers who addressed popular audiences in vernacular languages, like Shakespeare and Cervantes, became the founders of modern literature. Shakespeare famously knew “small Latin and less Greek,” in the words of Ben Jonson’s elegy, and his knowledge of the life of Julius Caesar or Mark Antony wouldn’t pass muster in any history department. But it is only through Shakespeare’s imagination that Caesar and Antony live for most people today.

This is the paradox of culture: It requires knowledge but flees academicization. Friedrich Nietzsche, a professor of Greek who quit his job at the University of Basel to devote himself to writing and thinking, made this point in his 1874 essay “The Use and Abuse of History for Life,” where he observed that “Antiquarian history knows only how to preserve life, not how to generate it.”

Until the 20th century, the distinction between the life of culture and the study of culture was reflected in university curricula, which focused on the art and thought of the distant past. When English became an academic subject around the turn of the 20th century, it meant studying Beowulf and Chaucer, not living writers. And only since the 1960s has it become common for writers and artists themselves to have careers as university professors.

When we consider the university the only place where society can explicitly formulate its visions of truth, beauty and justice, it’s no wonder that campuses become fierce ideological battlegrounds.

What is true for the “producers” of humanistic culture is also true for the “consumers.” The real action takes place outside the classroom, in theaters, concert halls, art galleries and libraries, or simply in the living rooms where people read and think. Being a successful literature or history or art major requires different skills than the ones needed to make these things a part of one’s actual inner life. Students are judged by what they can readily articulate, but in life, it is what we don’t know how to express that draws us to read, think, listen to music or look at art.

When the university comes to be seen as the sole custodian of the humanities, both the humanities and the university suffer. Most scholarship in the humanities is directed solely to other scholars and has little or no effect on the culture at large. (In 2005, the average history book from a scholarly publisher sold 200 copies.) There are exceptions—important thinkers whose work changes the way we see the world and ourselves—but these are as rare inside the academy as outside it.

Certainly there is a hunger in the U.S. for engagement with ideas and culture that isn’t mediated by universities. The Center for Fiction recently opened a beautiful new headquarters in Brooklyn, where it houses readings, workshops and a massive library; the Poetry Foundation does the same for verse in its home in Chicago. The NEA’s Big Read program, which encourages cities and communities to read and discuss a chosen book, has attracted almost five million people to its events since its launch in 2005. And the past decade has seen the emergence of several important intellectual journals, from Jacobin on the left to American Affairs on the right, which keep alive the tradition of the independent “little magazine.”

But the habit of seeing universities as the main or even sole custodians of humanistic culture isn’t just inaccurate; it is bad for universities themselves. When we consider the university the only place where society can explicitly formulate its visions of truth, beauty and justice, it’s no wonder that campuses become fierce ideological battlegrounds—for students, faculty and outside observers alike. (When the University of Tulsa recently reorganized its curriculum, for instance, it created a division called “Humanities and Social Justice,” as if these were two faces of the same coin.)

This conception of the humanities invites the same problem that often afflicts an established church: It becomes a place where we put our ideals for safekeeping while we go about our real lives. The crumbling of such a church doesn’t necessarily imply that belief is in decline. It can also mean that belief is taking different forms and requires new outlets for expression.

Indeed, the most important ideas are often considered transgressive and dangerous by the respectable institutions of their day. Socrates was executed by the right-thinking citizens of Athens on a charge of corrupting the young—the ultimate deplatforming, one might say. Spinoza wasn’t allowed to publish his radical thoughts about God, even in liberal 17th-century Amsterdam. Modern art began with a rebellion against the official academies and salons that controlled the art world of 19th-century Europe. All of these ideas and movements were eventually incorporated into the academic humanities, but they could never have been born there.

There is no reason to take pleasure in declining humanities enrollments, of course, but they hardly represent the death of the things that humanists cherish: free thought and free expression, the quest for beauty and truth.

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Showing 44 database articles primarily about College

Easy A’s, Less Pay: The Long-Term Effects of Grade Inflation

Jeffrey Denning, Rachel Nesbit, Nolan Pope and Merrill Warnick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
March 24, 2026
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Important

Data from Los Angeles and Maryland linking high school, postsecondary, and earnings records suggest that one class-year with a teacher with 1 SD higher mean grade inflation reduces the PDV of their students’ lifetime earnings by ~$213,872.

We develop two teacher-level measures of grade inflation: one measuring average grade inflation (the year-specific teacher fixed effect showing the teacher’s average contribution to grades after controlling for the student's contemporaneous performance in the focal subject as measured by the corresponding subject test score as well as prior test scores, prior grades, and other background characteristics), and another measuring a teacher's propensity to give a passing grade [which affects primarily students near the bottom of the distribution]. A [separate] cognitive value-added measure [included in the regressions] is a teacher fixed effect capturing how much a teacher raises students' standardized test scores relative to what would be predicted from the students' prior test scores and background characteristics. Grade-inflating teachers have moderately lower cognitive value-added and slightly higher noncognitive value-added. The two [grade-inflation] measures differentially impact students' long-term outcomes. Being assigned a higher average grade inflating teacher reduces a student's future test scores, the likelihood of graduating from high school, college enrollment, and ultimately earnings. A teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value [PDV] of lifetime earnings of their students by $213,872 per year.  In contrast, passing grade inflation reduces the likelihood of being held back and increases high school graduation, with limited long-run effects. [Figure 7 in the gallery].

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Master’s Programs Are Cash Cows for Universities. Do They Pay Off for Students?

Mark Schneider American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
September 10, 2024
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Database
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Important

Mark Schneider @AEIecon reviews the ROI of master’s degree programs and finds “vast differences among fields of study and among programs in the same field of study.” He argues that policymakers need to provide accurate ROI metrics to applicants.

The absolute increase in lifetime earnings is the average gain in income between students completing the degree and the counterfactual earnings of similarly situated students without the degree. Incorporating the time spent getting a master’s degree, the cost of obtaining the degree, and the probability of completing a program generates an “adjusted ROI.” Taking these costs into account drastically reduces the return to the student—and puts the return for master’s degrees dead last. [But] Averages Hide Lots of Information. Business is the single largest field of study for master’s students; but, on average, business master’s degrees have a negative ROI. But graduates from the top performing programs—including Dartmouth, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of Pennsylvania— can earn millions more than graduates from other business programs. Students who choose badly could experience a negative ROI of over $1 million. Even in computer science, the field with the highest overall ROI, graduates from some programs experienced negative ROIs.

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  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — .@OppInsights finds that the “Ivy-Plus” (Ivy League, plus UChicago, Duke, MIT, Stanford) admit students from the highest income families scoring in the top 1%…
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Human Capital Spillovers and Health: Does Living Around College Graduates Lengthen Life?

Jacob Bor, David Cutler, Edward Glaeser and Ljubica Ristovska National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 25, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Bor, @Cutler_econ, Glaeser, and @lj_ristovska find a strong negative correlation between the % of college graduates in an area and all-cause mortality, even after controlling for individual education.

[There is] a strong and robust relationship between area human capital and mortality, even after controlling for individual education. More than half of the correlation between area human capital and mortality can be explained by differences in smoking rates and obesity rates across areas, and that [these effects are] strong even after controlling for individual education. More than half of the correlation between area human capital and mortality can be explained by differences in smoking rates and obesity rates across areas. We find empirical evidence for [both] regulatory policies such as workplace smoking bans, and peer effects about the harms of smoking. Health-related behaviors are particularly sensitive to human capital spillovers among younger individuals, implicating the role of changing social norms around smoking and obesity across generations in the widening geographic gaps in health between high and low human capital areas.

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  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Caroline Hoxby argues that Anne Case and Angus Deaton’s recent findings on the divergence btw Americans with a BA and those without is largely driven by…
  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — As of 2021, US adults with a college degree have a life expectancy at age 25 on par with Japan, but US adults without a BA have a life expectancy that’s 8.5…
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Comments On: "Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA" By Anne Case and Angus Deaton

Caroline Hoxby Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 10, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Caroline Hoxby argues that Anne Case and Angus Deaton’s recent findings on the divergence btw Americans with a BA and those without is largely driven by a compositional shift that has occurred as more Americans have graduated college.

I find it entirely plausible that selection accounts for most or even all of the widening mortality gap. Measures of achievement have not risen among 12 graders and other high school students for essentially the entire period since we started to measure them in a consistent way (i.e. since the early 1970s). However, the share who obtain a BA degree has increased quite dramatically over the same period. An NLSY [National Longitudinal Survey Youth] exercise shows that non-BAs are increasingly negatively selected. A comparison between the NLSY79 (1979) and the NLSY97 (1997) shows that the distribution of ASVAB [Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery] percentiles of non-BAs is shifted to the left for 97 vis-a-vis 79.

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Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges

Raj Chetty, David Deming and John Friedman National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 24, 2023
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Database
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.@OppInsights finds that the “Ivy-Plus” (Ivy League, plus UChicago, Duke, MIT, Stanford) admit students from the highest income families scoring in the top 1% of SAT/ACT at far greater rates than those from lower-income families.

Children from families in the top 1% are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, and Chicago) as those from middle-class families with comparable SAT/ACT scores. Two-thirds of this gap is due to higher admissions rates for students with comparable test scores from high-income families; the remaining third is due to differences in rates of application and matriculation. The high-income admissions advantage at private colleges is driven by three factors: (1) preferences for children of alumni, (2) weight placed on non-academic credentials, which tend to be stronger for students applying from private high schools that have affluent student bodies, and (3) recruitment of athletes, who tend to come from higher-income families. Highly selective public colleges that follow more standardized processes to evaluate applications exhibit smaller disparities in admissions rates by parental income than private colleges that use more holistic evaluations.

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  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — United States Income, Wealth, Consumption, and Inequality Diana Furchtgott-Roth
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Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
May 11, 2022
Is Database:
Database

@PaulKrugman, according to his Wonk Out piece, the gap btw median male college graduate wages and the 95th percentile has widened since 2000, with the latter seeing substantial gains while the former’s real income has stagnated or declined.

Since 2000, wage inequality has risen while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the notion that education is a primary driver of economic inequality. Data shows that the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median male college graduate has widened, with the former seeing substantial gains while the latter's real income has stagnated or declined. This suggests that a college degree is no longer a reliable path to financial success for many, contradicting the belief that college-educated individuals are part of the economic elite. The disparity highlights that factors beyond education, such as structural economic changes, play a significant role in rising inequality. This insight is crucial for policymakers considering student debt relief and broader economic reforms, as it underscores the need to address systemic issues rather than focusing solely on educational attainment.

The Economic Policy Institute had a very useful analysis of this data just before the pandemic. Between 1979 and 2000, there was a rough match between growth in one measure of overall inequality — the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median worker — and its estimate of the average wage premium for college-educated workers. Since 2000, however, wage inequality has continued to rise, while the college premium has barely changed... my own version of this observation, comparing growth of incomes of households at the 95th percentile with those of the median male college graduate. Now, Americans at the 95th percentile don’t consider themselves rich, because they aren’t, surely as compared with C.E.O.s, hedge funders and so on. Nonetheless, they have seen substantial gains. On the other hand, the typical college graduate — who is, remember, someone who made it through and received an accredited degree — hasn’t.

Paul Krugman, "Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think,"Krugman Wonks Out, April 29, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/29/opinion/college-student-loan-debt.html

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think

President Biden says that he is taking a “hard look” at student debt relief, which probably means that some significant relief is coming. For one thing, Biden promised relief during the 2020 campaign. For another, it’s one progressive priority he can address by executive action, which is important given the extreme difficulty of getting anything through an evenly divided Senate.

How much relief will he offer? I have no idea. How much relief should he offer? I’m for going as big as political realities allow, but I understand that too generous a debt write-off might produce a backlash. And I have no confidence that I know where the line should be drawn.

What I think I do know is that much of the backlash to proposals for student debt relief is based on a false premise: the belief that Americans who have gone to college are, in general, members of the economic elite.

The falsity of this proposition is obvious for those who were exploited by predatory for-profit institutions that encouraged them to go into debt to get more or less worthless credentials. The same applies to those who took on educational debt but never managed to get a degree — not a small group. In fact, around 40 percent of student loan borrowers never finish their education.

But even among those who make it through, a college degree is hardly a guarantee of economic success. And I’m not sure how widely that reality is understood.

What is widely understood is that America has become a far more unequal society over the past 40 years or so. The nature of rising inequality, however, isn’t as broadly known. I keep encountering seemingly well-informed people who believe that we’re mainly looking at a widening gap between the college-educated and everyone else.

This story had some truth to it in the 1980s and 1990s, although even then it didn’t account for the huge income gains at the top of the distribution — the rise of the 1 percent and even more among the 0.01 percent. Since 2000, however, most college graduates have actually seen their real incomes stagnate or even decline.

The Economic Policy Institute had a very useful analysis of this data just before the pandemic. Between 1979 and 2000, there was a rough match between growth in one measure of overall inequality — the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median worker — and its estimate of the average wage premium for college-educated workers. Since 2000, however, wage inequality has continued to rise, while the college premium has barely changed:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Furthermore, not all college graduates have had the same experience. Some have done pretty well, but many have seen no gains at all:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 2


I have my own version of this observation, comparing growth of incomes of households at the 95th percentile with those of the median male college graduate:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Now, Americans at the 95th percentile don’t consider themselves rich, because they aren’t, surely as compared with C.E.O.s, hedge funders and so on. Nonetheless, they have seen substantial gains. On the other hand, the typical college graduate — who is, remember, someone who made it through and received an accredited degree — hasn’t.

So here’s how I see it: Much of the student debt weighing down millions of Americans can be attributed to false promises.

Some of these promises were scams pure and simple; think Trump University. Even those who weren’t outright cheated, however, were pulled in by elite messaging assuring them that a college degree was a ticket to financial success. Too many didn’t realize that their life circumstances might make it impossible to finish their education — it’s hard for comfortable, upper-middle-class Americans to realize how difficult staying in school can be for young people from poorer families with unstable incomes. Many of those who did manage to finish found that the financial rewards were far smaller than they expected.

And all too many of those who fell victim to these false promises ended up saddled with large debts.

Of course, there are many Americans who have suffered from rising inequality. I wouldn’t argue that college debtors are greater victims than, say, truck drivers who have seen their real wages plunge or families stuck in declining rural areas and small towns. And we should be helping all of these people.

Unfortunately, most things we could and should be doing for Americans in need — like extending the expanded child tax credit — can’t be done in the face of 50 Republican senators, plus Joe Manchin. Student debt relief, by contrast, is something President Biden can do. So he should.

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