Market Power In Neoclassical Growth Models
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Dynamic efficiency findings challenge debt policy metrics: US social capital returns >8% show market vitality. Firm market power invalidates real rates as government debt welfare indicator.
This paper has addressed a classic topic: the optimal accumulation of capital and the welfare effects of government debt in neoclassical growth models. Over the past several decades, the thinking of many economists has been shaped by the Solow growth model and the Diamond overlapping-generations model, which assume certainty and competitive markets. In these models, the real interest rate reflects the marginal product of capital. As a result, the low real interest rates experienced in recent years have tempted some economists to conclude that capital accumulation now has only small social value at the margin and, therefore, that the crowding out of capital by government debt is of little concern. The innovation in this paper is to generalize these two canonical modelsto include firms with market power. In this environment, the real interest rate earned by savers is below the net marginal product of capital. For a plausible calibration of the extended Solow model, the wedge between them is about 4 percentage points. The calibration also suggests that the U.S. economy is dynamically efficient. When market power is introduced into the Diamond model, government Ponzi schemes can have different implications for welfare than they do under competition. Even if a perpetual rollover of government debt and accumulating interest is feasible, the crowding out of capital may still reduce steady-state welfare.Previous work has established a close connection between the feasibility of government Ponzi schemes and the possibility of rational speculative bubbles. This equivalence suggests that in an overlapping-generations model with market power, rational bubbles are possible whenever government Ponzi schemes are. But unlike under competition, these bubbles may reduce welfare because they could occur even in dynamically efficient economies. By diverting saving away from capital accumulation, bubbles may depress aggregate consumption. This topic could be addressed in future research. Much previous work on dynamic efficiency and Ponzi schemes has stressed the role of uncertainty about capital returns. Under uncertainty, the risk-free real interest rate is below the expected marginal product of capital, and attempted Ponzi schemes by the government are riskyThis paper abstracts from these issues by considering models with certainty. A more realistic analysis of the U.S. economy would include both uncertainty and market power. We also leave that topic for future work.
Laurence Ball and Greg Mankiw, "Market Power In Neoclassical Growth Models,"Working Paper, April 2022, http://www.restud.com/wp-content/uploads/2022/05/MS30597manuscript.pdf
Impact of firm market power"...If typical prices are marked up 20% over marginal cost, as some of the literature suggests, the real interest rate is about 4 percentage points below the social return on capital. Correcting for the effects of market power yields an estimate of the social return of more than 8%. Because this estimated social return on capital is much higher than the economy’s growth rate, it indicates that the U.S. economy is dynamically efficient...."
Relationship with "Government Ponzi Scheme""...The impact of a government Ponzi scheme on welfare depends on two effects. The first we call the aggregate effect. Because government debt crowds out capital, it depresses aggregate consumption if the net marginal product of capital exceeds the growth rate and increases aggregate consumption in the opposite case. (This is parallel to the classic Phelps, 1961, result.) The second we call the generational effect: the introduction of government debt improves the allocation of aggregate consumption between the young and the old. This effect is similar to the Pareto improvement that can result from pay-as-you-go social security when the growth rate exceeds the interest rate (Samuelson, 1958; Weil, 2008). In a competitive economy, the aggregate and generational effects of debt work in the same direction. In an economy with market power, when the economy’s growth rate is greater than the real interest rate but less than the net marginal product of capital, the two effects conflict. These findings show that, in the presence of market power, the real interest rate by itself is a poor guide for judging the welfare effect of increased government indebtedness..."



