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The Elusive Explanation for the Declining Labor Share

Gene Grossman National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
August 27, 2021
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Current explanations for the decline in labor share sum to 3-4 times the actual decline, according to @GeneGrossman @nberpubs.

Despite extensive research, the decline in labor share remains inadequately explained, with proposed mechanisms collectively accounting for 3-4 times the actual decline. The labor share in the U.S. non-farm business sector fell by about 8 percentage points since its peak in the 1950s, stabilizing recently. Various factors, such as technological advances, globalization, and increased market concentration, have been suggested as causes. However, distinguishing their individual impacts is challenging due to overlapping effects and publication bias favoring decline-predicting theories. Globally, labor shares have declined by roughly 5 percentage points since 1975, yet the exact reasons remain contentious. The complexity of these dynamics underscores the need for further investigation into stabilizing forces and the role of technological and market changes.

Grossman/Oberfield literature review finds that we don't have a consensus on why labor share in national income has fallen, or if it will continue to decline, stabilize/steady as she goes, or will reverse,"....If we sum the amounts explained by the various mechanisms proposed in the literature, the total easily comes to three or four times the amount that the labor share actually fell.In this concluding section, we offer two potential explanations for this embarrassment of riches…”

“…First, the literature identifies many proximate causes of the decline in the labor share, but precious few fundamental causes. As a result, many authors present different sides of the same coin. This creates a problem of interpretation inasmuch as the same primitive cause can move many endogenous variables together. Even if the various mechanisms that have been suggested all are active,it becomes difficult to gauge what part of the effect estimated in one study has already been accounted for elsewhere. Take, for example, technological advances that give rise to falling prices of ICT capital. Such advances can directly induce substitution of capital for labor, but if they disproportionately benefit larger firms, they can also lead to rising concentration, greater exercise of product and labor market power, and perhaps a change in returns to scale. Without an independent source of variation in the data, it will be difficult to distinguish which effects on factor shares work through the mechanism of rising markups and increased profits and which through altered production techniques. Meanwhile, the nature of technological progress could reflect directed innovation, which in turn could be a response to reduced costs of offshoring. Improved opportunities for offshoring might result from lower communications costs and might also be responsible for deunionization and loss of worker power. In short, the literature on the declining labor share offers a long list of potential mechanisms, many of which seem plausible. The operation of these mechanisms can be studied in a cross-section of firms and industries, and much can be learned about whether microeconomic responses correspond to predictions of the models. But cross-section evidence may not shed much light on the evolution of the aggregates, for the reasons we outlined in Section 3. Meanwhile, the recent economic history is short and macroeconomic variables move together, so identification in the time series raises insuperable challenges. Second, publication bias may be at play. It is widely (though not universally) accepted that the labor share fell in recent decades and that this fact demands elucidation. Many events happened during the period in question, and while some likely have pushed the labor share downward, others may have buffeted the decline. With the goal of finding an explanation for the decline, economists conducting research on the topic may well have pursued mechanisms that predict a decline in the labor share and abandoned those with predictions of countervailing effects. If researchers selectively pursue ideas that imply a fall in the share and neglect those that predict the opposite, the cumulative weight of the theories and their qualifications is bound to overshoot its target….”

Measuring the Decline in the Labor Share

".... Figure 1 shows three popular measures of the labor share in the United States. The BLS headline series for the labor share of the non-farm business sector is the only official series and the most commonly used. This series measures labor compensation plus an estimate of the labor income of self proprietors as a share of gross value added. It gives a clear impression that after decades of stability, or perhaps a modest decline since the late 1940s, the labor share has fallen sharply since 2000, stabilizing in the last decade. In all, this measure shows a decline of about 8 percentage points from its peak in the 1950s. Some researchers prefer measures of the labor share in the corporate sector, because they avoid the ambiguity of proprietors income that we discuss briefly in Section 2.3 below. The figure shows labor compensation in the non-financial sector as shares of gross value added and net value added (which deducts depreciation from the gross measure). Both series show a decline of 6-7 percentage points from the 1980s to the 2010s. The gross labor share was relatively stable through 2000, but then declined to a level below its historical range. In contrast, as noted by Bridgman (2018) and Rognlie (2015), the net labor share had been rising between 1940 and 1980, so the recently lower level is not without precedent. All three series show a modest increase over the last few years, together with a sharp spike in 2020, although it is, of course not yet clear whether this recent history represents a durable rebound or a repeat of the temporary surge during the Great Depression. Another observation that has been emphasized by Karabarbounis and Neiman (2014) is that, over the last few decades, measured labor shares have been declining steadily around the world, with a fall in the global labor share of roughly 5 percentage points since 1975. However, this conclusion remains controversial (GutiÈrrez and Piton, 2020)...."

Will the Labor Share Continue to Fall? (They think the answer is no)

"...But many economists appear to believe that further automation, robotization, globalization, market concentration, and aging of the population spell ongoing declines for the labor share. Some even fear that the labor share in national income might fall to zero…We are more sanguine. The remarkable stability of the labor share for more than a century despite the fact that labor shares in specific industries regularly undergo large changes, and despite the long list of factors that, as we have seen, have the ability to alter the functional distribution of income suggests to us the existence and operation of powerful, stabilizing forces. The exact nature of these forces has yet to be firmly established, but the literature identifies several candidates. The simplest, of course, would be a unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in an aggregate production function, if such a function can be defined. Then any shift in the supply or demand for labor would generate wage movements that exactly counteract the initial shock...."Stabilization could come from the demand side or the supply side of the factor markets...On the demand side, Acemoglu (2002, 2003) points to directed technical change. When the cost share of a factor in scarce supply begins to rise, private agents and an incentive to invest in innovations that reduce that cost. As long as capital and labor are complements in aggregate production, technical change directed at the factor whose share is abnormally high will tend to offset the short-term effects of any shock. In Acemoglu (2003), the supply of capital is perfectly elastic in the long run. Since labor cannot be accumulated but capital ultimately is not scarce, the perpetually rising labor bill induces technical change directed at labor. But the more general point is that a rising factor share for any input will generate a technological response.30 On the supply side, agents might invest in children or schooling to overcome a short-term shortage of some factor. For example....fertility responds endogenously to the return that altruistic parents reap from bearing children relative to the return on their investments in (physical and human) capital. When parents foresee ample earning power for their children, they choose to produce more of them.....individuals spend more time in school when the skill premium is high. In their setting with complementarity between physical capital and raw labor, capital-augmenting technical change or investment-specific technical change induces a short-term decline in the capital share. Then, if the aggregate production function is characterized by capital-skill complementarity, the return to investments in skill rises, leading new generations to remain in school longer. The accumulation of skills in turn raises the return to capital, thereby off setting the initial shock. In the presence of stabilizing forces such as these on the demand or supply side, shocks that move factor shares in the short run are (at least partially) reversed in the longer run. A sudden burst of automation, or a shift in industry composition due to non-homothetic preferences, or differential productivity growth of different factors, or increased competition from imports generates a short-run response in factor shares. But private agents respond to conserve on use of the expensive factors or to provide more of these factors to take advantage of their temporarily high return. Although the conditions for exact long-run constancy of factors shares are delicate in any particular model, it is easy to believe that equilibrating forces might keep these shares in a relatively narrow range. Identifying and measuring these forces in the data is challenging, however, because they operate slowly and may not be seen in cross-sectional data for the reasons discussed in Section 3….”

Gene Grossman and Ezra Oberfield, "The Elusive Explanation for the Declining Labor Share," National Bureau Of Economic Research, August 2021, https://www.nber.org/papers/w29165

Gross versus Net Income, "...National income can be measured gross or net, the difference being depreciation of the capital stock or the natural environment. To the extent that average depreciation rates trend over time say because the composition of the capital stock shifts from more physical to more intangible capital or because society depletes its natural resource base at a faster ratio dividing wage income by gross income will tell a different story about the evolution of the labor share than dividing it by net income.."

Treatment of Intellectual Property, "...Atkeson (2020) takes a different approach to the same problem. Using data for the corporate sector, he computes payments to capital as the sum of payouts to investors and corporate taxes. This method treats all investments as current expenses, in keeping with the suggestion by Barro (2019). His measures of capital income are immune to the recent BEA changes in accounting practices, because payouts to investors are the same no matter whether IP is regarded as an intermediate or a capital good. When he computes the labor share as the fraction of wages in the combined payments to labor and capital, he find like Koh et al. that the current level is low compared to what it was in the 1970ís and 1980ís, but not outside a longer, historical range..."
Treatment of Self Employment and Entrepreneurial Income, "...However, as Smith et al. (2021) point out, entrepreneurs have considerable flexibility when classifying their income in the light of the prevailing tax code. Recent changes in the code have created incentives to reclassify income from forms that give favorable treatment to labor income to those that give favorable treatment to profits, and for frms with high labor shares to leave the corporate sector entirely by forming partnerships. They estimate that reclassification alone accounts for a 1.6 percentage point drop in the labor share in the corporate sector...."

Treatment of Owner-Occupied Housing, "....Real estate constitutes a significant fraction of the capital stock in many countries. For residential housing that is occupied by its owners, statistical agencies impute rent as a return to this capital and include the imputed rent as part of national income. While this practice may be justified as a way of putting residential real estate on a similar footing with commercial real estate, as Rognlie (2015) emphasizes, the returns to owner-occupied housing accrue mostly to workers, not capitalists. Like self-employment income, the issue raised by imputing a return to owner-occupied housing can be avoided at least for the United States by focusing solely on income shares in the non-financial corporate sector..."

Treatment of Factorless Income, "...Oftentimes, the share of capital is treated as a residual, i.e., as one minus the labor share. But efforts can be made to impute the return to capital, which then may not make up the entirety of the difference between national income and wage payments. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2019) label the residual as factor less income Barkai (2020) imputes capital income, using a measure of the risky real interest rate to estimate the rental cost of capital.7 Since the real interest rate spiked in the 1970ís, Barkai finds the imputed capital share to be unusually high at that time and that it has fallen since. This means, of course, that with the wage share also falling, the residual has been growing. But what would account for an expansion in factorless income and who in society benefits from it? Karabarbounis and Neiman (2019) explore three possibilities. First, the residual might an unmeasured return to capital. Second, it could represent pure proof in the face of increased monopoly power and rising markups. Third, it could simply represent measurement error in the return to owners of capital, considering the difficulties that arise in assessing the appropriate risk premium. They finds that none of these interpretations of the residual is fully satisfactory, but that the possibility of measurement error in returns seems closest to the truth. In sum, there remains considerable controversy about the facts. Some believe that the labor share has fallen precipitously while others see a smaller drop or even that the current levels are not far from their historical values. We have tried to argue that many of these differences recast alternative notions of the labor share, and that various measures are valuable for different purposes. Moreover, the significant volatility in all of the measures makes it di¢ cult to distinguish medium turn fluctuations from long-run level changes, or even ongoing trends. Nonetheless, there exists a fair amount of consensus that the labor share today however measured is well below its level of the 1970ís and 1980ís, at least in the United States. We will henceforth take such a decline as a fact worthy of an economists attention...."

Investment-Specific Technological Change, "...even if investment-speciÖc technical change reduced the labor share more in sectors with greater exposure to the change, the impact on the aggregate labor share depends on whether the subsequent increase in the wage o§sets or ampliÖes the initial impulse. This depends on the aggregate elasticity of substitution between capital and labor. Hubmerís conclusion that investment-speciÖc technical change reduced the labor share requires the assumption that capital and labor are gross substitutes in aggregate production. Hubmer imposes gross substitutability by assuming that equipment and structures combine to form a composite capital good that is separable from labor in the aggregate production function. However, other plausible production functionsó such as one that forms a composite of labor and equipment that is then combined with building and structuresó would allow for the possibility that labor and capital are complements. The implications of regressing labor shares on the price of equipment to infer whether capital and labor are substitutes or complements becomes even less clear when we recognize that there are di§erent types of labor and that equipment might complement some (such as skilled labor) while substituting for others (such as unskilled labor)...."

The Rise of Superstar Firms, "...The adoption of new technologies like automated production methods often imposes substantial fixed costs, as Yeaple (2005) and Bustos (2011) have noted. If so, firms that have a larger scale of output will see greater incentives to adopt. Meanwhile, ICT technologies may be more productive in larger firms, if for example, they enhance the integration and coordination of different units (see Lashkari et al., 2021). The differential adoption of new technologies involving ICT and automated production methods have been seen as one reason for a reallocation of resources toward larger firms and for a rise in concentration in many industries. Autor et al. (2020) refer to this phenomenon as the rise of superstar firms....Autor et al. (2020) take a step further. They show that industries that became more concentrated have seen faster TFP growth and a greater increase in patenting. Faster productivity growth in larger firms suggests that these firms benefited disproportionately from recent innovations, perhaps because the adoption of new technologies entails a substantial fixed cost that only these larger firms were willing to incur. In the model they develop to rationalize their findings, larger firms have a lower labor share because they face less elastic demand and choose a higher markup. Together, these forces imply a falling labor share.13 Using establishment-level data for the U.S. manufacturing sector between 1967 and 2012, Kehrig and Vincent (2021) offer a different take on the evidence. They observe firms that, over this period, the manufacturing labor share rose in the median plant. Meanwhile, resources moved to firms with below-average labor shares. However, compositional forces cannot account for the aggregate decline; instead they find that the labor share in these low-share firms fell as they grew in size. Indeed, when they decomposed the change in the manufacturing labor share into the change in the average share, faster growth of firms with below-average shares, and the covariance between the two, they found that the (negative) covariance term accounts for the entire decline...."
Robot Adoption, "...The idea that robots are good substitutes with low skilled labor does not necessarily imply that robots substitute with labor differently than do other the types of capital that appeared earlier. As Acemoglu and Restrepo (2018) point out, it is possible to have technical changed biased toward labor alongside automation. Alternatively, Krusell et al. (2000) show that, in the presence of capital-skill complementarity, a type of capital can be substitute for low-skilled labor but nonetheless complement an aggregate labor input (holding fixed its skill composition). In such an environment, Grossman et al. (2017) show that the subsequent skill acquisition means that declining capital costs can be compatible with long-run stability of the labor share..."
Bottom Line on the Effects of Automation, "...Autor…are well aware of the pitfalls in going from micro to macro. Indeed, their discussion pays heed to the general equilibrium effects that would be overlooked by a strict focus on direct-displacement effects. Even so, their regressions identify deviations of technical change from Hicks-neutrality, whereas aggregate changes reflect deviations of technical change from Harrod neutrality. A cross-section regression of changes in the industry labor share on industry-level TFP growth implicitly holds wages constant. The findings of Autor….are consistent with a pattern of technological progress that is mostly labor-augmenting and an elasticity of substitution between capital and labor less than one. However, aggregate TFP growth also generates a change in relative factor prices that is absent from the Autor…analysis. When technical progress is mostly labor augmenting and the elasticity of substitution is less than one, the wage movements offset the direct effects on the factor shares. The aggregate shifts in the labor share depend only on the extent of deviations from Harrod-neutral technical change in the simple model that we outlined above. The coefficient of -0.579 that they report in their Table 9 from a regression of the labor share on TFP growth is consistent with they hypothesis that virtually all productivity improvements have been labor-augmenting and very little if any have been capital-augmenting..."

Globalization and the Rise of China, "...Finally, we should mention that Autor et al. (2020) included a China-shock variable in their regression of changes on labor share on industry characteristics. They find no evidence that manufacturing industries that were exposed to larger increases in imports from China experienced greater labor-share declines. Growth in China might also have been responsible for booming prices of traded raw materials in the early 2000ís. Castro Vincenzi and Kleinman (2020) show that the decline in the labor share was concentrated in U.S. industries that rely heavily on intermediate inputs. They regress changes in the industry labor share on changes in input prices, finding a negative and significant relationship. According to their estimates, an industry with an average change in its price index of imported materials experienced a 6.2 percentage point decline in its labor share relative to an industry that saw no change in input prices. They also estimate the elasticity of substitution between material inputs and non-material inputs in the industry production functions and find suggestive evidence of strong complementarities between the two, as would be required for a commodity price boom to depress the labor share. For the most part, studies addressing the impact of trade on income distribution have focused on cross-sectional differences in factor shares. As we stressed earlier, to account for the full impact of growing trade on the labor share one must also incorporate the general-equilibrium response of factor prices...."

Increased Product Market Power, "...Alongside (or, perhaps, instead of) technological change and increased globalization, some researchers indict increased product market power as a potential culprit for the declining labor share. As a matter of definition, national income accrues as payments to factors of production or results in pure profits. If pure profits rise, there is less to share among the primary factors of production, including labor. Pure profits could rise due to less stringent enforcement of antitrust laws or because the evolution of technologies gives greater advantage to large firms and forces exit by their smaller rivals. Unfortunately, there is almost no research that ties aggregate trends in product market power and higher pure profits to more primitive causes..."

A Rising Profit Share?'..Barkai (2020) argues that profits shares have been rising in the United States alongside a fall in the shares in value added of both primary factors. To make this argument, he attempted to measure the evolution of aggregate returns to installed capital. An obvious difficulty that he was forced to confront is that firms own most of their capital rather than leasing it, so it is impossible to distinguish rental income from pure profits in either aggregate or firm-level data. In view of this, Barkai sought to impute the required return to capital using a combination of returns on corporate debt and equity, along with an estimate of the depreciation rate.21 He then estimated capital costs as the product of the required return and the value of the extant capital stock. He concludes that the capital share in value added fell by 22% between the early 1984 and 2014, while the share of pure profits in gross value added rose by 13.5 percentage points. Using (5) and an assumption of constant returns to scale, his estimates imply an increase in average markups from 2% to 19% over the period.22 These conclusions are controversial. Karabarbounis and Neiman (2019) point out that the decline in the real interest rate since the 1980ís was preceded in the late 1970ís by a sharp rate hike, which was not, however, accompanied by a rise in the labor share. Moreover, the proÖt share in the period before the spike in real interest rates was higher than it is today. Barkai and others might easily have underestimated growth in the capital share, which would cause them to exaggerate growth of profits. For example, the imputed returns to capital would fall short of true returns, if measures of growth in the capital stock fail to capture all investments in intangible capital for the reasons we discussed in Section 2.5. Also, estimates of required returns might be too low, if depreciation rates have increased with the shift in the composition of the capital stock from mostly structures and equipment to more intellectual property or if market interest rates understate the appropriate discount rates for assessing the user-cost of capital. As Rognlie (2019, p.241) observes about the evolution of markups implied by movements in imputed profit shares since the 1950s, it is not an inconceivable sequence, but it does defy the structural explanations (e.g., market concentration) usually put forward for thinking about markups, none of which should have induced such sharp reversal..."

Rising Markups?"...An increasingly common procedure to estimate average markups, drawing on Hall (1988) and De Loecker and Warzynski (2012), uses together with observed data on some input share and econometric estimates of the elasticity of output with respect to that input. In a much cited paper, De Loecker et al. (2020, henceforth DEU) use firm-level accounting data for a composite input termed cost of goods sold (COGS), which comprises intermediate inputs and a subset of labor inputs that are deemed to be flexible in the short run. Meanwhile, they take capital as a quasi-fixed input. Using techniques popularized by Olley and Pakes (1996) to account for the endogeneity of flexible inputs in response to productivity shocks, they estimate a time-varying production function with variable returns to scale. Finally, they compute a time series for the weighted-average markup by dividing the estimated output elasticity by the cost share of COGS. They conclude that the average markup rose from 21% in 1980 to 61% in 2016, with almost all of the increase attributable to rising markups in the firms in the upper tail of the distribution of price-cost margins.23 Since the markup should be equal to "V =V for any factor V (i.e., the ratio of the output elasticity to the factor share), they conclude that the estimated rise in markups can explain the fall in the labor share...."

Rising Concentration?"...Several studies have pointed to increased industry concentration as evidence of an increase in market power, which in turn could spell a decline the share of revenues available for distribution to the primary factors of production. Barkai (2020) and Autor et al. (2020) find a positive correlation across industries between the rise in concentration and the decline in the labor share. Barkai, in fact, argues that increased concentration (taken to be exogenous) can account for most of the fall in the labor share. Hartman-Glaser et al. (2016) establish that larger firms which have seen the greatest fall in labor share while growing faster than smaller firms tend to operate in more concentrated markets…”

Bottom Line on Product-Market Power, "...If technological developments such as improvements in ICT and automation disproportionately beneÖt larger Örms, as would seem to be the case from the data, then these developments will also enhance the exercise of market power. The appropriate answer to “was it technology or was it market power?” might well be yes..."

Declining Market Power of Workers, "...In addition to a possible increase in product market power, some researchers point to firms ability to extract more of the rents in their relationships with their employees as a source of the shifting distribution of income. A shift in bargaining power may have occurred due to changes in regulations governing labor market interactions, to the sustained decline in union membership in some countries in the post-war period, or to increased concentration of employment within local labor markets that may have allowed firms to exercise greater monopsony power...."

The Decline in Union Membership, "...Consensus estimates put the union wage premium somewhere between 15% and 25% at its height (Rosenfeld, 2014). Farber et al. (2018) show that it has been fairly stable over the last century, with a modest decline over the last few decades. Farber et al. document a positive correlation between state-level labor shares since 1929 and state union membership rates, after controlling for time and state fixed effects and a variety of other controls. They use the passage of the Wagner Act that legalized union organization and the establishment of the National War Labor Board that promoted unionization in establishments receiving defense contracts during World War II as plausibly exogenous sources of variation in states unionization rates and, using these events as instruments, continue to find that labor shares covary with union density. Stansbury and Summers also show a positive correlation across states and industries between the labor share and their measure of labor rents..."

Increasing Concentration of Labor Demand, "... If firms exercise monopsony power in their relationships with their workers, then increasing concentration of firms in the relevant (local) labor markets could account for greater mark downs of wages relative to marginal revenue productivity and perhaps to a smaller labor share. There are now several theoretical models that capture this idea in one form or another, building on Manning (2013). Berger et al. (2019) develop an oligopsony model in which large firms face upward sloping labor supply curves due to heterogeneous worker preferences over the identity of their employer. The firms compete for labor by posting wages, which in equilibrium are below the competitive levels and especially so for the larger, more productive firms..."

Demographics and Education, "...Some authors attribute a portion of the decline in the labor share to changes in the composition of the labor force. The workforce in many advanced countries has been aging due to increased longevity and reduced fertility. And it has been becoming better skilled due to steady gains in educational attainment...."

Potential Drivers of Labor Shares Fall

Ed Comment: Ben, explain why when we transition from investment in machinery that increases blue collar productivity (and eventually displaces them into jobs suffering from Baumol’s cost disease) to IT and intangibles that increase white collar productivity (by opening a window of new opportunities where the demand for brains seems to exceed the supply), that we should expect a unitary elasticity of substitution between capital and labor in an aggregate production function. As capital per worker grows, especially the intangible value of institutions, why wouldn’t we expect labors share to decline? Why wouldn’t we expect labor’s wages to decline to world wages as we open trade with the world? And even if there is unitary elasticity, why wouldn’t we have to include all our imports and exports, especially if we are importing labor-intensive products? Assuming a constant elasticity of substitution under varying conditions seems naïve.

Ben Comment: As capital per worker grows, especially the intangible value of institutions, why wouldn’t we expect labors share to decline? Why wouldn’t we expect labor’s wages to decline to world wages as we open trade with the world? And even if there is unitary elasticity, why wouldn’t we have to include all our imports and exports, especially if we are importing labor-intensive products? Assuming a constant elasticity of substitution under varying conditions seems naïve. The basic assumption is that people are paid their marginal product of labor. More capital will make them more productive and drive up their marginal product of labor, and (theoretically) their wages. Maybe people aren't paid their marginal product of labor, but most of the phenomena pushing people’s wages below MPL would fall within the definitions of monopsony. I’m just not sure how you think wages are set in this context. What you call naive is basically standard theory. If wages are set differently than MPL, I’d like to understand better what you think changes those wages? Also, the sentence you’ve italicized specifically refers to an aggregate production function. Aggregate production functions are intentionally simplified away from a lot of the distinctions you’re making. Unitary elasticity of substitutions mean that a 1% change in capital could be offset by a 1% change in labor and production would still cost the same - and is indicative of Cobb-douglas production functions in aggregate. I’m not sure why this seems like such a bad approximation. It’s generally used in aggregate because labor share and capital share were basically constant from 1947-1980. Maybe it’s different now, but there is some aggregate elasticity of substitution and economist try to measure it. Most estimates are relatively close to 1. I don’t really understand your import/export question since net exports are included in GDP calculations. Labor intensive products means they’re using relatively less capital - so the labor is relatively less productive, and would be paid relatively less. Capital intensive production would imply the labor is very productive and would be paid relatively more. I don’t think I understand what the question is.

Ed Comment: I don’t think 1 is unreasonable. And I know it’s standard. I’m questioning why it couldn’t vary under varying circumstance. You are quick to dismiss my question. The purpose of thinking is not to stop thinking. Imagine a 2-sector economy, a highly productive capital-intensive sector without employees that earns the cost of capital (let's call it manufacturing) and an unproductive labor-intensive sector without capital that employs the marginal employee at their marginal product of labor (let's call it services). As the capital intensive sector grows relatively larger, why wouldn't labor's share of GDP decline? Now imagine the first sector with employees whose wages are set by the marginal product of labor of the second sector that expands to hires the marginal worker whose productivity is low without capital. Again, why wouldn't labor's share decline as the first sector grows relatively? Imagine the case where the first sector is shedding workers as it grows. Again, why wouldn't labor's share decline as the first sector grows relatively? Before you dismiss my question by saying manufacturing isn't growing relatively, first respond to the theoretical scenarios and questions as asked. My question is really about whether segmentation vs aggregation can change the answer. If it can, then I can show other segments that might also change the answer.

Ben Comment: I think I understand what you’re saying so here it goes: ED: PS Imagine a 2-sector economy, a highly productive capital-intensive sector without employees that earns the cost of capital (let's call it manufacturing) and an unproductive labor-intensive sector without capital that employs the marginal employee at their marginal product of labor (let's call it services). As the capital intensive sector grows relatively larger, why wouldn't labor's share of GDP decline? BEN: In partial equilibrium, labor share would decline. In general equilibrium (i.e. macro economics), you have not outlined a fully specified model. To do so, you would need to say something about consumer preferences for one type of good vs another (demand functions) and you would need to say something about labor supply functions. I can write down an aggregate production function that looks like the economy you’ve described, but the relative sizes of the two sectors would depend on who is buying what in what proportions and the elasticity of substitution between the two goods, which in turn depends on the wages the laborers are receiving in the “unproductive” sector and how high/low those wages are relative to the cost of capital. Again, in partial equilibrium analysis, the labor share would go down in the scenario you’ve outlined but general equilibrium creates lots of unknowns. All of this before we even touch autarky vs open economy macro and which prices are set on the world market. ED: Now imagine the first sector with employees whose wages are set by the marginal product of labor of the second sector that expands to hires the marginal worker whose productivity is low without capital. Again, why wouldn't labor's share decline as the first sector grows relatively? BEN: Again, in partial equilibrium, you are right. In general equilibrium (or, this time, even in a game theory sense), you would need to explain *why* the wages in sector 2 pin down the wages in sector 1. To make this kind of argument, you would either need a lot of corporate market power in labor markets (monopsony) or completely elastic labor supply functions. Without assuming this market power, companies in sector 1 bid up wages to hire more people because if they cannot find the labor they need, they’re leaving profits on the table. And how far do they bid up wages? Up to the marginal product of labor (the profit maximizing point). Without firm market power in labor markets (monopsony) this argument fails. On the other hand, if labor supply is completely elastic (the quantity doesn’t change with price), then people don’t respond to incentives. Neither of those is particularly compelling, huh? ED: Imagine the case where the first sector is shedding workers as it grows. Again, why wouldn't labor's share decline as the first sector grows relatively? BEN: Again, we need more structure to actually analyze this sort of scenario. Of course the way you’ve set up the analysis would have the impact you’re suggesting in partial equilibrium but in general equilibrium, prices, wages, and employment would shift among the sectors could ( and do in macro models!) rebalance to make the labor share constant. To build the model you’ve described, there need to be frictions in the various markets that prevent the prices (including wages) from readjusting to balance. Without those frictions, the labor share would be constant.

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Moonshot Capitalism: AI Rewrites The Venture Capital Playbook

AI Summary. Deep-tech investment outside AI has exceeded $150bn since early 2024, surpassing the $133bn invested across the entire prior decade. Falling valuations for traditional software companies and outsized returns from early bets on capital-intensive ventures are pushing investors toward riskier, science-driven deals.

Tim Bradshaw Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Since the start of 2024, more than $150B of venture capital has been invested into non-AI “deep tech” firms whose products are rooted in significant engineering advances, exceeding the $133B invested in such firms btw 2010 and 2019.

Are investors abandoning software for capital-intensive science bets?

Core argument: Deep-tech investment excluding AI exceeded $150bn since early 2024, surpassing the entire $133bn deployed across the prior decade (through end-2019), as falling valuations for traditional software push venture capital toward capital-intensive scientific bets.

The AI boom is fuelling a resurgence in ambitious “moonshot” bets, as early SpaceX backers’ huge returns and falling valuations for traditional software companies force tech investors to embrace riskier and more capital-intensive dealmaking. Excluding the giant sums ploughed into AI start-ups, global investment in “deep tech” — companies whose products are rooted in big scientific or engineering advances — has exceeded $150bn since the start of 2024, more than the $133bn in the entire decade to the end of 2019, according to Dealroom. This year’s deep-tech investments have not yet surpassed 2021’s peak, which was propelled by battery and electric vehicle deals for the likes of Rivian and Northvolt — many of which turned sour, highlighting the risks involved in moonshot dealmaking.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Deep-tech investment excluding AI exceeded $150bn since early 2024, surpassing the entire $133bn deployed across the prior decade (through end-2019), as falling valuations for traditional software push venture capital toward capital-intensive scientific bets.
  2. The 2021 deep-tech peak — driven by battery and electric vehicle deals including Rivian and Northvolt — has not yet been surpassed, and the subsequent losses from those deals underscore the capital destruction risk inherent in moonshot dealmaking.

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  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Btw 1985-2021 the capital intensity of the American economy was relatively flat as a rise in intangible investment was offset by a decline in tangible…
  • Public to Private Equity in the United States: A Long-Term Look — Global venture capital returns are highly skewed: 62% of deals lose money, more than half lose 50–100% of invested capital, but fat-tailed outliers drive overall returns. This pattern mirrors historical whaling voyages, where payoffs were similarly variable and driven by rare outsized outcomes.
  • Gross and Net US Investment — Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment merely replaces depreciating assets. The shift toward faster-depreciating information technology assets requires larger gross investment increases to achieve any given gain in productive capital per worker.
  • Investment
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The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era

AI Summary. The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 between 2022 and 2026, the first sustained decline in relative demand for college labor in four decades. AI exposure in white-collar occupations accounts for ~28% of this drop, as moving from zero to full occupational AI exposure reduced wages by 0.086.

José Azar, Mireia Gine and Javier Sanz-Espín Social Science Research Network
Date Posted:
September 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The college wage premium flattened in the mid-2010s and has fallen ~8% since 2022. The authors argue that this compression reflects a broad decline in the returns to formal schooling, rather than a decline in the upper tail.

Is the college degree losing its economic value to artificial intelligence?

Core argument: The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026—the first sustained negative relative demand growth for college labor in four decades, per Current Population Survey data.

After expanding for four decades, the U.S. college wage premium [dropped] sharply from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026. Current Population Survey data through 2026 implies an unprecedented drop in relative demand for college labor—the first sustained negative relative demand growth. Post-2022 wage growth slowed disproportionately in high-exposure occupations, which employ a disproportionate share of college graduates. By 2026, going from zero occupational AI exposure to full exposure had a negative effect on wages of−0.086. Combined with the college–non-college exposure gap, this mechanism accounts for roughly 28% of the total drop in the college wage premium from 2022 to 2026. While non-causal, these patterns indicate that task displacement in AI-exposed white-collar occupations plays a quantitatively meaningful role in the recent compression of the aggregate skill premium.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 in 2022 to 0.575 in 2026—the first sustained negative relative demand growth for college labor in four decades, per Current Population Survey data.
  2. Moving from zero to full occupational AI exposure reduced wages by 8.6 percentage points by 2026; because college graduates concentrate in high-exposure white-collar roles, this mechanism accounts for roughly 28% of the premium’s compression.

Related Articles:

  • Looking for the Ladder — The downtick in hiring in AI-exposed occupations started 6 months prior to the release of ChatGPT, and is “perfectly” aligned with the start of Fed rate hikes…
  • How Students and Recent Grads are Responding to the Rise of AI — Far from shying away from AI, American undergraduates “are flocking towards the most-AI-exposed degrees,” with enrollment in these majors up 8% last year…
  • AI and Young-adult Jobs: The Real Mystery — Since the summer of 2023, the employment rate for Americans 22–25 has declined for both college grads and non-college workers, a phenomenon beyond both…
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  • Productivity
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      • College
    • Unemployment/Participation

Gross and Net US Investment

AI Summary. Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment merely replaces depreciating assets. The shift toward faster-depreciating information technology assets requires larger gross investment increases to achieve any given gain in productive capital per worker.

Timothy Taylor Conversable Economist
Date Posted:
September 4, 2026
Is Database:
Database

U.S. real net private domestic investment—which adds to the American capital stock—is now only ~25% as large as gross investment, down from ~40% in the 1970s. Taylor suggests the widening gap between gross and net investment reflects the relatively rapid depreciation of IT-related capital.

Does faster asset depreciation explain slowing productivity growth?

Core argument: Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment now merely replaces depreciating capital rather than expanding the productive stock.

The figure divides net investment by gross investment. Back in the 1970s, net investment was often around 40% of gross investment, but the share has been slumping over time. For the last decade or so, net investment has been about 25% of the gross–that is, about three-quarters of gross investment is just making up for depreciation of the pre-existing capital stock. The likely reason for the growing gap between gross and net investment is that modern investment is more likely to be related to information technology [which] depreciates more rapidly and thus needs to be replaced and updated more often. If we want the average US worker to be using a greater amount of capital on the job–which was one of the key drivers of rising labor productivity in the past–it now takes a bigger rise in gross investment to lead to a given rise in net investment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Net investment has fallen from ~40% of gross investment in the 1970s to ~25% today, meaning three-quarters of gross investment now merely replaces depreciating capital rather than expanding the productive stock.
  2. The shift toward information technology — which depreciates faster than physical machinery — is the primary driver of the widening gap between gross and net investment.
  3. Raising capital per worker, a historic engine of labor productivity growth, now requires a substantially larger increase in gross investment than it did several decades ago.

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  • US Stock Market To Stop Shrinking For First Time In 23 Years — US equity supply is turning positive for the first time in over two decades, as a surge in IPOs and large share sales by major technology companies outweighs the buybacks and privatizations that have shrunk the stock market since 2003.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Btw 1985-2021 the capital intensity of the American economy was relatively flat as a rise in intangible investment was offset by a decline in tangible…
  • The Transition to a Higher Cost of Capital — Bridgewater Associates co-CIO Karen Karniol-Tambour expects 10-year Treasury yields to rise from the current ~4.5% to compensate for structurally higher fiscal…
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The AI Re-Acceleration That Wasn’t

AI Summary. AI capability growth follows a linear trend with no statistically significant acceleration; apparent re-acceleration results from cherry-picking frontier observations, selecting a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate trend lines on either side.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
September 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Kedrosky argues AI capabilities continue to improve, but “the full composite data shows flattening relative gains, not acceleration…rolling relative model gains have fallen from their 2024 peak, while model dispersion has narrowed sharply.”

Does AI capability growth actually accelerate or just appear to?

Core argument: Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.

Using all Epoch’s Capabilities Index observations, and controlling for developer and model family, there is no statistically significant breakpoint. A piecewise model—which splits the series into intervals and applies a sub-function to each segment—does not improve on a purely linear trend: p = 0.615, The estimated change in slope has a confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 points per year. In short, the maths shows there is no model acceleration, contrary to claims, and as expected. The result comes from selecting frontier observations only, choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate lines on either side.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Epoch’s Capabilities Index shows no statistically significant AI performance acceleration when controlling for developer and model family, with a breakpoint test returning p = 0.615 and a slope-change confidence interval of -8.4 to +23.4 pts per year.
  2. Claims of AI re-acceleration rest on a methodological artifact: selecting only frontier model observations, pre-choosing a breakpoint, ignoring variance collapse, and fitting separate trend lines on each side of that breakpoint.

Related Articles:

  • Why .400 Hitters Disappeared — and What It Means for AI — As AI model performance converges toward a ceiling, relative gains per improvement cycle shrink, transforming frontier capability from a pricing moat into a commodity where price becomes the primary differentiator and margin pressure intensifies across leading providers.
  • Chart of the Day: Small Models are Closing the Gap to Frontier AI — Small AI models are closing the gap with large ones, achieving the same reasoning benchmarks with 142x fewer parameters than required two years ago. This makes on-device AI viable without data centers, compressing the economic case for cloud-based, per-query AI services.
  • Anthropic’s Best AI Model Struggles To Attract Users As Cheaper Tools Thrive — Spending on the most expensive AI model from a leading provider has plateaued at 11% of total outlay, as cheaper, older models prove capable of handling most business tasks.
  • Innovation/Research
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Understanding AI and Productivity

AI Summary. U.S. productivity growth has accelerated to ~2.2% annually since mid-2022, above the 2010s baseline, though pandemic-era labor market and business formation dynamics likely contributed alongside AI. Historical general-purpose technology booms sustained labor productivity growth above 2.5% for a decade or more, making the current acceleration substantial but not unprecedented.

Chad Syverson Economic Innovation Group
Date Posted:
August 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Syverson is skeptical that AI initiated the rise in productivity growth that began in 2023. The acceleration began while AI investment was small, and pandemic-era labor market churn and business dynamism match the acceleration’s start.

Is AI-driven productivity growth sustainable at historical technology boom levels?

Core argument: U.S. labor productivity has grown at roughly 2.2% annually since mid-2022, a pace exceeding the 2010s trend and, if sustained, implying GDP per capita roughly 7% higher within a decade than the prior trajectory.

Productivity from mid-2022 on has maintained a faster-than-2010s trajectory involving annual growth of about 2.2%. Could this acceleration be due to AI? Perhaps. The timing leans against AI being the sole initial cause. Additionally, there were well-documented increases in economic dynamism (labor market churn and business formation) during the pandemic emergence whose timing matches the acceleration’s start. Regardless of AI’s current effect, the longer the aggregate productivity acceleration continues, the more plausible it is that AI is an important driver. As for the magnitude, a sustained increase from 1.5 to 2.2% annual productivity growth would be substantial (after a decade, GDP per capita would be 7% higher than otherwise), but hardly unprecedented. The 1995–2004 productivity boom saw annual productivity growth of nearly 3% per year, and other past general-purpose-technology-related productivity boosts saw labor productivity growth in excess of 2.5% for a decade or longer.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. labor productivity has grown at roughly 2.2% annually since mid-2022, a pace exceeding the 2010s trend and, if sustained, implying GDP per capita roughly 7% higher within a decade than the prior trajectory.
  2. The 1995–2004 productivity boom averaged nearly 3.0% annual growth, establishing that a durable AI-driven acceleration to 2.2% would be meaningful but well within historical precedent for general-purpose-technology cycles.
  3. Pandemic-era surges in labor market churn and business formation align more precisely with the productivity acceleration’s start date than AI adoption does, complicating AI-as-sole-cause narratives.

Related Articles:

  • AI and Productivity — Rising US labor productivity is driven by higher capital utilization—factories, servers, and hotel rooms running harder—rather than new investment or efficiency gains at the individual task level.
  • Google’s AI & Economy ATLAS v1.0: Mapping Gemini Usage in the Economy — Google’s new AI & Economy ATLAS maps 15M AI interactions to occupations, tasks, and activities, showing AI use is pervasive but not intensive…
  • Writing Code vs. Shipping Code: Productivity Effects Across Generations of AI Coding Tools — Event studies indicate that adoption of AI coding tools raised “commits” (saved code updates) ~180%, but releases by only ~30%. Large upstream…
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Productivity
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US Widens AI-Driven Investment Gap With Europe

AI Summary. US corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to grow 40% in real terms by the end of next year, versus 12% in the euro area, widening a productivity gap where output per hour worked rose $14 in the US compared with $2 in Europe since 2018.

Sam Fleming, Amy Borrett and Olaf Storbeck Financial Times
Date Posted:
August 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Oxford Economics projects US real business investment will rise 40% over 2021–2027, ~3x the euro area’s 12%. US investment growth since 2024 has been largely information processing and software, but high US growth in GDP/hour is not “merely digital.”

Is artificial intelligence investment widening the transatlantic productivity divide?

Core argument: U.S. corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and end-2026, versus 12% in the euro area and near-zero growth in Germany, sharply widening the transatlantic capital-spending gap.

Corporate spending on new equipment and facilities in the US is projected to increase 40% in real terms between 2021 and the end of next year, according to forecasts from Oxford Economics. The US surge compared with a real-terms increase of just 12% in the euro area, while German business investment is expected to have all but stagnated over the same period. Europe also faces a large and growing productivity gap with the US. “The United States has recently pulled further ahead of Europe,” Bart van Ark, a professor at the University of Manchester, told policymakers at the ECB Forum in Sintra. GDP per hour worked increased $14 in the US between 2018 and 2025, compared with just $2 in Europe. “The gap is not only a digital sector story,” added van Ark, stressing that the US outperformance extended to other sectors, including wholesale and retail as well as professional services.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. corporate investment in equipment and facilities is projected to rise 40% in real terms between 2021 and end-2026, versus 12% in the euro area and near-zero growth in Germany, sharply widening the transatlantic capital-spending gap.
  2. U.S. labor productivity rose $14 per hour worked between 2018 and 2025, versus $2 in Europe, with outperformance spanning wholesale, retail, and professional services—not solely the digital sector.

Related Articles:

  • The Two Europes — The European Union contains two divergent economies: a reforming frontier energized by security threats, and a stagnant interior where structural reform pressure remains absent.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — An EC study of European competitiveness finds that EU gross value-added per hour worked increased by 0.7%/year from 2000-19, vs. 1.2%/year in the US. “Europe…
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