Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Substance Abuse during the Pandemic: Implications for Labor-Force Participation

Nezih Guner National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 12, 2022
Is Database:
Database

COVID-19 pandemic has intensified substance abuse, contributing to a decline in labor force participation among prime-age workers. Substance abuse, particularly involving opioids and meth, accounts for up to 26% of a 1.3pp drop in participation, with 391,000 additional non-participants linked to pandemic-related increases in substance use.

The COVID-19 pandemic has exacerbated substance abuse, significantly impacting labor-force participation among prime-age workers. Between February 2020 and June 2021, the labor force participation rate (LFPR) for this group fell by 1.3 percentage points, equating to 1.51m fewer individuals in the workforce. Increased opioid and meth use during the pandemic is estimated to account for 9-26% of this decline, with 391,000 additional non-participants attributed to elevated substance abuse. The LFPR for individuals with opioid-use disorder is 69.7%, 13.2 percentage points below those without a disorder, while meth-use disorder results in a 16.3 percentage point gap. Overall, over 2.7m prime-age individuals are not participating in the labor market due to substance abuse, highlighting the pandemic's role in exacerbating existing trends and contributing to a 7-19% decline in LFPR relative to pre-pandemic predictions.

Could increased substance abuse during the pandemic be a factor contributing to the fall in labor-force participation?..The dramatic drop and sluggish recovery in the labor supply of prime-age workers can be seen in Figure 1. Early on in the pandemic, the LFPR dropped by about 3 percentage points, and although two-thirds of that decline has recovered,the rate is still about 1 percentage point below its pre-pandemic level.After its steady decline since the late 1990s, the LFPR of prime-age workers was trending upward before the pandemic.1 The straight dashed line in the figure shows the trend in labor-force participation over the January 2015 to February 2020 period. Assuming the prime-age LFPR would have increased at the same rate absent the COVID-19 pandemic, the LFPR is about 1.6 percentage points below trend….The first row of Table 1 reports the cumulative number of deaths from opioids, meth, and alcohol between April 2020 and June 2021 for individuals ages 25 to 54.13 The second row reports the number of deaths predicted using the pre-pandemic trend and seasonal components in Figure 2. Subtracting the second row from the first row gives an estimate of the additional number of deaths that occurred due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These are reported in the third row. There were 69,342 opioid deaths between April 2020 and June 2021, 14,820 of which were above the level predicted by the pre-pandemic trends. Similarly there were 2,702 excess meth-related deaths and 7,835 excess alcohol-related deaths. In total, during this period there were an additional 25,356 drug and alcohol deaths.... As the bottom three rows of Table 1 report, more than 27 million prime-age individuals are estimated to have a substance abuse disorder with more than 5 million of these individuals, 23%, being additional substance abusersabove the expected level based on past trend and seasonal effects…The LFPRs are calculated from the 2015-2018 NSDUH for prime-age individuals who either exhibit a disorder from using a particular substance or do not have a substance-disorder. The LFPR of individuals with an opioid-use disorder is 69.7 which is 13.2 percentage points below the prime-age rate for individuals who do not have a substanceuse disorder of 82.9%.Similarly, the LFPR for individuals with meth-use disorder is 66.7% which is 16.3 percentage points below the rate for individuals without a substance-use disorder. By contrast, there is no difference in LFPRs between alcohol abusers and non-abusers. Since the data shows no impact of alcohol abuse on labor-force participation, the increase in alcohol abusers will not have any impact on the number of additional individuals out of the labor force. For each substance, multiplying the number of abusers in Table 1 by the difference between the LFPR of abusers and non-abusers gives an estimate of the number of prime-age individuals who are out of the labor force (LF) due to substance abuse. For example, multiplying the 1,96 million additional opioid abusers reported in Table 1 by 13.2 percentage points implies that about 259,000 additional people are not in the labor force due to elevated levels of opioid abuse. The estimates indicate that all together there are over 2.7 million prime-age individuals not participating in the labor market due to substance abuse,391 thousand of which are additional non-participants due to the elevated levels of abuse during the COVID-19 pandemic. Table 3 summarizes the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic on labor-force participation of prime-age workers. Due to a 1.3 percentage point lower participation rate, there were 1.51 million fewer prime-age individuals in the labor force in June 2021 than in February 2020. The sixth row of the table reports the number of individuals predicted to be in the labor force in June 2021 using the pre-pandemic trend. Relative to the predicted number of 105.04 million, there were 2.02 million fewer participants...Under the assumption of no change in the death rate of abusers, the increase in opioid and meth usage during the pandemic accounts for a sizable fraction of the decline in LFPRs. The results are reported as the upper bound estimates in Table 4. These shares are determined by taking the estimated 391 thousand additional individuals not participating due to substance abuse reported in Table 2 and dividing it by the declines in the size of the labor force reported in Table 3. Additional non-participants due to elevated substance abuse are 25.8 percent of the 1.51 million person decline in the labor force between February 2020 and June 2021 and 19.4 percent of the decline from the predicted June 2021 levels based on the pre-pandemic trend. Next, we provide a lower-bound estimate assuming that the rise in opioid deaths during the pandemic was due to increased opioid use of existing abusers rather than a surge in the number of abusers….Using data on substance abuse deaths, increased substance abuse during the COVID-19 pandemic is estimated to account for between 9 and 26 percent of the decline in prime-age labor-force participation between February 2020 and June 2021. A decline that, as of January 2022, has still not fully recovered. Relative to levels predicted using the pre-pandemic trend, estimates indicate that increased substance abuse accounts for 7 to 19 percent of the decline. Interestingly, the falls in labor-force participation in early 2020 were larger for those without a college degree. The LFPR of non-college individuals dropped by 3.9 percentage points compared to a 2.8 percentage point drop for those with a college degree. Non-college labor-force participation has also been slower to rebound. As of January 2022, more than 70 percent of the initial fall in the LFPR of college graduates has recovered with the rate now less than 1 percentage point below levels predicted by the pre-pandemic trend. In contrast, less than half of the initial drop for non-college has recovered. As of January 2022, the non-college rate is still 2.4 percentage points below trend. The large initial drop in labor-force participation by non-college individuals and its slow recovery may be due to differential rates of increase in substance abuse by education during the pandemic. Rates of opioid abuse are more than three times higher, and rates of meth abuse nearly six times higher, among those without a college degree. Given their higher prevalence for illicit drug use, the extent of drug abuse may have increased more for noncollege individuals during the pandemic leading to larger negative effects on their labor-force participation.

Core Finding "...The labor-force participation rates of prime-age U.S. workers dropped in March 2020—the start of the COVID-19 pandemic—and have still not fully recovered. At the same time, substance abuse deaths were elevated during the pandemic relative to trend indicating an increase in the number of substance abusers, and abusers of opioids and crystal methamphetamine have lower labor-force participation rates than non-abusers. Could increased substance abuse during the pandemic be a factor contributing to the fall in labor-force participation? Estimates of the number of additional substance abusers during the pandemic presented here suggest that increased substance abuse accounts for between 9 and 26 percent of the decline in prime-age labor-force participation between February 2020 and June 2021...."

The Evidence

“…Figure 2 shows the deaths rates associated with overdoses from different substances The solid blue line in the figure displays monthly deaths from narcotics, which covers various types of opioids such as opium, heroin, fentanyl, and other natural and synthetic opioids, as well as deaths from cocaine. The blue dashed line shows the trend and seasonal narcotic deaths based on the pre-pandemic period The red solid and dashed lines show the death rates, actual and predicted, from alcohol (excluding those associated to drunk driving). Finally, the black lines are deaths from psychostimulants, primarily crystal methamphetamine (meth). Meth deaths have also been higher during the pandemic, although they have not been as elevated relative to their exponentially increasing trend as narcotic and alcohol deaths…”

Substance Abuse during the Pandemic: Implications for Labor-Force Participation: Extended Excerpt Image 1


“…The first row of Table 1 reports the cumulative number of deaths from opioids, meth, and alcohol between April 2020 and June 2021 for individuals ages 25 to 54.13 The second row reports the number of deaths predicted using the pre-pandemic trend and seasonal components in Figure 2. Subtracting the second row from the first row gives an estimate of the additional number of deaths that occurred due to the COVID-19 pandemic. These are reported in the third row. There were 69,342 opioid deaths between April 2020 and June 2021, 14,820 of which were above the level predicted by the pre-pandemic trends. Similarly there were 2,702 excess meth-related deaths and 7,835 excess alcohol-related deaths. In total, during this period there were an additional 25,356 drug and alcohol deaths Next turn attention to the death rates. Under the assumption that these rates did not change during the pandemic, they are determined by dividing the number of deaths prepandemic by the number of abusers. These death rates, taken from Mulligan (2022), are reported in the fourth row of Table 1. The death rate for opioids, about 0.6 percent, is much higher than those for meth and alcohol, about 0.26-0.27 percent. For each substance, the number of abusers (individuals with substance-use disorder) can now be inferred by simply dividing the number of deaths by the pre-pandemic death rates. As the bottom three rows of Table 1 report, more than 27 million prime-age individuals are estimated to have a substance abuse disorder with more than 5 million of these individuals, 23%, being additional substance abusers above the expected level based on past trend and seasonal effects..”

Substance Abuse during the Pandemic: Implications for Labor-Force Participation: Extended Excerpt Image 2

Substance Abuse and the Decline in LFP

“…Next turn to how much substance abuse lowers labor-force participation. The first row of Table 2 shows the difference between the LFPRs of opioid, meth, and alcohol non-abusers and abusers…”

Jeremy Greenwood, Nezih Guner and Karen Kopecky, "Substance Abuse during the Pandemic: Implications for Labor-Force Participation,"National Bureau Of Economic Research, April 2022, https://www.nber.org/papers/w29932

“….These shares are determined by taking the estimated 391 thousand additional individuals not participating due to substance abuse reported in Table 2 and dividing it by the declines in the size of the labor force reported in Table 3…. …Additional non-participants due to elevated substance abuse are 25.8 percent of the 1.51 million person decline in the labor force between February 2020 and June 2021 and 19.4 percent of the decline from the predicted June 2021 levels based on the pre-pandemic trend….”

“…Due to a 1.3 percentage point lower participation rate, there were 1.51 million fewer prime-age individuals in the labor force in June 2021 than in February 2020.The sixth row of the table reports the number of individuals predicted to be in the labor force in June 2021 using the pre-pandemic trend. Relative to the predicted number of 105.04 million, there were 2.02 million fewer participants. How many of these missing workers might be attributed to drug abuse?Under the assumption of no change in the death rate of abusers, the increase in opioid and meth usage during the pandemic accounts for a sizable fraction of the decline in LFPRs. The results are reported as the upper bound estimates in Table 4….”

“… The LFPRs are calculated from the 2015-2018 NSDUH for prime-age individuals who either exhibit a disorder from using a particular substance or do not have a substance-disorder. The LFPR of individuals with an opioid-use disorder is 69.7 which is 13.2 percentage points below the prime-age rate for individuals who do not have a substanceuse disorder of 82.9%. Similarly, the LFPR for individuals with meth-use disorder is 66.7% which is 16.3 percentage points below the rate for individuals without a substance-use disorder. By contrast, there is no difference in LFPRs between alcohol abusers and non-abusers. Since the data shows no impact of alcohol abuse on labor-force participation, the increase in alcohol abusers will not have any impact on the number of additional individuals out of the labor force. For each substance, multiplying the number of abusers in Table 1 by the difference between the LFPR of abusers and non-abusers gives an estimate of the number of prime-age individuals who are out of the labor force (LF) due to substance abuse. For example, multiplying the 1,96 million additional opioid abusers reported in Table 1 by 13.2. percentage points implies that about 259,000 additional people are not in the labor force due to elevated levels of opioid abuse. The estimates indicate that all together there are over 2.7 million prime-age individuals not participating in the labor market due to substance abuse, 391 thousand of which are additional non-participants due to the elevated levels of abuse during the COVID-19 pandemic. Table 3 summarizes the impact of the COVID-19 epidemic on labor-force participation of prime-age workers.

  • Business Cycle
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Previous articleApril 12, 2022Inequality and the Piketty Accounting ErrorThe decline in income inequality during the early 20th century is more accurately attributed to the 1929 stock-market crash, not FDR’s tax hikes, as severe capital losses among the wealthy reduced top income shares.Next articleApril 12, 2022Moving to density: Half a century of housing costs and wage premia from Queens to King SalmonNon-college workers now face an urban wage penalty after accounting for housing costs, reversing a historical trend where urban areas offered wage premia that offset higher living expenses.
Showing 218 database articles primarily about Business Cycle

3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. Direct lending represents roughly 3% of total U.S. household and business debt, a fraction of the 60% share mortgages held at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Core argument: Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.
  2. The mortgage market’s dominance has shifted dramatically since the 2006 housing peak, reducing systemic risk concentration.
  3. Non-bank lenders now capture meaningful market share in credit provision across the economy.

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Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

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Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

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  • America’s Housing Affordability Crisis and the Decline of Housing Supply — Why are constant-quality house prices 15% above their pre-2007 peak? Ed Glaeser notes that US housing grew just 0.6% annually in the 2010s, down from 4% in the…
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  • GDP
    • Growth

How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

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Is it Over?

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

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  • AI’s $600B Question — .@DavidCahn6 at @sequoia argues that because of lack of pricing power and rapidly improving chip technologies, multi-$B investments in current-generation GPUs…
  • Business Cycle
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  • Productivity
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US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

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