Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
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  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
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  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
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The Wealth of Generations: Latest Update

AI Summary. Millennials hold roughly the same wealth per capita as Baby Boomers and Gen X did at the same age, while Gen X is about $100,000 or 18% wealthier per capita than Boomers were at that age. A broad decline in wealth has had little effect on Millennials, whose largest asset category is real estate rather than stocks.

Jeremy Horpedahl Economist Writing Every Day
Date Posted:
January 3, 2023
Is Database:
Database

cording to @jmhorp Millennials are keeping pace with Baby Boomers and Gen X in terms of generational wealth per capita.

Are younger generations as wealthy as earlier ones at the same age?

Core argument: Gen X holds roughly $100,000 more wealth per capita than Baby Boomers did at the same age, about 18% greater.

Millennials are roughly equal in wealth per capita to Baby Boomers and Gen X at the same age. Gen X is currently much wealthier than Boomers were at the same age: about $100,000 per capita or 18% greater. Wealth has declined significantly in 2022, but the hasn’t affected Millennials very much since they have very little wealth in the stock market (real estate is by far their largest wealth category.)

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Gen X holds roughly $100,000 more wealth per capita than Baby Boomers did at the same age, about 18% greater.
  2. Millennials are roughly equal in wealth per capita to Baby Boomers and Gen X at the same age.
  3. Wealth declined significantly in 2022, but Millennials were affected little because they hold very little wealth in the stock market, with real estate their largest wealth category by far.
  • Mobility/Assortative Mating
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
Previous articleJanuary 3, 2023Millennials are Shattering the Oldest Rule in PoliticsAn analysis by @jburnmurdoch suggests millennials in the US and UK are breaking a historical pattern of becoming more conservative in their voting behavior as they age.Next articleJanuary 3, 2023The Pandemic Drinking Binge Just Keeps GoingAmericans are drinking at elevated levels in the aftermath of the pandemic with inflation-adjusted spending up 15% in 2022 vs. just before the pandemic. @foxjust
Showing 12 database articles primarily about Mobility/Assortative Mating

Anatomy of US Inequality

AI Summary. Using ancestral origins for millions of U.S.-born working-age individuals, the authors estimate that inequality within 186 ancestral groups accounts for 96% of U.S. income inequality, and inequality within six broad ethnic categories accounts for 97%, leaving only 3–4% attributable to differences between groups.

Oded Galor and Daniel Wainstock National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
December 26, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Inequality within 186 distinct US ethnic groups accounts for 96% of total income variation, while between-group inequality contributes only 4%, largely constant across time and regions. For 6 broad ethnic categories, within variation is 97% of the total.

How much of US income inequality occurs within ethnic groups?

Core argument: Inequality within 186 distinct ancestral groups accounts for 96% of the variation in overall U.S. income inequality, while between-group inequality accounts for 4%, based on a representative sample of millions of U.S.-born, working-age individuals.

This paper examines inequality within the U.S. population, exploring variations between and within ethnic groups. Leveraging the ancestral origins of a representative sample of the U.S. population, consisting of millions of U.S.-born, working-age individuals, the study decomposes income inequality into within-group and between-group components, distinguishing disparities among those sharing a common ancestry from inequality between groups. As indicated in Figure 1, inequality within the 186 distinct ancestral groups accounts for 96% of the variation in overall income inequality in the U.S., while between-group inequality accounts for only 4%. Similarly, inequality within six broad ethnic categories (Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native American, Pacific Islander, and White) accounts for 97% of the variation, while between-group inequality accounts for just 3%. When restricting the sample to individuals with the same educational attainment and demographic characteristics, within-ethnic-group inequality still accounts for the principal share of income dispersion. Spatial decomposition reveals that the predominance of within-group inequality holds across local micro-areas throughout the U.S. The South exhibits a modestly smaller share of within-group inequality—a pattern consistent with the region’s greater ethnic fragmentation and enduring legacy of discrimination.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Inequality within 186 distinct ancestral groups accounts for 96% of the variation in overall U.S. income inequality, while between-group inequality accounts for 4%, based on a representative sample of millions of U.S.-born, working-age individuals.
  2. Within six broad ethnic categories — Asian, Black, Hispanic, Native American, Pacific Islander, and White — within-group inequality accounts for 97% of the variation in income inequality, versus 3% between groups.
  3. Among individuals with the same educational attainment and demographic characteristics, within-ethnic-group inequality still accounts for the principal share of income dispersion, and its predominance holds across local micro-areas, with the South showing a modestly smaller within-group share.

Related Articles:

  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Across the 1978 to 1992 birth cohorts, adult household incomes fell for white children raised in low-income families and rose for those raised in high-income families, increasing the intergenerational persistence of income ranks among white children by 28%. Over the same cohorts, adult incomes rose for Black children at all parental income levels.
  • How Immigration is Changing the Black-White Earnings Gap — A study of earnings among non-Hispanic White and three generations of Black workers finds that while the overall Black-White earnings gap widened, first- and second-generation Black immigrants made earnings advances, with second-generation Black women earning at or above White women. The authors attribute second-generation gains largely to educational attainment, with residential patterns playing a protective role.
  • Income Mobility of the Top One Percent — Using tax-return income, the authors estimate that a third of people in the top 1% drop out within a year and two-thirds within a decade, with three-quarters of the top 0.1% exiting over a decade. Measuring income over two decades rather than one year lowers top 1% income shares by an average of 15%, and top 0.001% shares by 40%.
  • Mobility/Assortative Mating
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

Getting Beneath the Veil of Intergenerational Mobility: Evidence from Three Cities

AI Summary. Using a new descriptive statistical method, the authors find that education is the strongest correlate of intergenerational income mobility, with resilience a statistically indistinguishable close second. Half of the significant correlates are psychological skills, including self-esteem, self-control, locus of control, and grit, alongside mental health problems, youth trouble with police, adverse childhood experiences, and trusted adult relationships.

Oren Danieli, Tanaya Devi and Roland Fryer Tel Aviv University
Date Posted:
November 20, 2025
Is Database:
Database

A data-driven method to select cost-effective policy interventions, applied to survey responses of ~1,000 people reared in poverty in 3 US cities, confirms the primacy of education, but finds an ~= role for childhood determinants of noncognitive skills.

What factors correlate most strongly with intergenerational income mobility?

Core argument: Using non-parametric estimation, the authors find education is the most important correlate of intergenerational income mobility, with resilience — the ability to bounce back from stressful situations — a close and statistically indistinguishable second.

We develop a new descriptive statistical method to assist the design of future experiments, whose goal is to improve some outcome variable. Most descriptive methods ignore the potential difficulty of changing the covariates in an intervention. Our method uses information from the joint distribution of the covariates, and instead of recommending experiments that would extrapolate into cases rarely seen in the data, it focuses on the way in which the outcome variable (in our case, escaping poverty) is higher in real life. Panel A in Figure 3 shows, using non-parametric estimation methods, that the most important correlate of income mobility is education. A close second– and statistically indistinguishable– is resilience: the ability to bounce back from stressful situations,measured by responses to questions such as “It does not take me long to recover from a stressful event.” Half of the significant correlates of intergenerational income mobility are psychological skills: resilience, Big 5 [personality traits from psychological test], self-esteem, self control, locus of control and grit. Mental health problems are also significant in this specification, [as are] whether the respondent was ever in trouble with the police in their youth, had adverse childhood experiences, and the existence of adult relationships they trusted.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Using non-parametric estimation, the authors find education is the most important correlate of intergenerational income mobility, with resilience — the ability to bounce back from stressful situations — a close and statistically indistinguishable second.
  2. Half of the significant correlates of intergenerational income mobility are psychological skills: resilience, the Big 5 personality traits, self-esteem, self-control, locus of control, and grit.
  3. Mental health problems, youth trouble with the police, adverse childhood experiences, and the existence of trusted adult relationships are also significant in the authors' specification.

Related Articles:

  • The American Dream Is Not a Coin Flip, and Wages Have Not Stagnated — Using an alternative cost-of-living adjustment, the typical 40-year-old's pre-tax family income rose 52% between 1979 and 2019, or 73% adjusting for family size, versus 15% under the methods behind widely cited mobility estimates. Absolute mobility is down 20 percentage points since 1979 but stood at 72% in 2023.
  • The Misguided War On The SAT — The National Assessment of Educational Progress, a nationwide test of elementary and middle school students with no test-prep industry around it, shows racial and economic gaps closely resembling those on the SAT and ACT. Researchers argue this indicates college admissions tests measure underlying learning, making score disparities a symptom rather than a cause of inequality.
  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Across the 1978 to 1992 birth cohorts, adult household incomes fell for white children raised in low-income families and rose for those raised in high-income families, increasing the intergenerational persistence of income ranks among white children by 28%. Over the same cohorts, adult incomes rose for Black children at all parental income levels.
  • Mobility/Assortative Mating
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Poverty/Crime

A Chip Off the Old Block? Genetics and the Intergenerational Transmission of Socioeconomic Status

AI Summary. Linking Dutch genetic data to tax records, the authors estimate that moving a person 10 percentiles higher in a genetic index raises their own income by 0.9 percentiles and their child's by 0.7 percentiles. They attribute about 50% of this to transmitted genes and the rest to environmental pathways.

Sjoerd van Alten, Silvia Barcellos, Leandro Carvalho, Titus Galama, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database

A 10-percentile increase in a person’s polygenic index (PGI) raises that person’s income by 0.9 percentiles and that of their child by 0.7 percentiles; ~1/2 is direct genetic transmission, and ~ 1/2 the effect of parent’s genes on nurturing capacity.

How much of genetic influence on children's income comes through environment?

Core argument: Linking Dutch Lifelines Cohort genetic data to 2006–2022 tax records, the authors find that moving a reference 10 percentiles higher in the polygenic index distribution raises that person's own income by 0.9 percentiles and their offspring's by 0.7 percentiles.

We examine how the genetics of one generation influences the SES [Socioeconomic Status] of the next by linking genetic data from the Dutch Lifelines Cohort to tax records for 2006-2022. Figure 5 plots the next-generation genetic effect against the same-generation genetic effect for each SES measure. The 22.5-degree line represents a benchmark where the next-generation genetic effects are half as large as the same-generation genetic effects. The figure indicates a high degree of persistence in the effects of the reference’s genetics across generations: e.g. moving a reference 10 percentiles higher in the PGI distribution increases that reference’s own income by 0.9 percentiles, and their offspring’s income by 0.7 percentiles. For most outcomes, the markers lie closer to the 45-degree line than to the 22.5-degree line, suggesting that genetic transmission is not the sole mechanism through which one generation’s genetics affects the next. Genetic transmission explains about 50% of the total effect, while genotypic assortative mating contributes little. This implies that the remaining 50% must be attributed to genetic nurture—the influence of the reference’s genetics operating through environmental pathways, even when these genetic markers are not transmitted to the offspring.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Linking Dutch Lifelines Cohort genetic data to 2006–2022 tax records, the authors find that moving a reference 10 percentiles higher in the polygenic index distribution raises that person's own income by 0.9 percentiles and their offspring's by 0.7 percentiles.
  2. Genetic transmission explains about 50% of the total effect of one generation's genetics on the next generation's socioeconomic status, with genotypic assortative mating contributing little.
  3. The authors attribute the remaining 50% to genetic nurture, the influence of the reference's genetics operating through environmental pathways even when those genetic markers are not transmitted to the offspring.

Related Articles:

  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • For Whom the Bell Curve Tolls: A Lineage of 400,000 English Individuals 1750-2020 Shows Genetics Determines Most Social Outcomes — A study of 402,000 English individuals across 1750–2020 estimates an intergenerational occupational status correlation of 0.88 and a genetic correlation between spouses of 0.76, which the authors interpret as a strong genetic basis for the persistence of social status. The authors argue that highly assortative mating around status genetics limits what policy can do to raise social mobility.
  • Like Great-Grandparent, Like Great-Grandchild? Multigenerational Mobility in American History — Using data on multiple ancestors, the authors estimate a small grandparent effect on children's status among white American families and conclude it largely reflects measurement error in the father's status rather than causal transmission. Including Black families raises estimated multigenerational status transmission, as racial economic gaps have converged more slowly than within-race family gaps.
  • Mobility/Assortative Mating
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

The Effects of Parental Income and Family Structure on Intergenerational Mobility: A Trajectories-Based Approach

AI Summary. Using the Panel Study of Income Dynamics, the authors estimate that parental income during middle childhood and adolescence has a significantly stronger influence on a child's future income than parental income in early childhood. The income advantage of being raised in a two-parent household is modest in early childhood but pronounced in middle childhood and adolescence, peaking around age 17.

Yoosoon Chang, Steven Durlauf, Bo Hu, and Joon Park National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Chang et al find that in the PSID, higher parental income and living in an intact family during middle childhood and adolescence are more predictive of favorable child outcomes than income and family structure during early childhood.

Does parental income matter more in adolescence than early childhood?

Core argument: Parental income during middle childhood and adolescence exerts a significantly stronger influence on a child's latent permanent income in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics than parental income during early childhood, contrasting with the early childhood development literature.

[The two panels] capture the age-specific effects of parental income and family structure, respectively, on a child’s latent permanent income in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics [PSID]. Parental income during middle childhood and adolescence exerts a significantly stronger influence on a child’s future income than parental income during early childhood, a finding [that] contrasts with the early childhood development literature. The sensitivity of adult outcomes to adolescent incomes suggests that the uses of this income have distinct effects from early childhood investment. One reason why this finding is credible is that incomes in later childhood and adolescence influence the schools and neighborhoods, determinants that are not operational for younger years. Children raised in two-parent households tend to achieve higher adult income status than those raised in single-parent households. While this advantage is relatively modest during early childhood, it becomes pronounced in middle childhood and adolescence, peaking during the late high school years at around age 17. [Editor’s note: This may reflect the likelihood that a family that is still intact when the child is 17 was more functional throughout].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Parental income during middle childhood and adolescence exerts a significantly stronger influence on a child's latent permanent income in the Panel Study of Income Dynamics than parental income during early childhood, contrasting with the early childhood development literature.
  2. Children raised in two-parent households tend to reach higher adult income status than those raised in single-parent households, an advantage that is modest in early childhood but pronounced in middle childhood and adolescence, peaking around age 17.
  3. The sensitivity of adult outcomes to adolescent parental income suggests that this income has uses distinct from early childhood investment, since later-childhood income influences schools and neighborhoods, determinants not operational in younger years.

Related Articles:

  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility — Across the 1978 to 1992 birth cohorts, adult household incomes fell for white children raised in low-income families and rose for those raised in high-income families, increasing the intergenerational persistence of income ranks among white children by 28%. Over the same cohorts, adult incomes rose for Black children at all parental income levels.
  • Intergenerational Mobility in American History: Accounting for Race and Measurement Error — Accounting for Black families, who historical studies routinely drop, and for measurement error in fathers' economic status can double estimates of intergenerational persistence in linked United States census data from 1850 to 1940. The author argues historical mobility was lower than previously estimated, implying greater equality of opportunity today than in the past.
  • The Inheritance Of Social Status: England, 1600 to 2022 — Using a genealogical database of 422,374 English people with rarer surnames, the authors find social status persists strongly even among distant relatives, with status correlations declining by a constant factor of 0.79 per step in the lineage across all status measures and eras studied. The authors argue this constancy suggests social interventions have modest effects.
  • Mobility/Assortative Mating
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
    • Inequality

ZIP Code Is Destiny? Turns Out That’s Bunk

AI Summary. The authors argue that research crediting neighborhoods with causing better child outcomes confuses causation with parental self-sorting, since more affluent, better-educated, and more stable families tend to move to good neighborhoods before their children are born. Their analysis of Danish population data found the same sorting pattern as in the United States.

James Heckman and Sadegh Eshaghnia Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
September 5, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Heckman argues that contrary to Chetty’s research, local geography has little causal effect on children’s adult outcomes in the US. Studies that find otherwise reflect parental self-selection.

Heckman argues that contrary to Chetty’s research, local geography has little causal effect on children’s adult outcomes in...

Do neighborhoods cause better child outcomes, or do families sort themselves?

Core argument: The authors argue that neighborhood-effects research falsely attributes disparities in outcomes across locations to the causal effect of neighborhoods, when the differences stem from the parents who self-sort into those neighborhoods.

Advocates of [relocating struggling families to residential areas with better conditions] ignore serious flaws in the research. The methods used in this literature falsely link the disparity of outcomes across locations to the causal effect of neighborhoods. In reality, the difference is due to the parents who self-sort into neighborhoods. Those who move to better neighborhoods early on tend to be more affluent, more educated and more likely to have intact families. They move to better neighborhoods with people similar to themselves, just as later movers, who are less affluent and less educated, move to less affluent neighborhoods. Focusing on the family rather than the neighborhood changes the conversation around intergenerational mobility. In our 2022 study on lessons for America from Denmark, we analyzed data collected by Denmark’s government statistics agencies for the entire population, similar to census data in the U.S. As with Americans, more-affluent and better-educated Danish are more likely to move to good neighborhoods before children are born. Less-educated and less-affluent families that relocate later in their children’s lives tend to be less stable than early movers, who are less likely to experience divorce or a change in household composition.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors argue that neighborhood-effects research falsely attributes disparities in outcomes across locations to the causal effect of neighborhoods, when the differences stem from the parents who self-sort into those neighborhoods.
  2. Families who move to better neighborhoods early tend to be more affluent, more educated and more likely to have intact families than those who relocate later in their children's lives.
  3. A 2022 study of Danish government statistics covering the entire population found that, as in the U.S., more-affluent and better-educated Danes are likelier to move to good neighborhoods before children are born, while later movers are less stable.

Related Articles:

  • Changing Opportunity: Sociological Mechanisms Underlying Growing Class Gaps and Shrinking Race Gaps in Economic Mobility* — The authors find that children's economic mobility improves across birth cohorts in communities where parental employment rates increase, with larger effects for children who move to such communities at younger ages. The relationship is strongest for the parental employment rates of peers in a child's own birth cohort, suggesting it is mediated by social interaction.
  • Lessons from Denmark about Inequality and Social Mobility — Denmark's intergenerational educational mobility resembles that of the U.S. despite its extensive welfare and equalizing social policies, with cognitive test scores of Danish children correlating similarly with parental income across cohorts born in 1958 and 1988. The evidence suggests family background and neighborhood effects shape educational outcomes in ways universal service provision does not offset.
  • Transmission of Family Influence — The authors estimate substantially higher intergenerational persistence using expected lifetime resource measures than using traditional income measures. They estimate that, measured at ages 30–35, almost 80% of male children have higher disposable income than their fathers did, about 70% have higher consumption, and around 60% have greater expected lifetime resources.
  • Mobility/Assortative Mating
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage

Inter-State Labor Mobility and the U.S. Economy

AI Summary. The decline in gross migration between U.S. states over the past 50 years is modest and has been essentially flat since the early 2000s, with the net migration rate showing no trend and little evidence that demographic change explains the decline. Most moves offset each other, with only about 10–12 out of 100 producing a net population shift between states.

Andrea Foschi, Christopher House, Christian Proebsting, and Linda Tesar Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
Date Posted:
August 26, 2025
Is Database:
Database

U.S. gross migration rates have fallen modestly over the past 50 years, but net migration has hardly budged. “On average, only 10–12 out of 100 moves reflect a net flow from one location to another.”

Has migration between U.S. states declined significantly?

Core argument: Only 10–12 of every 100 U.S. inter-state moves reflect a net flow from one location to another, with the majority of gross migration consisting of flows that offset each other.

The decline in gross inter-state migration over the last 50 years is relatively modest and has been essentially stable since the early 2000’s. The net migration rate, which is one of the main equilibrating mechanisms between locations, exhibits no trend. There is little evidence that demographic changes explain the decline in aggregate gross migration. Figure 2 plots gross migration and its decomposition into the contributions of absolute net migration and offsetting migration– since 1975 using the IRS data. We see again the slight decline in the gross migration rate, matched by a similar trend in the Offsetting Migration Rate. We also see that the majority of gross migration is given by flows that offset each other, and only a small fraction of flows actually induce a change in a given state’s population. On average, only 10-12 out of 100 moves reflect a net flow from one location to another. Net flows are a small fraction of overall labor migration and have remained fairly constant.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Only 10–12 of every 100 U.S. inter-state moves reflect a net flow from one location to another, with the majority of gross migration consisting of flows that offset each other.
  2. The decline in gross inter-state migration over the past 50 years is relatively modest and has been essentially stable since the early 2000s, with the net migration rate showing no trend.
  3. IRS data since 1975 show the slight decline in the gross migration rate matched by a similar trend in the offsetting migration rate, and there is little evidence that demographic changes explain the decline.

Related Articles:

  • Where is Standard of Living the Highest? Local Prices and the Geography of Consumption — The authors estimate that geographical differences in cost of living are especially large for low-income US households, and that expensive cities offer college graduates a standard of living similar to affordable cities while offering less-educated households a lower one. A high school dropout household moving from the most affordable to the most expensive commuting zone would see consumption fall 18.5%.
  • Housing Constraints and Spatial Misallocation — The authors estimate that housing supply constraints in high-productivity cities such as New York and San Francisco misallocated labor and lowered aggregate US growth by 36% over 1964–2009. Relaxing supply in those cities to the median US city's level is estimated to have raised output 3.7%, or about $3,685 in additional average annual earnings.
  • Why Is Geographic Mobility Declining? — As women's earnings and full-time employment rates converge with men's, geographic mobility would be expected to decline, since couples with similar earnings are less likely to relocate than those with unequal earnings. The convergence may also raise child care needs, encouraging families to locate near relatives who can help.
  • Mobility/Assortative Mating
  • Workforce
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