U.S. Housing as a Global Safe Asset: Evidence from China Shocks
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Chinese capital outflows significantly impacted U.S. real estate btw 2010-2016, with $1bn in net money and deposit outflows from China correlating to a $0.7bn increase in inflows to the U.S.
Research from the Fed finds evidence of risk adverse savings flowing out of the PRC into the United States having a significant impact on real estate prices in impacted area“…We find evidence of an impact of foreign capital inflows on the evolution of house prices in major U.S. cities. The magnitude of the premium in price growth in China-exposed over non- exposed areas averages about 2 percent in the two years following each of the two episodes of China shocks in the last decade. Then, using local projections, we find that Chinese capital inflows to the United States explain the majority of the widening in price growth differentials after Chinese stress episodes. Overall, the evidence we present is consistent with U.S. residential real estate serving as a safe haven asset for foreign Chinese households….”
William Barcelona, Nathan Converse, and Anna Wong, "U.S. Housing as a Global Safe Asset: Evidence from China Shocks," Federal Reserve Board, November 2021, https://www.federalreserve.gov/econres/ifdp/us-housing-as-a-global-safe-asset-evidence-from-china-shocks.htm
Relationship Between Excess Price Gaps and Capital Infows from China
".... Figure 12 plots the relationship between deposit inflows from China and Hong Kong along with the evolution of the gap in house price growth between China-exposed ZIP codes and the matched controls.10 Recall that in Section 2 we presented evidence that funds brought to the U.S. via the banking system were being used for house purchases with a lag. The relationship between inflows and the estimated treatment effect also exhibits this behavior: the contemporaneous correlation is only 0.06, but rises to 0.36 with a three-quarter lag. This is why Figure 12 plots the treatment effect three quarters ahead. The degree of comovement between the two series is striking, and we see that peaks in capital infows from China and Hong Kong coincide with peaks in the treatment effect three quarters ahead. It is also notable that there was essentially no relationship between the two series prior to 2010, the year in which China liberalized some controls on capital outflows...”
"...To control for the state of the U.S. economy as it relates to the housing market, we include as controls the month-on month growth in seasonally adjusted U.S. non-farm payrolls as well as the average 30-year mortgage rate in the U.S. The matrix contains lagged values of the dependent variable, the shock, and the controls, with our specification containing nine lags. We experiment with alternative lag structures and differencing (e.g.year-on-year rather than month-on-month changes); the results are qualitatively similar to those presented below. The results of the estimation are presented in Figure 13. We find a significant and positive relationship between deposit flows from China to the U.S. and the gap in house price growth between exposed and non-exposed ZIP codes. The effect peaks at around eight months. Recall that in Section 2 we showed that deposit out flows from China showed a strong correlation with the U.S. statistical discrepancy with a lag of three quarters and noted that this pattern is consistent with Chinese residents moving money into U.S. banks and using it to purchase real estate on average three quarters later. It is therefore striking that the impulse response in Figure 13 is also consistent with such timing. As the China deposit inflows variable enters our specification in logs, the estimates in Figure 13 imply that a one percentage point increase inflows generates an 0.008 percentage point widening in the gap in price growth between China-exposed and non-exposed areas in the U.S. This effect may seem small at first glance, but recall from Figure 12 above that inflows reached roughly $70 billion during periods of concern about a China hard landing in 2012 and 2015. Taking a concrete example, banking inflows from China were $10.1 billion in July of 2015 and $32.2 in August of that year. Our estimates imply this increase explains 90 percent of the widening gap in house price growth between China-exposed areas and those not exposed...."
The Effect of Chinese Demand on U.S. House Prices
"..The difference in the mean growth rates of the two distributions provides the average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) of exposure to foreign Chinese capital over the 6-year window. For treatment definition 1, the mean house prices over this period for the treatment grew 7 percent faster than for the control group, or 1.1 percent faster per year. For treatment definition 2, mean house price growth for the treatment group was 14 percent faster over the 6 year period, or 2.2 percent per year, compared to that of the control. Another way to visualize the cumulative impact is to look at the evolution of the house price index of the treatment and control group (Figure 9). Because of their differential growth rates, the house price level of the treatment group has diverged significantly from the control group in recent years. For the 20 cities included in the treatment definition 1, the divergence picked up after 2008, and for the 34 cities in the treatment group 2, the divergence picked up since 2010...."
Core of paper, "...Aggregate capital flows data from balance of payments (BOP) accounts offer additional clues to the size of foreign purchases of U.S. residential real estate. While the most recent IMF Balance of Payments Manual (BPM6) species that foreign purchases of residential real estate should be included in foreign direct investment, the U.S. and indeed many countries do not measure such flows. As a result, these flows are captured only in the residual statistical discrepancy line of the balance of payments, or as the difference between the U.S. measured current account deficit and the measured financial inflows from abroad that finance that deficit. When the measured current account deficit exceeds the recorded net financial inflows, a positive statistical discrepancy arises. In the U.S. case, the statistical discrepancy primarily reflect two missing assets: financial derivatives, and the object of interest for our study foreign purchases of U.S. residential real estate assets.Since 2008, the U.S. BOP statistical discrepancy experienced several episodes of turning positive, meaning that some U.S. capital inflows are not being captured in official statistics. In particular, since 2010 we note a striking increase in the comovement of private capital outfows from China and missing net capital in ows to the United States as captured by the statistical discrepancy line in the U.S. BOP. Figure 1 shows that the 12-quarter rolling correlation between the two variables went from being zero or negative to above 0.8 and remained elevated from 2012 to 2017. We next explore bilateral capital ows data between the U.S. and China at a more granular level...."
"...Large cross-border transactions, particularly for real estate purchases, oftentimes involve transactions between a foreign bank and a U.S. bank. So naturally, one might ask: how do recorded banking outflows from China comove with U.S. data on ows into U.S. banks from China? Panel (a) of Figure 2 plots gross out flows via money and deposits as reported in Chinese balance of payment statistics, along with recorded flows into deposits at U.S. financial institutions from China and Hong Kong, obtained from the U.S. Treasury International Capital (TIC) System.3 We include flows from Hong Kong because of the widely documented practice of Chinese households using banks in Hong Kong as a conduit when moving funds abroad. Panel (a) of Figure 2 shows a striking degree of comovement between total Chinese deposit out flows and the pattern of Chinese deposit in flows to the United States. Most notably, total bank out flows from China and bilateral bank in flows to the United States from China both spiked during the two recent periods of deteriorating economic conditions in the Chinese economy, first in 2011-2013 and again in 2014-2016. This comovement suggests that residents in China shifting money abroad place a substantial share into the U.S. banking system. At the peak of the first episode, in the fourth quarter of 2011, in flows to the United States accounted for 29 percent of total Chinese money and deposit out flows. And at the height of the second episode, when China unexpectedly devalued its currency in the third quarter of 2015, flows from China and Hong Kong into U.S. deposits accounted for 48 percent of total Chinese money and deposit out flows. To verify that the comovement observed in panel (a) of Figure 2 is not simply a reflection of a high degree of banking integration between the U.S. and China, we examined the correlation between foreign banking out flows from other countries and bilateral banking in flows to the U.S. from those same countries. The results of this exercise, which can be found in the Appendix (Figure A2-1 and also Table A21) confirm rm that the comovement we observe for Chinese flows is not the norm. Rather, from 2010 onward, we observe an unusually close relationship between bank flows out of China to the rest of the world and bank flows from China into the U.S...."
"...In normal times, the U.S. statistical discrepancy is small in size and has an average value of zero.6 But the discrepancy has historically registered sizeable positive values during bouts of international financial turmoil such as the Asian Financial Crisis and (as seen in panel (b) of Figure 2) the Global Financial Crisis, due to unrecorded safe haven flows into the United States (Flatness et al., 2009). It is therefore notable that not only do banking in flows from China (the green line in Figure 2) peak during the 2011-13 and 2014-16 periods of heightened concern about a hard landing in China, but the U.S. statistical discrepancy became large and positive as well, despite those not being periods of global financial stress. Panel (b) of Figure 2 shows inflows from China to the U.S. banking system along with the three-quarter-ahead value of the U.S. statistical discrepancy. Figure 2 makes clear that the U.S. statistical discrepancy peaked three quarters after bank in flows from China and Hong Kong during the two episodes of economic distress in China during the period we are studying. Conversely, the statistical discrepancy dropped to zero three quarters after banking inflows from China and Hong Kong dropped to their lowest level ever, in the third quarter of 2016. In Appendix Figure A2-2, we show that the correlation between the two series demonstrate a strong positive value starting at a lag of two quarters, peaking at a lag of three quarters. What is the significance of the three quarter lag in the strong relationship between banking inflows from China and the U.S. statistical discrepancy? In fact, it is further suggestive of substantial in flows of Chinese capital to the U.S. residential real estate market. This is because bank transactions involving foreigners are measured in the U.S. balance of payments while real estate transactions are not. Consider an example in which a resident based in China moves money into a U.S. bank to purchase a house in the United States: When the Chinese resident deposits money in a U.S. bank, the bank reports an increase in its liabilities to China, which shows up as capital inflow from China. Six to nine months later, when the same foreign resident takes the money out to purchase a house, the bank reports a drop in its liabilities to China, generating a capital outflow to China in official statistics. The earlier capital inflow from China and subsequent out flow to China exactly nets out to zero, a neutral impact on the U.S. net investment position vis-a-vis China. Even though the foreigner has purchased a claim on a U.S. asset (the house), which is technically an inflow of direct investment from abroad, in practice it is not recorded in the balance of payments. This unrecorded FDI inflow adds to the U.S. statistical discrepancy, pushing it upwards. The three quarter lag in the relationship is consistent with foreign residents depositing funds in U.S. banks and then taking between six and nine months to find a house to buy and settle the resulting real estate transaction, a very plausible time frame. A larger implication of this idiosyncrasy in the U.S. balance of payments is that over time, the missing real estate in flows would lead to an understatement of the gross U.S. liabilities to China in the U.S. net international investment position accounts. To more formally establish the connection between U.S. missing in flows and Chinese capital outflows, we regress the four quarter moving average of U.S. statistical discrepancy and three China-specific variables that proxy for shocks: Chinese FX reserve sales, net Chinese money and deposits out flows, and changes in the Chinese macro conditions, measured by the coincident macro climate index published by the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics (NBS). Taking into account the lagged relationship evident in Figures 1 and 2, we lag these explanatory variables by three quarters.
"..Because Figure 1 indicates that the relationship between Chinese outflows and U.S. inflows changed dramatically in 2010, in the regressions we allow the coefficient on the Chinese variables to vary over time. Specifically, we create dummy variables for pre- and post- 2010Q2 periods and interact them with each China variable. Additionally, in the post-2010Q2 period, we allow the coefficient on the China variables to vary depending on whether it represents a positive or negative signal regarding the outlook for the Chinese economy. Net foreign exchange reserve sales, for example, would be a negative signal, indicating that the authorities are intervening against currency depreciation pressure emanating from private market participants. Conversely, net foreign exchange reserve purchases would suggest intervention to dampen appreciation due to net capital inflows to China. Finally, we include the year-on-year log change in the VIX to control for global financial conditions more generally. The results, shown in Table 1, further confirm that negative (positive) shocks from China are associated with an increase (decrease) in U.S. statistical discrepancy net inflows since 2010Q2, with a three quarter lag. The pre-2010 China shocks are not important in explaining the safe haven flows, as none of these Chinese variables are significant when interacted with the pre-2010Q2 dummy. The VIX, our measure of global financial conditions, is insignificant across all specifications,suggesting that unrecorded capital inflows to the U.S. are better explained by Chinese factors than by global financial conditions more generally. Strikingly, the regressions using Chinese capital outflows variables have substantial explanatory power: the R-square is 0.42 for the net foreign reserves sales regressions, and 0.28 for the regressions with Chinese money and deposit outflows. A back of the envelope calculation based on these results suggests that each $1 billion in net reserves sales by the Chinese authorities since 2010Q2 is associated with a $0.3 billion increase in unrecorded capital inflows to the United States; for each $1 billion in net money and deposit out flows from China, there is a $0.7 billion increase..."
Specifically, “…house prices in major U.S. cities that are highly exposed to demand from China have on average grown 7 percentage points faster than similar neighborhoods with low exposure over the period 2010-2016….”
What this looks like in terms of an impact on American real estate, “.. , the estimates in Figure 13 imply that a one percentage point increase inflows generates an 0.008 percentage point widening in the gap in price growth between China-exposed and non-exposed areas in the U.S. This effect may seem small at first glance, but recall from Figure 12 above that inflows reached roughly $70 billion during periods of concern about a China hard landing in 2012 and 2015. Taking a concrete example, banking inflows from China were $10.1 billion in July of 2015 and $32.2 in August of that year. Our estimates imply this increase explains 90 percent of the widening gap in house price growth between China-exposed areas and those not exposed...."
Their bottom line, The results, shown in Table 1, further confirm that negative (positive) shocks from China are associated with an increase (decrease) in U.S. statistical discrepancy net inflows since 2010Q2, with a three quarter lag. The pre-2010 China shocks are not important in explaining the safe haven flows, as none of these Chinese variables are significant when interacted with the pre-2010Q2 dummy. The VIX, our measure of global financial conditions, is insignificant across all specifications,suggesting that unrecorded capital inflows to the U.S. are better explained by Chinese factors than by global financial conditions more generally. Strikingly, the regressions using Chinese capital outflows variables have substantial explanatory power: the R-square is 0.42 for the net foreign reserves sales regressions, and 0.28 for the regressions with Chinese money and deposit outflows. A back of the envelope calculation based on these results suggests that each $1 billion in net reserves sales by the Chinese authorities since 2010Q2 is associated with a $0.3 billion increase in unrecorded capital inflows to the United States; for each $1 billion in net money and deposit out flows from China, there is a $0.7 billion increase..."





























Ed Comment: I LOVE to see Main finally admitting my chief criticism of their work -- criticism I published that surely they read: "The negative consequences of a crisis are due to both the crisis itself but also to the imbalances that precede a crisis." As you (Steve) recall, those were imbalances their proposed solution stupidly advocated perpetrating after the crisis as a solution to the crisis. Failing to see that allocations prior to the crisis were onetime and could not continue growing forever was a preposterously stupid oversight on their part. Ironically, I was also the one who recognized it might not be a misallocation, just a one time expansion of an allocation that could not continue to expand at the same rate forever, much less expanded in the face of the crisis as they initially proposed. It showed an utter lack of understanding of what caused the crisis--an expansion of risk-averse (offshore ) savings that destabilized an inherently unstable banking system (that costs more than it was worth to stabilized privately rather than publicly--hence the slowest recovery since ww2).
Amir Sufi and Alan Taylor argue that financial crises are predictable and foreshadowed by credit and elevated asset prices. The negative consequences are a function of both to the crisis itself but also preceding imbalances, “…Financial crises have large deleterious effects on economic activity, and as such have been the focus of a large body of research. This study surveys the existing literature on financial crises, exploring how crises are measured, whether they are predictable, and why they are associated with economic contractions. Historical narrative techniques continue to form the backbone for measuring crises, but there have been exciting developments in using quantitative data as well. Crises are predictable with growth in credit and elevated asset prices playing an especially important role; recent research points convincingly to the importance of behavioral biases in explaining such predictability. The negative consequences of a crisis are due to both the crisis itself but also to the imbalances that precede a crisis. Crises do not occur randomly, and, as a result, an understanding of financial crises requires an investigation into the booms that precede them…”
“…For financial crises to be seen as a distinct, important, and disastrous type of event, we might first ask: how damaging are they? and how frequent?The associated downturns are much more adverse than a typical normal recession. We present a headline summary in Table 1. Using local projections (LPs, see Jorda`, 2005), the deviation of real GDP per capita y is estimated h years after a crisis event. In the first two panels, the event is a crisis year and the baseline is trend; in the last two panels the event is the peak of a financial recession (a crisis within ±2 years) and the baseline is a normal recession. To start, using the simpler crisis year definition, Table 1a shows that at a 6 year horizon, real GDP per capita is lower by about 5%-6% following crises, relative to trend. Table 1b shows the result is not driven by the great global crises, the synchronized distress in many countries seen in the interwar depression and the 2008 Global Financial Crisis. Next, aligning events using business cycle peaks as in Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor ` (2013), Table 1c shows that over 6 years, real GDP per capita is lower by about 4% after financial peaks, relative to normal peaks. Table 1d shows this is also not driven global crises, with a deviation of about 3% still seen…”

“…The raw event frequency summary for the onset of financial crises is given in Table 2, and it is also noteworthy that, despite the unusually calm period from 1946 to 1970, when no financial crisis events were seen in advanced economies and very few in emerging economies, the incidence of financial crisis recessions has been large in recent decades, and comparable to outcomes in the turbulent 1870 to 1939 period….”
“…The empirical evidence we survey supports the view that financial crises are indeed predictable, especially by credit and asset price growth. Support has also built up for the view that deviations from rational expectations are an important component in explaining this predictability. In general, the findings in the literature fit a broader trend in macroeconomics towards the study of the booms that precede economic downturns; or, as (Beaudry, Galizia, and Portier, 2020) put it, “putting the cycle back into business cycle analysis.”…”
“…We highlight two interesting findings in Baron, Verner, and Xiong (2021), notably: first, declines in real bank equity returns R B are the best coincident classifier of conventional narrative financial crisis binary events, compared to many macroeconomic and financial variables; second, bank equity returns are a strong predictor of subsequent growth slow downs and credit crunches, based on an LP analysis, even controlling for real nonfinancial equity returns R N, a result we discuss in more detail below. A third result also bears mentioning: banking panics (runs by depositors/creditors) on their own have small macro-financial consequences—it is the bank failures that matter most. Obviously, panics can happen without failures, and failures without panics, in theory and in the data. This finding is important since much debate centered on whether the key locus of the crisis problem is runnable funding outbreaks (roughly, liquidity), or systemic failures (roughly, solvency). The empirical record points to the latter as the more serious issue in terms of macroeconomic consequences, and justifies the central use of solvency and failure criteria in the traditional narrative definition of a financial crisis…”
“..In sum, both measures—bank equity crashes and the traditional narrative indicator— reflect emergent problems on bank balance sheets. They are not perfectly correlated, and the failure-based narrative indicator still provides the most discriminating information: BVX count 197 narrative failure events, and out of these 193 are called as crises (98%); but out of a count of 269 bank equity crashes, only 138 are called as crises (51%). This shows that the inclusion of data on bank equity declines complements the narrative approach with useful auxiliary information….”
“…To confront the issue of whether asset price booms also contribute meaningfully to elevated financial crisis risk, Jorda, Schularick, and Taylor (2015b) collate further data series on equity and housing prices for the long-panel of advanced economies. They develop a “bubble indicator” based on whether the asset price in a given year is more than one s.d. above its de-trended value (using a lowpass filter) and whether there is also a subsequent large correction. An illustration of this approach is in Figure 6c, where the sample is again restricted to recession peaks, and the logit estimation is augmented to include a bubble indicator for either asset price. When there is no bubble in either asset price, crisis risk is generally low. In contrast, when there is either kind of bubble, crisis risk is significantly elevated, by a factor of roughly 1.5 in the mid-range of credit growth
“…Some illustrative evidence is shown in Figure 7a using local projections. The outcome variable is private credit to GDP, denoted CREDGDPct, from the Jord`a, Schularick, and Taylor (2017) bank loan measure, and the sample is the long-panel of advanced economies. The shock is a change in the degree of financial liberalization, treated as exogenous, according to a set of indices constructed by Kaminsky and Schmukler (2008) for the period 1973-2005, a range of dates which closely encompasses the great era of financial liberalization in both advanced and emerging economies. The index used here is the standardized sum of three measures of the domestic financial sector, the stock market, and the capital account. The figure clearly shows that in the 5 years after a financial liberalization event, changes in credit to GDP, which were on a positive long-run postwar trend anyway, had a tendency to accelerate even more rapidly….”
“…Illustrative evidence on trends around financial crises are shown in Figure 8 for the JST long panel. Using an event-study approach, the average evolution of each variable is plotted relative to the peak year of the cycle. Averages are displayed separately for normal recessions (solid blue line) and financial crisis recessions (dashed red line). The first row of four charts shows the familiar timing of events and macro aggregates. Crisis probability is of course high in the ±2 year window around a financial crisis recession, by construction, given the JST peak classification; it is negligible in normal recessions, although it is not exactly zero except in year zero, since nearby financial crisis events may be associated with a different nearby cyclical peak in JST. Real GDP per capita growth decelerates after a recession peak, but much more so in a financial crisis recession as expected. Likewise, a recession is associated with the onset of a disinflationary period of several years, but the trend is much more pronounced in a financial crisis recession. Finally, the fourth chart shows that financial crisis recession peaks are preceded by credit booms and followed by credit crunches much more so than normal recessions. The second row of charts in Figure 8 shows some interesting financial market covariates using selected asset prices. The first chart shows the Krishnamurthy and Muir (2017) normalized credit spread, which is the percent difference of the credit spread from its country mean (so 0% means the spread is equal to this average), and clearly spreads are tighter than average (50% lower) before a financial crisis recession peak, and much wider immediately after (50%-100% higher), compared to the minimal variation seen in normal recession events. The next chart shows the Baron and Xiong (2017) real total return on bank equities, which is a little high before a normal recession peak and indistinguishable from zero after; but near a financial crisis recession peak, bank equities experience a very large run up before, and a large crash afterwards, with significant negative real returns (note that these are log×100 units). Finally, we can see that distress clearly spills over into broader aggregate asset prices, where the onset of a financial crisis recession event similarly implies much larger and predictable reversals for investors exposed to the stock market or housing market, as shown in the last two charts….”