Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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China's Economy Is Not Overtaking America's

Michael Beckley Journal Of Applied Corporate Finance
Date Posted:
May 21, 2020
Is Database:
Database

China’s economy, despite growth, isn’t overtaking the U.S. due to inefficiencies & rising costs. China’s high production costs, welfare burdens & debt (over 300% of GDP) hinder growth, while the U.S. benefits from higher productivity & innovation.

China's economy, despite its impressive growth, is not overtaking the U.S. due to significant inefficiencies and rising costs. While China boasts a larger GDP and higher investment rates, the U.S. remains several times wealthier, with the wealth gap expanding by trillions annually. China's high production costs and welfare burdens, coupled with inefficient state sectors, result in over one-third of industrial capacity going to waste. The country's debt has surged to over 300% of GDP, with 45% of new loans used to pay interest on old ones. In contrast, the U.S. benefits from higher productivity, with American workers generating seven times the output of their Chinese counterparts. Additionally, the U.S. leads in innovation, producing more high-tech output and holding more international patents. China's aging population and resource inefficiencies further hinder its economic prospects, while the U.S. maintains a healthier, more educated workforce and greater resource efficiency.

Michael Beckley, "China's Economy Is Not Overtaking America's,"Journal Of Applied Corporate Finance, May 18, 2020, https://www.aei.org/research-products/journal-publication/chinas-economy-is-not-overtaking-americas/

"...China’s economic growth over the past three decades has been spectacular, even miraculous. Yet the veneer of double-digit growth rates has masked gaping liabilities that limit China’s ability to close the wealth gap with the United States. China has achieved high growth at high costs, and now the costs are rising while growth is slowing. As I explain in a recent book, data that accounts for these costs reveal thatthe United States is several times wealthier than China, and the gap appears to be growing by trillions of dollars every year.1 This conclusion may surprise many people, given that China has a bigger GDP, a higher investment rate, larger trade flows, and a higher economic growth rate than the United States. How can China outproduce, outinvest, and outtrade the United States—and own nearly $1.2 trillion in U.S. debt—yet still have substantially less wealth?....The reason is that China’s economy is big but inefficient. It produces vast output but at enormous expense. Chinese businesses suffer from chronically high production costs, and China’s 1.4 billion people impose substantial welfare and security burdens. The United States, by contrast, is big and efficient. American businesses are among the most productive in the world; and with four times fewer people than China, the United States has much lower welfare and security costs. GDP and other standard measures of economic heft ignore these costs and create the false impression that China is overtaking the United States economically. In reality, China’s economy is barely keeping pace as the burden of propping up loss-making companies and feeding, policing, protecting, and cleaning up after one-fifth of humanity erodes China’s stocks of wealth.....China’s productivity growth has not only been unspectacular; it has been virtually nonexistent.5 By contrast, productivity improvements have accounted for roughly 20% of U.S. economic growth over the past decade, as it has for most of the past 100 years.6...China’s private sector is relatively efficient, but it is shackled to a bloated state sector that destroys nearly as much value as it creates.11... All told, more than one-third of China’s industrial capacity goes to waste and nearly two-thirds of China’s infrastructure projects cost more to build than they will ever generate in economic returns.12 Total losses from this waste are difficult to calculate, but the Chinese government estimates that it blew nearly $7 trillion on “ineffective investment” between 2009 and 2014.13...As just one example, China’s unused capacity in steelmaking exceeds the total combined steel production capacity of Japan, the United States, and Germany.10....The unsurprising result of all these burdens, plus the wasted investment highlighted above, has been a dramatic rise in China’s debt, from 100% of GDP in the 1990s to greater than 300% in 2019.19.... With a per capita income six times greater than China’s, the United States not only has more surplus wealth to pay down its debts it also has much lower interest rates....China’s household and corporate borrowers have been hit with rising interest rates that now consume 20% of China’s GDP.21 Roughly a quarter of China’s thousand biggest firms owe more money in interest than they earn in gross profits; and 45% of all new loans in China are being used to pay interest on old loans, a practice that analysts are calling “Ponzi finance.” Writing off these bad loans will cost China somewhere between $1.5 trillion and $10 trillion, with the latter figure nearly equal to China’s GDP.22 To put that number in context, consider that the United States spent 8% of its GDP writing off bad loans after the 2008 financial crisis.23.....Ultimately, the only way for China to solve its debt problem without gutting social spending is to increase its productivity, which in turn will require innovation. The Chinese government understands this well. Since 2007, it has tripled R&D spending, employed more scientists and engineers than any other country, and mounted the most extensive corporate espionage campaign in history......These moves, however, have yet to turn China into an innovation powerhouse. China produces only half the high-technology output and highly-cited scientific studies as the United States, holds five times fewer international patents, and pays more royalties for technology than it takes in.24...China is a major player in high-technology supply chains, but Chinese firms mainly focus on low-tech activities...For those reasons, Deloitte and Boston Consulting Group both argue that the United States increasingly rivals China as the world’s most cost-competitive manufacturing nation.33....China now leads the world in retractions of scientific studies due to fraud, one-third of Chinese scientists have admitted to plagiarizing or falsifying results (versus 2% of U.S. scientists), and nearly two-thirds of China’s R&D spending has been lost to corruption.35/////This culture of fraud extends throughout China’s economy.....According to the World Bank and the UN, human capital—the knowledge, skills, and labor embodied in a nation’s population—constitutes more than half of the wealth of most countries. Both organizations estimate that the U.S. stock of human capital is several times greater than China’s.38 China has four times the population of the United States, but the average American worker generates seven times the output of the average Chinese worker.39....China also loses 400,000 of its most highly educated workers every year to foreign countries in net terms, including thousands of scientists, engineers, and “inventors” (people that have registered at least one patent).52The United States, by contrast, nets one million workers annually from all foreign countries, including roughly 20,000 inventors and 15,000 scientists and engineers, 5,000 of whom come from China.....The U.S. workforce is not only better educated but also healthier than China’s. China loses 40% more years of productive life per capita on average from major ailments.53....China is aging more rapidly than any society in history. The number of Chinese aged 65 and older will more than triple by midcentury, from 130 million in 2015 to 400 million by 2050.63 Meanwhile China’s workforce will shrink by 212 million—about one-third of the current total. At that point, senior citizens will account for more than 30% of China’s population versus only 20% of the U.S. population.....The United States can feed its population with only 1% of its workforce in agriculture whereas China devotes 30% of its workforce to farming—and still depends on food imports to feed its population.64....Roughly one-third of China’s provinces and two-thirds of its major cities suffer from extreme water scarcity.67....The United States generates more than three times as much wealth from each gallon of water as China.68....The United States generates roughly 40% more wealth per unit of energy than China.76....American farmers produce 30% more food per hectare than Chinese farmers.....China must recognize that its economic engine is not strong enough to support grand ambitions for territorial conquest and regional hegemony. Its best option, therefore, is to become a responsible stakeholder in the existing international order. The United States, on the other hand, must recognize that China is nowhere close to dominating East Asia, let alone challenging the United States for global primacy. And so Instead of preparing for preventive war, the United States should reinforce the existing East Asian balance of power...."

Ed Comment:Most insightful thing I've read in a while. Probably Chinese propaganda. Some of it seems a bit flakey. For example he says the Chinese economy is bigger than the US but then says it's $10T. Some inconsequential differences seem blown out of proportion. Plz add the graphs to my condensed summary below. Plz read the studies mentioned on wealth estimates Add to data base

Steve Comment:Attached a BPEA paper from last year that found that Chinese GDP growth has been overstated by an average of 1.7% y/y btw 2008-2016. If true their GDP is 12% smaller then official figures suggests. Paper was very well received (he does cite it, but prob a better citation for Chinese growth then this report) There is a great deal of truth in this (I’ve read most of what he relies on suspect that larger GDP is what matters, quantity has a quality of its own (given GDP was first developed to measure potential investment in defense capacity)

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Previous articleMay 21, 2020A forensic examination of China's national accountsChina GDP overstatement: Growth inflated +1.7%/yr (2008-16), economy 12% smaller than reported. Debt/GDP ratio understated by 30bps, investment rate off by 7pp.Next articleMay 21, 2020Departing CEO Age and TenureCEO demographics shift: Avg exit age rises to 64 in 2022 from 62 in 2010. Tenure lengthens to 9.7yrs from 8.4yrs. Both metrics signal extended leadership spans.
Showing 882 database articles primarily about either GDP, Business Cycle, Financial Markets, Growth, Housing, Inflation, Savings Glut/Trade Deficit, or Trade (not deficits)

World’s Unusually High Dollar Exposure Risks Fueling Selloff

AI Summary. Global institutional investors hedge only 41% of their foreign-currency exposure — the lowest rate since at least 2015 — leaving portfolios heavily exposed to dollar depreciation. A sudden shift in sentiment could trigger a self-reinforcing dollar selloff as unhedged holders rush to reduce exposure simultaneously.

Ruth Carson, Masaki Kondo, and Anya Andrianova Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A Bloomberg analysis finds only 41% of global investors’ foreign-currency exposure is hedged in six major markets, the lowest level since 2015. Foreigners now hold almost $40T of American assets.

Are unhedged dollar positions setting up a market crash?

Core argument: Global institutional investors hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure as of June 30—the lowest share since at least 2015—leaving dollar-denominated assets acutely vulnerable to a sentiment-driven selloff.

Sift through the filings of pension funds and insurers around the world and one thing stands out: some of the biggest holders of US assets have little protection against a weaker dollar, leaving the currency at risk of steeper declines if sentiment suddenly turns. Across markets [Canada, Denmark, Australia, Taiwan, Japan and Finland for which data is available] investors hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure as of June 30 — the lowest since at least 2015. While not a complete picture, it offers a glimpse into how the sudden rush last year to hedge against dollar losses triggered by President Donald Trump’s global tariff rollout has faded as the US currency slowly stabilized.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global institutional investors hedged just 41% of their foreign-currency exposure as of June 30—the lowest share since at least 2015—leaving dollar-denominated assets acutely vulnerable to a sentiment-driven selloff.
  2. The retreat from peak hedging activity reflects fading demand for dollar-loss protection after the U.S. currency stabilized following the tariff-driven shock, compressing a key buffer against renewed depreciation.

Related Articles:

  • Financial Innovation and the International Monetary System — The U.S. dollar accounts for 59% of international payment values routed through SWIFT and ~90% of global foreign exchange turnover, while the Chinese renminbi has risen to 9% of foreign exchange turnover by displacing other major currencies, not the dollar.
  • The Global Balance Sheet 2026: Imbalance And Divergence — Paper wealth — asset price gains detached from real investment — drove nearly 60% of global household wealth growth in 2025, up from one-third historically. Only 20% came from net new real investment, compared to a 30% historical average.
  • Momentum, Rotation and the Value in Growth — Noting US underperformance relative to the world since the start of 2025, and the fact that the 5 largest US stocks now have a P/E only marginally above that…
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

Public to Private Equity in the United States: A Long-Term Look

AI Summary. Global venture capital returns are highly skewed: 62% of deals lose money, more than half lose 50–100% of invested capital, but fat-tailed outliers drive overall returns. This pattern mirrors historical whaling voyages, where payoffs were similarly variable and driven by rare outsized outcomes.

Michael Mauboussin and Dan Callahan Morgan Stanley
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Btw the mid-90s and 2018, 62% of global venture capital investments lost money, and more than half of the deals lost 50–100% of invested capital. Yet US VC returned ~40% higher mean wealth btw 1984 and 2020 than a parallel investment path in the S&P 500.

Does venture capital's extreme inequality in returns justify its economic role?

Core argument: Across 31,000+ global venture capital deals from the mid-1990s to 2018, 62% lost money and more than half destroyed 50–100% of invested capital, yet fat-tailed winners generate returns sufficient to offset the majority of losses.

Exhibit 8 shows in excess of 31,000 observations of returns, measured as multiples of invested capital at the beginning of the period, for global venture capital deals. These results are from the mid-1990s to 2018. 62% lost money and more than one-half of all deals lost 50 to 100% of invested capital. The offset is that the tails are much fatter than those for buyouts or public equities. Public market equivalent (PME) is generally reflected as a ratio between private equity and public market returns. A ratio above 1 reveals relative outperformance and below 1 means underperformance. Here’s an example of how PME works. Say a fund drew $200 million from its investors in January 2021 and paid out $470 million in December 2025. An investor could have invested the $200 million in the S&P 500, which returned $392 million over the same period. The PME would be 1.2 ($470/$392). For venture funds, the average over [1984-2020] was about 1.4.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Across 31,000+ global venture capital deals from the mid-1990s to 2018, 62% lost money and more than half destroyed 50–100% of invested capital, yet fat-tailed winners generate returns sufficient to offset the majority of losses.
  2. Harvard Business School professor Tom Nicholas finds venture capital return distributions mirror those of historical whaling voyages, where payoffs were determined by highly variable oil and whalebone yields — confirming that extreme skewness in risk capital is a durable structural feature, not a modern anomaly.

Related Articles:

  • Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II — Analysis of >5k German fighter pilots reveals that awards & status competition significantly influenced performance, with disparities across skill levels…
  • The Deep End: 2025 Alternative Investments Review — For venture funds vintage 2018 and later both the mean and median investor have underperformed the S&P 500 as of 2025. While the top quartile has…
  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Btw January 1926 and December 2025, 60% of US firms had negative total returns relative to T-bills. 46 firms accounted for half of the $91T in net wealth…
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  • Productivity
    • Incentives/Risk-Taking
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What Are U.S. Treasury Markets Really Telling Us? Part II

AI Summary. 54 percentage point yield increase since 2022. The shift reflects reduced Federal Reserve absorption of long-duration debt, forcing private investors to demand greater compensation for interest rate risk.

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Lustig presents a decomposition that attributes 156bp of the 254bp rise in the 10-year yield since March 2022 to an increase in the term premium, which he associates with the additional duration risk borne by investors as the Fed reduced its balance sheet.

Does reduced Fed demand for long-duration debt explain rising Treasury yields?

Core argument: Term premium accounts for 1.56 percentage points — nearly two-thirds — of the 2.54-point rise in the 10-year Treasury yield since March 2022, dwarfing the 98-basis-point contribution from rising expected short rates.

I plot a decomposition of the increase in the 10-year yield into a term premium component and a future short rate component. According to this measure, a big chunk —1.56 pps (or nearly 2/3 rds)— of the 2.54 pps increase in the 10-year yield since March 2022 is actually due to an increase in the term premium. That premium (the red line in the figure) turned negative around 2015, and [when] it bottomed out in 2020, yields (black line) were trading 135 bps below the path of future short rates (blue line). That’s not entirely surprising: The Fed was absorbing a large share of Treasury issuance at the long end of the yield curve —as well as MBS issuance— effectively removing a great deal of interest rate risk from the market.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Term premium accounts for 1.56 percentage points — nearly two-thirds — of the 2.54-point rise in the 10-year Treasury yield since March 2022, dwarfing the 98-basis-point contribution from rising expected short rates.
  2. The term premium bottomed at -1.355% in 2020, when Fed absorption of long-end Treasury and MBS issuance stripped duration risk from the market and pushed yields 135 basis points below the expected path of short rates.
  3. The term premium’s steady climb since 2022 signals that investors now demand compensation for bearing interest rate risk rather than paying for the privilege, reversing a multi-year structural distortion created by quantitative easing.

Related Articles:

  • What Are Bond Markets Telling Us? — U.S. bond market indicators, including long-term inflation expectations and default insurance prices, show no meaningful rise in concern about government insolvency or debt sustainability.
  • What Are US Treasury Markets Really Telling Us? Part I — Lusting agrees with Krugman that low CDS prices on Treasurys argue against default panic, but finds them a weak signal. Constructing synthetic Treasuries from…
  • America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t — The safety premium that investors historically paid for US government bonds over equivalent alternatives has compressed toward zero and, at longer maturities, reversed — with global investors now pricing foreign government bonds as safer than US Treasurys.
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Is the AI Buildout Pushing Up Yields?

AI Summary. Heavy corporate investment in new technology can shift businesses from net savers to net borrowers, absorbing household savings and widening the current account deficit, as occurred during the early-2000s technology boom.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
August 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Brooks argues, “The AI buildout isn’t why government bond yields are rising,” noting the US non-financial corporate sector was a net saver as of Q1 2026, which suggests government deficit spending is driving up long yields.

Does massive technology investment shift corporations from savers to borrowers?

Core argument: Government dissaving—not corporate capital expenditure—is the primary driver of U.S. domestic savings consumption and current account deterioration.

The chart shows quarterly data for the US saving-investment balance going back to 1990. This is an identity that apportions the current account balance into net saving in various sectors of the economy. Households tend to be net savers, as is the financial sector and non-financial corporates. The government tends to be a net borrower. The last time we had a lot of excitement about technological innovation and higher productivity growth was in the “IT bubble” of the early 2000s, which saw non-financial corporates flip from being net savers to borrowers, i.e. the capex buildout at the time was very large and - for a few years - accounted for the entire current account deficit. Nothing like that’s happening now. It’s government dissaving, i.e. the budget deficit, that’s eating up resources, while the non-financial corporate sector stayed a net saver in data through the first quarter of this year.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Government dissaving—not corporate capital expenditure—is the primary driver of U.S. domestic savings consumption and current account deterioration.

Related Articles:

  • AI Is Driving Up Treasury Yields: ‘It Just Touches Everything’ — Heavy corporate bond issuance driven by AI investment has reduced demand for long-term government debt, pushing 10-year Treasury yields up ~0.3 percentage points as investors rotate into higher-yielding corporate bonds.
  • The Other US Capex Question — Weak non-AI business investment in the U.S. is driven primarily by near-zero labor force growth from tightened immigration policy, not by AI spending crowding out capital, since corporate savings are sufficient to fund both simultaneously.
  • Corporate America Is Minting Money—and Not Just in Tech and Finance — S&P 500 earnings per share are growing above 13% year-over-year for the sixth consecutive quarter, with sales rising at the fastest pace since late 2022 and margins expanding across most sectors. The gap between earnings-per-share growth and net income growth has narrowed to under 1 percentage point, indicating profit gains
  • Financial Markets
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    • Fiscal Deficits
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Bessent Bounce Starts to Emerge in Long Bond Market Metrics

AI Summary. The gap between long-term government bond yields and equivalent swap rates has narrowed to its smallest in months, reflecting increased investor willingness to hold long-dated government debt following expanded buybacks of longer-dated bonds.

Greg Ritchie and Elizabeth Stanton Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Modest compression of the spreads between Treasury yields and synthetic “swap” securities (~5.5bp for the 30 year and ~3bp for the 10 year) suggest Bessent’s Treasury purchase program has had a degree of success at lowering long-term government yields.

Are investors returning to long-term government bonds?

Core argument: The 30-year Treasury-swap spread narrowed to its smallest since February following Bessent’s announcement, as Treasuries outperformed equivalent-maturity swaps and benchmark yields drifted lower.

Since Bessent’s announcement, Treasuries have outperformed equivalent-maturity swaps, narrowing the 30-year spread to the smallest since February. Swaps are popular with some investors as an alternative to owning bonds; the gap between [swap rates] and US government yields [gauges] how willing [investors] are to hold Treasuries instead. The 10-year swap spread has compressed too, with the gap three basis points smaller at around 38 basis points. Still, the recent drop has only dented a years-long rise in long-term US government borrowing costs. The 10-year US yield inched up 3bp to 4.66% after touching 4.75% last week. “While conducting buybacks at the long end of the yield curve may technically decrease yields, higher structural US budget deficits, which [require] a significant supply of Treasuries to finance the US debt, [are] not changing anytime soon,” said Libby Cantrill, head of public policy at Pimco.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The 30-year Treasury-swap spread narrowed to its smallest since February following Bessent’s announcement, as Treasuries outperformed equivalent-maturity swaps and benchmark yields drifted lower.
  2. The Treasury’s plan to at least double longer-dated bond buybacks drove the repricing.
  3. the swap-yield gap—a direct gauge of investor preference for Treasuries over derivatives—compressed in response.

Related Articles:

  • Let the Bond Market Speak — Treasury intervention in a functioning bond market suppresses the price signal that transmits collective market information to decision makers, removing the mechanism by which orderly volatility performs its intended economic function.
  • US 30-Year Bonds Erase Gains From Treasury’s Buyback Surprise — US government bond yields have returned to near two-decade highs despite a buyback program targeting long-dated debt, indicating that investor concern over rising government borrowing remains unresolved.
  • America’s Risky Debt: What Markets See That Policymakers Don’t — The safety premium that investors historically paid for US government bonds over equivalent alternatives has compressed toward zero and, at longer maturities, reversed — with global investors now pricing foreign government bonds as safer than US Treasurys.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP

The United States and Its Creditors: Assessing Foreign Demand for U.S. Assets

AI Summary. Foreign private investors now hold $6.7tn in U.S. government debt, vastly exceeding the $3.9tn held by foreign governments. This shift reflects a structural move away from official to private foreign ownership of U.S. debt over the past two decades.

Anusha Chari and Gian Maria Milesi-Ferretti Brookings Institution
Date Posted:
August 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The composition of foreign ownership of U.S. Treasury debt has shifted sharply from official to private investors over the past two decades. Foreign private investors now hold $6.7T in Treasuries, vastly exceeding the $3.9T held by foreign official institutions.

Are foreign private investors replacing governments as holders of U.S. debt?

Core argument: Foreign private holdings of U.S. Treasury securities ($6.7 trillion) now exceed official holdings ($3.9 trillion) by 1.7x, reversing the official-investor dominance that characterized the pre-2008 era.

Figure 5 shows a large shift in foreign holdings of US Treasurys: a diminishing role for official investors, who accounted for the predominant share in 2008, offset by a rising role for private investors. Figure 6 shows net issuance and purchases of U.S. Treasury securities during the past 25 years. The boom in net issuance during and after the COVID pandemic is particularly striking, even after controlling for the net purchases by the Fed which reduce net market supply. Foreign net purchases show a notable shift toward private purchases relative to the 2000s. As a result, foreign private holdings of U.S. Treasury securities in mid-2025 ($6.7 trillion, including the Cayman Islands correction) vastly exceed official holdings of $3.9 trillion.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Foreign private holdings of U.S. Treasury securities ($6.7 trillion) now exceed official holdings ($3.9 trillion) by 1.7x, reversing the official-investor dominance that characterized the pre-2008 era.
  2. The U.S. creditor base has shifted decisively toward market-sensitive private investors since 2008, replacing the official-sector dominance that once provided more stable, policy-driven demand for Treasuries.

Related Articles:

  • Mid-Year Outlook: At the Crossroads of Stagflation—What’s Next? — Citing a decline in foreign participation in 30-year Treasury auctions in recent months, Torsten Sløk argues that while the risk of a “firesale” of US assets…
  • Tariffs and “International Payments Problems” — The worsening of the US net international investment position – from -20% of US GDP in 2010, to -53% pre-pandemic, and to -89% as of the end of 2025Q3…
  • Global Trade Imbalances: Actual Problems, Unlikely Solutions — The composition of foreign investment into the U.S. is shifting from government bond purchases to private equity and riskier assets, meaning future productivity gains will flow to foreign investors and capital is more likely to flee during downturns.
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