Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
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Rethinking Trade Imbalances

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
January 27, 2025

Challenging @michaelxpettis @paulkrugman argues that trade deficits are the obverse side of capital account surpluses. As “the US economy was doing well, it was attracting a lot of foreign investment. And the balance of payments balances.”

There was definitely a period of a decade or so [~1990-2005] when the U.S. was really figuring out what to do with IT and the rest of the world was not. And so the U.S. pulled ahead and is still ahead, although a lot of the divergence took place during this relatively brief period. You'll see that that's exactly when the United States began running big trade deficits. And the reason is that because the US economy was doing well, it was attracting a lot of inflows of foreign investment. And the balance of payments balances. The trade balance plus net inflows of foreign investment equals zero. So if we're getting a lot of money coming to America to take advantage of the opportunities, we run a big trade deficit. Hard to see how any of this is objectionable or a problem. This is international macroeconomics working the way it's supposed to. Capital flowing to areas that offer high returns to investment, which for a while was the United States. Okay, now the reason people think it's a problem is that we have definitely de-industrialized.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Very Bad, No Good Trillion-Dollar Trade Surplus — .@paulkrugman notes China’s $1T 2024 trade surplus and argues “The rest of the world just isn’t going to accept China’s attempt to export its way out of policy…
  • Trade Intervention for Freer Trade — China comprises 17% of global GDP but 29% of manufacturing and 13% of consumption while the US is 26% of GDP, 16% of manufacturing, and 26% of consumption…
  • A User’s Guide to Restructuring the Global Trading System — .@SteveMiran cites the 2018-19 experience with tariffs on China and $/Yuan exchange rates and argues that increased tariffs will be largely offset by $/Yuan…
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
Previous articleJanuary 27, 2025Data Update 3 for 2025: The Times They Are A'changin!Between 2014 and 2024, the Mag 7 added $15.8T in market cap, approximately 40% of the increase in market capitalization across all US equities over the decade. @AswathDamodaranNext articleJanuary 27, 2025Germany’s Economic Model Is Broken, and No One Has a Plan BGerman industrial output has fallen by 15% since 2018 and manufacturing employment is down 3%, as German exports slow amid increasing global competition from Chinese manufacturers.
Showing 56 database articles primarily about Trade (not deficits)

The Global Economy Is Threatened Again by Trade Imbalances

AI Summary. Global trade imbalances have reached 3.7% of world economic output, the highest since the 2008 financial crisis, as deficits and surpluses have become more persistent and structurally entrenched across economies.

Greg Ip The Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
June 12, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Greg Ip warns that while global imbalances are “narrower” than they were pre-crisis, “they are more persistent and more entrenched in national behavior,” pointing to China’s trade surplus and chronic US fiscal deficits.

Are persistent trade imbalances becoming a structural threat to global stability?

Core argument: Global trade imbalances reached 3.7% of GDP last year, up from a post-2008 low, driving renewed financial stability risks across.

The IMF calculates that deficits plus surpluses reached 3.7% of global gross domestic product last year after falling steadily from around the global financial crisis. Until the early 2000s, they fluctuated between 1% and 3%. This is worrisome. Current-account deficits played a part in the crises that swept Latin America in the early 1980s, East and Southeast Asia in the late 1990s, the U.S. in 2007-09, and the eurozone from 2009 on. Today’s imbalances look different. While annual deficits are narrower than 15 years ago, they are more persistent and more entrenched in national behaviour. Take the U.S., whose current-account deficit of $1.1 trillion is by far the largest single imbalance. Last year, tariffs did reduce some imports, but because the AI boom sucked in foreign-made tech equipment, the current-account deficit narrowed only slightly. The bigger contributor to the U.S. current-account deficit is its budget deficit, which sustains excessive U.S. spending and inadequate saving. The IMF estimates a budget deficit of 2% of GDP increases the current-account deficit by 0.5% of GDP.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Global trade imbalances reached 3.7% of GDP last year, up from a post-2008 low, driving renewed financial stability risks across.
  2. Current-account deficits have narrowed vs. 15 years ago but grown more persistent, leading to entrenched structural imbalances that amplify systemic.
  3. Trade imbalances fluctuated 1–3% of GDP through the early 2000s before spiking post-crisis, indicating a structural shift in savings behavior.

Related Articles:

  • Understanding Global Imbalances — Four economies—the United States, China, Germany, and Japan—account for roughly two-thirds of global imbalances, with current account surpluses and deficits now lasting twice as long as they did in the 1980s. Persistent imbalances have accumulated into large foreign asset and liability positions, with the United States holding net foreign liabilities
  • Why Global Imbalances Matter — Surplus economies depend on deficit countries as buyers of excess goods, giving deficit nations structural leverage despite appearing financially weak.
  • The U.S. Trade Deficit: Myths and Realities — Obstfeld @PIIE argues that current account deficits have not been forcibly “imposed” on the US from abroad since 2002. Rejecting Pettis’ tax on capital flows…
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • China
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

Japan, South Korea and Taiwan Are Suffering Industrial Rot

AI Summary. North-east Asian manufacturing has become almost entirely dependent on AI-related production, with all 15% of the region's industrial output growth since 2019 driven by AI-linked goods. Output at factories unrelated to AI has shrunk, leaving chips and data-centre hardware accounting for 40–80% of exports across South Korea and Taiwan.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
May 28, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The industrial production of Japan, South Korea and Taiwan has risen 15% since 2019 – entirely driven by AI-related demand. Apart from chip-making, IP has shown no trend since 2011. The fall in non-chip output is likely due to Chinese competition.

Is North-East Asia's economy becoming dangerously dependent on AI manufacturing?

Core argument: Japan, South Korea and Taiwan Are Suffering Industrial Rot.

North-east Asian manufacturing is getting narrower. Chips and other gear related to AI make up over 40% of South Korean exports, more than double their share just two years ago. In Taiwan it is 80% of exports, compared with about half before the pandemic. After accounting for firms not neatly captured as AI-linked in official statistics, like Japan’s Advantest (which makes chip-testing gear) and Taiwan’s Foxconn (which produces data-centre servers, among other electronics), The Economist finds that all 15% of the region’s rise in industrial output since 2019 is thanks to AI. In Japan, South Korea and Taiwan output at factories unrelated to AI has shrunk in recent years.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Japan, South Korea and Taiwan Are Suffering Industrial Rot.
  2. North-east Asian manufacturing is getting narrower.
  3. In Taiwan it is 80% of exports, compared with about half before the pandemic.

Related Articles:

  • China’s Next-Generation Industrial Policy — China's exports are shifting away from consumer goods and toward intermediate inputs and capital goods, with those categories rising 26% and 32% respectively over three years. This reflects a strategy of progressively localizing entire supply chains, embedding China deeper into global manufacturing systems as a supplier of components and machinery
  • China Is Making Trade Impossible — Robin Harding argues, “China is making trade impossible. If it will buy nothing from others but commodities and consumer goods, they must prepare to do…
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — GS estimates that for every 1pp export-driven increase in Chinese GDP, advanced economies experience a 0.1–0.3pp drag. “China Shock 2.0 is likely to crowd out…
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • China
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
  • Productivity
    • Investment

State of U.S. Tariffs: February 21, 2026

John Iselin Yale University
Date Posted:
February 23, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The new 15% tariffs under Section 122 bring the mean effective tariff rate to 13.7%, down from 16.9% prior to the SCOTUS ruling that the IEEPA tariffs were illegal. Section 122 tariffs will expire in 150 days unless extended by Congress.

The Budget Lab (TBL) estimates the effects of all US tariffs and foreign retaliation implemented through February 20, 2026, including the new 15% Section 122 tariffs and the elimination of IEEPA-based tariffs. Under our baseline case, the Section 122 tariffs expire after 150 days. Before the IEEPA tariffs were struck down, consumers faced an overall average effective tariff rate of 16%, the highest since 1936. Immediately following the IEEPA ruling, the rate fell to 9.1%. After the Section 122 tariffs were imposed, the rate rose to its current level of 13.7%. If those tariffs expire in 150 days, the rate will fall again to 9.1%. Assuming Section 122 tariffs expire in 150 days, the administration’s tariffs will raise about $1.3 trillion over 2026-35, though slower economic growth reduces revenues and brings the net dynamic revenue to $1.1 trillion. (If they are instead made permanent, these figures would be $2.2 trillion and $1.9 trillion.)

Related Articles:

  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US trade deficit was $901.5B in 2025, effectively unchanged from 2024 despite the new tariff regime. The US bilateral deficit with China fell to $202B, the…
  • Help for the Heartland? The Employment and Electoral Effects of the Trump Tariffs in the United States — Tariffs implemented during the 2018-2019 trade war were “at best a wash, and may have been mildly negative” in terms of employment, but increased political…
  • Did Tariffs Make American Manufacturing Great? New Evidence from the Gilded Age — In a study of over 80 US manufacturing industries from 1870-1909 @cmicmeissner concludes that higher tariff rates reduced labor productivity. “The era’s high…
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Taxation
  • GDP

Trump’s Options After the Supreme Court Said His Tariffs Are Illegal

Isabel Gottlieb Bloomberg
Date Posted:
February 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Trump has at least five tools he can use to offset the IEEPA tariffs; however, none of them offer the latitude that Trump’s interpretation of IEEPA allowed. Section 338 of Smoot-Hawley, which has never been used, likely has the broadest scope.

President Donald Trump can lean on alternative legislation to try to rebuild his tariff wall, after the US Supreme Court ruled that he can’t use a 1977 emergency law to impose import taxes. [Notably], Section 338 of the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930. The Depression-era provision empowers the president to introduce tariffs on imports from nations “whenever he shall find as a fact” that these countries impose unreasonable charges or limitations, or engage in discriminatory behavior against US commerce. There’s no prerequisite for a federal agency to conduct an investigation before the president can apply tariffs. Section 338 has never been used before to impose tariffs. If Trump were to lean on this provision, such an unprecedented move may invite legal challenges. The possibility that Trump could tap Section 338 has alarmed some Democrats in the House of Representatives — five lawmakers introduced a resolution in March 2025 to repeal this section of the 1930 law.

Related Articles:

  • Help for the Heartland? The Employment and Electoral Effects of the Trump Tariffs in the United States — Tariffs implemented during the 2018-2019 trade war were “at best a wash, and may have been mildly negative” in terms of employment, but increased political…
  • The Incidence of Tariffs: Rates and Reality — Actual 2025 tariff rates are, to date, far less than statutory rates, but the costs of the tariffs are mostly borne by the US – estimated tariff…
  • Who Is Paying for the 2025 U.S. Tariffs? — A FRBNY analysis finds that ~90% of tariffs’ economic burden was borne by American firms and consumers in the first 8 months of 2025. Between January and…
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Taxation
  • GDP

State of U.S. Tariffs: February 20, 2026

John Iselin Yale University
Date Posted:
February 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Without the IEEPA tariffs, the mean effective tariff rate is 9.1%, down from 16.9%. The previous tariff regime was projected to raise ~$2.7T over 2026–35 ($2.3T dynamically). The SCOTUS decision will cut revenue by about 50% to ~$1-1.2T with or without refunds.

The Budget Lab estimates the effects of all US tariffs and foreign retaliation implemented in 2025 after the decision by the Supreme Court of the United States that President Trump exceeded his authority to invoke the 1977 International Emergency Economic Powers Act (IEEPA) to impose reciprocal tariffs. Without IEEPA tariffs, consumers will face an overall average effective tariff rate of 9.1%, which remains the highest since 1946 excluding 2025. (If IEEPA tariffs had been allowed to stay in effect, this figure would have been 16.9%.) All tariffs to date as of February 2026 are projected to raise about $1.2 trillion over 2026-35, though slower economic growth reduces revenues and brings the net dynamic revenue to $1 trillion. (With IEEPA, these figures would be more than twice as large.) The economic implications of the SCOTUS decision are complicated by two major factors. First, in the short-term, firms will be aggressively seeking refunds on tariffs paid in 2025, which has large revenue effects and uncertain distributional effects. Second, the current Administration has stated its intent to replace IEEPA tariffs with tariffs using other authorities, but there remain timing and other questions regarding these steps.

Related Articles:

  • US Notches One of Its Biggest Annual Trade Gaps Since 1960 — The US trade deficit was $901.5B in 2025, effectively unchanged from 2024 despite the new tariff regime. The US bilateral deficit with China fell to $202B, the…
  • China Is Making Trade Impossible — Robin Harding argues, “China is making trade impossible. If it will buy nothing from others but commodities and consumer goods, they must prepare to do…
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — GS estimates that for every 1pp export-driven increase in Chinese GDP, advanced economies experience a 0.1–0.3pp drag. “China Shock 2.0 is likely to crowd out…
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Taxation
  • GDP

Industrial Policies, Global Imbalances and Technological Hegemony

Ambrogio Cesa-Bianchi, Andrea Ferrero, Luca Fornar, and Martin Wolf Bank of England
Date Posted:
February 12, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Cesa-Bianchi et al show that countries (primarily in East Asia) that make more intensive use of industrial policies have had more rapid growth in manufacturing employment, total factor productivity, and exports, but not larger trade surpluses.

Figure 5 [see image gallery] reports scatter plots together with correlation coefficients (ρ) and associated t-statistics. The data reveal strong and interesting correlations. The left panel shows that countries with higher use of industrial policies experienced larger rises (or smaller drops) in manufacturing employment shares. The correlation is 0.52 and highly statistically significant. The right panel shows that an analogous result applies to TFP growth, with a similar correlation (0.48) and high statistical significance. As one would expect, East-Asian countries play an important role in driving these correlations. This conforms with the popular view that East-Asian countries have adopted a strategy of outward-oriented growth, characterized by policies that promote tradable sectors. Figure 6 shows the relationship between industrial policies and export growth (left panel) and the current account to GDP ratio (right panel), both averaged over the 2002- 2019 period. The results show a positive relation between industrial policies and exports, though with a smaller coefficient (0.30) and lower statistical significance than for TFP or manufacturing employment shares. Industrial policy does not appear to be related to current account to GDP ratio in the raw cross-country data.

Related Articles:

  • The Dangerous Triumph Of Neo-Mercantilism — China’s refusal to address its excess saving will likely fracture the global economy, Wolf argues. He suggests reviving Keynes’ attempt, rejected by the US at…
  • Sticking with What Works: Raising GDP Forecast on China’s Manufacturing Push — GS estimates that for every 1pp export-driven increase in Chinese GDP, advanced economies experience a 0.1–0.3pp drag. “China Shock 2.0 is likely to crowd out…
  • Europe Has No Choice But To Intervene On Trade — Pettis argues that unless the EU is “willing to dismantle its welfare system and force down wages relative to productivity to restore competitiveness,” it must…
  • Trade (not deficits)
  • GDP
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit
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