Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Labor Market Mystery: Where Are the Older Gen Z Workers?

Bryan Mena Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
November 14, 2022
Is Database:
Database

@BryanMena The labor force participation rate for 20-24 year-olds has declined to 70.8% from a pre-pandemic level of 72.1%, resulting in a shortfall of about 500,000 workers in this age group compared to 2019.

The labor force participation [LFP] rate for 20-24 year-olds has declined to 70.8% from a pre-pandemic level of 72.1%, resulting in a shortfall of about 500,000 workers in this age group compared to 2019. This decline is not offset by increased educational enrollment, as college enrollment has decreased by 1.5m students since the pandemic. The NEET [Not in Employment, Education, or Training] rate for this demographic rose to 18.27% in 2021, the highest since 2014. Factors such as caretaking responsibilities, mental health issues, and the impact of Covid-19 contribute to this trend. Additionally, some young workers may be waiting for better job opportunities, reflecting a shift in mindset towards greater bargaining power in a tight labor market. This situation contrasts with past economic downturns where increased education enrollment typically accompanied reduced LFP among younger individuals.

The labor force participation rate for 20-24 year-olds has dropped to 70.8% relative to a pre-pandemic level of 72.1%, without a corresponding increase in educational enrolment

Labor Market Mystery: Where Are the Older Gen Z Workers?: Extended Excerpt Image 1



“…For people ages 20 to 24, participation that averaged 72.1% in 2019 stood at just 70.8% in October. That equals a shortfall of about half a million workers in their early 20s when comparing the current size of that workforce with 2019 levels. In the past, a decline in labor-force participation among younger people has usually coincided with an increase in their school enrollment, generally reflecting higher relative demand for educated or highly skilled workers, especially in a weak labor market, economists said. That’s what happened during the 2007-09 recession—but it hasn’t been the case this time. About 1.5 million fewer students were enrolled in college this fall compared with before the pandemic….”

Bryan Mena, "Labor Market Mystery: Where Are the Older Gen Z Workers?"Wall Street Journal, November 13, 2022, https://www.wsj.com/articles/labor-market-mystery-where-are-the-older-gen-z-workers-11668278379

Labor Market Mystery: Where Are the Older Gen Z Workers?

The exodus from the labor force in the pandemic’s early months has mostly reversed, but one group remains oddly absent: people in their early 20s.

For people over age 15, the labor-force participation rate—the share of people employed or actively seeking a job—dropped from an average of 63.1% in 2019 to 61.7% in 2021, and recovered to 62.2% in October. But for people ages 20 to 24, participation that averaged 72.1% in 2019 stood at just 70.8% in October.

That equals a shortfall of about half a million workers in their early 20s when comparing the current size of that workforce with 2019 levels.

Labor Market Mystery: Where Are the Older Gen Z Workers?: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Participation for people over 55 also remains well below prepandemic levels. That seems at least partly due to many of them taking early retirement, either by choice or because of difficulty finding suitable work late in their careers.

Those reasons don’t apply to people in their 20s, who are usually just starting out in their careers.

Demand for workers is intense. As states reopened their economies in 2021, employers were competing from a smaller pool of available workers. Wages rose robustly, job openings became plentiful and some employers even reduced their requirements to fill jobs.

That did the trick in luring 16- to 19-year-olds into the workforce, and they raked in the fastest wage increases of any age group last year. That group’s participation rate averaged 36.2% in 2021, the highest since 2009, and has since climbed to 36.6% this year through October.

Economists cite several possibilities for why so many people in their early 20s stayed on the sidelines.

In the past, a decline in labor-force participation among younger people has usually coincided with an increase in their school enrollment, generally reflecting higher relative demand for educated or highly skilled workers, especially in a weak labor market, economists said. That’s what happened during the 2007-09 recession—but it hasn’t been the case this time around.

About 1.5 million fewer students were enrolled in college this fall compared with before the pandemic, according to the National Student Clearinghouse, an educational nonprofit. College enrollment had been declining for a decade in part because of concerns about student debt and the rise of alternative credentials.

Overall enrollment in graduate and undergraduate programs across all ages was 3.2% lower in this fall semester versus two years ago. However, enrollment in graduate school among those ages 21 through 24 was 8.5% higher during the same period. That age group almost entirely drove the 1.6% increase in graduate-school enrollment from 2020 to 2022.

That might indicate that some workers in their early 20s aren’t working because they are pursuing a graduate degree, although some might be working while in school, said Andria Smythe, an economist at Howard University.

Workers in their early 20s may have decided to continue their education because of pandemic disruptions in 2020, when schools pivoted to online instruction.

“For a vast majority of students, going to college is just as much about the experience as it is getting the degree, so if that’s the case, they’ve missed out on the experience and want to figure out a way of getting it,” said Ron Hetrick, an economist at data-analytics firm Lightcast.

Some people in their early 20s are neither in school nor working. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development, an intergovernmental group that promotes economic growth, tracks the share of people who aren’t in employment, education or training, known as the NEET rate. The NEET rate for U.S. workers ages 20 to 24 rose from 14.67% in 2020 to 18.27% in 2021, the highest since 2014.

The NEET rate might have increased specifically for workers ages 20 to 24 because some of them might have dropped out of school in the early days of the pandemic when they were high-school seniors, according to Alejandra Grindal, senior international economist at Ned Davis Research Group.

“The NEET rate is always much higher among people who don’t even have a high-school education,” Ms. Grindal said.

These people appear to be disconnected from work, for reasons that include child care, the toll of long Covid, fear of catching Covid-19 and mental health.

An analysis of Census Bureau data by Gad Levanon, chief economist of The Burning Glass Institute, found workers in their early 20s who aren’t in school or the labor force overwhelmingly cited caretaking responsibilities, though the numbers hadn’t changed much since 2019. Covid-19 may also be keeping some of these workers on the sidelines.

Finally, 20-somethings might simply be waiting for the right job opportunity to come along, a luxury afforded by the ease of finding a job in the still-tight U.S. labor market.

“They might just be making decisions that are best suited to them and not necessarily rushing into the labor market to get the first job out there,” said Nicole Smith, chief economist of Georgetown University’s Center on Education and the Workforce.

Job openings began to soar in 2021 and have remained historically high this year. The number of workers quitting their jobs has also remained elevated, reflecting confidence in finding a new job.

“Movements like ‘work your wage’ and ‘quiet quitting‘ are very revealing of this changed mind-set for these young workers. They think that they have more bargaining power so some of them became more picky,” Justine Hervé, an economist at the Stevens Institute of Technology in Hoboken, N.J., said.

“Quiet quitting” and “work your wage” are both phrases popularized this year that mean working no harder than the job, or its pay, deserves.

  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation
Previous articleNovember 11, 2022David Shor’s (Premature) Autopsy of the 2022 Midterm Elections.@Davidshor notes that Republicans likely turned out at higher rates than democrats in 2022 and suspects the reason Democrats won independents was anger at the Dobbs decision.Next articleNovember 15, 2022From public labs to private firms: magnitude and channels of RD spilloversEvidence from France suggests public research spending spills over to the private sector; firms in the top 25% of exposure to academic funding increase their R&D effort by 20% relative to firms with the lowest exposure.
Showing 218 database articles primarily about Business Cycle

3% vs. 60%

AI Summary. Direct lending represents roughly 3% of total U.S. household and business debt, a fraction of the 60% share mortgages held at the peak of the housing bubble.

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
April 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Torsten Sløk notes the direct lending market is ~$2T or 3% of household and non-financial debt outstanding. To provide context, he shows that in 2006, on the eve of the crisis, mortgages accounted for ~60% of such debt.

Core argument: Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.

The direct lending market is roughly $2 trillion, or about 3% of total debt outstanding for US households and businesses. By comparison, mortgages accounted for about 60% of total household and corporate debt at the peak of the housing bubble in 2006.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Direct lending represents a small but growing alternative to traditional bank financing for businesses and households.
  2. The mortgage market’s dominance has shifted dramatically since the 2006 housing peak, reducing systemic risk concentration.
  3. Non-bank lenders now capture meaningful market share in credit provision across the economy.

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Top 10% of Earners Drive a Growing Share of US Consumer Spending

Jonnelle Marte Bloomberg
Date Posted:
September 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Mark Zandi finds Americans in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of consumer spending in Q2, the highest level since 1989.

Consumers in the top 10% of the income distribution accounted for 49.2% of total spending in the second quarter, up from 48.5% in the first quarter, reaching the highest level in data going back to 1989, according to an analysis of Federal Reserve data by Mark Zandi, chief economist for Moody’s Analytics. In contrast, the bottom 80% of the income distribution, or consumers making less than roughly $175,000 a year, have seen their spending merely keep pace with inflation since the pandemic.

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  • GDP
  • Workforce
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Litigation Nation, Engineering Empire

Jonathon Sine Cogitations
Date Posted:
September 2, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Jonathon Sine argues China “is moving beyond its breakneck industrial prime, facing similar dilemmas to those America confronted in the 1960s and 70s.” The ratio of science/engineering to humanities undergraduate majors is 2:1 in both the PRC and US.

Dan Wang’s “big idea” [is] “China is an engineering state, building big at breakneck speed, in contrast to the United States’ lawyerly society, blocking everything it can, good and bad.” I re-group US college majors according to Chinese disciplines to allow for rough comparison. Surprisingly, the ratio of science/engineering to humanities/social sciences is 2:1, the same as in China (if one groups management with science/engineering, as I also do for China). As with China today, America’s breakneck building phase was decidedly winding down by the 1960s. Urbanization went from 40% in 1900 to 70% by 1960, and grew much more incrementally over the next 60 years to 85% by 2020. The country simply did not need to continue building dams, expressways, and energy production facilities at breakneck pace. It became much more a matter of maintaining and upgrading (which has not gone well, at least according to the American Society of Civil Engineers’ report card). The American [building/investment slowdown that started after the 1970s] may be more about structural economic shifts than lawyers.

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How America’s AI Boom Is Squeezing The Rest Of The Economy

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
August 19, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

As AI-related investment has risen since 2023, residential and nonresidential investment have declined or flatlined. This may suggest that a relatively rate-insensitive AI buildout is crowding out more interest-sensitive forms of investment.

Something like a sixth of the 2% rise in American real GDP over the past year has come from investments in computer and communications equipment, including chips, and data centres. Add in the grid upgrades to power AI models, plus the intellectual-property value of the software itself, and one estimate puts the boom’s contribution to real GDP growth at 40%. The trouble is that the very sector powering so much of America’s economic growth is squeezing the rest of its output. Housebuilders, for instance, cannot afford to be blithe about higher borrowing costs. Data centres have also constrained the rest of the economy by keeping energy prices high. Average American electricity bills have risen by 7% so far in 2025, at least in part due to the extra strain data centres have put on the grid. Real consumption has flatlined since December. Housebuilding has slumped, as has non-AI business investment.

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Is it Over?

Joseph Wang Fed Guy Blog
Date Posted:
August 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Following tepid reactions to the release of GTP-5, Joe Wang observes, “It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from.”

GPT-5 users widely expressed disappointment in the capabilities of the new release, which seemed in some ways a step back. This sentiment is reflected in benchmarks that show a modest improvement in capabilities since the significant improvement in version 4 released two years ago. In addition, the benchmarks suggest a broader convergence in the capabilities of AI models. Commentary suggests this could be due to inherent limitations in the LLM technology and exhaustion of new training data. AI is fascinating technology, but it may not justify the enormous sums spent in its pursuit. It is looking more like companies are spending hundreds of billions on rapidly depreciating GPUs that produce a commoditized product that most clients only modestly benefit from. The entire macro landscape would look very different without the support of the AI boom.

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  • Business Cycle
  • GDP
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  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

US Households and Firms Are in Great Shape

Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
March 31, 2025
Is Database:
Database

​​Torsten Sløk notes that US household and banking sector debt has fallen to its lowest level in decades as a % of GDP, while corporate leverage has moved sideways. “The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.”

Household sector leverage and banking sector leverage have declined significantly since 2008. Over the same period, federal government leverage has increased significantly, and corporate leverage has moved sideways. The bottom line is that the private sector in the US is in incredibly good shape.

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