Edward Conard

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Human Capital Spillovers and Health: Does Living Around College Graduates Lengthen Life?

AI Summary. Living in an area with more college graduates is associated with lower mortality even after accounting for individuals' own education, and more than half of that correlation can be explained by area differences in smoking and obesity rates. The authors find evidence for both regulatory policies such as workplace smoking bans and peer effects about the harms of smoking.

Jacob Bor, David Cutler, Edward Glaeser and Ljubica Ristovska National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
April 25, 2024
Is Database:
Database

Bor, @Cutler_econ, Glaeser, and @lj_ristovska find a strong negative correlation between the % of college graduates in an area and all-cause mortality, even after controlling for individual education.

Does living around college graduates lengthen life?

Core argument: The authors find a strong, robust relationship between area human capital and mortality that persists after controlling for individual education, with more than half the correlation explained by differences in smoking and obesity rates across areas.

[There is] a strong and robust relationship between area human capital and mortality, even after controlling for individual education. More than half of the correlation between area human capital and mortality can be explained by differences in smoking rates and obesity rates across areas, and that [these effects are] strong even after controlling for individual education. More than half of the correlation between area human capital and mortality can be explained by differences in smoking rates and obesity rates across areas. We find empirical evidence for [both] regulatory policies such as workplace smoking bans, and peer effects about the harms of smoking. Health-related behaviors are particularly sensitive to human capital spillovers among younger individuals, implicating the role of changing social norms around smoking and obesity across generations in the widening geographic gaps in health between high and low human capital areas.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors find a strong, robust relationship between area human capital and mortality that persists after controlling for individual education, with more than half the correlation explained by differences in smoking and obesity rates across areas.
  2. The authors find empirical evidence for both regulatory policies, such as workplace smoking bans, and peer effects regarding the harms of smoking.
  3. Health-related behaviors are particularly sensitive to human capital spillovers among younger individuals, implicating changing social norms around smoking and obesity across generations in the widening geographic health gaps between high and low human capital areas.

Related Articles:

  • Comments On: “Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA” By Anne Case and Angus Deaton — Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.
  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — The mortality gap between American adults with and without a four-year college degree widened across three periods—falling mortality for both with larger gains for graduates, then diverging, then rising faster for the less educated during the pandemic—reaching an 8.5-year difference in adult life expectancy. Americans with a degree, treated as a separate country, would rank just below Japan.
  • How Disadvantage Became Deadly in America — The author calculates that the average age of death among the shortest-lived 10% of Americans is 36, versus 55 in the Netherlands and 57 in Sweden, after falling by about eight years over the past decade. Wealthy Americans live equally long regardless of local opioid use and gun violence, while poor Americans in those areas live far shorter lives.
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Education
      • K-12
Previous articleApril 24, 2024TikTok Ban in US Looms as Biden Kicks Off 270-Day CountdownPresident Biden signed into law a ban on TikTok in the US as of 1/19/25 unless ByteDance, the Chinese parent, divests TikTok in favor of Western ownership. The company plans to challenge the law in court on First Amendment grounds.Next articleApril 25, 2024Europeans ‘Less Hard-Working’ Than Americans, Says Norway Oil Fund BossThe CEO of Norway’s $1.6T oil fund notes that US companies have outpaced their European rivals in innovation and technology; “There’s a mindset issue in terms of acceptance of mistakes and risks…the Americans just work harder.”
Showing 44 database articles primarily about College

Easy A’s, Less Pay: The Long-Term Effects of Grade Inflation

AI Summary. The authors estimate that students assigned teachers who inflate average grades have lower future test scores, high school graduation, college enrollment, and earnings, with a one standard deviation increase in a teacher's average grade inflation reducing the present value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872. Inflating passing grades instead raises graduation with limited long-run effects.

Jeffrey Denning, Rachel Nesbit, Nolan Pope and Merrill Warnick National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
March 24, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Data from Los Angeles and Maryland linking high school, postsecondary, and earnings records suggest that one class-year with a teacher with 1 SD higher mean grade inflation reduces the PDV of their students’ lifetime earnings by ~$213,872.

How does teacher grade inflation affect students' long-term outcomes and earnings?

Core argument: The authors estimate that assignment to a teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872 per year.

We develop two teacher-level measures of grade inflation: one measuring average grade inflation (the year-specific teacher fixed effect showing the teacher’s average contribution to grades after controlling for the student's contemporaneous performance in the focal subject as measured by the corresponding subject test score as well as prior test scores, prior grades, and other background characteristics), and another measuring a teacher's propensity to give a passing grade [which affects primarily students near the bottom of the distribution]. A [separate] cognitive value-added measure [included in the regressions] is a teacher fixed effect capturing how much a teacher raises students' standardized test scores relative to what would be predicted from the students' prior test scores and background characteristics. Grade-inflating teachers have moderately lower cognitive value-added and slightly higher noncognitive value-added. The two [grade-inflation] measures differentially impact students' long-term outcomes. Being assigned a higher average grade inflating teacher reduces a student's future test scores, the likelihood of graduating from high school, college enrollment, and ultimately earnings. A teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value [PDV] of lifetime earnings of their students by $213,872 per year.  In contrast, passing grade inflation reduces the likelihood of being held back and increases high school graduation, with limited long-run effects. [Figure 7 in the gallery].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The authors estimate that assignment to a teacher with one standard deviation higher average grade inflation reduces the present discounted value of students' lifetime earnings by $213,872 per year.
  2. Higher average grade inflation by teachers lowers students' future test scores, high school graduation likelihood, college enrollment, and earnings, while passing-grade inflation instead reduces grade retention and raises high school graduation with limited long-run effects.
  3. Grade-inflating teachers have moderately lower cognitive value-added, measured as a teacher's contribution to standardized test scores beyond what students' prior scores and background characteristics predict, and slightly higher noncognitive value-added.

Related Articles:

  • Steeper At The Top: Cognitive Ability and Earnings in Finland and Norway — Administrative data on over 350,000 men each in Finland and Norway show a convex relationship between earnings rank and cognitive ability measured by military conscription tests: top-percentile earners score about 1 standard deviation above median earners, who score about 0.5 above bottom-percentile earners. The lowest scores are almost absent among top earners.
  • Never Enough: Dynamic Status Incentives in Organizations — Data on over 5,000 German fighter pilots show performance rose markedly as pilots approached the eligibility threshold for each medal in a tiered awards ladder and slumped immediately after receiving it, with the effect repeating at each successive rung. The authors estimate the ladder added 3,000–5,000 aerial victories, 5–10% of the total.
  • Killer Incentives: Status Competition and Pilot Performance during World War II — Analysis of over 5,000 German World War II fighter pilots finds that public peer recognition was associated with higher victory scores among skilled pilots without higher mortality, while average pilots gained little in victories but died at higher rates. The authors conclude status-based awards can have uneven effects in high-risk settings.
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Education
    • Wages/Income

Master’s Programs Are Cash Cows for Universities. Do They Pay Off for Students?

AI Summary. Adjusting for time spent, tuition costs, and completion probability drastically reduces the estimated return on a master's degree, leaving master's programs with the lowest adjusted return among degree types. Averages mask wide variation: business master's degrees show a negative return on average, while top programs' graduates can earn millions more.

Mark Schneider American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
September 10, 2024
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Mark Schneider @AEIecon reviews the ROI of master’s degree programs and finds “vast differences among fields of study and among programs in the same field of study.” He argues that policymakers need to provide accurate ROI metrics to applicants.

Do master's degrees pay off for students after accounting for costs?

Core argument: Adjusting lifetime earnings gains for time spent in school, the cost of the degree, and the probability of completion drastically reduces the return to master's students and places master's degrees last on adjusted ROI.

The absolute increase in lifetime earnings is the average gain in income between students completing the degree and the counterfactual earnings of similarly situated students without the degree. Incorporating the time spent getting a master’s degree, the cost of obtaining the degree, and the probability of completing a program generates an “adjusted ROI.” Taking these costs into account drastically reduces the return to the student—and puts the return for master’s degrees dead last. [But] Averages Hide Lots of Information. Business is the single largest field of study for master’s students; but, on average, business master’s degrees have a negative ROI. But graduates from the top performing programs—including Dartmouth, the Massachusetts Institute of Technology, and the University of Pennsylvania— can earn millions more than graduates from other business programs. Students who choose badly could experience a negative ROI of over $1 million. Even in computer science, the field with the highest overall ROI, graduates from some programs experienced negative ROIs.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Adjusting lifetime earnings gains for time spent in school, the cost of the degree, and the probability of completion drastically reduces the return to master's students and places master's degrees last on adjusted ROI.
  2. Business, the single largest field of study for master's students, has a negative ROI on average, while graduates of top-performing programs at Dartmouth, MIT, and the University of Pennsylvania can earn millions more than graduates of other business programs.
  3. Students who choose badly could experience a negative ROI of over $1 million, and even in computer science, the field with the highest overall ROI, graduates of some programs experienced negative ROIs.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.
  • Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges — Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.
  • Multidimensional Human Capital and the Wage Structure — The wage return to cognitive skills has declined, from about 10% higher hourly wages per standard deviation of test score in the 1980s and early 1990s to 4.5% in the 2000s and early 2010s, while returns to a bachelor's degree rose. Social skill-intensive occupations grew as a share of US jobs, with faster real wage growth.
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Education

Comments On: "Accounting For the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA" By Anne Case and Angus Deaton

AI Summary. Selection plausibly accounts for most or all of the widening mortality gap between US adults with and without a bachelor's degree: high school achievement measures have not risen since the early 1970s while the share earning degrees rose, and national youth survey data show non-graduates increasingly negatively selected on aptitude scores.

Caroline Hoxby Brookings Papers On Economic Activity
Date Posted:
October 10, 2023
Is Database:
Database

Caroline Hoxby argues that Anne Case and Angus Deaton’s recent findings on the divergence btw Americans with a BA and those without is largely driven by a compositional shift that has occurred as more Americans have graduated college.

Does selection explain the widening mortality gap by education?

Core argument: Selection is plausibly responsible for most or even all of the widening mortality gap between American adults with and without a BA, according to this commentary on Anne Case and Angus Deaton's work.

I find it entirely plausible that selection accounts for most or even all of the widening mortality gap. Measures of achievement have not risen among 12 graders and other high school students for essentially the entire period since we started to measure them in a consistent way (i.e. since the early 1970s). However, the share who obtain a BA degree has increased quite dramatically over the same period. An NLSY [National Longitudinal Survey Youth] exercise shows that non-BAs are increasingly negatively selected. A comparison between the NLSY79 (1979) and the NLSY97 (1997) shows that the distribution of ASVAB [Armed Services Vocational Aptitude Battery] percentiles of non-BAs is shifted to the left for 97 vis-a-vis 79.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Selection is plausibly responsible for most or even all of the widening mortality gap between American adults with and without a BA, according to this commentary on Anne Case and Angus Deaton's work.
  2. Comparing the National Longitudinal Survey of Youth cohorts of 1979 and 1997, the distribution of ASVAB percentiles among adults without a BA is shifted leftward for 1997, suggesting non-BAs are increasingly negatively selected.
  3. Measures of achievement among 12th graders and other high school students have not risen since consistent measurement began in the early 1970s, while the share obtaining a BA degree rose dramatically over the same period.

Related Articles:

  • Accounting for the Widening Mortality Gap Between American Adults With and Without a BA — The mortality gap between American adults with and without a four-year college degree widened across three periods—falling mortality for both with larger gains for graduates, then diverging, then rising faster for the less educated during the pandemic—reaching an 8.5-year difference in adult life expectancy. Americans with a degree, treated as a separate country, would rank just below Japan.
  • Why Are Americans Dying So Young? — One in 25 American five-year-olds is projected not to reach age 40, making deaths among the young a defining feature of US mortality. These deaths are overwhelmingly caused by external factors such as drug overdoses, gun violence, and dangerous driving.
  • Who Won the Cold War? Part II — Americans born around 1990 had higher death rates in their 20s than peers in affluent allied countries, and the gap widened across young adulthood. By age 29, US mortality for that cohort was about 2x New Zealand's, 2.5x France's, 3x Japan's, and 4x Italy's or Spain's.
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Demographics
    • Education
      • K-12

Diversifying Society’s Leaders? The Determinants and Causal Effects of Admission to Highly Selective Private Colleges

AI Summary. Children from top-1% families are more than 2x as likely as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores to attend an Ivy-Plus college, with two-thirds of the gap attributable to higher admissions rates. The authors attribute this advantage to legacy preferences, weight on non-academic credentials, and athlete recruitment.

Raj Chetty, David Deming and John Friedman National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
July 24, 2023
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

.@OppInsights finds that the “Ivy-Plus” (Ivy League, plus UChicago, Duke, MIT, Stanford) admit students from the highest income families scoring in the top 1% of SAT/ACT at far greater rates than those from lower-income families.

Why are high-income students likelier to attend highly selective private colleges?

Core argument: Children from top-1% families are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, Chicago) as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores.

Children from families in the top 1% are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, and Chicago) as those from middle-class families with comparable SAT/ACT scores. Two-thirds of this gap is due to higher admissions rates for students with comparable test scores from high-income families; the remaining third is due to differences in rates of application and matriculation. The high-income admissions advantage at private colleges is driven by three factors: (1) preferences for children of alumni, (2) weight placed on non-academic credentials, which tend to be stronger for students applying from private high schools that have affluent student bodies, and (3) recruitment of athletes, who tend to come from higher-income families. Highly selective public colleges that follow more standardized processes to evaluate applications exhibit smaller disparities in admissions rates by parental income than private colleges that use more holistic evaluations.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Children from top-1% families are more than twice as likely to attend an Ivy-Plus college (Ivy League, Stanford, MIT, Duke, Chicago) as middle-class students with comparable SAT/ACT scores.
  2. Two-thirds of that attendance gap comes from higher admissions rates for high-income students with comparable test scores, and the remaining third from differences in application and matriculation rates.
  3. The high-income admissions advantage at private colleges reflects preferences for alumni children, weight on non-academic credentials that tend to be stronger among applicants from affluent private high schools, and recruitment of athletes, while highly selective public colleges using more standardized evaluation show smaller disparities by parental income.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Wages Grow Faster for Educated Workers? — College graduates sort into professional, non-routine occupations where wages rise much more with job tenure, and the author estimates this occupational sorting explains at least half of the life-cycle growth in the college wage premium. That premium is estimated at 22% at age 26, 49% at age 40, and 56% at age 60.
  • Multidimensional Human Capital and the Wage Structure — The wage return to cognitive skills has declined, from about 10% higher hourly wages per standard deviation of test score in the 1980s and early 1990s to 4.5% in the 2000s and early 2010s, while returns to a bachelor's degree rose. Social skill-intensive occupations grew as a share of US jobs, with faster real wage growth.
  • The Economics of Inequality in High-Wage Economies — United States Income, Wealth, Consumption, and Inequality Diana Furchtgott-Roth
  • College
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • Test Scores

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think

AI Summary. Wage inequality has risen while the college wage premium has stagnated, with wages at the 95th percentile gaining substantially as real income for the median male college graduate stagnated or declined. This pattern challenges the view that education is a primary driver of rising economic inequality.

Paul Krugman Krugman Wonks Out
Date Posted:
May 11, 2022
Is Database:
Database

@PaulKrugman, according to his Wonk Out piece, the gap btw median male college graduate wages and the 95th percentile has widened since 2000, with the latter seeing substantial gains while the former’s real income has stagnated or declined.

Is education a primary driver of rising wage inequality?

Core argument: Wage inequality has risen since 2000 while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the view that education is a primary driver of economic inequality.

Since 2000, wage inequality has risen while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the notion that education is a primary driver of economic inequality. Data shows that the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median male college graduate has widened, with the former seeing substantial gains while the latter's real income has stagnated or declined. This suggests that a college degree is no longer a reliable path to financial success for many, contradicting the belief that college-educated individuals are part of the economic elite. The disparity highlights that factors beyond education, such as structural economic changes, play a significant role in rising inequality. This insight is crucial for policymakers considering student debt relief and broader economic reforms, as it underscores the need to address systemic issues rather than focusing solely on educational attainment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Wage inequality has risen since 2000 while the college wage premium has stagnated, challenging the view that education is a primary driver of economic inequality.
  2. The gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median male college graduate has widened, with top earners posting substantial gains while median college-graduate real income stagnated or declined.
  3. The stagnation of college-graduate incomes suggests that policymakers weighing student debt relief and broader economic reforms should address structural economic changes rather than educational attainment alone.

The Economic Policy Institute had a very useful analysis of this data just before the pandemic. Between 1979 and 2000, there was a rough match between growth in one measure of overall inequality — the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median worker — and its estimate of the average wage premium for college-educated workers. Since 2000, however, wage inequality has continued to rise, while the college premium has barely changed... my own version of this observation, comparing growth of incomes of households at the 95th percentile with those of the median male college graduate. Now, Americans at the 95th percentile don’t consider themselves rich, because they aren’t, surely as compared with C.E.O.s, hedge funders and so on. Nonetheless, they have seen substantial gains. On the other hand, the typical college graduate — who is, remember, someone who made it through and received an accredited degree — hasn’t.

Paul Krugman, "Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think,"Krugman Wonks Out, April 29, 2022, https://www.nytimes.com/2022/04/29/opinion/college-student-loan-debt.html

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think

President Biden says that he is taking a “hard look” at student debt relief, which probably means that some significant relief is coming. For one thing, Biden promised relief during the 2020 campaign. For another, it’s one progressive priority he can address by executive action, which is important given the extreme difficulty of getting anything through an evenly divided Senate.

How much relief will he offer? I have no idea. How much relief should he offer? I’m for going as big as political realities allow, but I understand that too generous a debt write-off might produce a backlash. And I have no confidence that I know where the line should be drawn.

What I think I do know is that much of the backlash to proposals for student debt relief is based on a false premise: the belief that Americans who have gone to college are, in general, members of the economic elite.

The falsity of this proposition is obvious for those who were exploited by predatory for-profit institutions that encouraged them to go into debt to get more or less worthless credentials. The same applies to those who took on educational debt but never managed to get a degree — not a small group. In fact, around 40 percent of student loan borrowers never finish their education.

But even among those who make it through, a college degree is hardly a guarantee of economic success. And I’m not sure how widely that reality is understood.

What is widely understood is that America has become a far more unequal society over the past 40 years or so. The nature of rising inequality, however, isn’t as broadly known. I keep encountering seemingly well-informed people who believe that we’re mainly looking at a widening gap between the college-educated and everyone else.

This story had some truth to it in the 1980s and 1990s, although even then it didn’t account for the huge income gains at the top of the distribution — the rise of the 1 percent and even more among the 0.01 percent. Since 2000, however, most college graduates have actually seen their real incomes stagnate or even decline.

The Economic Policy Institute had a very useful analysis of this data just before the pandemic. Between 1979 and 2000, there was a rough match between growth in one measure of overall inequality — the gap between wages at the 95th percentile and those of the median worker — and its estimate of the average wage premium for college-educated workers. Since 2000, however, wage inequality has continued to rise, while the college premium has barely changed:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Furthermore, not all college graduates have had the same experience. Some have done pretty well, but many have seen no gains at all:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 2


I have my own version of this observation, comparing growth of incomes of households at the 95th percentile with those of the median male college graduate:

Education Has Less to Do With Inequality Than You Think: Extended Excerpt Image 3


Now, Americans at the 95th percentile don’t consider themselves rich, because they aren’t, surely as compared with C.E.O.s, hedge funders and so on. Nonetheless, they have seen substantial gains. On the other hand, the typical college graduate — who is, remember, someone who made it through and received an accredited degree — hasn’t.

So here’s how I see it: Much of the student debt weighing down millions of Americans can be attributed to false promises.

Some of these promises were scams pure and simple; think Trump University. Even those who weren’t outright cheated, however, were pulled in by elite messaging assuring them that a college degree was a ticket to financial success. Too many didn’t realize that their life circumstances might make it impossible to finish their education — it’s hard for comfortable, upper-middle-class Americans to realize how difficult staying in school can be for young people from poorer families with unstable incomes. Many of those who did manage to finish found that the financial rewards were far smaller than they expected.

And all too many of those who fell victim to these false promises ended up saddled with large debts.

Of course, there are many Americans who have suffered from rising inequality. I wouldn’t argue that college debtors are greater victims than, say, truck drivers who have seen their real wages plunge or families stuck in declining rural areas and small towns. And we should be helping all of these people.

Unfortunately, most things we could and should be doing for Americans in need — like extending the expanded child tax credit — can’t be done in the face of 50 Republican senators, plus Joe Manchin. Student debt relief, by contrast, is something President Biden can do. So he should.

  • College
  • Workforce
    • Education
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income

Are Women Reaching Parity with Men in STEM?

AI Summary. Women make up 44% of college-educated workers in science, technology, engineering and math, but earn only 22% of engineering and 19% of computer science degrees while earning 62% of life sciences and 78% of psychology degrees. Because male-dominated fields typically pay more, this uneven distribution contributes to the gender pay gap.

Prathi Seneviratne Econofact
Date Posted:
April 28, 2022
Is Database:
Database

Women now make up 44% of college-educated workers in STEM occupation, but men continue to make up majority of degree recipients in STEM fields that are spatially and mathematically intensive.

Are women reaching parity with men across STEM fields?

Core argument: Women earn 22% of engineering degrees and 19% of computer science degrees, while accounting for 62% of life sciences and 78% of psychology degrees, despite comprising 44% of college-educated STEM workers.

Despite women comprising 44% of college-educated workers in STEM, significant gender disparities persist in degree attainment and workforce representation. Men dominate spatially and mathematically intensive fields like engineering and computer science, where women account for only 22% and 19% of degree recipients, respectively. Conversely, women are overrepresented in life sciences and psychology, earning 62% and 78% of degrees. This uneven distribution contributes to a gender pay gap, as male-dominated fields typically offer higher salaries. The leaky pipeline phenomenon further exacerbates disparities, with women less likely to advance to senior academic positions. As women continue to saturate certain fields while men exit, the gender imbalance may widen, impacting economic outcomes and perpetuating inequality in decision-making power and well-being.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Women earn 22% of engineering degrees and 19% of computer science degrees, while accounting for 62% of life sciences and 78% of psychology degrees, despite comprising 44% of college-educated STEM workers.
  2. The uneven distribution of women across STEM fields contributes to the gender pay gap, as male-dominated fields typically offer higher salaries.
  3. A leaky pipeline compounds STEM gender disparities, with women less likely to advance to senior academic positions, and continued saturation of certain fields by women alongside men's exit may widen the imbalance.

Women...now make up 44% of college-educated workers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) occupations. However, a closer look at the underlying data reveals divergent patterns of gender (in)equality within STEM. Men continue to make up the vast majority of degree recipients in STEM fields that are spatially and mathematically intensive — geoscience, engineering, economics, mathematics, computer science, and physical science — while women are overrepresented in life sciences, psychology, and social sciences....In 2017, 49% of all bachelor’s degrees in science and engineering were awarded to women. This number masks substantial gender disparities across fields, however. Women earned two-thirds of bachelor’s degrees in life sciences, psychology and social science fields — 62% in biology, 78% in psychology, and 61% in social science. In contrast,women were only slightly over one quarter of degree recipients in the combined math-intensive fields of geoscience (39%), engineering (22%), economics (32%), mathematics (42%), computer science (19%), and the physical sciences (40%)....Gender disparities within science, technology, engineering, and mathematics bachelor’s degrees have become more pronounced since 2000...Gender differences carry over from education to the STEM workforce.

A leaky pipeline reduces the share of women rising up the ranks of career hierarchy in academia. Women were 45% of junior full-time faculty but only 33% of senior full-time faculty in 2019. However, the pipeline leaks more in fields where women are overrepresented in the lower ranks. In psychology, for instance, the share of women was 68% among junior full-time faculty and 53% among senior faculty, a 15 percentage-point difference. With a 6 percentage-point difference, pipeline leakage is smallest in computer science: the share of women was 25% among junior full-time computer science faculty and 19% among senior faculty. What explains the differences in pipeline leakage by field? It is possible that the smaller number of women who choose to enter the male-dominated fields may be highly positively selected — especially motivated — compared to those who enter the more female-friendly fields. This is consistent with research showing that a large number of female entrants into STEM fields has a negative impact on gender equality in that field in terms of career outcomes. In psychology and the social sciences, it may be that the higher degree of female representation in the lower ranks indicates a shift in the preferences of men: the number of junior male faculty has declined since 1981. This may be due to occupational “tipping”, whereby men start to exit an occupation when the fraction of women in that occupation rises above a certain threshold.

What this Means:

As a smaller proportion of women enter geoscience, engineering, economics, mathematics, computer science, and physical science at the undergraduate level, the career pipeline in these fields will become even smaller. Less gender diversity could be detrimental to the quality and relevance of knowledge generated in these fields, by narrowing the range of ideas generated and reducing success in problem solving. We should then expect the same outcome in life sciences, psychology and social sciences if women continue to saturate them while men exit. A widening of the uneven gender distribution between STEM fields helps perpetuate the gender pay gap. This, in turn, can have negative consequences for gender equality outside the labor market if, for example, lower female-male wage ratios erode women’s decision-making power in the family and reduce women’s well-being.

The share of women holding academic positions has increased substantially but also varies greatly by field. In 2019, women comprised 39% of all academic positions held by science, engineering and health doctorate holders at 2- and 4-year colleges or universities. This reflects a substantial increase from just 9% in 1973 and 22% in 1993. Gender gaps vary noticeably by fields. Women held only 19% of academic positions in engineering, 26% in physical and geosciences, 26% in mathematics and statistics, and 23% in computer science. This is in contrast to 60% of positions in psychology, 47% in life sciences, and 42% in social sciences including economics. Among academic position types, women are more likely than men to hold “other” full-time positions (instructor, adjunct, lecturer, research associate, administrator) as well as post-doc and part-time positions.

The STEM fields in which women are underrepresented typically pay higher salaries than fields with high shares of women. For example, the median salary in 2019 for full-time workers holding the highest degree in their field was $105,000 for computer scientists and $100,000 for engineers, both male-dominated occupations. Among female-heavy occupations, median salary was $74,000 for psychologists and $64,000 for biological, agricultural and environmental scientists.

Gender differences carry over from education to the STEM workforce. While the college-educated STEM workforce had almost reached gender parity in 2019, with a female share of 44%, large gender gaps remain between types of STEM jobs. Although only 29% of the science and engineering (S&E) workforce in 2019 was female, women were 57% of S&E-related workers (e.g. nurse, dental hygienist). The representation of women coincides with the patterns of gender balance in STEM degrees. Women scientists and engineers comprise 48% of biological, agricultural and environmental life scientists, 81% of psychologists, and 64% of social scientists; and much smaller shares of geoscientists (30%), engineers (16%), economists (24%), mathematical scientists (42%), computer scientists (24%), and physical scientists (35%). Even within the S&E-related workforce, women comprise 70% of health-related occupations — such as nurses, pharmacists, and physician assistants — but only 21% of computer and information systems managers.

Female attrition along the STEM educational hierarchy is driven by the very disciplines that, paradoxically, seem to attract large numbers of women at the entry level. In general, women earned a smaller share of doctoral degrees than bachelor’s degrees in 2017, reflecting the well-known leaky pipeline in women’s progress up the career hierarchy. In STEM fields, the pipeline is leakiest in life science, psychology and social science fields, which are female-dominated at the undergraduate level — the female share of degree recipients in these fields was 58% at the doctoral level compared with 66% at the bachelor’s level in 2017. In contrast, the four fields with the lowest female shares among bachelor’s degrees recipients — geoscience, engineering, economics, and computer science — have higher female representation among PhD recipients (see here).

Gender disparities within science, technology, engineering, and mathematics bachelor’s degrees have become more pronounced since 2000. The number of women earning bachelor’s degrees in life sciences, psychology and social sciences grew faster than the number of men since 2000. These fields, which started out with high female shares at the turn of the century, became even more disproportionately represented by women at the undergraduate level. Similarly, even as the numbers of women in many of the STEM fields that started out with a disproportionate representation of men have been increasing, the number of men earning bachelor’s degrees in several of these fields grew faster than the number of women — this trend was most pronounced in computer science and mathematics, while engineering was an exception (see chart).

While women earn close to half of all STEM bachelor’s degrees, there is wide variation in women’s representation across fields. In 2017, 49% of all bachelor’s degrees in science and engineering were awarded to women. This number masks substantial gender disparities across fields, however. Women earned two-thirds of bachelor’s degrees in life sciences, psychology and social science fields — 62% in biology, 78% in psychology, and 61% in social science. In contrast, women were only slightly over one quarter of degree recipients in the combined math-intensive fields of geoscience (39%), engineering (22%), economics (32%), mathematics (42%), computer science (19%), and the physical sciences (40%).

Prathi Seneviratne, "Are Women Reaching Parity with Men in STEM?"Econofact, April 15, 2022, https://econofact.org/are-women-reaching-parity-with-men-in-stem

Are Women Reaching Parity with Men in STEM?

Are Women Reaching Parity with Men in STEM?: Extended Excerpt Image 1


The Issue:

Women have made tremendous gains in education and now make up 44% of college-educated workers in science, technology, engineering, and mathematics (STEM) occupations. However, a closer look at the underlying data reveals divergent patterns of gender (in)equality within STEM. Men continue to make up the vast majority of degree recipients in STEM fields that are spatially and mathematically intensive — geoscience, engineering, economics, mathematics, computer science, and physical science — while women are overrepresented in life sciences, psychology, and social sciences. If anything, these gender disparities appear to be widening slightly over time at the undergraduate level, with potential implications for gender differences in employment, pay, academia, and beyond.

The Facts:

Women have made dramatic inroads in education since the 1990s. From making up less than a third of the college-educated workforce in the early 1990s, women have come to surpass men — making up 52% of the workforce with at least a college degree in 2019. The representation of college-educated women in STEM occupations has also been trending upwards since the early 1990s.

  • College
  • Comparisons
    • Gender
    • Historical
    • Skill Level
  • Workforce
    • Education
    • Inequality
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