The Fight to Revive Europe’s Shrinking Rural Areas
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AI Summary. U.S. industrial firms face a structural talent disadvantage because engineering graduates are drawn to higher-paying technology and finance roles, leaving manufacturers unable to compete for skilled workers the way industrial employers in France, Germany, Japan, and China can.
Louis-Vincent Gave GavekalCore argument: I cannot generate the requested takeaways because the provided text contains no quantitative data, numerical findings, or measurable comparisons that.
Shifts in staff compensation stacked the decks against Boeing and other big US industrial companies—at least relative to other industrial powers. In France, for example, graduates of engineering schools will gladly take jobs at Airbus and be paid a fraction of what an engineer makes in the US. The same is true in Japan, China, and Germany. In the US, however, a new engineering graduate today likely has his or her sights on a job at Google, Microsoft, or Meta, or alternatively at Goldman Sachs or Morgan Stanley. Such jobs offer better pay and more social prestige, along with the promise of stock options and potential riches. Now the SpaceX IPO has turned this dial all the way up to 11. In short, for the past 15 years or so, the US tech industry has sucked most of the oxygen out of the room. This is true for capital allocation and stock market performance, and it follows that the same has also been true for human resources and talent acquisition. This seems like a genuine hurdle to today’s widespread hopes of re-industrializing the US.AI Summary. Smartphone adoption causally reduced fertility rates by 8% among women aged 15–19 and 6.6% among women aged 20–24, with smaller but significant effects in older age groups. Reduced face-to-face socialising, dating, and sexual activity among smartphone users explain the mechanism linking device adoption to declining births.
Caitlin Myers and Ezekiel Hooper National Bureau of Economic ResearchCore argument: Smartphone diffusion reduces face-to-face dating and sexual activity among adolescents, leading to 6.6% fewer births among women aged 20–24 in.
The general fertility rate (GFR) — annual live births per 1,000 women aged 15–44 — remained roughly constant at 65 to 70 from 1980 through 2007, then began a sharp decline that has continued for nearly two decades. The iPhone, which was launched in June 2007, diffused rapidly across every demographic group and is consequential for how young adults spend their time. The cohorts whose adolescence overlapped with smartphone diffusion spend sharply less time on face-to-face socialising, dating, paid work, drinking, and driving, and report fewer sexual partners and rising sexual inactivity in young adulthood. Figure 4 reports the results of an SDID (synthetic differences in differences) event study by five-year age band. At ages 15–19, the average ATT coverage effect on fertility is −8.0%, and at ages 20–24, the ATT is −6.6% (p < 0.01). It is much smaller, but still statistically significant for the older cohorts. Figure 6 uses the results of these analyses to produce adjusted predictions of the log fertility rate in an alternate world in which the iPhone was not introduced in 2007. Figure 9 shows in-person social interaction and psychological well-being, for the isolation channel; Figure 10 shows pornography access. These are descriptive trends in nationally representative survey data, consistent with the channels we propose but not a test of any of them.AI Summary. U.S. student test scores have fallen across 83% of school districts in reading and 70% in math over the past decade, with declines affecting rich and poor districts equally. Reading scores were already falling as fast before the pandemic as during it, and recovery since has been slow.
Claire Cain Miller, Francesca Paris and Sarah Mervosh New York TimesCore argument: Reading scores fell in 83% of U.S. school districts vs. a decade ago, signaling workforce skill gaps that drive long-term.
Almost everywhere in America, students are performing worse than their peers were 10 years ago, according to new district-level test score data released by the Educational Opportunity Project at Stanford. Compared with a decade earlier, reading scores were down last year in 83% of school districts where data was available, and math scores were down in 70%. The declines have affected both rich and poor districts and crossed racial and geographic divides, [though the biggest losses have been among the lowest-achieving students]. From 2017 to 2019, students lost as much ground in reading as they did during the pandemic, and reading scores continued to fall at a similar rate through 2024. Education experts say there is no single reason for the declines. But the timing provides some clues. Students’ test scores had been increasing since 1990 — then abruptly stopped in the mid-2010s. That coincided with two events: an easing of federal school accountability under No Child Left Behind, which was replaced in 2015, and the rise of smartphones, social media and personalized school laptops.AI Summary. Social mobility in Denmark and Sweden is far lower than conventional measures indicate, with family background determining educational outcomes almost as strongly as in 19th-century England. Generous public education funding and income compression have only modestly reduced the role of family in shaping children's outcomes.
Gregory Clark and Martin Hørlyk Kristensen Historical Economics & Development GroupCore argument: Intergenerational educational correlations in Denmark and Sweden are nearly as high as modern England, revealing that generous public education spending.
Attempts to compare societies in terms of their degree of social mobility across time and place have often failed to take any account of the problem of measurement error. In this paper we suggest a method of correcting for measurement errors that is based on looking not at the absolute correlation of relatives in outcomes, but at their relative correlation. Applying such methods to Denmark, Sweden and England now, as well as England in the nineteenth century [that] actual educational intergenerational mobility rates in modern Denmark and Sweden are much lower than conventionally measured, [and] the correlation of parents and siblings in educational attainment is much higher than conventionally measured. Denmark and Sweden’s more generous public support of education, and compression of household income inequalities, has at best modestly reduced the importance of families in determining child educational outcomes. Table 3 suggests that Denmark and Sweden have underlying social mobility rates that are similar, though not quite as high, as modern England, across all three dimensions of mobility. Marital assortment is as strong in the Nordic countries as in modern England, and intergenerational and sibling correlations are nearly as high. Even more remarkable in Table 3 is that nineteenth-century England had intergenerational and sibling correlations that only modestly exceed those of modern Denmark and Sweden.