Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
  • “…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
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Do Family Policies Reduce Gender Inequality? Evidence from 60 Years of Policy Experimentation

Camille Landais National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
November 20, 2020
Is Database:
Database

Austria’s extensive family policy reforms over 60 years have not narrowed the gender pay gap. The raw gender gap in earnings remains roughly 40% despite a 30 percentage point decrease from 1953 to 2017.

Despite Austria's extensive family policy reforms over the past 60 years, including generous parental leave and childcare subsidies, the gender pay gap has not significantly narrowed. The Austrian gender gap in earnings decreased by about 30 percentage points from 1953 to 2017, yet these policies had virtually no impact on gender convergence. The raw gender gap in earnings remains roughly 40%, with a female labor force participation rate of about 55% as of 2018. The study suggests that gender convergence is more influenced by labor market equilibrium and evolving gendered preferences and norms than by government interventions. This indicates that even substantial policy expansions may not effectively address gender inequality if underlying societal norms and preferences remain unchanged.

Henrik Kleven, Camille Landais, Johanna Posch, Andreas Steinhauer and Josef Zweimüller, "Do Family Policies Reduce Gender Inequality? Evidence from 60 Years of Policy Experimentation," National Bureau Of Economic Research, November 2020, https://www.nber.org/papers/w28082

Their conclusion, "....We find that parental leave policies have had negative short-term effects on female labor market outcomes, but no long-term effects.... Our main conclusion is simple and striking: The enormous expansions of parental leave and child care subsidies have had virtually no impact on gender convergence..... The short-term effects are relatively small and largely inconsequential for the evolution of aggregate gender inequality. More surprisingly, we also find that publicly provided and heavily subsidized child care has had no effect on the secular decline in gender inequality. This stands in contrast to the strong cross-country correlation between child care subsidization and gender gaps, while within-country quasi-experimental studies of specific reforms have led to mixed results. Broadly speaking, our evidence is consistent with the ideas exposed in Goldin (2014), arguing that gender convergence relies less on government intervention than on equilibrium features of the labor market. Our work is also consistent with the notion that gender convergence reflects the evolution of gendered preferences and norms.....This underlines the need for furthering our understanding of the formation of preferences and social norms regarding the family-career choices of men and women, and to account for their potential interaction with public policies. Endogenous preferences may create multiple equilibria and tipping points, whereby small changes in policies can have large effects on gender inequality. Conversely, as seems to be the case in Austria, gendered preferences can be sufficiently strong that gender gaps do not respond to even very large expansions of policies..."

Do Family Policies Reduce Gender Inequality? Evidence from 60 Years of Policy Experimentation: Extended Excerpt Image 1

Austria has significant policy interventions into family policy, "...In the aftermath of World War II, there was no system of parental leave in Austria. Women were simply entitled to Mutterschutz, a maternity insurance period of 8 weeks following delivery, akin to sick leave. In 1961, a paid and job-protected maternity leave of 52 weeks was introduced. Since then, the country has implemented four large reforms of its parental leave policies (in 1990, 1996, 2000, and 2008), which have considerably expanded the generosity and scope of parental leave. Today, the Austrian parental leave system stands out as one of the most generous in the developed world. Currently, parents are entitled to up to about 35 months of paid parental leave if that time is shared, or up to about 28 months if one parent takes the time alone. The replacement rate is relatively high: the median replacement rate is about 40% of net earnings. The take-up of parental leave comes with a job-protection guarantee of 24 months. The receipt of parental leave benefits is not subject to any work eligibility requirement prior to child birth..."

Those programs have had the following impact on the wage gap, "... we rely on exceptional administrative data covering the labor market and birth histories of Austrian workers from 1953 to 2017. During this era, the Austrian gender gap in earnings fell by about 30 percentage points, while public policies supporting families with children were introduced and greatly expanded...."

Though their Figure 9 was strongly illustrative of the null effect they found (here in terms of childcare expansion)“…We start in Figure 9 by presenting the results for nursery care expansions. In panel (a), we focus on women who are one year before birth (t = −1), and report their estimated earnings in control municipalities vs treated municipalities, from five years before, to five years after the expansion shock. The graph first shows no evidence of a differential trend in earnings before expansion. This helps alleviate concerns that the supply shock was an endogenous response to the evolution of female labor market outcomes in treated municipalities. Secondly, the graph reveals that the expansion had no effect on the outcomes of women prior to giving birth. In other words, the increased access to child care did not lead to anticipatory effects among women about to have children…”

Bottom line more generous family policy extension over 50 years has had no impact on gender convergence “…Our main conclusion is simple and striking: The enormous expansions of parental leave and child care subsidies have had virtually no impact on gender convergence…”That implies the gap is a revealed preference, “…Broadly speaking, our evidence is consistent with the ideas exposed in Goldin (2014), arguing thatgender convergence relies less on government intervention than on equilibrium features of the labor market. Our work is also consistent with the notion that gender convergence reflects the evolution of gendered preferences and norms…”

The NBER study mentioned in WSJ uses several natural experiment resulting from family policy reforms (childcare and parental leave expansions) in Austria. For context this is what Austria looks like today, "...The raw gender gap in earnings is roughly 40% and the female labor force participation rate is about 55% (in 2018)..."

Ed Comment:“….Blog post (….but no posting until my kid gets into college. …thank you Steve for supporting that crime.) The Austrian parental leave system stands out as one of the most generous in the developed world. Parents are entitled to up to about 35 months of paid leave The median replacement rate is about 40% of net earnings. The receipt is not subject to any work eligibility requirement prior to child birth. Our main conclusion is simple and striking: The enormous expansions of parental leave and child care subsidies have had virtually no impact on gender convergence. Our work is consistent with the notion that gender convergence reflects the evolution of gendered preferences and norms….”

  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
    • Gender Pay Gap
    • Unemployment/Participation
Previous articleNovember 20, 2020Why Tunnels in The US Cost Much More Than Anywhere Else in The WorldNew York pays 3x the German salaries on tunnel projects while using 4x as many workers.Next articleNovember 20, 2020The Dynamism Divide: Examining the 2020 Election Through the Lenses of Population Growth, Jobs, and Business FormationCounties That Broke For Biden In 2020 Were Home To ~2/3 Of US Population Group From 2010 And 83% Of New Net Firms, 73% New Net Jobs.
Showing 128 database articles primarily about Wages/Income

Sticky Wage Norms and the Real Wage Cost of Unexpected Inflation

AI Summary. Firms' wage-setting norms are sticky, rising only from 2.7% to 3.5% even as inflation peaked near 7%, causing real wages for workers who stayed in their jobs to fall systematically. By the time inflation subsided, the median firm's wage rule had converged to ~3%, roughly matching inflation.

Erik Hurst, Christina Patterson, Nela Richardson, and Ye Liv Wang University of Chicago
Date Posted:
September 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database

ADP microdata from 2016–25 suggest firms set wages according to “wage norms” ~ invariant to inflation. The 2020–21 inflation surge mechanically reduced real wages. By the end of 2025, 34% of incumbent workers’ real wages were lower than in 2020.

Do sticky wage norms systematically reduce real wages during inflation spikes?

Core argument: Firm-level modal wage rules peaked at 3.5% in 2022–2023 against roughly 7% inflation, meaning nominal rigidity systematically eroded real wages for job stayers throughout the inflationary episode.

Roughly 42% of all nominal wage increases below 6% were within 0.01 percentage points of a whole or half number [Figure 6]. Figure 9 plots the employment-weighted average modal wage change across firms (solid line) alongside inflation rate (dashed line) from 2016 through 2025. In the pre-pandemic period, firm-level wage rules were relatively stable at a median of 2.7%, modestly above the rate of inflation. Beginning in 2021, inflation rose sharply, peaking at approximately seven percent in 2022. The average modal wage change also rose, reaching a peak of 3.5% in 2022 and 2023. By 2025, the median firm had a wage rule granting increases of three percent, roughly in line with inflation. The stickiness of firms’ wage rules in the face of inflationary pressure contributed to the systematic fall in real wages for job stayers. Evidence from Belgium [which has strong wage indexation], suggests that declining real wages, rather than inflation itself, helps explain the persistence of depressed consumer sentiment during the 2021–2024 period.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Firm-level modal wage rules peaked at 3.5% in 2022–2023 against roughly 7% inflation, meaning nominal rigidity systematically eroded real wages for job stayers throughout the inflationary episode.
  2. The median firm’s modal wage increase converged to 3% by 2025—matching inflation rather than exceeding it—marking a reversal from the pre-pandemic norm of 2.7% modestly above price growth.

Related Articles:

  • Do Voters Punish Inflation or Pay Cuts? Inflation and Real Wages in U.S. Elections — Given state fixed effects, demographics, and local inflation, a county whose real wage loss was 1SD > that of the mean county shifted its Presidential vote…
  • Real Wages Start To Shrink In Developed Countries — Real wages are shrinking across the US, UK, and Eurozone as energy-driven inflation outpaces earnings growth. Fiscal constraints limit government support in key economies, raising recession risk as household spending power falls.
  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The labor share of income has fallen 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching an all-time post-war low, driven by within-industry dynamics rather than shifts in activity across sectors.
  • Wages/Income
  • GDP
    • Inflation
  • Politics
  • Workforce

How Many Big Macs Does Your Salary Buy?

AI Summary. U.S. workers earn the most Big Macs annually (10,215), but Swiss workers lead on an hourly basis at 7 Big Macs per hour versus the U.S. at 6, reflecting longer American working hours rather than higher hourly wages.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.

Does working longer hours mask stagnant American wage growth?

Core argument: American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.

On an annual basis, America continues to top our McWages rankings. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year; Switzerland and Australia are in second and third place, respectively. But American working hours are supersized, too. On an hourly basis, Switzerland comes out on top: the average worker there earns the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with America’s six. Australia ranks third, at five burgers for every hour worked.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.
  2. Switzerland leads all nations in hourly McWage purchasing power at seven Big Macs per hour, with Australia third at five, demonstrating that top annual earnings and top hourly compensation do not always coincide.

Related Articles:

  • The Big Mac Index At 40 — Global currency misalignments are at their widest since the mid-1990s, driven by post-2021 U.S. inflation, an undervalued Chinese currency, and a weakening Japanese yen that has made consumer goods cheaper in Japan than in China.
  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — The gap in hours worked between Americans and non-Americans has narrowed by half since the 1990s, driven by declining U.S. work hours as expanded government health benefits reduced the need to work, while rising wages and lower barriers to employment increased hours worked in other advanced economies.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce

US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins have expanded ~250 basis points over the past year, approaching all-time highs, as 23% profit growth far outpaced 8% growth in corporate value added. Labor's share of income is hitting new lows, confirming that margin expansion—not faster economic growth—is the primary driver of record profit levels.

Abiel Reinhart J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

US corporate profit margins rose ~250bp y/y in Q2 and are approaching an all-time high. Reinhart notes that tech and communications services drove ~58% of recent S&P 500 profit growth, even as the sectors have been “steadily losing employment since late 2022.”

Are record corporate profits driven by growth or margin expansion?

Core argument: Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) were very robust in both 2Q (41% [annual rate]) and over the last year (23%). Excluding post-recession spikes, we haven’t seen a year this strong since the mid-2000s. Higher margins [were] the key driver [of profit growth], as 23% y/y domestic profit growth was far in excess of the 8% increase in corporate value added. Profit margins (pre-tax profits divided by value added) increased close to 250bp over the last year, and are approaching all-time highs, whereas the labor share is hitting new lows.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Related Articles:

  • US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt — U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
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Consumer Checkpoint: The Great Convergence

AI Summary. Spending and wage growth have largely converged across income groups, with lower- and middle-income households posting after-tax wage growth of 5.2% and 4.2% year-over-year, narrowing a previously wide gap — though the top 5% of earners continue to outpace all others.

David Michael Tinsley, Joe Wadford, Liz Everett Krisberg, Vanessa Cook, et al. Bank of America
Date Posted:
August 11, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Over the last two years, after-tax wage growth for the top 5% has outpaced the rest of the distribution. BofA internal data show after-tax wage growth for the lowest income tercile has surpassed that of the top 5% for the first time since December 2024.

Are lower-income households finally catching up in wage growth?

Core argument: The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.

We have discussed the “K-shaped” divide between higher- and lower-income households’ spending and wage growth. But since May, our data has shown a significant narrowing in this gap. As of July, spending and wage growth have largely converged across income cohorts, with the exception of the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace the rest. A similar dynamic was evident in discretionary spending. In our view, one factor behind the narrowing spending growth gap is stronger after-tax wage growth. For lower- and middle-income households, after-tax wage growth rose to 5.2% YoY and 4.2% YoY, respectively, in July.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.
  2. After-tax wage growth for lower-income households reached 5.2% YoY in July versus 4.2% for middle-income households, with stronger after-tax gains identified as a primary driver of narrowing discretionary spending gaps across cohorts.

Related Articles:

  • What the World Cup Revealed About America — U.S. households with retirement savings and home equity have been insulated from inflation, as $15tn in annual spending by 45 million such households—driven by wealth gains rather than income—has sustained GDP growth well above rates seen in comparable economies.
  • K-Shaped Economy? — Using internal Stripe payment data, Tedeschi finds that spending growth of households in low-income zip codes has outpaced that of households in high-income…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Inequality

Income Shocks and Intrahousehold Dynamics: Evidence from a Guaranteed Income Experiment

AI Summary. Guaranteed income transfers reduce total household earnings by more than the transfer amount, as other household members—particularly partners—work fewer hours and are less likely to advance in their jobs.

Elizabeth Rhodes, David Broockman, Eva Vivalt, Patrick Krause, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
August 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

In a randomized guaranteed-income experiment, giving one adult a transfer of $1,000/month for two years cut the other household members’ income by ~$1,700/year. Partners worked less and advanced less at work, while schooling and training among others rose.

Does guaranteed income reduce household work effort beyond the transfer amount?

Core argument: Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant earnings and total household income by roughly $1,700 per year, with the shortfall driven primarily by reduced earnings among other household members rather than the transfer recipient.

Figure 4 summarizes treatment effects on the standardized family-level indices. The transfers’ effects reshaped the income and employment of other household members. The gap between participant income and total household income fell by about $1,700 per year (s.e. $800). The decline appears to reflect lower earnings among other household members. Effects on employment outcomes are consistent with this interpretation. Partner promotions and transitions to better jobs decrease significantly, but these effects are very small in magnitude. Partner hours and employment show more meaningful declines but are not significant in the unconditional analysis. Several other measures provide supporting evidence of negative effects on labor supply. Net transfers—the value given [to extended family] minus the value received—increased by roughly $135 per year. Estimates for household stability, decision-making, and the division of labor cluster near zero.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant earnings and total household income by roughly $1,700 per year, with the shortfall driven primarily by reduced earnings among other household members rather than the transfer recipient.
  2. Net transfers to extended family increased by approximately $135 per year, while household stability, decision-making, and division of labor showed no meaningful treatment effects.

Related Articles:

  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Parenting and Children — A randomized experiment giving 1,000 parents an unconditional $1K/month over 3 years found essentially no differences in family outcomes; treated children…
  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Consumption and Household Balance Sheets: Experimental Evidence from Two US States — An experiment giving 1,000 individuals $1k per month for 3 years raised spending on housing as well as consumption, but also increased indebtedness, suggesting…
  • The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States — Giving low income individuals $12,000/year for 3 years resulted in reduced market income of $1,500/year, due to a 2ppt reduction in labor force participation…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce
    • Family/Marriage
    • Unemployment/Participation

The Impact of AI on the U.S. Labor Market

Sania Edlich and Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
July 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A difference-in-differences design finds 6.7% slower real-wage growth in AI-exposed occupations since 2023 than in low-exposure ones, with no detectable job loss. The largest effects were for the lowest quartile (-10.7%) and service occupations (-24.3%).

We examine the wage and employment effects of AI adoption across U.S. occupations using observed usage data from the Anthropic Economic Index rather than the theoretical exposure measures that dominate prior work. Using a difference-in-differences design with occupation and year fixed effects across 321 matched occupations from 2015 to 2025, we find that high-exposure occupations experience a 6.7% decline in real wage growth post-2023 with no detectable employment effects. The effect is concentrated among the lowest earners: service workers face a 24.3% decline and the bottom wage quartile a 10.7% decline, while top earners show no significant effect.Today, 5.8 million workers are affected, but as AI adoption deepens across corporate America, this figure is likely to grow substantially, with significant implications for income inequality and labor market policy in the years ahead. Only 321 of roughly 800 BLS occupations were matched, and the post-2023 period may be partially confounded by post-pandemic labor market dynamics. [Editor’s note: Figure 3 shows both wage and employment growth and decline among high-exposure workers, but the exposure measure combines automated and augmentative use, and thus cannot distinguish substitution from complementarity.]

Related Articles:

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  • Technology and the Baby Bust Paradox — Aging societies face structural labor shortages that create permanent incentives to automate, making demographics a long-run driver of AI deployment. Technology-producing economies benefit twice: by offsetting domestic labor scarcity and by exporting automation solutions to every other aging society.
  • Wages/Income
  • Productivity
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Unemployment/Participation
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