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Does Deutschland Do Digital?

AI Summary. The market capitalization of American technology firms far exceeds that of German manufacturing firms. German industrial companies are digitizing but remain reluctant to adopt open platforms and share data, and their tradition of precision and incremental improvement contrasts with Silicon Valley's faster innovation.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
May 21, 2020
Is Database:
Database

American tech firms’ market cap far surpasses German manufacturing firms’, highlighting a digital divide. German firms face challenges in adopting open platforms & data-sharing practices, limiting their ability to compete globally.

Can German manufacturers match American tech firms in digital transformation?

Core argument: The market capitalization of American technology firms significantly exceeds that of German manufacturing firms, a gap that highlights a digital divide.

The market cap of American tech firms significantly surpasses that of German manufacturing firms, highlighting a digital divide. While Germany's industrial giants like Bosch and Trumpf are making strides in digitization, they face challenges in adopting open platforms and data-sharing practices. German firms are traditionally focused on precision and incremental improvements, which contrasts with the rapid innovation seen in Silicon Valley. The reluctance to share data and collaborate on platforms limits their ability to compete globally. Despite efforts like Industrie 4.0, which aims to integrate digital technologies into manufacturing, German firms must overcome cultural and structural barriers to fully embrace digital transformation and compete with American tech giants.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The market capitalization of American technology firms significantly exceeds that of German manufacturing firms, a gap that highlights a digital divide.
  2. German industrial companies including Bosch and Trumpf are advancing digitization but face challenges in adopting open platforms and data-sharing practices, limiting their ability to compete globally.
  3. German manufacturers' traditional focus on precision and incremental improvement contrasts with Silicon Valley's rapid innovation, and initiatives such as Industrie 4.0 require overcoming cultural and structural barriers.

“Does Deutschland Do Digital?” November 21, 2017. The Economist.https://www.economist.com/news/business/21678774-europes-biggest-economy-rightly-worried-digitisation-threat-its-industrial

Yet it would be unfair not to mention the “Bosch Start-up Platform” which the firm has recently set up in Ludwigsburg, a short drive away. It has already incubated a handful of firms. One has developed a wireless sensor to improve asparagus yields, another builds agricultural robots that kill weeds. Germany’s manufacturers are clearly changing. The question is whether they can do so fast enough.

Compare Silicon Valley and Germany’s equivalent for industrial firms, the region around Stuttgart, and the cultural differences are clear. Google’s campus in Mountain View offers about 30 different canteens with free food and generous opening hours. Visitors can see some self-driving cars, but the scenery is dominated by bicycles in primary colours which employees use to pedal between the many buildings. At Bosch in Gerlingen, employees all stream into a huge, centralised corporate cafeteria at lunchtime. And the most striking vehicles are green self-driving lawnmowers that keep the grass around the firm’s office block in perfect trim.

The engineering background of many managers also explains why they focus more on incremental improvements than on making drastic gains in their products’ functionality and ease of use. “Germans are really good at reducing theSpaltmass, the clearance between the parts of a car’s body,” says Christoph Keese, who was one of the Springer executives who spent a few months in Silicon Valley and has written an influential book about the experience. But the user interfaces for German products are a different matter. They are often so complex, says Mr Keese, that the word that appears most often on their displays isAnwenderfehler(“user error”).

Many employees, too, are not ready for the digital world. At German universities computer scientists are trained much like engineers, meaning they are focused on precision, explains Clemens Westerkamp of the University of Applied Sciences in Osnabrück. This mindset, he says, is a big advantage when building highly reliable systems, which are required in many industries. But it is a drawback in the world of software and data, where quick thinking and risk-taking are more important. “The battle for industrial platforms will be a fight between German precision and American speed,” says Mr Westerkamp.

A fourth and final hurdle relates to German corporate culture. Although German firms are no longer as hierarchical as they once were, they are still managed from the top down; risk-taking is discouraged. A key to developing successful platforms and services is to put them in the hands of autonomous teams—rather like internal startups—and to be prepared to shut projects down if they fail to take off. Many German giants now have “accelerators” to incubate new business ideas, but lots are just public-relations exercises. Only a few have gone as far as Klöckner, which has set up an incubator for internal startups in Berlin, far away from its headquarters in Duisburg, with the aim of digitising the firm’s entire supply chain.

Third, platforms are about sharing the data they gather. The best new services are often the result of combining information from different sources. But in Germany this can be difficult. One barrier is privacy: in addition to the country’s strict data-protection laws, there is a widespread suspicion of anything that smacks of monetising data. Even among younger Germans, nearly two-thirds worry that data generated by their cars will be sold on, according to a recent study by Deloitte, a consulting firm. Many Germans are wary of what has come to be calledPlattform-Kapitalismus, meaning the dominance of new markets by mighty foreign providers such as Google and Facebook (see chart 2). This is seen as somehow unfair and an example of American “cowboy capitalism”, which adds to the reluctance of German firms to create and promote their own platforms. Mittelstand firms too are reluctant to share data: they fear they could lose control of their intellectual property and thus their competitive edge.

Shy about sharingUser-unfriendly

Second, successful platforms tend to be “open”, meaning chiefly that their owners encourage other firms, including competitors, to build applications that run on them. Bosch, Trumpf, Siemens and others claim to be open, but it is not clear how welcoming they will be in practice. German bosses tend to think that they can offer all the necessary services themselves and do not like the idea of inviting others onto their platform. German carmakers could probably build the dominant operating system for vehicles if they overcame their rivalries. But it is unclear whether BMW, Daimler and VW’s Audi subsidiary will turn Here, the digital-maps business they are buying from Nokia, into a bona fide platform. Such proprietary thinking also makes German industrial firms reluctant to produce open-source software, or to give away other forms of intellectual property, in the way that Tesla, an American maker of electric cars, has done with its patents in an effort to spread its technology.

If that offers some comfort to German manufacturers, it only goes so far. First, platforms thrive when other firms, developers and customers make use of them. Most big IT companies have grown up managing such “ecosystems”, but this will not come easy to manufacturers. As Sangeet Paul Choudary, a technology analyst, puts it, they are steeped in “pipe thinking”: firms order supplies, fashion them into products and then send them towards customers. Now they must think more like a gardener, and maintain a park which attracts and retains other firms and customers, in order to flourish.

Yet the economics of the markets for industrial equipment, and the other business-to-business products many German firms make, are different, explains a report this month by Stiftung Neue Verantwortung, a think-tank, and other organisations. These markets move more slowly and are more complex. The expertise of incumbents is hard to replicate and, more important, in many cases they control access to the data their products generate. As a result, network effects are not as strong in these sorts of business.

Fortunately for many German industrial firms—and, for that matter, their counterparts in other countries—they have more time to adapt than consumer firms. In consumer markets, digital newcomers can quickly become dominant by exploiting the “network effects” in some technology platforms: the more people use them, the more apps and other offerings they generate, and the stronger they get versus any rivals. This is why German makers of cars and heating equipment look with trepidation at Google’s work on self-driving cars and intelligent thermostats.

The first aim of this bureaucracy is to produce templates and test beds for trying out innovative digital services, and to publicise interesting examples. Its second aim is to convince two groups of the need for change: the smaller among Germany’s Mittelstand firms, and the industrial trade unions, which, under the country’s “co-determination” model of labour relations, have a say in many management decisions. “Creating acceptance is key,” says Matthias Machnig, a senior official who leads the Industrie 4.0 effort at the ministry of economic affairs.

Does Deutschland do digital?

SINCE it was founded in 1923 Trumpf, a family-owned company based near Stuttgart, has had one main mission: making things that make things. It started out with motorised hand shears and other tools to work sheet metal. It then invented fabrication machines with a numerical-control system and later was among the first to use lasers to cut metal. A prime example of a firm from Germany’s industrial Mittelstand that has outgrown the label (which literally means “mid-sized trades”), the firm today has annual sales of €2.7 billion ($3.2 billion) and more than 10,000 employees worldwide.

Trumpf’s roots in metalworking and other hardware stand in stark contrast to what it is trying to achieve next: building a new business purely based on software and data. Unveiled last month, its online offering, called Axoom, connects machines built by Trumpf and others, and uses the data it collects from them to help customers organise their production—for instance, to warn them when they are running out of material or to order it directly from the supplier. Much like smartphones, Axoom will be able to run “apps” from other providers, such as software to schedule workloads, or to predict when machines will need a spare part.

The company’s attempt to redefine itself is emblematic of the leap that manufacturers, in Germany and everywhere else, now have to make. The much-discussed “internet of things” (IoT) is becoming a reality on factory floors: industrial machines and the products they make are increasingly packed with sensors and connected to the internet (see Schumpeter).

As a result, the rules in many industries, from construction equipment to cars, are changing: making things matters less and knowing things more. In many cases the successful companies will no longer be the ones that make the best products, but the ones that gather the best data and combine them to offer the best digital services. And the biggest winners of all may be those that control a “platform”, a layer of software that combines different kinds of devices, data and services, on top of which other firms can build their own offerings—just as Trumpf is trying to do with Axoom.

Mastering this sort of transformation ought to be on the agenda of any country with a big manufacturing base (see chart 1). But nowhere is the sense of urgency more developed than in Germany, where the fear that digitisation threatens its position as a leading industrial nation has been given added piquancy by Volkswagen’s recent emissions scandals. The first half of the battle to master the digital world was lost, according to Timotheus Höttges, the boss of Deutsche Telekom. “The question now is: how do we win the second half?”

Does Deutschland Do Digital?: Extended Excerpt Image 1


The problem is not that German companies have stopped innovating. In fact, many are ahead of the pack in digitising their products as well as their shop floors. Making products and factories “smart”, however, is only the first stage in the digitisation journey, argues Germany’s National Academy of Science and Engineering (Acatech) in a recent report. The next is to use the data generated by connected devices and other information to offer clever services, and make money with new business models. Firms that cannot create such offerings “may quickly lose their ability to compete,” argues the Acatech report.

Smart services do not have to be closely related to the principal use of the product. A high-end car, for instance, has the digital horsepower of 20 personal computers and generates 25 gigabytes of data per hour of driving, estimates Gabriel Seiberth of Accenture, a provider of IT and consulting services. Rather than just building vehicles, he argues, carmakers should be thinking about how to provide, and profit from, the entertainment and e-commerce services that could be offered on the screens inside a vehicle. “The car will become a central part of a person’s digital life,” says Mr Seiberth.

That strikes a particular chord in Germany. Some fear that its carmakers, which directly or indirectly employ one in seven workers nationwide, could be demoted to low-margin metal-bashers, while American tech giants make most of the money by providing the software and the in-car entertainment—and perhaps, in time, designing the cars themselves.

Apple and Google are pressing carmakers to install the operating systems they have designed for cars’ entertainment systems, which in practice will suck up all sorts of other data about the car and its occupants. Carmakers are realising that to give up this territory would risk their “sovereignty over the data” generated by their vehicles, in the words of Wilko Stark, Daimler’s strategy chief. They could end up like Samsung, whose profits from smartphones are limited by the fact that it depends on Android, Google’s mobile operating system.

It is not just German carmakers which worry about this sort of future, however. The American tech giants are also trying to establish platforms for the “smart home”, which collect data from appliances, heating systems and the like. “Whoever controls the platforms will rule the future,” declares Henning Kagermann, the head of Acatech, who coined the term “Industrie 4.0” for German industry’s collective efforts to make the transition to a digital, internet-connected future.

Despite such concerns, in some ways Germany’s industry seems well prepared for the rise of services and platforms. Its bosses are alive to the threat. Axel Springer, a publishing giant, started a trend among German firms by having some of its top people live in Silicon Valley for several months. The experience led the firm to invest in a consulting firm, gratingly called Hy!, which introduces old-economy executives to startups and helps them plan their digital transformation.

Some firms have already acted on the insight that digital platforms are crucial for their futures. One is Trumpf. Another is Klöckner, a metals trader, which has created a platform to connect steelmakers with construction firms and other customers. Germany’s engineering and manufacturing giants, too, have started to take platforms seriously: Bosch now offers an “IoT Suite” to help other companies create new services around connected devices. Deutsche Telekom has teamed up with other firms to establish Qivicon, a smart-home platform to rival Apple’s and Google’s.

The government is trying to help. It has taken the lead in Industrie 4.0, creating around it an unwieldy structure that ropes in everyone from trade associations and ministries to unions and academics. Only in a country with Germany’s corporatist tradition would an effort to make businesses more agile and responsive to change be so stuffed with steering committees, working groups and advisory boards.

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The Stock Market’s Read On The Midterms, In Its Winners And Losers

AI Summary. Stocks rose broadly after a sweeping Democratic win in midterm elections, with health insurers tied to the Affordable Care Act and solar companies gaining while data-center firms and companies linked to Trump and Musk fell. The move reflects the increment beyond already-priced-in Democratic victories, from greater certainty and a larger-than-expected margin.

Jason Furman Econvitals
Date Posted:
November 5, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Furman notes that between election day and Wednesday’s close there were broad-based gains for the solar sector and health companies, particularly those with close ties to the ACA, even though substantial, while less dramatic, Democratic victories in the House and Senate were already priced in. [Note: Today saw technology stocks plunge, pushing the S&P 500 down ~4% and the Nasdaq down ~5%]. 

How do stock winners and losers reveal expected election policy impacts?

Core argument: The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections, and the composition of winners and losers indicates what the market expects the policy impact to be.

The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections. Perhaps more interesting, and more telling, was the composition, which shows what the market thinks the policy impact of the election will be: health companies (especially ones like Centene, with close ties to the Affordable Care Act) and solar companies were up, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies were down. And remember, Democratic victories were already priced in, so this is just the additional increment from greater certainty as well as the larger-than-expected magnitude. 

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The broader stock market rallied the day after Democrats won a sweeping victory in the midterm elections, and the composition of winners and losers indicates what the market expects the policy impact to be.
  2. Health companies with close ties to the Affordable Care Act, such as Centene, and solar companies rose after the midterms, while data-center companies and Trump- and Musk-related companies fell.
  3. Democratic victories were already priced into the stock market, so the post-election move reflects only the added increment from greater certainty and the larger-than-expected magnitude.

Related Articles:

  • Now You Can See Everything — Nearly every major local ballot measure opposing data centers won, putting an estimated 37.5 GW of planned capacity at risk of a pause and another 15 GW subject to conditions such as grid cost-sharing, water limits, and ended tax incentives. The 37 GW expected in 2027, 75% already under construction, is largely unaffected.
  • How Americans Voted in 2026 — Estimates of US voter behavior combine interviews with 26,706 voters nationally, re-interviews with more than 7,000 voters after they cast ballots, precinct- and county-level results, validated turnout for 44% of voters, and state voter registration files.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
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This Time Would Have To Be Very Different. Part II

AI Summary. Holding US corporate free cash flow at its record 15% share of gross value added and keeping valuation multiples fixed implies a real expected return of about 5.3%, below what US corporate capital has historically delivered. Earning the historical average would require that cash flow share to keep rising, a bet on capital gaining at labor's expense.

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents
Date Posted:
November 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

If the free cash flow of the entire US corporate sector were to hold at its record ~15% share of corporate value added, corporations would return only ~5.3% over the next decade. To earn the historical mean return, FCF would have to keep rising, implying a structural transformation favoring capital at labor’s expense.

Do record corporate cash flows still imply below-average expected stock returns?

Core argument: Holding the multiple fixed, a 3.26% free cash flow yield plus the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ 4.58% projected nominal GDP growth and 2.5% inflation implies a real expected return of roughly 5.3% on US corporate debt plus equity.

At a CAPE of 40.7 US stocks look extremely expensive, and expected returns are low, especially compared to TIPS yields. Plugging in today’s numbers, you back out an expected real return of around 3% over the next decade, compared to a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.6%. Now, instead of an investor holding a single share, we could look at an investor who owns the entire corporate sector, all equity, bonds, and other liabilities. This investor acquired a claim to FCF, the total amount of cash that can be paid out to its owners, including bondholders: gross corporate value added left after paying workers, the government, and investment expenditure. This FCF is now about 15% of corporate value added. Earnings minus FCF is net investment; corporations have invested less. Its FCF yield is 3.26%, vs. 3.21% since 1952. That delivers an approximate real expected return of 5.3%, below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Holding the multiple fixed, a 3.26% free cash flow yield plus the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ 4.58% projected nominal GDP growth and 2.5% inflation implies a real expected return of roughly 5.3% on US corporate debt plus equity.
  2. The 5.3% real return assumes free cash flow stays at its record 15% of gross value added indefinitely, and still falls below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.
  3. Earning the historical average return requires the free cash flow share of value added to keep climbing, a bet on a structural transformation of US capitalism favoring capital at the expense of labor.

Related Articles:

  • This Time Would Have To Be Very Different — The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 stands at 40.7, implying an earnings yield of 2.46% and, combined with an estimated 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth, a real expected return near 3% a year. Against a 2.75% inflation-protected 10-year Treasury yield, that leaves an equity premium of roughly 25 basis points, assuming the elevated multiple holds.
  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • A Macroeconomic Perspective on Stock Market Valuation Ratios — The authors argue that a decline in labor's share of US corporate value added, combined with weak corporate investment, mechanically raises valuation-to-earnings ratios even without changes in expected returns or growth. They find corporate enterprise value rose alongside an equal-sized increase in free cash flow's share of value added.
  • Reconciling Macroeconomics and Finance for the U.S. Corporate Sector: 1929 to Present — Using integrated U.S. macroeconomic and financial accounts, the authors find that fluctuations in expected cash flows to corporate owners, rather than expected rates of return, have been the dominant driver of swings in U.S. corporate market valuations. They attribute most valuation fluctuations to changes in the share of corporate output flowing to owners as pure rent.
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This Time Would Have To Be Very Different

AI Summary. The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 stands at 40.7, implying an earnings yield of 2.46% and, combined with an estimated 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth, a real expected return near 3% a year. Against a 2.75% inflation-protected 10-year Treasury yield, that leaves an equity premium of roughly 25 basis points, assuming the elevated multiple holds.

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

At 40.7, CAPE is nearing its December 1999 peak of 44.2. For the S&P 500 to beat TIPS over the next decade, today’s near-record P/E multiple must persist for ten years, or real earnings must grow more than 5.8% a year—a pace exceeded in only two decades since 1880: the 1920s and 2010s.

How much do stock valuations offer over inflation-protected Treasuries?

Core argument: The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.

The CAPE is currently trading at 40.7, which is close to an all-time high. You’re paying close to 41 times annual earnings when you buy the S&P 500. The implied earnings yield is only 2.46%. According to AQR, a reasonable estimate for real earnings growth (on a per share basis) is 1.8% per annum. If you plug in today’s numbers, you end up with a real expected return of around 3% per year for U.S. equity. That’s a surprisingly low number. When you compare it to the 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, you’re left with a razor-thin equity premium. The stock market will only yield an extra 25 basis points per annum over the next, say, 10 years to compensate you for taking on equity risk. You might think this is a very conservative estimate, but it’s actually not, because we’re implicitly assuming that the CAPE stays at 40.7 over the next 10 years. That’s quite a lofty multiple. Even casual eyeball econometrics suggests that that’s not a great assumption, because the price-earnings ratio tends to revert back to its mean.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.
  2. Combining the 2.46% earnings yield with AQR’s estimate of 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth yields a real expected return of roughly 3% per year for U.S. equity.
  3. Against a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, U.S. equities offer an equity premium of about 25 basis points per year, an estimate that assumes the CAPE stays at 40.7 for a decade despite the price-earnings ratio’s tendency to revert to its mean.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • One Hundred Years in the U.S. Stock Markets — Over a century, U.S. publicly traded stocks generated roughly $91tn in shareholder wealth enhancement, with returns strongly positively skewed and dominated by a relatively small number of high-performing firms. Because most possible outcomes fall below the mean in a skewed distribution, the authors argue financial planning should focus on median outcomes or the full distribution.
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Circularity in AI Shows Up in Token Spending Too

AI Summary. Payment-data analysis finds 80% of the largest corporate AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, indicating that much token spending is funded by venture capital rather than earnings. If AI payoffs are slow, venture returns could suffer and a funding pullback could weaken demand for computing power.

Torsten Slok Apollo
Date Posted:
October 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to Ramp data, 80% of firms in the top 1% of AI spending are VC-backed, compared with just 13% of firms at the median. This suggests that the largest purchasers of AI computing capacity rely heavily on venture capital rather than internally generated earnings.

Is venture capital funding most corporate AI token spending?

Core argument: Ramp data show 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, suggesting the largest buyers of compute are funding token spending with venture capital rather than organic earnings.

Ramp data show that 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are VC-backed, compared with only 13% of the median spender, suggesting that the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending, as the startups buying the most compute are paying for it with venture capital rather than organic earnings. If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, VC returns would come under pressure, since the capital funding today’s token spending would have little to show for it, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Ramp data show 80% of the top 1% of AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, suggesting the largest buyers of compute are funding token spending with venture capital rather than organic earnings.
  2. Ramp’s data on the venture backing of the heaviest AI spenders suggest the circularity seen among AI hyperscalers and model providers also extends to token spending.
  3. If the AI payoff is slow to materialize or never arrives, venture capital returns would come under pressure, and a pullback in venture funding could in turn weaken demand for compute.

Related Articles:

  • Slowing Token Spend Shows Compute Demand Isn’t Unlimited — Demand for computing power appears highly price-sensitive, with modest increases in token prices pushing buyers to cut usage or switch to cheap open-source alternatives, undercutting claims that demand is unlimited. Return on invested capital at the five largest cloud providers is declining as invested capital grows faster than the earnings it generates.
  • AI Capex, Required Revenues, And What’s Priced In The AI Trade — Goldman Sachs projects the largest US hyperscalers' capital spending reaches $1.2tn in 2027 and $1.4tn in 2028, with growth decelerating, and estimates they need roughly $300bn in annual AI revenues to break even. AI infrastructure stocks have de-rated, with hyperscalers at their smallest recorded premium to the median S&P 500 company.
  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
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Revenue Per Worker Is Up. Are Firms Getting a Larger Share?

AI Summary. Publicly listed firms' profit margins were roughly flat through the 2010s, with gross margins growing about 0.4% a year from 2010 to 2019, then turned up: average gross margins rose from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025, and operating margins from 16% to 18%.

Jeremy Pearce Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
October 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Nonfarm business output per hour grew 2.2% annually between 2019 and 2025, up from 1% in 2010–19. Among public firms, growth in real revenue per worker accelerated from 0.7% to 2.2%. Operating margins rose from 16% to 18% of sales (2.4% annual growth).

Have corporate profit margins risen after a flat decade?

Core argument: Average operating margins rose from about 16% of sales in 2019 to 18% in 2025, growth of 2.4% a year, after being roughly flat through the 2010s.

A profit margin is profit divided by sales: the share of each sales dollar the firm keeps after paying its costs. The gross margin subtracts the direct cost of production (cost of goods sold), while the operating margin also subtracts overhead (selling, general, and administrative expense, which in Compustat typically includes R&D). If productivity gains were flowing to firms’ profits, margins should show it. Through the 2010s margins were flat: gross margins grew about 0.4% a year from 2010 to 2019, and operating margins were roughly flat. Both then turned up: on average, gross margins went from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025 (1.3% growth per year), and operating margins from 16% to 18% (2.4% growth per year). Part of the gains surfaced with wider profit margins: on a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average operating margins rose from about 16% of sales in 2019 to 18% in 2025, growth of 2.4% a year, after being roughly flat through the 2010s.
  2. Average gross margins increased from about 34% of sales in 2019 to 37% in 2025, growth of 1.3% a year, up from about 0.4% a year over 2010–2019.
  3. On a reasonable baseline, the operating margin rose over 2% a year from 2019 to 2025, indicating part of the productivity gains surfaced as wider profit margins.

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Earnings Will Be Spectacular. It May Not Be Enough

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins, long regarded as one of the economy's most reliably mean-reverting series, have risen continuously so far this century. Measured through the national income accounts used in calculating GDP, profits now take a larger share of the economy than on the eve of the 1929 crash.

John Authers Bloomberg
Date Posted:
October 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Since 2000, post-tax corporate profits as a share of GDP have trended upward across cyclical setbacks and are now near an all time high, above their 1929 level.

Have corporate profit margins stopped reverting to the mean?

Core argument: Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.

Throughout the 20th century, profit margins were regarded as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy. So far this century, however, margins have done nothing but rise. Measured with the National Income and Product Accounts, part of the GDP calculation, profits are currently taking a bigger share of the economy even than on the eve of the Great Crash in 1929. The series comes with a lag, so we can assume the profit share on this basis is comfortably at a record by now.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profits measured in the National Income and Product Accounts take a larger share of the U.S. economy than on the eve of the 1929 Great Crash.
  2. Profit margins were regarded throughout the 20th century as one of the purest mean-reverting series in the economy, yet so far this century they have done nothing but rise.
  3. The National Income and Product Accounts profits series comes with a lag, so the profit share on this basis can be assumed to be comfortably at a record.

Related Articles:

  • US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits — US nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national accounts grew 23% over the past year, a pace not seen outside post-recession spikes since the mid-2000s. Wider margins were the key driver, as domestic profit growth far exceeded the 8% rise in corporate value added, pushing margins near all-time highs while the labor share hit new lows.
  • The Post‑COVID Decline in the Labor Share — The share of US national income paid to workers fell 1.6 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level, reaching a post-war low. The authors find this decline stems mainly from changes within industries rather than shifts in activity across sectors, following cyclical patterns seen in earlier recessions.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — US after-tax non-financial corporate profit margins remain elevated by historical standards, estimated at 7.6% versus a post-1949 high of 8.2%, while employee pay as a share of non-financial corporate gross value added has fallen from 66% to 56%. One argument holds that subdued demographic growth leads companies to prioritize maximizing margins over expanding capacity.
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