Edward Conard

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Leaked Amazon memo warns the company is running out of people to hire

Jason Del Rey Vox
Date Posted:
June 28, 2022
Is Database:
Database

Amazon’s attrition rate soared to 159% in 2020, outpacing the 59% US warehouse sector turnover, highlighting a critical labor challenge. @JasonDelRey

Amazon’s attrition rate soared to 159% in 2020, outpacing the 59% US warehouse sector turnover, highlighting a...
Amazon's attrition rate soared to 159% in 2020, significantly higher than the 59% turnover in the broader US warehouse sector, highlighting a critical labor challenge. Internal research warns that Amazon may deplete its US labor pool by 2024, risking service quality and growth. Attrition in Phoenix rose from 128% in 2019 to 205% in 2020, exacerbating labor shortages. Amazon's strategy of rapid workforce turnover, once seen as beneficial, now threatens its operational stability. To mitigate this, Amazon could raise wages, enhance automation, or improve employee retention. A $1 increase in minimum wage could expand the hiring pool by 7%, while reducing attrition to 2019 levels could extend hiring runway by three years. The company's reliance on a vast workforce underscores the urgency of addressing these issues to maintain its e-commerce dominance.

Jason Del Rey, "Leaked Amazon memo warns the company is running out of people to hire,"Vox, June 17, 2022, https://www.vox.com/recode/23170900/leaked-amazon-memo-warehouses-hiring-shortage

Leaked Amazon memo warns the company is running out of people to hire

Amazon is facing a looming crisis: It could run out of people to hire in its US warehouses by 2024, according to leaked Amazon internal research from mid-2021 that Recode reviewed. If that happens, the online retailer’s service quality and growth plans could be at risk, and its e-commerce dominance along with it.

Raising wages and increasing warehouse automation are two of the six “levers” Amazon could pull to delay this labor crisis by a few years, but only a series of sweeping changes to how the company does business and manages its employees will significantly alter the timeline, Amazon staff predicted.

“If we continue business as usual, Amazon will deplete the available labor supply in the US network by 2024,” the research, which hasn’t previously been reported, says.

The report warned that Amazon’s labor crisis was especially imminent in a few locales, with internal models showing that the company was expected to exhaust its entire available labor pool in the Phoenix, Arizona, metro area by the end of 2021, and in the Inland Empire region of California, roughly 60 miles east of Los Angeles, by the end of 2022. Amazon’s internal report calculated the available pool of workers based on characteristics like income levels and a household’s proximity to current or planned Amazon facilities; the pool does not include the entire US adult population.

Amazon spokesperson Rena Lunak didn’t refute the contents of the internal report Recode obtained but declined to comment on it.

The research provides a rare glimpse into the staffing challenges that Amazon is now facing behind its slick veil of one-click online shopping and same-day Prime delivery. And it pointedly reveals how much of Amazon’s business success and its longtime position as a darling of Wall Street investors is dependent on its workforce of more than 1 million people who pick, pack, and ship its customers’ orders nearly 24/7.

The leaked internal findings also serve as a cautionary tale for other employers who seek to emulate the Amazon Way of management, which emphasizes worker productivity over just about everything else and churns through the equivalent of its entire front-line workforce year after year.

In the past, that churn wasn’t a problem for Amazon — it was even desirable at some points. Amazon founder and former CEO Jeff Bezos saw his warehouse workforce as necessary but replaceable, and feared that workers who remained at the company too long would turn complacent or, worse, disgruntled, according to reporting by the New York Times. But now, as the internal report Recode reviewed shows, some inside Amazon are realizing that strategy won’t work much longer, especially if leaders truly want to transform it into “Earth’s best employer,” as Bezos proclaimed in 2021.

To be sure, part of Amazon’s turnover issue relates to how some employees view working in a warehouse as a brief pit stop on the way to better things. But some workers have long complained of stresses unique to Amazon’s workplace, from the pace and repetition of the labor to the unrelenting computerized surveillance of workers’ every move to comparatively high injury rates. In a company survey of 31,000 workers who left Amazon that was referenced in the report, some former Amazon workers say it’s worse to work at Amazon than some big-name competitors like Walmart or FedEx. In that survey, those who joined another employer soon after leaving the tech giant “rated Amazon significantly worse on work fitting skills or interests, demands of the work, shift length and shift schedule.”

With traditional competitors ramping up their investments in e-commerce warehouses, Amazon is no longer a slam-dunk top choice for those seeking work in these types of facilities and the starting minimum wage that comes along with it. And that dynamic is already playing out in some parts of the country.

Danger zones

In the Inland Empire region of California, for example, Amazon may cycle through every worker who’d be interested in applying for a warehouse job by the end of 2022, the internal report warned. One of the reasons is that Amazon is increasingly finding itself in a bidding war for workers with rivals in the area, which is a key logistics region because it is within a two-hour drive of 20 million potential customers and two of the largest container ports in the US.

“We are hearing a lot of workers say, ‘I can just go across the street to Target or Walmart,’” said Sheheryar Kaoosji, co-executive director of an Inland Empire nonprofit called the Warehouse Worker Resource Center. Kaoosji added that Walmart is offering some workers with past warehouse experience as much as $25 an hour. An Amazon executive told Reuters in late 2021 that the company was bumping the average starting wage for new hires in the US to more than $18 an hour, attributing the decision to intense competition among employers. He also said Amazon had increased hiring bonuses to as much as $3,000 in some geographies.

And internal forecasts showed the situation was dire in Phoenix, Arizona, with Amazon projected to exhaust its entire potential workforce by the end of 2021. The Phoenix metro area has been a key market for Amazon since it opened its first warehouse there in 2007. The company currently operates more than 20 facilities in the region. But attrition at Amazon’s facilities in the area grew from 128 percent in 2019 to 205 percent in 2020, as the pandemic upended labor markets and online shopping boomed, putting pressure on fulfillment center employees.

As a result, Amazon seemed to have reversed, or stopped enforcing, some workplace policies at Phoenix warehouses amid the labor shortage, according to a former manager.

“They were so concerned about attrition and losing people that they rolled back all the policies that us as managers had to enforce,” Michael Garrigan, a former entry-level manager at Amazon warehouses in Phoenix from 2020 to early 2022, told Recode. “There was a joke among the … managers that it didn’t matter what got written up for because we knew HR was gonna exempt it. It was almost impossible to get fired as a worker.”

Lunak, the Amazon spokesperson, declined to comment on Garrigan’s claims.

The internal research also identified the regions surrounding Memphis, Tennessee, and Wilmington, Delaware, as areas where Amazon was on the cusp of exhausting local warehouse labor availability. Amazon’s models used for this internal research were 94 percent accurate in predicting the US geographies where Amazon was significantly understaffed in the lead-up to the Amazon Prime Day shopping event in June 2021, the report noted, which contributed to delivery delays for customers in those markets. The warnings about Amazon’s labor supply shortages indicate that in at least some markets, Amazon shipments could face more severe delays in the future.

Despite its looming labor crisis, Amazon temporarily overcorrected in some markets, going from understaffed to overstaffed. Amazon’s chief financial officer had previously said that the company was understaffed by 10,000 employees during the end of 2021, before the omicron Covid-19 variant had wreaked havoc on much of the US. But in April, the company revealed that it was actually overstaffed in some areas in early 2022 as the first wave of omicron subsided and employees returning from sick leave worked alongside new hires who had been recruited to backfill their roles.

Amazon spokespeople have said that the company will count on natural attrition rates to solve much of the current overstaffing problem, and the Wall Street Journal reported on Thursday that a top company official pitched a plan internally to “ out its worker base through attrition.” It’s unclear where exactly Amazon is overstaffed and how long it will take to rightsize its workforce, but it seems unlikely that it is thinning staff in competitive locales like Phoenix and the Inland Empire where it had already exhausted much of the labor pool. It’s also unclear how the current economic climate will impact consumer spending and, relatedly, Amazon’s hiring needs.

For better or worse, the approach of reducing the temporary overstaffing issue through attrition should work for Amazon because it has long churned through its workers at a rapid clip. Amazon’s attrition rates were 123 percent in 2019 before jumping to 159 percent in 2020, according to internal data in the report Recode obtained, while turnover rates across the US transportation and warehouse sectors were much lower: 46 percent and 59 percent respectively in 2019 and 2020, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates.

Turnover in the US retail industry was slightly higher than that — 58 percent and nearly 70 percent respectively in 2019 and 2020 — but still only about half as bad as Amazon’s. The high rates of attrition “made some executives worry about running out of workers across America,” the New York Times reported in 2021, though the article did not include specific timelines.

The leaked report viewed by Recode reads like an attempted wake-up call — along with potential solutions to avert the crisis — for some company leaders who long exhibited a nonchalant attitude toward employee attrition.

No silver bullet

Amazon has a variety of potential solutions for its people problem, but they will require the company to shift its mindset and overcome practical or logistical challenges.

On the surface, simply employing its current workers for longer would be a big help. The turnover rate disparity between Amazon and industry averages shows there is ample opportunity for the company to keep employees longer and delay the arrival of the day when it won’t have workers left to recruit. This is not some unsolvable, mysterious problem; the BLS stats show that plenty of companies retain workers much better than Amazon does. In fact, Amazon’s own data shows that nearly 90 percent of new workers say they want to stay at their jobs for at least six months. If Amazon could bring attrition rates down to its 2019 levels, which were still above 100 percent, the company would gain three more years of hiring runway, according to the internal projections.

In other parts of the country, though, where labor shortages aren’t yet a certainty, remnants of Amazon’s longtime aggressive termination practices persist. It’s not uncommon for some of Amazon’s automated computer systems to automatically fire employees for a variety of minor infractions, without exception. Jose Pagan, a former Amazon employee at a warehouse in Bronx, New York, says he got the automated ax recently despite nothing but positive feedback from his managers.

Pagan began working at the Amazon delivery hub in October and, within two months, had been promoted to a role on the safety committee for the facility. The new role didn’t come with a pay raise, and is on top of a worker’s core tasks, but Pagan saw it as a stepping stone to an official promotion. But in April, Pagan told Recode, he took two days off to have an infected tooth looked at and ultimately removed.

The problem, he said, was that he only had seven hours of unpaid time off but ended up missing 20 hours of work; he had enough paid vacation time to cover the absence, but he said the company did not pull from that separate bank of days because Pagan would have had to apply for vacation time in advance. Pagan said he also had a doctor’s note but was told the company did not need to accept it as an excuse, even though he had been excused from work with a doctor’s note previously. He said he worked for another full week without issue, until he showed up one night for his overnight shift and his badge no longer worked. He was eventually told he had been terminated.

An HR manager told Pagan that there was nothing he could do about the termination but that Pagan should reapply for a job at the company in three months, per Amazon policy.

“We would love you back in 90 days,” Pagan says the HR staff member told him. In the meantime, Pagan should “do some GrubHub or Uber,” the HR employee said.

“I find the whole situation crazy,” said the 35-year-old Pagan, who was supporting his wife and daughter on his Amazon income. “They’re gonna lose a good worker for nothing.”

Lunak, the Amazon spokesperson, said the company is looking into Pagan’s case.

Besides changing termination or retention policies, increasing pay is another obvious lever that Amazon could pull to expand its labor pool. (All of these are things that workers calling for unionization have demanded from the company.) The report predicted that for every dollar Amazon bumps up its minimum wage, it adds 7 percent more workers to its potential hiring pool. If Amazon were to do a little better, and raise its hourly minimum by just $1.50, that too would expand its pool of potential workers enough to extend its hiring ability in the US by three years.

The internal document also suggested Amazon needs to become more efficient at hiring. At the time the report was written, Amazon needed 6.7 job applicants to apply to fill a single warehouse role. Around 9 percent of applicants were rejected either because they were former employees not permitted to be rehired or because they failed a drug test or had an unsatisfactory background check. (Later in 2021, Amazon said it would stop screening many of its warehouse worker applicants for marijuana use.)

Of course, Amazon could also simply reduce the number of workers it needs by speeding up automation in its warehouses — a controversial approach. Nonetheless, the report revealed that Amazon executives had already in 2021 set a “conservative” goal of improving warehouse productivity by 25 percent by the end of 2024, strictly through increased automation. Hitting that goal on its own would push back the labor crisis as well, but only slightly.

The research team also pondered improvements that could be made to how Amazon already utilizes its existing staff. Amazon’s warehouse staff worked, on average, a little more than 27 hours a week in 2020, according to internal data. If Amazon had increased that weekly number by just 10 percent, the company could have reduced new hires by 118,000 people, the internal report estimated. The report also referenced a team in Amazon’s HR division, called Hamilton, that is building tools to automatically transfer workers between nearby facilities based on staffing levels and order volume. The relocations would come in the form of both “permanent transfers and short-term assignments.”

Lastly, according to the report, Amazon’s HR staffing division wants to play a bigger role in influencing where new warehouses are located so they can ensure the available labor pool is large enough for the company’s needs. For some types of Amazon warehouses, there is little wiggle room. Amazon delivery stations, for example, are the last stop for a package before it’s delivered, so they need to be located within a short driving distance to a large number of Amazon customers. But for others — like “cross dock” facilities that receive merchandise from suppliers, and fulfillment centers that receive goods from cross dock facilities and pack them into customer orders — there is more leeway in the location selection process and so an opportunity to better use internal labor forecasting tools.

“Our longer-term strategy … is to apply labor forecasts to future site selection,” the report read.

Overall, the leaked report offers a variety of solutions to choose from, but each with trade-offs that Amazon executives may not find palatable. Raise wages and the company may need to pull back spending elsewhere. Increase automation and risk the wrath of critics concerned about replacing people with robots at the second-largest private sector employer in the country. A focus on better retaining employees could also mean reducing performance tracking and productivity quotas that have played a role, however controversial, in the company’s historic business success to date.

Amazon has shown time and time again that it values “customer obsession” — and the promises it makes to its customers — above all else. But the customer loyalty that results from that obsession is ultimately at risk if Amazon cannot employ enough people — or robots — to pack and ship the boxes people expect to find outside their front door a day or two after clicking “Place your order.” The company’s new CEO, Andy Jassy, has proclaimed that Amazon is “not close to being done in how we improve the lives of our employees.” As the internal report shows, doing so should no longer be optional for Amazon; it’s an imperative.

Ed Comment: I assume 159% attrition means the average tenure is 7.5 months. If 20% stay a long time, supervisors for example, then the tenure of the other 80% is even shorter. I think this is typical of low wage workers more generally. Presumably people quite because they get fired, get a better job, or don't need to work, at least temporarily. "Amazon’s attrition rates were 123 percent in 2019 before jumping to 159 percent in 2020, according to internal data in the report Recode obtained, while turnover rates across the US transportation and warehouse sectors were much lower: 46 percent and 59 percent respectively in 2019 and 2020, according to Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates....Turnover in the US retail industry was slightly higher than that — 58 percent and nearly 70 percent respectively in 2019 and 2020 — but still only about half as bad as Amazon’s. In Phoenix: Attrition at Amazon’s facilities in the area grew from 128 percent in 2019 to 205 percent in 2020..."

  • Wages/Income
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Previous articleJune 27, 2022Unemployment Insurance, Starting Salaries, and JobsUI benefit cuts show employment-wage trade-off: 23-50% UI reduction drives job growth +1.5-2.4% but wages fall -1.8-7.2%. Study across 7 states reveals -1.0 labor demand elasticity.Next articleJune 28, 2022Have Wages Stagnated for Decades in the US?Since 1990, real median American wages grew by 34% since 1990, with the 10th, 20th, and 30th percentiles experiencing 50%, 48%, and 38% growth, respectively.
Showing 127 database articles primarily about Wages/Income

How Many Big Macs Does Your Salary Buy?

AI Summary. U.S. workers earn the most Big Macs annually (10,215), but Swiss workers lead on an hourly basis at 7 Big Macs per hour versus the U.S. at 6, reflecting longer American working hours rather than higher hourly wages.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.

Does working longer hours mask stagnant American wage growth?

Core argument: American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.

On an annual basis, America continues to top our McWages rankings. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year; Switzerland and Australia are in second and third place, respectively. But American working hours are supersized, too. On an hourly basis, Switzerland comes out on top: the average worker there earns the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with America’s six. Australia ranks third, at five burgers for every hour worked.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.
  2. Switzerland leads all nations in hourly McWage purchasing power at seven Big Macs per hour, with Australia third at five, demonstrating that top annual earnings and top hourly compensation do not always coincide.

Related Articles:

  • The Big Mac Index At 40 — Global currency misalignments are at their widest since the mid-1990s, driven by post-2021 U.S. inflation, an undervalued Chinese currency, and a weakening Japanese yen that has made consumer goods cheaper in Japan than in China.
  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — The gap in hours worked between Americans and non-Americans has narrowed by half since the 1990s, driven by declining U.S. work hours as expanded government health benefits reduced the need to work, while rising wages and lower barriers to employment increased hours worked in other advanced economies.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — I debate @JasonFurman—Pres. Obama’s Chair of the Council of Economic Advisors—at Harvard over the effect of tax increases on the expected value of innovative…
  • Wages/Income
  • Workforce

US Focus: The Effect Of Soaring Profits

AI Summary. Corporate profit margins have expanded ~250 basis points over the past year, approaching all-time highs, as 23% profit growth far outpaced 8% growth in corporate value added. Labor's share of income is hitting new lows, confirming that margin expansion—not faster economic growth—is the primary driver of record profit levels.

Abiel Reinhart J.P. Morgan
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

US corporate profit margins rose ~250bp y/y in Q2 and are approaching an all-time high. Reinhart notes that tech and communications services drove ~58% of recent S&P 500 profit growth, even as the sectors have been “steadily losing employment since late 2022.”

Are record corporate profits driven by growth or margin expansion?

Core argument: Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Nominal pre-tax corporate profits in the national income and product accounts (NIPA) were very robust in both 2Q (41% [annual rate]) and over the last year (23%). Excluding post-recession spikes, we haven’t seen a year this strong since the mid-2000s. Higher margins [were] the key driver [of profit growth], as 23% y/y domestic profit growth was far in excess of the 8% increase in corporate value added. Profit margins (pre-tax profits divided by value added) increased close to 250bp over the last year, and are approaching all-time highs, whereas the labor share is hitting new lows.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Corporate profit margins expanded nearly 250 bps over the past year and are approaching all-time highs, as domestic profit growth of 23% dwarfed the 8% rise in corporate value added, compressing labor’s share of income to record lows.

Related Articles:

  • US Corporate Profits Surge To Record As Worker Payouts Wilt — U.S. corporate pre-tax profits reached an annualized $4.8tn, or 18% of national income—the highest share since the post-WWII era—while workers' wages and benefits fell to 60% of national income, the lowest since the 1950s.
  • Are US Corporate Profit Margins Too High? — In Q1 2026, US after-tax non-financial margins were estimated at 7.6%, just short of the post-1949 high of 8.2% in Q2 of 2021. Tan Kai Xian argues US corporate…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
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Consumer Checkpoint: The Great Convergence

AI Summary. Spending and wage growth have largely converged across income groups, with lower- and middle-income households posting after-tax wage growth of 5.2% and 4.2% year-over-year, narrowing a previously wide gap — though the top 5% of earners continue to outpace all others.

David Michael Tinsley, Joe Wadford, Liz Everett Krisberg, Vanessa Cook, et al. Bank of America
Date Posted:
August 11, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Over the last two years, after-tax wage growth for the top 5% has outpaced the rest of the distribution. BofA internal data show after-tax wage growth for the lowest income tercile has surpassed that of the top 5% for the first time since December 2024.

Are lower-income households finally catching up in wage growth?

Core argument: The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.

We have discussed the “K-shaped” divide between higher- and lower-income households’ spending and wage growth. But since May, our data has shown a significant narrowing in this gap. As of July, spending and wage growth have largely converged across income cohorts, with the exception of the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace the rest. A similar dynamic was evident in discretionary spending. In our view, one factor behind the narrowing spending growth gap is stronger after-tax wage growth. For lower- and middle-income households, after-tax wage growth rose to 5.2% YoY and 4.2% YoY, respectively, in July.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The K-shaped spending and wage growth divide has largely closed since May, with income cohorts converging by July—except the top 5% of earners, who continue to outpace all other groups.
  2. After-tax wage growth for lower-income households reached 5.2% YoY in July versus 4.2% for middle-income households, with stronger after-tax gains identified as a primary driver of narrowing discretionary spending gaps across cohorts.

Related Articles:

  • What the World Cup Revealed About America — U.S. households with retirement savings and home equity have been insulated from inflation, as $15tn in annual spending by 45 million such households—driven by wealth gains rather than income—has sustained GDP growth well above rates seen in comparable economies.
  • K-Shaped Economy? — Using internal Stripe payment data, Tedeschi finds that spending growth of households in low-income zip codes has outpaced that of households in high-income…
  • The Record Divide Between Corporate Profits and Worker Pay — Labor's share of national income has fallen to 51%—its lowest recorded level—while corporate profits have reached 12.1% of national income, their highest share since 1950. Inflation-adjusted hourly wages have risen 3% since 2019, while inflation-adjusted corporate profits have risen 50% over the same period.
  • Wages/Income
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Income Shocks and Intrahousehold Dynamics: Evidence from a Guaranteed Income Experiment

AI Summary. Guaranteed income transfers reduce total household earnings by more than the transfer amount, as other household members—particularly partners—work fewer hours and are less likely to advance in their jobs.

Elizabeth Rhodes, David Broockman, Eva Vivalt, Patrick Krause, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
August 10, 2026
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Database
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Important

In a randomized guaranteed-income experiment, giving one adult a transfer of $1,000/month for two years cut the other household members’ income by ~$1,700/year. Partners worked less and advanced less at work, while schooling and training among others rose.

Does guaranteed income reduce household work effort beyond the transfer amount?

Core argument: Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.

Figure 4 summarizes treatment effects on the standardized family-level indices. The transfers’ effects reshaped the income and employment of other household members. The gap between participant income and total household income fell by about $1,700 per year (s.e. $800). The decline appears to reflect lower earnings among other household members. Effects on employment outcomes are consistent with this interpretation. Partner promotions and transitions to better jobs decrease significantly, but these effects are very small in magnitude. Partner hours and employment show more meaningful declines but are not significant in the unconditional analysis. Several other measures provide supporting evidence of negative effects on labor supply. Net transfers—the value given [to extended family] minus the value received—increased by roughly $135 per year. Estimates for household stability, decision-making, and the division of labor cluster near zero.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Guaranteed income transfers narrowed the gap between participant income and total household income by approximately $1,700 per year, a reduction driven by lower earnings among other household members rather than collective income gains.
  2. Guaranteed income transfers reduced partner labor supply, with statistically significant declines in promotions and job transitions, though effect sizes were small.
  3. partner hours and employment showed larger but statistically insignificant declines.

Related Articles:

  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Parenting and Children — A randomized experiment giving 1,000 parents an unconditional $1K/month over 3 years found essentially no differences in family outcomes; treated children…
  • The Impact of Unconditional Cash Transfers on Consumption and Household Balance Sheets: Experimental Evidence from Two US States — An experiment giving 1,000 individuals $1k per month for 3 years raised spending on housing as well as consumption, but also increased indebtedness, suggesting…
  • The Employment Effects of a Guaranteed Income: Experimental Evidence from Two U.S. States — Giving low income individuals $12,000/year for 3 years resulted in reduced market income of $1,500/year, due to a 2ppt reduction in labor force participation…
  • Wages/Income
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    • Family/Marriage
    • Unemployment/Participation

The Impact of AI on the U.S. Labor Market

Sania Edlich and Torsten Sløk Apollo
Date Posted:
July 30, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A difference-in-differences design finds 6.7% slower real-wage growth in AI-exposed occupations since 2023 than in low-exposure ones, with no detectable job loss. The largest effects were for the lowest quartile (-10.7%) and service occupations (-24.3%).

We examine the wage and employment effects of AI adoption across U.S. occupations using observed usage data from the Anthropic Economic Index rather than the theoretical exposure measures that dominate prior work. Using a difference-in-differences design with occupation and year fixed effects across 321 matched occupations from 2015 to 2025, we find that high-exposure occupations experience a 6.7% decline in real wage growth post-2023 with no detectable employment effects. The effect is concentrated among the lowest earners: service workers face a 24.3% decline and the bottom wage quartile a 10.7% decline, while top earners show no significant effect.Today, 5.8 million workers are affected, but as AI adoption deepens across corporate America, this figure is likely to grow substantially, with significant implications for income inequality and labor market policy in the years ahead. Only 321 of roughly 800 BLS occupations were matched, and the post-2023 period may be partially confounded by post-pandemic labor market dynamics. [Editor’s note: Figure 3 shows both wage and employment growth and decline among high-exposure workers, but the exposure measure combines automated and augmentative use, and thus cannot distinguish substitution from complementarity.]

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Cognitive Ability in Labor and Capital Markets

AI Summary. Higher cognitive ability predicts both higher capital income and higher investment returns, with the return advantage reflecting skill rather than risk-taking, as high-ability individuals earn better risk-adjusted returns while holding lower-risk portfolios.

Spencer Bastani, Kristina Karlsson, Jonas Kolsrud and Daniel Waldenström Uppsala University
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Cognitive ability positively predicts capital as well as labor income, with the capital-income gradient ~3x as large in % terms. This reflects both higher saving rates and higher risk-adjusted returns, neither fully explicable by earnings.

Does cognitive ability generate superior investment returns independent of risk?

Core argument: Cognitive ability’s capital income gradient is 3x steeper than labor income gradient in log specifications, driven by higher saving rates.

We document three results. First, cognitive ability predicts capital income. Figure 2 plots mean log income and mean income rank against the nine cognitive ability scores reporting test performance on a 1–9 scale, with both series normalized to zero at the lowest score. In the log specification (Panel a), the capital income gradient is roughly three times steeper than the labor income gradient. In the rank specification (Panel b), the ordering reverses: the labor income gradient is steeper, because the heavy right tail of capital income compresses rank differences. Figure 3 provides a complementary perspective, plotting average cognitive ability across percentiles of the labor and capital income distributions. [The relationship between ability and rank flattens at the top of the labor distribution but strengthens at the top of the capital distribution.] Second, the capital-income gradient is only partially explained by labor income: a decomposition shows that ability is associated with higher saving rates and investment returns through channels beyond labor income. Third, the investment return channel is consistent with skill rather than risk compensation, as high-ability individuals earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns while holding portfolios with lower systematic risk.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cognitive ability’s capital income gradient is 3x steeper than labor income gradient in log specifications, driven by higher saving rates.
  2. High-ability individuals earn higher risk-adjusted excess returns while holding lower-risk portfolios, indicating skill-based rather than risk-based compensation in capital markets.
  3. Ability-income associations persist across genders and remain largely unexplained by education, occupation, or family background, suggesting intrinsic cognitive factors drive.

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