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The Majority of U.S. Children Still Live in Two-Parent Families

Wendy Wang Institute For Family Studies

Date Posted:: June 14, 2021
Is Database:: Database

According to @WendyWangCFA @InstituteForFamilyStudies, 68.9% of American children live with two parents, down from 85.2% in 1970.

The proportion of American children living with two parents has decreased from 85.2% in 1970 to 68.9% today, reflecting a significant shift in family structures. Despite this decline, the share has stabilized over the past two decades, with nearly 7 in 10 children still residing in two-parent households. However, there is a notable increase in cohabitation, as 5% of children in two-parent homes now live with unmarried parents, up from 2.6% in 2007 to 3.6% in 2018. This trend highlights evolving family dynamics and suggests potential implications for economic stability and child development, as cohabitation is often linked to greater family instability and poorer child outcomes.

Wendy Wang, "The Majority of U.S. Children Still Live in Two-Parent Families," Institute For Family Studies, October 4, 2018, https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-majority-of-us-children-still-live-in-two-parent-families

The Majority of U.S. Children Still Live in Two-Parent Families

After a steady decline since the 1970s, the share of American children who live with two parents has leveled off in the past two decades. Today, nearly 7 in 10 children live with two parents, and this share remains flat since 2000.1 However, unlike their peers growing up a couple of decades ago, children under age 18 today are more likely to live with parents who are living together but not married.

The Majority of U.S. Children Still Live in Two-Parent Families: Extended Excerpt Image 1

In the past decade, the share of children who live with two married parents has dropped from 68 to 65 percent. Meanwhile, the share of children who live with two parents who are unmarried increased from 2.6% in 2007 to 3.6% in 2018, according to a Analysis by the Institute for Family Studies. In other words, 5% of children in two-parent homes today live with unmarried parents.

Cohabitation is more common among single parents. In 2018, about 1 in 6 children (16%) living with single parents also live with their mother or father’s partner, up from 11% in 2007. And the share of all children living in this arrangement rose from 2.9% to 4.2% between 2007 and 2018. At the same time, the overall share of children who live with single parents has been steady in the past two decades.

The Majority of U.S. Children Still Live in Two-Parent Families: Extended Excerpt Image 2

Taken together, an estimated 5.8 million American children live with cohabiting parents in 2018, which accounts for about 8% of all children under age 18. Among these children, 2.7 million live with their own two parents who are not married, and another 3.1 million live with one parent and that parent’s live-in partner (who is not biologically related to the child).

Younger children are more likely to experience this newer living arrangement. More than 10% of children under age 3 live in a cohabiting family in 2018—7% live with two cohabiting parents and 4% live with a single parent and his or her partner. In comparison, among teenagers between ages 12 and 17, about 6% live with cohabiting parents. Only 2% of these teenagers live with their own unmarried mom and dad, while 4% live with a single parent and his or her partner.

The living arrangements of children vary by their racial and ethnic background. A vast majority of Asian children (85%) today live with two married parents, as is the case for most white children (74%) and Hispanic children (61%). The share among black children who live with married parents is markedly lower—36% of black children live with married parents.

The Majority of U.S. Children Still Live in Two-Parent Families: Extended Excerpt Image 3

Close to 10% of Hispanic children, 8% of black children, and 7% of white children live in a home with cohabiting parents, either with their two parents or one parent and his or her unmarried partner. Cohabiting parenthood is less common among Asian families, where only 3% of Asian children live with cohabiting parents.

Among children who live with single and non-cohabiting parents, most live with their mom. More than 4 in 10 black children live with their mom (44%), and this is the most common living arrangement for black children. The share of children living with a single mom is also relatively higher among Hispanic children (22%), compared with the share among white children (12%) and Asian children (7%).

On the other hand, a small proportion of American children (4%) live in a home without either of their parents. They could be living with grandparents, relatives, or be in foster care. About 8% of black children are in this type of living arrangement, and the share among children of other races and ethnicities is lower, averaging around 3 percent.

Children’s living environment while growing up also varies by parents’ education levels. It is well-documented that a parent’s higher education, especially a mother’s, is associated with better child outcomes. One of the reasons is that highly-educated and economically better-off adults are more likely to marry and stay married, which provides a relatively more stable environment for their children’s development.

Having a college-educated mother is associated with a much higher chance that children live with two married parents. For children whose mother is college educated, 86% live with two married parents in 2018, down slightly from 2007 when it was 88%.2 In contrast, 60% of children with high-school educated mothers live with married parents in 2018.

The Majority of U.S. Children Still Live in Two-Parent Families: Extended Excerpt Image 4

Children of college-educated mothers are less likely to live in a cohabiting family: only 4% live with cohabiting parents, and about 10% live with a single mom. The share is higher among children whose mothers do not have a college degree. For example, 11% of children with high-school educated mothers live with cohabiting parents and 28% live with a single mom.

The growing share of children living in a cohabiting family, whether with their own parents or with one of their parents, adds another layer of complexity to American families today. Children can struggle in adapting to parents’ new living arrangements and navigating the relationships between their parent, his or her partner, and their other parent who does not live with them. Cohabitation is also associated with greater family instability, as most cohabitations in the U.S. are short lived. And family instability, in turn, is strongly linked to poorer child outcomes. Nevertheless, more and more children today find themselves living in a cohabiting family—at least for a time.

Wendy Wang is director of research at the Institute for Family Studies and a former senior researcher at Pew Research Center.

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1. Based on the Census Bureau’s Current Population Surveys. Parents could be either biological, step, or adoptive parents. Two parents can be either same-sex or opposite-sex couples.

2. Based on children living in households where the mother is present. Children who live with a single dad or who live without their parents (about 9% of children in 2018) are not included in the analysis.

“…After a steady decline since the 1970s, the share of American children who live with two parents has leveled off in the past two decades. Today,nearly 7 in 10 children live with two parents, and this share remains flat since 2000.1 However, unlike their peers growing up a couple of decades ago, children under age 18 today are more likely to live with parents who are living together but not married….”

Ed Comment:Does the family study break out children living with married parents by income AND race (i.e., a 2x2 matrix)?

Ben Comment:Here is the analysis from the institute for family studies:https://ifstudies.org/blog/the-majority-of-us-children-still-live-in-two-parent-families(note, this article is from 2018) I’m surprised it’s as high as they’re reporting too. They do not break the numbers out by income, nor do they make any adjustments for income, but they do the breakout by education:

The Imprint articlehttps://imprintnews.org/featured/new-york-city-de-blasio-black-foster-care/33992is from Fed 2019. None of this stuff is exactly new. From NYC population data (2019):

This is not exactly apples to apples since the imprint data end in 2017 and the City data I found is 2019. Looks like Latino underrepresentation is over stated (latino pop is ~35% and the latino foster pop is between 32 and 35%. The biggest under representation is White (20 percentage point difference) followed by asian (6-8 percentage point drop). The imprint article also does nothing to account for income but this is hardly surprising - not too many rich kids in foster care, I would guess.

Falling Fertility: The Changing Value of Freedom, Fulfillment, and Family

Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros Onofri National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: September 2, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].

Terra Incognita: The Economics of a Shrinking World

Jesús Fernández-Villaverde and Patrick Norrick University of Pennsylvania

Date Posted:: August 14, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

In Table A1 we compare the World Population Prospects (WPP) estimates of births in 2022-2023 with the official numbers reported by several countries. [A2 shows the full sample with the deviations.] As of 2026, humanity is likely to be below the replacement fertility level: we are having fewer births than we need to keep population constant in the long run. This astonishing fact does not mean that population has stopped growing. Because of momentum effects (the large cohorts of women born two or three decades ago are having their children now, and their own parents have not died yet), world population will keep growing for another 30 years or so. But unless trends change, it will peak at roughly 9 billion around 2056 and then start falling, first slowly, then fast.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Global fertility has fallen below replacement level as of 2026, ending humanity’s ability to sustain long-run population stability without a reversal in trends.
Population momentum—driven by large cohorts of women now in peak childbearing years—will sustain growth for roughly 30 more years before world population peaks at approximately 9 billion around 2056 and begins declining.

Americans Are Done With Being Put in Racial Boxes

Justin Fox Bloomberg

Date Posted:: July 21, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

The increase in immigration from Asia and Latin America since the 1960s has been the chief driver of the rise in diversity and decline in the non-Hispanic White share of the population. But those immigrants have been doing what generations of immigrants before them did and, well, becoming Americans. Marriages across racial and ethnic lines are much more prevalent among Hispanic and Asian Americans than Black or non-Hispanic White Americans, while intermarriage rates have been rising steadily for the latter two groups, too. As a result, a growing share of Americans just isn’t going to fit neatly into any single racial or ethnic category that the US government can come up with.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Post-1960s immigration from Asia and Latin America is the primary driver of rising U.S. demographic diversity and the declining non-Hispanic White population share.
Intermarriage rates among Hispanic and Asian Americans exceed those of Black and non-Hispanic White Americans, expanding a multiracial population that no single government racial category can accurately capture.

The Pig In The Python: US Decennial Labor Flows And Economic Opportunity, 1910–2040

Steven Ruggles Proceedings of the National Academy of Sciences

Date Posted:: July 14, 2026
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Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

Figure 3A highlights the influx of workers that occurred between 1960 and 1980, as the large baby-boom cohort entered the labor force, female labor-force participation expanded, and immigration rose [see Figure 2 for a detailed breakdown]. It was difficult for the economy to absorb all the new workers, and wages for young people declined sharply after peaking in 1973. Figure 3A does not, however, provide a valid measure of labor-market competition because the baby boomers and newly employed women and immigrants did not suddenly vanish after they entered the labor force; they kept working and occupying jobs until they eventually retired decades later. The glut of workers entering the labor force in the 1970s would continue to stifle demand for new workers until their eventual exit from the labor force, a process that is still in progress. The index of employment competition shown in Figure 3B is [a better] measure of relative cohort size than 3A. It represents the cumulative net labor-market entries over the previous five decades as a % of the working-age population in the current decade. As shown in Figure 1C, we are already seeing signs of an uptick in the wages of young workers, and as the demographic shortage accelerates we may finally see real wages of the young exceed the levels of the early 1970s.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Baby-boom labor-force entry during 1960–1980 suppressed young-worker wages, which declined sharply after peaking in 1973, reducing economic opportunity for new.
Cumulative labor-market entries over five decades as a % of working-age population drives employment competition that persists decades after initial.
Female labor-force participation expansion and immigration during 1960–1980 created a sustained worker glut that stifled demand for new employment until.

Baby Busts and Growth Booms: Demographic Change and the Macroeconomy

Daron Acemoglu, David Autor, Keelan Beirne and Andrew Scott National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: July 7, 2026
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Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Figure 3 traces out how GDP per worker evolves following a 1pp increase in birth rates at t−20. Since cohorts born at t−20 (e.g., 1970) do not enter the working-age population until t = 0 (e.g., 1990), we should observe no response before t = 0; [indeed] the estimated coefficients are ~0 and statistically insignificant before t = 0. Beginning at t = 0, however, higher birth rates are associated with lower GDP per worker, and the negative effects grow progressively larger over time. For example, a 1pp lower birth rate at t−20 is associated with 22 log points higher GDP per worker at t+20 and 29 log points higher by t+40. The latter corresponds to roughly 0.73 percentage points faster annual growth over the 40-year interval. We find that lower birth rates are associated with more labor-saving patents and a growing share of high-tech industries across countries and US commuting zones [Figure 11]. They are also predictive of higher TFP growth across countries and US industries and increased patenting in ICT and broader automation technology classes. Using cross-country variation in WWII-era military and civilian deaths, we present suggestive evidence that the positive growth effects of falling birth rates are primarily driven by the scarcity of younger workers rather than by reductions in population per se [Figure 14]. [Editor’s note: the paper does not grapple with the fiscal consequences of an aging population.]

What Demographic Prediction Can and Cannot Achieve

Samuele Lo Piano, Marta Kuc-Czarnecka, Roger Pielke, and Andrea Saltelli Social Science Research Network

Date Posted:: May 29, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

We explore demographic predictions by propagating all plausible choices that can be made during the analysis through the modelling process. This approach involves navigating the so-called ’garden of forking paths’—mimicking in silico what would happen if multiple investigators were to examine the same problem. For this, we now abandon [the Chinese government mathematician] Song Jian’s ‘historic’ model and turn to models currently in use: the Cohort-Component and UN WPP models, the Lee-Carter model and the Lotka-Volterra model. Note that in standard use, these tools are used in isolation, see e.g. the FAO’s How to Feed the World in 2050, resting on a single UN WPP population trajectory shielding the reader from the compounding effect of their uncertainty. Unsurprisingly, the exercise capturing the modelling of the modelling process for global population projections to 2050 and 2075 reveals distinct characteristics regarding the sensitivity and projection outcomes of the different models. Once abandoned the straitjacket of Song’s approach, uncertainty is free to manifest itself. The overall uncertainty distributions of the projected populations show a wide range of possible outcomes, reflecting the inherent uncertainties in demographic projections.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Model choice accounts for 98% of output variance in 2050 global population projections, driving divergent forecasts ranging from 4–25 billion.
Song Jian’s optimization model converges to 700 million people by 2080 across all parameter variations (670–700 million range), demonstrating structural.
Global fertility declined from 5 children per woman in 1950 to 2.1 currently, with no rebound in countries where rates.

According to @WendyWangCFA @InstituteForFamilyStudies, 68.9% of American children live with two parents, down from 85.2% in 1970.

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Does freedom from family obligations now outweigh the fulfillment children provide?

Related Articles:

The UN appears to systematically overestimate births; e.g. 33 of 37 countries with high-quality statistics registered fewer births in 2024 than the UN had forecast. Fernández-Villaverde and Norrick infer humanity is below replacement fertility in 2026.

Will declining birth rates eventually shrink the global economy?

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Less than half of Americans < 29 years old are non-Hispanic whites. As of 2020, 33.8mm Americans – 10.2% of the population – identify as being of two or more races, largely driven by intermarriage between whites and either Hispanics or Asian Americans.

Is the traditional racial classification system becoming obsolete?

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Accounting for both inflows and the overhang of previous labor market entrants, Ruggles predicts a labor shortage such that “Americans born in the 2020s might be the first cohort in a half century that earns significantly more than their parents did.”

Does a one-time labor surge create permanent wage pressure?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Cross-country evidence from 1950 to 2020 shows that a 1pp lower birth rate is associated with 22 log points (~25%) higher GDP per worker 40 years later and 29 log points (~44%) after 60 years, likely driven by labor-saving technical change.

Related Articles:

Simulation of the decision chain yielding projections of world population in 2050 that range from 6 to 14B suggests most of the variance in demographic forecasts arises not from parameter uncertainty or data randomness but from model choice.

How much do demographic models actually predict versus explore?

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