Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
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SCE Labor Market Survey Shows Average Reservation Wage Continues Upward Trend

AI Summary. A survey of consumer expectations finds the average reservation wage — the lowest pay respondents say they would accept for a new job — has risen for both employed and non-employed respondents, with a larger increase for the employed (19.4% versus about 12%). Among employed respondents, those without a college degree showed the largest rise, 27%.

Felix Aidala and Gizem Kosar Federal Reserve Bank Of New York
Date Posted:
December 19, 2022

According to the @NewYorkFed, the reservation wage continues to climb, with the average now $73,667. Since March 2020, that’s a 19.4% increase for employed workers and 12% for the unemployed.

Is the lowest pay workers will accept still rising?

Core argument: The average reservation wage in the SCE Labor Market Survey rose 19.4% for employed respondents between March 2020 and November 2022, versus about 12% for non-employed respondents over the same period.

When we look at the series for employed and non-employed (unemployed or out of the labor force) respondents separately, as in the chart below, we observe that the average reservation wage has been increasing for both groups since late 2017, but more so since the onset of the pandemic. In addition, the chart displays the increase since the onset of the pandemic (since March 2020) to be more pronounced for employed respondents. Specifically, while the average reservation wage increased by 19.4% between March 2020 and November 2022 for employed respondents, it increased by around 12 percent for non-employed respondents in the same time period. Among the employed respondents, we observe the highest rise in this time period for those without a college degree (a 27% increase).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The average reservation wage in the SCE Labor Market Survey rose 19.4% for employed respondents between March 2020 and November 2022, versus about 12% for non-employed respondents over the same period.
  2. Among employed respondents, those without a college degree recorded the largest increase in average reservation wage between March 2020 and November 2022, at 27%.
  3. Average reservation wages have risen for both employed and non-employed respondents since late 2017, with the increase more pronounced since the onset of the pandemic.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Workforce
    • Wages/Income
Previous articleDecember 19, 2022Britain’s NHS faces huge challenges in 2023Britain’s National Health Service is under increasing stress, with 6.8mm people on its waiting lists, up from 4.2mm prior to the pandemic. Britain has 2.9 doctors per thousand people, vs. 3.7 average for the OECD. @EconomistNext articleDecember 19, 2022What The Fed Says Versus What the Market Has Priced In.@biancoresearch sees two scenarios for equities, both bad: either the stock market declines on weak recessionary earnings and the Fed pivots, or the economy stays hot, and the market declines on higher-than-expected rates.
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AI, Work From Home, And The Young-Graduate Job Market

AI Summary. Occupations with higher work-from-home adoption are associated with slower employment growth for young college graduates relative to middle-aged workers, an accounting exercise attributing 56%–88% of the decline in young graduates' full-time-equivalent employment rate to remote work. Measures of artificial-intelligence exposure and adoption show statistically insignificant effects.

Ernie Tedeschi Stripe Economics
Date Posted:
November 12, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Employment is down among less AI-exposed Americans 22-26 without a 4-year college degree, as well as young college graduates, complicating an AI-only explanation. Stripe’s analysis indicates that work from home better predicts young graduates’ employment losses relative to older workers than does AI.

Is remote work, not AI, behind weaker young-graduate hiring?

Core argument: Each additional 10 percentage points of occupational work-from-home adoption is associated with employment rates for young college graduates growing 3.9 to 6.6 percentage points more slowly than for middle-aged workers, a statistically significant relationship.

The left panel shows the relationship between the occupational WFH [Work from home] share (x-axis) and growth in our young-grad–mid-career employment spread (y-axis). The relationship is negative and statistically significant. Between 2023 and the last 12 months, for every extra 10pp of WFH adoption, employment rates for young college grads grew between 3.9 to 6.6pp more slowly than those for middle-aged workers. The middle panel replaces WFH adoption with AI exposure as a separate explanatory variable. As jobs become more exposed to AI, the effect on the new-grad employment spread is also negative but much shallower than with WFH and statistically indistinguishable from zero. The same is true of industry AI adoption, shown in the right panel: industries that self-reported a higher likelihood of using AI in 2026 H1 actually saw, if anything, slightly faster young-grad employment growth relative to mid-career, though again, this effect is statistically insignificant. Our model is suggestive rather than truly causal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Each additional 10 percentage points of occupational work-from-home adoption is associated with employment rates for young college graduates growing 3.9 to 6.6 percentage points more slowly than for middle-aged workers, a statistically significant relationship.
  2. In an accounting rather than causal exercise, work-from-home accounts for 0.69 to 1.08 percentage points of the 1.23-percentage-point decline in the young-grad full-time-equivalent employment-population ratio between 2023 and 2026, or 56% to 88% of the total.
  3. AI exposure shows a negative but much shallower relationship with the young-grad employment spread that is statistically indistinguishable from zero, and industries self-reporting higher likely AI use in 2026 H1 saw, if anything, slightly faster young-grad employment growth relative to mid-career.

Related Articles:

  • August 2026: Adoption Rises to 22.4% — AI adoption has risen to 22.4%, with labor market effects visible but narrow: employment drags appear in marketing, graphic design, customer service, and some tech occupations, offset by 209k in added data center-exposed construction jobs. Corporate layoffs attributed to AI totaled 113k year-to-date, including 11k in a single month.
  • Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment
  • Workforce

On Europe’s Economy, Let’s Ditch The Lazy Stereotypes

AI Summary. Prime-age adults aged 25–54 and older workers aged 55–64 have higher employment rates in Europe than in the US, while US youth employment is higher because Europeans spend longer in education. The share of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe.

Chris Giles Financial Times
Date Posted:
September 10, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Despite Europe’s high social spending relative to the US, Chris Giles notes that prime-age adult (25–54) labor force participation in the Eurozone has overtaken that of the US, and there has been a dramatic convergence in the LFP of older workers.

Do Europeans work less than Americans?

Core argument: Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.

It does not matter whether you use EU or Eurozone data, prime-age adults (between 25 and 54) in Europe are more likely to be in work than those in the US. Older people (between 55 and 64) also have higher employment rates in Europe. Younger people (between 15 and 24) are more likely to have a job in the US, but that results from Europeans educating themselves for longer. The proportion of young people not in education, employment or training is higher in the US than in Europe. So welfare is not stopping work. More than that, the higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, although there is convergence within the Eurozone. Spain, in particular, has enjoyed rapid improvements.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Prime-age adults aged 25–54 in Europe are more likely to be employed than their US counterparts, whether measured with EU or Eurozone data, and Europeans aged 55–64 also have higher employment rates than Americans.
  2. Young people aged 15–24 are more likely to have a job in the US than in Europe, but that gap results from Europeans spending longer in education, and the share not in education, employment or training is higher in the US.
  3. The higher-welfare north of Europe tends to have higher employment rates than the south, with convergence within the Eurozone and rapid improvement in Spain.

Related Articles:

  • Why Do Americans No Longer Work So Much More Than Non-Americans? — About half of the 1990s gap between American and European hours worked had reversed by the end of the 2010s. The authors estimate US hours per person declined after the 2000s because of rising benefits for the non-employed—especially health benefits like Medicaid—while non-US hours rose with higher wages and lower work costs.
  • The Future of European Competitiveness – A Competitiveness Strategy for Europe — A European Union competitiveness report attributes the EU's labour productivity growth gap with the US largely to weaker activity in information and communications technology and large-scale digital services; excluding main ICT sectors, EU productivity was broadly at par with the US from 2000-2019. It estimates Europe's investment share must rise about 5 percentage points of GDP.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Comparisons
    • Europe USA Relative Performance
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Workforce

The Jobs Apocalypse Is Postponed. An AI Jobs Boom Is Here

AI Summary. Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, including electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing, has risen roughly 320,000 above what broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists have added about 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
September 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The Economist estimates that so far the AI boom has created ~1mm new jobs in the US, exceeding their estimate of ~200,000 layoffs attributed to AI since mid-2023.

Is the AI build-out adding jobs above trend?

Core argument: Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.

[We] tracked five industries at the heart of the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing. Since 2023 employment in them has risen by roughly 320,000 more than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Not all of those jobs owe their existence to AI—grid upgrades and other factory building matters too. [We also] tracked employment in professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—and compared their growth since 2022 with professional employment overall. These roles have added roughly 730,000 jobs above trend in recent years. AI will not have created every single one of them. But it has almost certainly created quite a few.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Employment in five industries tied to the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing, has risen by roughly 320,000 more since 2023 than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest.
  2. Professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—have added roughly 730,000 jobs above the trend for professional employment overall since 2022.
  3. Not all of these above-trend gains are attributable to AI, since grid upgrades and other factory building also matter, though AI has almost certainly created quite a few of them.

Related Articles:

  • The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
  • Canaries in the Coal Mine? Six Facts about the Recent Employment Effects of Artificial Intelligence — Employment for workers aged 22–25 in the occupations most exposed to artificial intelligence has declined roughly 18pp relative to less-exposed peers, with no comparable decline in other age groups. The authors find this operates mainly through reduced hiring, concentrated where AI substitutes for human tasks rather than complements them.
  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment
  • Workforce

Americans Without College Degrees Are Having One of the Best Job Markets in Years

AI Summary. The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 without a college degree has rarely been lower in the past two decades, and relative to their own historical ranges the job market looks much better for blue-collar and manual-service workers. Degree-holders still face lower unemployment rates overall.

Theo Francis and Ray Smith Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
September 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

In 2026, the 12-month moving-average unemployment for college-educated 22–34-year-olds is above its post-2003 mean, while the rate for non-college peers is historically low. Prime-age college grads still have lower unemployment than those with no degree.

Is the job market unusually strong for workers without college degrees?

Core argument: The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades, based on data through July.

The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades. To gauge how the job market has shifted for each cohort, [Gad Levanon, Burning Glass’s chief economist] compared current unemployment rates for the different groups with their own range of unemployment rates since 2003. The analysis included data through July. By that measure, the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers, including those in construction and on manufacturing lines, and manual-service workers. It is [however] still easier to find a job with a college degree. The unemployment rate for degree-holders in their prime working years—ages 25 to 54—averaged 2.7% for the 12 months ending in July - well below the 3.6% rate for workers with just some college education, and 4.7% for people with a high-school diploma only.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades, based on data through July.
  2. Burning Glass chief economist Gad Levanon compared each cohort's current unemployment rate against its own range since 2003, and by that measure the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers in construction and manufacturing and for manual-service workers.
  3. College graduates ages 25 to 54 averaged a 2.7% unemployment rate for the 12 months ending in July, below the 3.6% rate for workers with some college education and 4.7% for those with only a high-school diploma.

Related Articles:

  • College Grads Struggle to Find Jobs. Non-Grads Are Giving Up — The narrowing gap in unemployment rates between young college graduates and non-graduates appears driven mainly by non-graduates dropping out of the labor force rather than by diplomas losing value, since people not seeking work aren't counted as unemployed. The share of young non-graduates employed is 1.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels.
  • To Fix Education, Fix The Economy First — 30% of US adults have literacy skills typical of a 10-year-old, yet US workers scoring at that low level earn an average of nearly $30 an hour and two-thirds are employed, compared with about $20 and fewer than half employed in Britain. The author argues this reflects stronger economic growth rather than vocational education policy.
  • The College Wage Premium in the Generative AI Era — The U.S. college wage premium fell from 0.626 to 0.575 after four decades of expansion, implying the first sustained negative growth in relative demand for college-educated labor. The authors estimate that weaker wage growth in occupations highly exposed to artificial intelligence accounts for roughly 28% of that decline, though the patterns are not causal.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • College
      • K-12

What’s Behind the Declining Trend Unemployment Rate?

AI Summary. The trend unemployment rate is estimated to have fallen from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024, a decline of about 3.3 percentage points, with a little more than half attributed to changes in workforce composition. Rising educational attainment is the largest compositional factor, lowering the trend by about 1 percentage point.

Andreas Hornstein, Marianna Kudlyak, Greeshma Avaradi and Taerin Kim Federal Reserve Bank of San Francisco
Date Posted:
August 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Hornstein et al find that about half of the ~3pp drop in the trend unemployment rate since 1976 is due to compositional change in the work force towards lower unemployment “types ” – in particular, older and more educated workers.

Why has the trend unemployment rate declined over recent decades?

Core argument: The estimated trend unemployment rate fell from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024, a decline of about 3.3 percentage points, with changes in workforce composition accounting for a little more than half of it.

We find that the trend unemployment rate declined from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024 [Figure 1]. Roughly half of that decline reflects compositional change. Figure 2 separates the estimated cumulative change in the annual unemployment trend since 1976 into its components. The total decline was about 3.3 percentage points by 2024. Changes in workforce composition account for a little more than half of that decline. Rising educational attainment is the single largest compositional force, lowering the trend about 1pp. Figure 4 plots estimated education shares for entering cohorts of women, and these patterns are similar for male cohorts (not shown). The figure shows a steady long-run fall in the share of new female cohorts with less than high school education and a steady rise in the share with some college or a college degree. [Returning to Figure 2], changes in group-specific LFP rate trends contribute only ~0.3 pp. The remaining decline, a bit under 1pp, comes from lower group-specific trend unemployment.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The estimated trend unemployment rate fell from 7.8% in 1976 to 4.8% in 2024, a decline of about 3.3 percentage points, with changes in workforce composition accounting for a little more than half of it.
  2. Rising educational attainment is the single largest compositional force in the decomposition, lowering the trend unemployment rate by about 1 percentage point.
  3. Changes in group-specific labor force participation rate trends contribute about 0.3 percentage point of the decline, while lower group-specific trend unemployment accounts for a bit under 1 percentage point.

Related Articles:

  • Global Views: They’re Not Hiking — Estimated underlying trend job growth slowed to about 5k, below the estimated 50k breakeven pace, so similar readings would likely reverse part of the unemployment rate's decline from 4.5% to 4.1%. The authors argue that decline reflects lower labor force participation rather than higher employment, with wage growth still weak.
  • Labor Force Participation Is High If You Measure It Right — The headline labor force participation rate — the share of people 16 and older working or looking for work — is a limited gauge of labor market health because participation varies greatly by age. Aging baby boomers and the addition of nearly 1.7m Americans 65 and older to population estimates add distortion.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Workforce

College Grads Struggle to Find Jobs. Non-Grads Are Giving Up

AI Summary. The narrowing gap in unemployment rates between young college graduates and non-graduates appears driven mainly by non-graduates dropping out of the labor force rather than by diplomas losing value, since people not seeking work aren't counted as unemployed. The share of young non-graduates employed is 1.7 percentage points below pre-pandemic levels.

Justin Fox Bloomberg
Date Posted:
August 25, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Labor force participation is rising for American college graduates aged 25–29, and is now at 89.4% – above its pre-pandemic level. Participation among non-college members of that age cohort is falling; at 78.7%, it is now below its pre-pandemic level.

Is the narrowing unemployment gap driven by non-graduates leaving the workforce?

Core argument: The employment-population ratio for young adults without college degrees is 1.7 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level and trending downward, while the ratio for young college graduates sits near its pre-pandemic level.

The narrowing of [the unemployment gap btw college and non-college workers] in recent years has lent support to narratives that college diplomas are losing their value amid the rise of large language models, the purported return of blue-collar work, and other job market changes. But while it may well be that diplomas have lost value, the recent shrinking of the young-adult education-unemployment gap seems to be driven mainly by a different phenomenon. Growing numbers of young adults without college degrees simply aren’t trying to find work and thus aren’t counted in unemployment calculations. The employment-population ratio for young college grads is not far off from where it was just before the pandemic and seems as if it might be headed upward again after a sharp drop in 2023 and 2024, for non-grads it is 1.7 percentage points lower than before the pandemic and clearly trending downward.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The employment-population ratio for young adults without college degrees is 1.7 percentage points below its pre-pandemic level and trending downward, while the ratio for young college graduates sits near its pre-pandemic level.
  2. The narrowing unemployment gap between young college and non-college workers appears driven mainly by growing numbers of non-graduates who are not seeking work and therefore are not counted as unemployed.
  3. The employment-population ratio for young college graduates fell sharply in 2023 and 2024 and appears as if it might be headed upward again.

Related Articles:

  • Labor Force Participation Is High If You Measure It Right — The headline labor force participation rate — the share of people 16 and older working or looking for work — is a limited gauge of labor market health because participation varies greatly by age. Aging baby boomers and the addition of nearly 1.7m Americans 65 and older to population estimates add distortion.
  • How Labor Force Participation Has Diverged Across Genders — Between 1976 and 2024 the trend labor force participation rate fell 10.1 percentage points for men and rose 8.2 points for women. Population aging lowered participation by about 4 points for each gender and rising education raised it (+6 for women, +3 for men), but the divergence is dominated by participation trends within age-gender groups.
  • AI, Immigration, and Collapsing Labor Force Participation — As labor force participation falls, a shrinking group of workers generates the income, taxes, and innovation supporting a growing number of non-workers, leaving the economy more fragile because labor shocks are concentrated among fewer participants. Labor scarcity raises the return on automation, robotics, and software, making growth depend on productivity rather than participation.
  • Unemployment/Participation
  • Politics
  • Workforce
    • Education
      • College
      • K-12
    • Family/Marriage
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