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AI Summary. Support for right-wing populism is driven more by cultural anti-elitism than economic hardship, as working-class supporters report economic confidence matching national averages while cultural grievances—particularly distrust of media and perceived liberal dominance—are strongest among college-educated supporters.

Ryan Streeter American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
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According to @RyanStreeter, Trumpism is driven more by cultural anti-elitism than by economic populism, as seen in AEI survey results highlighting a cultural divide among Trump supporters.

Does cultural backlash drive populism more than economic anxiety?

Core argument: 90% of college-educated Trump supporters believe journalists have a political agenda vs. 80% of working-class supporters, demonstrating that cultural grievances about institutional bias drive Trumpism more than economic anxiety.

The AEI survey highlights a cultural rather than economic divide among Trump supporters, with 71% of working-class Americans believing they have achieved or are on their way to achieving the American Dream, aligning with the national average of 70%. Despite narratives of economic frustration, 42% of working-class heartlanders are confident in the economy during the pandemic, compared to 41% of college-educated heartlanders and 38% nationally. Cultural sentiments dominate, as 90% of college-educated Trump supporters believe journalists have a political agenda, compared to 80% of working-class supporters. Additionally, 56% of college-educated Trump supporters perceive liberals as having more cultural influence, versus 33% of the working class. On racial issues, only 33% of college-educated Trump supporters acknowledge discrimination against black Americans, compared to 46% of the working class. This data underscores that Trumpism is driven more by cultural anti-elitism than by economic populism.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. 90% of college-educated Trump supporters believe journalists have a political agenda vs. 80% of working-class supporters, demonstrating that cultural grievances about institutional bias drive Trumpism more than economic anxiety.
  2. 71% of working-class Americans report achieving or approaching the American Dream, matching the 70% national average, which leads to the conclusion that economic dissatisfaction does not explain Trump support among this demographic.
  3. 56% of college-educated Trump supporters perceive liberals as wielding excessive cultural influence vs. 33% of working-class supporters, indicating that anti-elitism rooted in cultural resentment—not economic hardship—motivates college-educated adherents.

Ryan Streeter, "Trumpism is more about culture than economics," American Enterprise Institute, November 23, 2020, https://www.aei.org/articles/trumpism-is-more-about-culture-than-economics/

Trumpism is more about culture than economics

The question of whether Trumpism will survive a Trump presidency was answered affirmatively after the November 3 election by a number of commentators and politicians, most of whom have been advocating working-class conservatism for a while.

The basic argument is that Trump’s performance with voters without college degrees, together with an increased share of ethnic minorities, proves the GOP should embrace economic populism. This is a classic case of David Hume’s famous “is-ought” problem whereby one easily slides from an observation of what is to prescriptions about what ought to be. Upon inspection, it is hard to find much evidence that a vote for Trump was a vote for economic populism. What does seem clear, rather, is that Trumpism has always been more of a cultural than economic phenomenon.

Scott Lincicome has helpfully catalogued how conservative voters don’t embrace economic nationalism’s protectionist trade and restrictive immigration policies. He also shows how working-class voters have been negatively impacted by Trump’s protectionist actions. This follows Jonah Goldberg’s observation that Trump’s campaign in 2020, like his governing successes since 2016, had virtually nothing to do with economic populism. In fact, one can argue that policies aimed to appeal to the working class, such as wall-building, were largely failures.

If we look a bit deeper at Trumpian populism, it becomes clear it is mostly a bundle of cultural sentiments. It is rooted in anti-elitism, which does not necessarily mean support for industrial policy, protectionism, or restrictive immigration. Large national surveys conducted by the American Enterprise Institute suggest Trump’s supporters are actually quite content with American economic life but highly reactive to elite dominance of American cultural life.

For instance, working-class Americans are more bullish on economic matters than conventional wisdom suggests: 71 percent of them believe they have either achieved the American Dream or are on their way to doing so, in line with the national average of 70 percent. Fifty-nine percent of the working class believe that anyone can start a business in America, compared to the national average of 56 percent. Working-class Americans who live in small towns and rural areas have been more optimistic about the economy during the pandemic than college-educated people in the same areas. Forty-two percent of working-class people in the heartland are confident in the economy during the pandemic versus 41 percent among heartlanders with college degrees and 38 percent nationally. In other words the reality of frustration in the heartland is a bit different than the narrative we hear so much about.

The “anger” that has been endlessly analyzed since 2016 has always been more of a cultural phenomenon than an expression of economic anxiety. Donald Trump antagonized the elite classes of American society from the beginning of his campaign in 2015, and his supporters loved him for it—and no one more than his non-working-class, college-educated supporters. It turns out that Trump voters with a college degree are more anti-elitist and ideological than the working class. Six in 10 Americans think journalists have a political agenda, but this jumps to nine in 10 among Trump supporters with college degrees and eight in 10 working-class Trump supporters. When asked how much influence liberals and conservatives have on American culture, 56 percent of college-educated Trump supporters think liberals have more influence, compared with 33 percent of the Trump working class.

When it comes to political discourse, educated Trump voters are more likely than working-class Trump supporters to view politics as a zero-sum game and to have less tolerance for disagreement with political opponents. Trump supporters with college degrees are also considerably more distrusting of experts than people with college degrees who live in small towns and rural areas, so there really is something about Trumpism that is more powerful than geography and demographics.

On race, 71 percent of the population thinks black Americans suffer discrimination. Given common portrayals of the working class, one shouldn’t be surprised that this drops to 46 percent among the Trump working class. But one might be surprised to know it drops even further to 33 percent among Trump supporters with college degrees.

Trumpism is an anti-leftist, anti-elitist cultural stance. It is not a policy agenda. If Trump had campaigned on eliminating the inheritance tax for the rich while keeping up his anti-elitist bluster, his support would have remained unchanged. The fact that working-class Trump supporters believe in entrepreneurship more than the average American could be just as easily used to suggest that a pro-worker agenda should focus on small business and angel investing rather than industrial policy. Economic populism seems to enjoy more support from highly educated writers, pundits, and politicians than the working class whose interests they claim to defend.

On the state of the American dream“…For instance, working-class Americans are more bullish on economic matters than conventional wisdom suggests: 71 percent of them believe they have either achieved the American Dream or are on their way to doing so, in line with the national average of 70 percent. Fifty-nine percent of the working class believe that anyone can start a business in America, compared to the national average of 56 percent. Working-class Americans who live in small towns and rural areas have been more optimistic about the economy during the pandemic than college-educated people in the same areas. Forty-two percent of working-class people in the heartland are confident in the economy during the pandemic versus 41 percent among heartlanders with college degrees and 38 percent nationally. In other words the reality of frustration in the heartland is a bit different than the narrative we hear so much about…”

On anti-elite anger, “…It turns out that Trump voters with a college degree are more anti-elitist and ideological than the working class. Six in 10 Americans think journalists have a political agenda, but this jumps to nine in 10 among Trump supporters with college degrees and eight in 10 working-class Trump supporters.When asked how much influence liberals and conservatives have on American culture,56 percent of college-educated Trump supporters think liberals have more influence, compared with 33 percent of the Trump working class….”

On race, “…71 percent of the population thinks black Americans suffer discrimination. Given common portrayals of the working class, one shouldn’t be surprised that this drops to46 percent among the Trump working class. But one might be surprised to know it drops even further to 33 percent among Trump supporters with college degrees. …”

Ed Comment:“….Martin sandbu in the Economics of Belonging, argues that culture views are a byproduct of economics, or, at least are highly correlated with them. Certain similar working class demographics across many countries/economies have right wing anti-elite/anti-immigrant/anti-trade/less tolerate of changing attitudes. So I think Streeter is overly dismissive of this linkage. What I find especially interesting about this article is that Trump supporters with college degrees believe more strongly that:“…Six in 10 Americans think journalists have a political agenda, but this jumps to nine in 10 among Trump supporters with college degrees and eight in 10 working-class Trump supporters. When asked how much influence liberals and conservatives have on American culture, 56 percent of college-educated Trump supporters think liberals have more influence, compared with 33 percent of the Trump working class….On race, 71 percent of the population thinks black Americans suffer discrimination. Given common portrayals of the working class, one shouldn’t be surprised that this drops to 46 percent among the Trump working class. But one might be surprised to know it drops even further to 33 percent among Trump supporters with college degrees…” Aren’t conservative college graduates just more clear-eyed about the truth? Journalists do have agendas. College liberalism has more impact on the world of college grads. And racism likely has less impact on the outcomes of blacks than advocate of anti-racism claim. Both Streeter and Sandbu seem biased in over-generalizing about the similarity of beliefs of the coalition of Trump supporters and describing their frustration negatively. Given the truths above, shouldn’t they be frustrated?

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