“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
“…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times

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The Immigration Rebound

Tim Krupa Goldman Sachs

Date Posted:: January 25, 2023
Is Database:: Database

According to @GoldmanSachs, foreign-born labor force is rebounding from 2.8mm below trend in September 2020 to 1.2mm below trend in March 2022.

Starting in 2019, tighter immigration policies and pandemic disruptions led to a significant decline in the US foreign-born working-age population, with the labor force falling 2.8m below its long-term trend by April 2020. However, by March 2022, this gap had narrowed to 1.2m below trend, indicating a rebound. Over the past 18 months, the foreign-born population has grown by 137k per month, compared to 68k per month from Jan. 2010 to Jan. 2019. Similarly, the foreign-born labor force has expanded by 110k per month, up from 42k per month during the previous period. This resurgence highlights a recovery in the foreign-born labor market, which is crucial for addressing labor shortages and supporting economic growth.

“….Starting in 2019, tighter immigration policies under the Trump Administration followed by pandemic disruptions depressed the US foreign-born working-age population. The foreign-born labor force fell 2.8 million below its long-term trend level in April 2020 and remained 1.2 million below trend in March 2022. In Exhibit 1, the left panel shows the foreign-born population has grown 137k per month in the past 18 months, compared to 68k per month from Jan. 2010 to Jan. 2019. The right panel shows the foreign-born labor force has grown 110k per month in the past 18 months, compared to 42k per month during the prior period…..”

Tim Krupa, “The Immigration Rebound,” Goldman Sachs, January 19, 2023, https://idfs.gs.com/as/authorization.oauth2

The Jobs Apocalypse Is Postponed. An AI Jobs Boom Is Here

Economist Staff The Economist

Date Posted:: September 9, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

The Economist estimates that so far the AI boom has created ~1mm new jobs in the US, exceeding their estimate of ~200,000 layoffs attributed to AI since mid-2023.

[We] tracked five industries at the heart of the data-centre build-out, from electrical contracting to equipment manufacturing. Since 2023 employment in them has risen by roughly 320,000 more than broader construction and manufacturing trends would suggest. Not all of those jobs owe their existence to AI—grid upgrades and other factory building matters too. [We also] tracked employment in professional occupations closest to the AI boom—engineers, software developers, mathematicians and data scientists—and compared their growth since 2022 with professional employment overall. These roles have added roughly 730,000 jobs above trend in recent years. AI will not have created every single one of them. But it has almost certainly created quite a few.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

AI-linked demand has generated roughly 730,000 above-trend jobs in engineering, software development, and data science since 2022, substantially outpacing near-term displacement effects.
Data-centre construction has added approximately 320,000 above-trend jobs across electrical contracting and equipment manufacturing since 2023, with grid upgrades and broader factory-building contributing alongside AI demand.

Americans Without College Degrees Are Having One of the Best Job Markets in Years

Theo Francis and Ray Smith Wall Street Journal

Date Posted:: September 8, 2026
Is Database:: Database

In 2026, the 12-month moving-average unemployment for college-educated 22–34-year-olds is above its post-2003 mean, while the rate for non-college peers is historically low. Prime-age college grads still have lower unemployment than those with no degree.

The unemployment rate for workers ages 22 to 34 who never graduated from college has rarely been lower in the past two decades. To gauge how the job market has shifted for each cohort, [Gad Levanon, Burning Glass’s chief economist] compared current unemployment rates for the different groups with their own range of unemployment rates since 2003. The analysis included data through July. By that measure, the job market looks much better for blue-collar workers, including those in construction and on manufacturing lines, and manual-service workers. It is [however] still easier to find a job with a college degree. The unemployment rate for degree-holders in their prime working years—ages 25 to 54—averaged 2.7% for the 12 months ending in July - well below the 3.6% rate for workers with just some college education, and 4.7% for people with a high-school diploma only.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Non-college workers ages 22–34 are experiencing one of their strongest job markets in two decades, with unemployment rates near historic lows relative to their own 2003–present range, outperforming their college-educated peers on that relative measure.
On an absolute basis, a college degree still confers a significant labor-market advantage: prime-age degree-holders averaged 2.7% unemployment versus 3.6% for some-college workers and 4.7% for high-school-only workers over the 12 months ending July.

Recent Trends in Personal Income & Wage Inequality

Jonathan Siegel and Jason Bram Office of the New York City Comptroller

Date Posted:: September 8, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Between 2019 and 2024, the New York City’s income shares at the top of the distribution rose faster than the nation's, and nearly two-thirds of the real income growth over the period accrued to the top 1%, compared with under 40% nationally. The result also holds when volatile capital gains are excluded. Real median income fell over the period, and real average income for the bottom 90% of tax units was essentially flat. Adjusted for local prices (but not for transfer programs), the purchasing power of income for the lower 90% of New Yorkers is close to one-fifth below that of the bottom 90% nationally. The divergence at the top is predominantly a story of non-wage income. Wage and salary income shows a much milder widening, and occupational wage data that exclude bonuses show base pay growing faster in lower-wage occupations than in higher-wage ones, and within many occupational groups wages are converging rather than growing more unequal.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Nearly two-thirds of New York City’s real income growth from 2019–2024 accrued to the top 1%, versus under 40% nationally, driven by faster-rising capital gains, dividends, and business income rather than wage divergence.
The bottom 90% of New York City earners hold purchasing power roughly one-fifth below their national counterparts after adjusting for local prices, even before accounting for transfer programs.

The Heterogeneous Effects of Large and Small Minimum Wage Changes: Evidence Using a Partially Pre-Committed Analysis Plan

Jeffrey Clemens and Michael Strain American Enterprise Institute

Date Posted:: September 3, 2026
Is Database:: Database

While a state-level event study finds no employment effect from small minimum-wage hikes, imputation DiD estimates show that four years after large hikes, employment is ~5pp lower for 16–25-year-olds without a HS degree and ~3pp lower for all 16–21-year-olds.

Figure 4 reports our imputation difference-in-differences estimates for the effects of small and large minimum wage changes on employment among individuals aged 16–21 and among individuals aged 16–25 with less than a completed high school education. The samples are from the ACS [American Community Survey]. [The data span 2011-2019]. We compare estimates for large versus small increases. The estimates to the left of the vertical dashed lines reveal no concerning evidence of divergent preexisting trends. We find null effects for the states that enacted small minimum wage increases and negative effects for states with large minimum wage increases. By 4 years after the enactment of the first increase, the estimate has approached −5pp for individuals aged 16–25 with less than a completed high school education, and −3pp for the sample of all individuals aged 16–21. [Editor's note: The authors note that Section VIII of the paper, which contains the Figure 4 imputation DiD estimates, “presents estimates from a modern difference-in-differences estimator that falls outside of our pre-analysis plan.” The results are somewhat larger than those reported in the Abstract.]

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Large minimum wage increases reduce employment by approximately 5 percentage points among workers aged 16–25 without a high school diploma and 3 percentage points among all workers aged 16–21 within four years of enactment.
small increases produce no measurable employment effect.
Disemployment from minimum wage increases is concentrated among the least-educated young workers and emerges only above a magnitude threshold, identifying wage-floor size—not the policy itself—as the decisive driver of employment loss.

Falling Fertility: The Changing Value of Freedom, Fulfillment, and Family

Raquel Fernández, Inés Berniell and Milagros Onofri National Bureau of Economic Research

Date Posted:: September 2, 2026
Is Database:: Database

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Figure 1 documents how fertility outcomes and attitudes changed over the decade. Intended fertility fell in every GGS country, from 28 to 21% on average (Figure 1a). The ideal number of children fell in 17 of the 22 ISSP countries, from 2.42 to 2.31 on average (Figure 1b). [Children] became more likely to be seen as constraining parental freedom and less likely to be seen as conferring status (Figure 1c). Gender roles became less traditional, and the division of household work became more equal [Figures 1i]. Despite this greater sharing of chores and care, work–family conflict rose sharply. The decade saw changes that might have been expected to make the burden of children lighter, at least for women. Simultaneously, however, children became less attractive and, above all, less necessary: the belief that a fulfilled life requires children lost more ground than any attitude we measure [Table 2, Part II, Panel B].

How Many Big Macs Does Your Salary Buy?

Economist Staff The Economist

Date Posted:: September 2, 2026
Is Database:: Database
Is Important:: Important

The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.

On an annual basis, America continues to top our McWages rankings. The average American worker earns enough to buy 10,215 Big Macs a year; Switzerland and Australia are in second and third place, respectively. But American working hours are supersized, too. On an hourly basis, Switzerland comes out on top: the average worker there earns the equivalent of seven Big Macs an hour, compared with America’s six. Australia ranks third, at five burgers for every hour worked.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

American workers earn the equivalent of 10,215 Big Macs annually, topping global McWage rankings, but longer working hours reduce U.S. hourly purchasing power to six Big Macs per hour, behind Switzerland’s seven.
Switzerland leads all nations in hourly McWage purchasing power at seven Big Macs per hour, with Australia third at five, demonstrating that top annual earnings and top hourly compensation do not always coincide.

According to @GoldmanSachs, foreign-born labor force is rebounding from 2.8mm below trend in September 2020 to 1.2mm below trend in March 2022.

The Economist estimates that so far the AI boom has created ~1mm new jobs in the US, exceeding their estimate of ~200,000 layoffs attributed to AI since mid-2023.

Is artificial intelligence creating a genuine employment boom or temporary hiring surge?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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In 2026, the 12-month moving-average unemployment for college-educated 22–34-year-olds is above its post-2003 mean, while the rate for non-college peers is historically low. Prime-age college grads still have lower unemployment than those with no degree.

Is the job market finally tightening for workers without degrees?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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Btw 2019 and 2024, pre-tax, pre-transfer real median income in New York City fell 3.2%. The top .1% tax units, ~ households, (mean income ~$24mm) saw real growth of ~25%, whereas the bottom 90% (mean income ~$45,000) fell 0.8%.

Is capital income concentration widening faster in major cities than nationally?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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While a state-level event study finds no employment effect from small minimum-wage hikes, imputation DiD estimates show that four years after large hikes, employment is ~5pp lower for 16–25-year-olds without a HS degree and ~3pp lower for all 16–21-year-olds.

Do large minimum wage increases harm young workers more than small ones?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

Related Articles:

Fernández et al. cast doubt on Goldin’s hypothesis that men’s limited willingness to share domestic responsibilities is central to fertility decline, pointing instead to the erosion of the belief that children are necessary for a fulfilling life.

Does freedom from family obligations now outweigh the fulfillment children provide?

Related Articles:

The Economist’s venerable Big Mac Index is indicative of significantly higher after-tax, PPP-adjusted wages for American workers than for their French and German counterparts.

Does working longer hours mask stagnant American wage growth?

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

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Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI

Takeaways by Macro Roundup^® AI