“Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
“…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
“Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
“Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
“Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
“…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
“…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“…a very valuable contribution.” - Larry Summers, former Secretary of the Treasury and director of the National Economic Council, president emeritus, Harvard University
“There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
“…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
Stephen Cecchetti, Michael Feroli, et alChicago Booth Working Paper
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A new @ChicagoBooth paper suggests that “raising the inflation target today would be a serious mistake.” The authors estimate that sustaining a disinflation will require unemployment to rise to 5% from January’s 3.4%.
We start by analyzing the large disinflations that occurred since 1950 in the United States and several other major economies. We estimate and simulate a standard model over several time periods, using various linear and nonlinear measures of labor market slack. We draw three main lessons from the analysis: (1) there is no post-1950 precedent for a sizable central-bank-induced disinflation that does not entail substantial economic sacrifice or recession; (2) regardless of the Phillips curve specification, models estimated over a historical period that includes episodes of high and variable inflation do a better job of predicting the post-pandemic inflation surge than those estimated over the stable inflation period from 1985 to 2019; and (3) simulations of our baseline model suggest that the Fed will need to tighten policy significantly further to achieve its inflation objective by the end of 2025. We see that the model using the full historical period (1962-2022; red line in the graphic above,) implies that inflation will fall only gradually to 3.7 percent by the end of 2025. By contrast, the model estimated over the stable inflation period (1985-2019; blue line in the graphic above,) has inflation falling quickly to the 2 percent target in the first quarter of 2024.
Nina Boyarchenko and Leonardo EliasFederal Reserve Bank of New York
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A @NewYorkFed analysis of 33 countries over 1966-2020 finds 1 s.d. higher growth rate in bank credit increases the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 2.5 percentage points, while nonbank credit has the opposite effect.
Credit extended by the banking and nonbanking sector[s] do not always move together. One type of lending is [often] expanding while the other is contracting, which suggests a substitution between bank and nonbank lending. Overall booms in private credit can be driven by either. We find that bank and nonbank credit expansions predict differentially the downside risk to growth—that is, the probability of extreme negative real GDP growth realizations. The blue line in the chart shows that the likelihood of an extreme negative real GDP growth realization —which we define as year-on-year real GDP growth below -2%— increases following expansions in bank credit for horizons of one to three years, while at the same horizon, growth in nonbank credit actually lowers the probability of a large drop in real GDP growth. In particular, a 1 s.d. Increase in bank credit increases the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 2.5 ppts relative to a baseline 6% probability in our sample. In contrast, a 1 s.d. higher growth rate in nonbank credit lowers the probability of real GDP growth below -2% in two years’ time by 1.9 ppts.
Credit Allocation and Macroeconomic Fluctuations— .@KarstenMueIIer and @EmilVerner find that credit growth to non-tradable industries like real estate is predictive of a boom-bust output pattern and financial…
Private Credit: Characteristics and Risks— Private credit has grown exponentially since 2000, reaching over $1.7T in June of 2023. @FederalReserve analysis suggests private credit raises overall…
Matthew Jaremski and Steven Sprick SchusterNational Bureau of Economic Research
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Jaremski and Schuster document that before the establishment of the FDIC, deposits fled to the safety of local insured postal banks, illustrating that lack of universal deposit coverage amplifies run risk. @ssprickschuster
Before the Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation (FDIC) became active in 1934, the only federally insured deposit accounts available to American households were through the U.S. Postal Savings System. To examine the role that postal savings played on bank closure, we collect the balance sheets of over 16,000 commercial banks just before the start of the Great Depression and match them with information on which post offices accepted deposits. We find banks that operated nearby a post office that accepted deposits were more likely to close between 1929 and 1935. The effect of postal savings is severely weakened after deposit insurance was installed across commercial banks in 1934. This lends evidence to the theory that we are capturing a competitive liquidity effect due to the lack of universal coverage.
Ameridollars— .@FedGuy12 notes that there are several trillion in uninsured dollar deposits abroad that aren’t FDIC insured. If these depositors shift their money to…
In Today’s Banking Crisis, Echoes of the ’80s— Phil Gramm and @cwcalomiris draw a parallel btw the current instability in the banking system and the Savings and Loans crisis which also played out against a…
Greg Buchak, Gregor Matvos, Tomasz Piskorski and Amit SeruNational Bureau of Economic Research
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Bank balance sheet lending has declined from 60% of total private lending in 1970 to 35% in 2023. Private credit is increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization. @NBERpubs
The role of traditional bank-led intermediation has declined sharply since the 1970s. Private credit is increasingly intermediated through arms-length transactions such as securitization. A structural model explores what can explain these shifts [and simulates] implications for macroprudential policies. Declines in securitization cost account for changes in aggregate lending quantities. Savers, rather than borrowers, are the main drivers of bank balance sheet size. Implicit banks’ costs and subsidies explain shifting bank balance sheet composition. Together, these forces explain the fall in the overall share of informationally sensitive bank lending in credit intermediation. Raising capital or liquidity requirements decreases lending in both early (1960s) and recent (2020’s) scenarios, but the effect is less pronounced in the latter. The substitution of bank balance sheet loans with debt securities in response to these policies explains why we observe only a fairly modest decline in aggregate lending despite a large contraction of bank balance sheet lending.
Samuel Hanson, Victoria Ivanshina, Laura Nicolae, Jeremy Stein, Adi Sunderam and Daniel TarulloBrookings Papers On Economic Activity
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Deposits – especially uninsured deposits that create run risk – have risen sharply, while banks with the most rapid growth in deposits have shifted assets away from lending towards longer-term MBS and Treasuries. @lauramnicolae
To inform the ongoing discussion of the appropriate regulatory response to [such events as] the failures of three regional banks 2023, we examine trends in the banking industry over the last twenty-five years. On the liability side of bank balance sheets, deposits—and especially uninsured deposits—have grown rapidly. On the asset side, there has been a notable shift away from the information-intensive lending traditionally associated with banks and towards longer-term securities such as MBS and long-term Treasuries. We assess the main regulatory options to reduce the risk of destabilizing bank runs—expanding deposit insurance and strengthening liquidity regulation— and argue that the industry trends we document favor the latter option. Regulators may be more comfortable tightening liquidity requirements on uninsured deposits, insofar as the substantial increase in those deposits in recent decades has not been correlated with an increase in information-intensive lending.
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All Clear— .@FedGuy12 writes that multiple indicators suggest that the banking sector is largely back to normal, and he cites evidence that loan growth was not…
Frankenstein’s Monster— Michael Cembalest @jpmorgan argues that the banking system is now stabilizing, with the pace of drawdowns slowing from mid-March.
In Today’s Banking Crisis, Echoes of the ’80s— Phil Gramm and @cwcalomiris draw a parallel btw the current instability in the banking system and the Savings and Loans crisis which also played out against a…
.@FedGuy12 endorses a proposed adjustment to the Basel III leverage calculations that would increase demand for Treasuries from US banks as future issuances surge.
Banks were huge investors in Treasuries during World War II, but steadily reduced their holdings even as Treasury issuance climbed. The share of bank assets in Treasuries remains historically low as banks have preferred to make loans or invest in higher yielding securities. While banks are required to hold high quality liquid assets, they have chosen to meet those requirements with reserves and Agency MBS rather than Treasuries. A revision to Basel in the form of a revamped leverage calculation would not only boost liquidity across markets, but also potentially make banks significant investors in Treasuries just in time to meet increased future issuance.
Living with High Public Debt— .@B_Eichengreen argues that high public debt levels are here to stay and that methods to suppress interest rates are “less feasible than in the past.” This…
Yueran Ma and Kaspar ZimmermannFederal Reserve Bank of Kansas City
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Historically monetary tightening has had an impact on risk capital: 100bps of tightening is associated with a 1-3pp decline in R&D spending and a 25% decline in VC investment over the following 1-3 year period.
We normalize the shock to tightening by 100bps. Investment in intellectual property products (IPP) in the national accounts (NIPA) declines by about 1%. The magnitude is comparable to the decline in traditional investment in physical assets. R&D spending in Compustat data for public firms declines by about 3%. VC investment is more volatile, and declines by as much as 25% at a horizon of 1 to 3 years after the monetary policy shock. Patenting in important technologies declines by up to 9% 2 to 4 years after the shock. An aggregate innovation index constructed using estimates of the economic value of patents also declines by up to 9%. Based on estimates of the output and total factor productivity (TFP) sensitivity to the aggregate innovation index, a 9% decline in the index can contribute to 1% lower real output and 0.5% lower TFP 5 years later.
Related Articles:
Data Update 2 for 2023: A Rocky Year for Equities— .@AswathDamodaran writes that, if analyst earnings forecasts are correct, the equity risk premium has increased from 4.2% at the start of 2022 to 5.9% today…