Edward Conard

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The insatiable appetite for dour data about a decent economy

James Pethokoukis American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
May 29, 2019
Is Database:
Database

A Federal Reserve survey shows 75% of U.S. adults feel they are “doing okay or living comfortably,” & 64% rate local economic conditions as “good” or “excellent.”.

A Federal Reserve survey shows 75% of U.S. adults feel they are “doing okay or living comfortably,” & 64%...
Despite the focus on financial vulnerability, data suggests a more nuanced economic picture. A Federal Reserve survey shows 75% of U.S. adults feel they are "doing okay or living comfortably," and 64% rate local economic conditions as "good" or "excellent." While 39% report difficulty handling a $400 emergency expense, 76% of households had at least $400 in liquid assets in 2016, likely higher today. Only 12% wouldn't use any means to cover such an expense, and 25% of those unable to cover it earn over $75k annually. This suggests behavioral factors, like the "credit card debt puzzle," influence financial decisions. The $400 statistic should be contextualized alongside positive trends in wages and economic mobility, indicating American capitalism may be more robust than perceived.

“…suggest $400 statistic be used with caution. For instance: A footnote in the survey highlights 2016 research that found 76% of households had at least $400 in liquid assets, far higher than the 56% in 2016 who said they would cover a $400 expense with cash or its equivalent. (Reasonable to assume that first number is higher today.) Moreover, the fact that some people choose to hold both high-interest credit card debt and cash that could be used to pay down that debt has been termed the “credit card debt puzzle.” It’s a thing. Indeed, only 12% said they wouldn’t use any means to pay that expense. (A great thread by National Review’s Robert VerBruggen notes, among other things, that 25% of those billed as being unable to cover $400 with borrowing or selling make more than $75,000 a year.”)…”

James Pethokoukis, "The insatiable appetite for dour data about a decent economy," American Enterprise Institute, May 28, 2019, https://www.aei.org/pethokoukis/the-insatiable-appetite-for-dour-data-about-a-decent-economy/

The insatiable appetite for dour data about a decent economy

If you look at the national unemployment rate of 3.6% — the lowest in more than 50 years — American capitalism doesn’t appear to be terribly broken. And as the economy has rebounded from the Great Recession and Financial Crisis, real wages continue to rise, especially so for lower-income Americans. Another seeming sign of non-brokenness.

Or to approach things a different way: A recent Federal Reserve survey finds 75% of U.S. adults say they are either “doing okay or living comfortably,” 56% say they are better off than their parents were at the same age (vs. 25% saying “about the same” and 19% “worse off”), and 64% rate their local economic conditions as “good” or “excellent.”

But none of those upbeat Fed survey findings were given the media attention of this one: Many adults are “financially vulnerable and would have difficulty handling an emergency expense as small as $400.” Specifically — and here I will use The Washington Post’s description of the survey results — “Almost 4 in 10 people (39%) said they wouldn’t be able to scrape together the cash to meet a $400 emergency expense” while 61% say they would cover it with cash, savings, or a credit card paid off at the next statement.

Instead, this group would resort to a number of alternate options, including putting the expense on a credit card and paying it off over time, borrowing from family members, and selling something to raise cash. (People could choose more than one option.) Proof positive, apparently, of a deep vein of financial fragility running through this economic boomlet.

But people are funny about money, and those behavioral quirks suggest $400 statistic be used with caution. For instance: A footnote in the survey highlights 2016 research that found 76% of households had at least $400 in liquid assets, far higher than the 56% in 2016 who said they would cover a $400 expense with cash or its equivalent. (Reasonable to assume that first number is higher today.)

Moreover, the fact that some people choose to hold both high-interest credit card debt and cash that could be used to pay down that debt has been termed the “credit card debt puzzle.” It’s a thing. Indeed, only 12% said they wouldn’t use any means to pay that expense. (A great thread by National Review’s Robert VerBruggen notes, among other things, that 25% of those billed as being unable to cover $400 with borrowing or selling make more than $75,000 a year.”)

The survey itself poses the question: “Although so many incurring additional costs for a modest expense is disconcerting, it is possible that some would choose to borrow even if they had $400 available, preserving their cash as a buffer for other expenses.”

Like I said, people are funny about money — and that includes answering surveys about money. (Question wording might be key here, such as “would” vs. “could.”) My AEI colleague Andrew Biggs notes on Twitter that while the Fed survey finds only 36% of non-retired adults think their retirement saving is on track, the reality of retirement finances suggest far more should be confident. As Biggs wrote in The Wall Street Journal earlier this year:

Eight in 10 retirees tell Gallup they have enough money to “live comfortably,” and 6 in 10 working-age households say the same. Seventy-five percent of retirees tell the Federal Reserve’s Survey of Consumer Finances they have “at least enough to maintain standard of living,” up from 61% in 1992. Census Bureau research that uses Internal Revenue Service data to measure retirees’ incomes found that the over-65 poverty rate was only 6.7% in 2012, down from 9.7% in 1990 and lower than any other age group…. According to Fed data, the median retiree household’s income grew by 56% above inflation from 1989 through 2016, versus only 4% real growth for working-age households. Incomes grew faster at the poorest fifth percentile retirees than at the 95th percentile of the working-age population.

The $400 statistic is certainly interesting and worth reporting in context, but no more so than other data on wages and mobility showing American capitalism might be doing better than you think.

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Previous articleMay 28, 2019QE May Be Over, But the Feds U.S. Debt Hoard Is About to SoarThe Fed’s balance sheet is set to expand significantly, with Treasuries holdings expected to double from $2tn to $4.4tn by the end of the decade, according to Wells Fargo estimates @LizMcCMNext articleMay 29, 2019The politics of American generations: How age affects attitudes and voting behaviorAge affects attitudes & voting behavior in complex ways, challenging the view of young=liberal & old=conservative. @PewResearch’s typology report reveals distinct identities shaped by formative experiences.
Showing 70 database articles primarily about Poverty/Crime

An Extra Point for Attendance: The Impact of High School Varsity Athletics on Absenteeism

AI Summary. High school varsity sports participation reduces student absenteeism by ~20%, with absence rates falling further during active seasons, indicating the relationship is at least partly causal rather than purely a result of selection.

Nat Malkus and Sam Hollon American Enterprise Institute
Date Posted:
April 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The absentee rate of Indiana high school students, ~23% of whom played a varsity sport, was ~20% lower for those who participated in varsity athletics than for non-athletes. The effect was stronger when an athlete’s particular sport was in season.

Does participation in high school sports significantly reduce student absenteeism?

Core argument: Varsity athletes’ absence rates drop 1.37 pts below non-athletes’, a ~20% reduction that drives improved school engagement year-round.

We find that varsity sports participation is strongly associated with better student attendance, and we argue it is plausible that varsity sports participation causes better attendance. When we control for a number of factors that we know matter for both sports participation and attendance, we continue to find that varsity athletes are absent less often than their peers across the entire year. Across the school year, athletes’ absence rate was 1.37 points lower than non-athletes’. That’s a reduction of almost 20%. The broad pattern shown in Table 1 is that students from more advantaged groups were more likely to participate in varsity sports and less likely to be absent from school. It’s thus no surprise that, in the raw data, there is an association between playing varsity sports and having good attendance (Figure 3). But is that because students who attend school more reliably are more likely to play sports or because playing sports leads to better attendance? One way to tease out the answer is to compare varsity athletes' attendance during their sports seasons with their attendance the rest of the year. Not only do varsity athletes have lower annual absence rates—especially unexcused absences—than non-athletes, but [Figure 3 and Figure 4] show that their absence rates fall further when their sport is in season, [which suggests at least some causal effect].

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Varsity athletes’ absence rates drop 1.37 pts below non-athletes’, a ~20% reduction that drives improved school engagement year-round.
  2. In-season absence rates fall further for varsity athletes, suggesting sports participation directly leads to more reliable attendance patterns.
  3. Athletes from advantaged backgrounds show stronger attendance gains, indicating varsity sports participation compounds existing socioeconomic advantages in school engagement.

Related Articles:

  • The Benefits of Scholastic Athletics — Heckman et al, using two longitudinal data sets with a rich set of controls, find that participation in varsity athletics raises rates of high school and…
  • Long COVID for Public Schools: Chronic Absenteeism Before and After the Pandemic — 28% of American public school students missed at least 10% of the school year in 2022 up from 15% before the pandemic. The change was most pronounced in…
  • The Latest Chronic Absenteeism Numbers — The number of students missing 10% or more of the school year doubled from 15% in 2019 to 28% in 2022 and 26% in 2023. Early reports for 2024 show signs of…
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Sports Betting Across Borders: Spatial Spillovers, Credit Distress, and Fiscal Externalities

Jacob Goss and Daniel Mangrum Federal Reserve Bank of New York
Date Posted:
March 27, 2026
Is Database:
Database

After the legalization of sports betting in 2018, delinquency rates on a wide range of consumer debts rose, increasing .31pp as of 2025. The delinquency rate for the ~3% of the population that were new gamblers increased by ~10pp driven by those under 40.

Exploiting the staggered roll-out of state-level legalization following the 2018 Murphy v. NCAA decision, we use an extended two-way fixed effects (ETWFE) framework that separately estimates direct treatment effects and cross-border spillover effects. Our first-stage estimates establish that legalization dramatically increases betting activity: average quarterly spending per person rises by roughly $46 from a pre-treatment mean of $2.50, and the share of the population with any sportsbook spending in a quarter increases by 3.1 percentage points. The effects on average spending grow continually over time with no clear evidence of saturation, suggesting the market for mobile sports betting continues to mature years after legalization. At the same time, substantial betting activity occurs in counties where sports betting is not legal but which lie near a legal state, with spillover effects on total spending roughly 14% of the direct effect for counties within 15 miles of a legal state, declining monotonically with distance and approaching zero by 60 miles. These spillovers have real consequences for consumer financial health. Three years after legalization, median credit scores are one point lower and overall delinquency rates increase by 0.31 percentage points following legalization. [Under-40 auto loan delinquency increases by half a percentage point and credit card delinquency by one percentage point, driving the overall increase in delinquency.] Since only about 3.1% of the population takes up betting after legalization, these intent-to-treat estimates would imply that those who are induced to bet due to legalization experience delinquency increases of 10 percentage points.

Related Articles:

  • The Case for Prohibiting Vice — Lehman makes the case for restricting sports gambling, marijuana, and pornography. The costs of vice and its regulation are not limited to individual harm…
  • Americans Increasingly See Legal Sports Betting As A Bad Thing For Society and Sports — 43% of American adults say widespread betting on sports is “a bad thing for society,” up from 34% in 2022. 47% of men under 30 say legal sports…
  • From Sports to AI, America Is Awash in Speculative Fever. Washington Is Egging It On — Citing the AI-related equity boom, crypto and the rise of sports betting, Greg Ip argues that “speculation has become woven into today’s political…
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New York City Government Services: Services for the Unsheltered

Thomas DiNapoli New York State Comptroller
Date Posted:
March 16, 2026
Is Database:
Database

In 2025 New York City spent $81,705 per “street” homeless person, up 262% from 2019 whose numbers increased 26% during that period. This does not include spending on “sheltered” homeless, who are ~97% of the homeless population.

New York City’s unsheltered population increased from 3,588 in FY 2019 to 4,504 in FY 2025 — a 26% increase from pre-pandemic levels. In that time, spending on services for this population has more than tripled, growing from $102 million in FY 2019 to nearly $368 million in FY 2025 (a 262% increase). Its share of spending has also increased, from just under 5% to nearly 9% of total Department of Homeless Services (DHS) spending.

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Poverty and Dependency in the United States, 1939–2023

Richard Burkhauser and Kevin Corinth National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
February 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Btw 1939 and 1963, the % of Americans below LBJ’s absolute poverty line (3× the cost of a minimal meal plan), fell from 48.5 to 19.5, driven by rising market income. Post-1964, most (for non-blacks, all) drops were the result of transfers, not earnings.

The major innovation of this paper is to extend a comprehensive and consistent measure of poverty back to 1939, exploiting a quarter century of data before the War on Poverty began. From 1939-1963, absolute poverty fell from 48.5% to 19.5%, a 29 percentage point reduction. This pre-war progress provides important context for previously documented success in reducing poverty afterwards, since it occurred before the major expansion of safety net programs like SNAP, Medicaid, and refundable tax credits. During that 1939–1963 period, it was the growth of market income rather than government transfers net of taxes that reduced poverty rates. In fact, poverty fell no faster in the 24 years after the War on Poverty was declared than in the 24 years before, even when applying the same initial poverty rate to both periods. Our results do not imply that poverty would have necessarily continued to fall at the same rate after 1963 in the absence of the War on Poverty. A pre versus post comparison is conflated by contemporaneous macroeconomic and social changes, such as slower economic growth in the post-1963 period. Conversely, any claim that the War on Poverty was necessary for poverty to decline should be accompanied by an attempt to understand why it had already been falling in the quarter century before it was declared.

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  • Evaluating the Success of the War on Poverty since 1963 Using an Absolute Full-Income Poverty Measure — The US won the War on Poverty on LBJ’s terms, cutting the absolute full-income poverty rate from 19.5% in 1963 to 1.6% in 2019. During these years the share of…
  • The Great “Transfer”-mation — Transfer payments made up 18% of all US personal income in 2022, up from 8% in 1970. Social Security/Medicare made up 56% of the increase from 1970 to 2022…
  • Government Benefit Programs Already Do A Lot To Help Low Income Families — A 2-adult, 3-child US family with $20,000 of market income receives at least $61,000 in annual benefits and has $79,000 of disposable income. That same family…
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The Biggest Fraud in Welfare

Phil Gramm and John Early Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
December 18, 2025
Is Database:
Database

Counting non-cash benefits as income would reduce the 19.8mm US households defined as poor by 90%. If the $1.4T in annual Federal poverty spending, including non-cash benefits, were distributed in cash to those households, each would receive $70,000.

Counting non-cash benefits as income would reduce the 19.8mm US households defined as poor by 90%. If the $1.4T in annual...
The government’s failure to count its largess as recipients’ income allows welfare households to blow past the income level above which a working family no longer qualifies for government help. Take a single parent with two school-age children who earns $11,000 annually from part-time work. The government considers this household in poverty because its income is below $25,273. But this family would qualify for benefits worth $53,128. It would receive Treasury checks of $3,400 in refundable child tax credits and $4,400 in refundable earned-income tax credits. The family would also receive Food Stamp debit cards worth $9,216 a year, $9,476 in housing subsidies, $877 of government payments for utility bills, $16,033 to fund Medicaid, $3,102 in free meals at school and $6,624 in Temporary Assistance for Needy Families. All this puts the family’s income at $64,128, or 254% of the poverty level. A hardworking family earning anything like $64,128 in salary wouldn’t be eligible for any of these welfare benefits in four-fifths of the states. Meanwhile, the welfare family would be eligible for another 90 small federal benefits and sundry state and local welfare programs.

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  • Stranded by the Safety Net: How to Fix the Benefit Cliff Problem — A non-working, non-disabled mother of two in North Carolina can collect $50k in benefits. Due to benefit phase-outs, she would have to earn $70k in market…
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Explaining the Widening Divides in US Midlife Mortality: Is There a Smoking Gun?

Christopher Foote, Ellen Meara, Jonathan Skinner, and Luke Stewart National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
December 17, 2025
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

The college/non-college life expectancy gap widened from 2.6–6.3 years btw 1992 and 2019, while county mortality inequality jumped 30% to the detriment of rural areas. Smoking by state predicts ~300 extra deaths per 100k for non-college grads, 0 for grads.

The education-mortality gradient has increased sharply in the last three decades, with the life expectancy gap btw people with and without a college degree widening from 2.6 years in 1992 to 6.3 years in 2019. During the same period, mortality inequality across counties rose 30%, accompanied by an increasing rural health penalty. Using county- and state-level data from the 1992–2019 period, we demonstrate that these three trends arose due to a fundamental shift in the geographic patterns of mortality among college and non-college populations. First, we find a sharp decline in both mortality rates and geographic inequality for college graduates. Second, the reverse was true for people without a college degree; spatial inequality became amplified. Third, we find that rates of smoking play a key role in explaining all three empirical puzzles, with secondary roles attributed to income, other health behaviors, and state policies. [An objection is that] the non-college smoking rate declined by somewhat more than the college rate from 1992 to 2019. [The resolution is that] college populations gave up smoking decades before non-college populations did. [The key] college/non-college comparison [is] among 55–64 year-olds, the age group for which the smoking mortality penalty is greatest.

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