Edward Conard

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  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “…a fresh argument for the productive value of inequality.” - David Autor, Professor of Economics, Massachusetts Institute of Technology
  • “Unintended Consequences should be read by anyone who takes for granted the superiority of progressive taxation and has not thought carefully about the trade-offs involved.” - The New Republic
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  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
  • “…challenges misconceptions that distort our economic debates.” - Arthur Brooks, President of the American Enterprise Institute
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Economists Aren’t As Nonpartisan As We Think

Zubin Jelveh, Bruce Kogut and Suresh Naidu FiveThirtyEight
Date Posted:
April 5, 2019
Is Database:
Database

A 60-40 liberal-conservative split among economists was found in a study of 2,000 economists, with macroeconomists and financial economists leaning conservative, while labor economists tend to be liberal.

An analysis of 2,000 economists revealed a 60-40 liberal-conservative split, highlighting the influence of political ideology on economic research. This ideological divide is reflected in the methodologies and research areas chosen by economists, with macroeconomists and financial economists leaning conservative, while labor economists tend to be liberal. The study found that political beliefs correlate with numerical results in research, such as tax rates and fiscal multipliers, which can impact public policy. Despite concerns, there is no evidence that journal editors' ideologies affect publication decisions. The findings suggest that policymakers may need to adjust economic insights for ideological biases, as the average optimal tax rate reported by economists was 41%, but a centrist economist might suggest 33%. This underscores the importance of recognizing political influences within economic research to ensure balanced policy-making.

"...We first needed to determine the political leanings of just a sample of economists, which we did by linking about 2,000 economists to their campaign contributions and political petition signatures. These economists represent faculty from all types of institutions including many from the most prestigious universities in the country. We determined that there was a 60-40 liberal-conservative split among the economists in our data....."

Zubin Jelveh, Bruce Kogut and Suresh Naidu, "Economists Aren’t As Nonpartisan As We Think, FiveThirtyEight, December 8, 2014, https://fivethirtyeight.com/features/economists-arent-as-nonpartisan-as-we-think/

We must point out that the relationships we describe are correlations — we can’t claim that ideology is causing different research results. Although people’s political beliefs don’t change drastically after their mid-20s, it could be that economists’ views are influenced by their findings throughout their careers. In our paper we describe different ways we investigated this possibility and found no impact on our results.

We also stress that our results don’t mean economists are deliberately altering findings. It’s more likely that these correlations are driven by research areas and the methodologies employed by economists of differing political stripes.10 Economics involves both methodological and normative judgments, and it is difficult to imagine that any social science could completely erase correlations between these two.

So what do our results mean for public policy and the science of economics?

Policymakers may need to “re-center” economists’ findings by adjusting for ideology. Take the area of tax rates for high earners. The average optimal tax rate reported by economists in our data is 41 percent. Using our model, we can also estimate that these economists as a group are slightly left of center. We can then figure out what optimal top tax rate a hypothetical centrist economist would report: 33 percent.11

Political disagreements inside economics are probably a healthy reflection of political debates in society overall. While some economists will disagree with this (even the claim that economics is politicized is probably itself political), it’s likely that all stakeholders in economic research understand that the science of economics contains the larger American political splits within it.

CLARIFICATION (Dec. 8, 10:58 a.m.): The article has been updated to make clear that the table only shows the most ideological phrases when economists write about macroeconomics.

CORRECTION (Dec. 14, 11:53 a.m.): A chart in an earlier version of this article was missing about 40 percent of its data points and made the relationship it showed look weaker than it actually is. We’ve updated the article with the correct version of the chart.

Using these associations, we could then predict the ideology of any economist not in our sample by feeding his or her body of work into our algorithm. The results weren’t perfect, but the algorithm showed promising ability in distinguishing between liberal and conservative economists. To understand how well it performed, imagine that you randomly pick two economists and predict their ideologies. Random guessing would get it right 50 percent of the time and a perfect model would be able to produce the right affiliation 100 percent of the time. Our algorithm got it right 74.1 percent of the time,6 and was consistently able to extract a signal from inherently noisy text. If peer review and other professional norms are working as intended, then we shouldn’t be able to find any connection between ideology and text.

We then used these predicted ideologies to get a better understanding of the role political beliefs play in economics.

We first found that an economist’s research area is correlated with his or her political leanings. For example, macroeconomists and financial economists are more right-leaning on average while labor economists tend to be left-leaning. Economists at business schools, no matter their specialty, lean conservative. Apparently, there is “political sorting” in the academic labor market.

If there is job-market sorting, then maybe editors of journals are responsible. After all, academics make their careers off publishing. So we looked at whether journal editors influenced the ideology of the papers appearing in their journals.

We have good news for economics here: There’s no evidence that publication decisions are determined by editor ideology.

Then what explains our ability to detect ideology from text? Since ideology differs by field, another possibility is that a journal’s peer reviewers are already ideologically aligned. Liberal economists may choose to study labor markets because they know others in the field have similar beliefs. This is not only more ideologically comforting — it also makes it easier for those who share an ideology with reviewers to publish.

At this point, you may object to the idea that the text of a paper completely captures the findings it reports. What if a conservative and a liberal economist used ideologically tinged language in their papers, but both came up with the same numerical result about, say, the fiscal spending multiplier? The size of these multipliers, which quantify how much an increase in government spending changes economic growth, were intenselydebated during the financial crisis, with conservatives faulting fiscal expansion for increasing the deficit with no economic gain and liberals advocating for much greater deficit spending.

To test if ideology influences policy, e.g. taxes or deficits, we collected numerical research results from fields that have direct impacts on public policy,7 including government spending, minimum wages, various tax rates, and income mobility. The results from these fields map quite nicely onto the liberal-conservative ideological spectrum. For example, liberals think the fiscal multiplier is high, meaning the government can improve economic growth by increasing spending, while conservatives believe the multiplier is close to zero or negative. A similar logic applies to numerical results in the other fields.

As the following chart shows, we found a (significant) correlation8 when we compared the ideologies of authors with the numerical results in their papers.9 That means that a left-leaning economist is more likely to report numerical results aligned with liberal ideology (and the same is true for right-leaning economists and conservative ideology).

Economists Aren’t As Nonpartisan As We Think

According to purists, the field of economics is supposed to be free of political ideology. Economics views itself as a science1 and the prevailing consensus, best articulated by Nobel-winner and Chicago-school doyen George Stigler, is that “the dominant influence” in economics “is the set of internal values and pressures of the discipline” which help keep it nonpartisan.

And yet most well-known economists achieve their star status in the political sphere. The econowonks reading this could name the politics of economists Paul Krugman and Greg Mankiw without much hesitation. And a little Googling would uncover the ideological leanings of Martin Feldstein, John Cochrane, Christina Romer or Jonathan Gruber. Even Thomas Malthus and David Ricardo had disagreements over free trade that were mirrored in the House of Commons.

Still, economists’ beliefs are separate from what makes them successful academics: their research prowess. We can easily discount the political opinions economists express in op-eds. But they’re also publishing research in peer-reviewed journals. Are findings on tax rates, minimum wages or government spending also influenced by ideology?

This is not just navel-gazing, as economics research informs public policy.2A recent Congressional Budget Office analysis of the minimum wage describes how results from academia influenced the CBO’s projections. If those findings were at least partially influenced by political beliefs, then the CBO’s assessments may be unwittingly biased.

So we set out to test the idea of nonpartisan economics on a large scale. In a recent paper, we researched whether economists’ political leanings were associated with their professional work.3 The answer: yes.

Our main proxy for research was the text that appeared in academic papers. To identify political leanings, we had to figure out a way to measure the ideology of any economist — not just people like Krugman and Mankiw. Luckily, there’s a growing body of research on how to detect people’s ideology (or mood or personality type) from the way they write.

We first needed to determine the political leanings of just a sample of economists, which we did by linking about 2,000 economists to their campaign contributions and political petition signatures.4 These economists represent faculty from all types of institutions including many from the most prestigious universities in the country. We determined that there was a 60-40 liberal-conservative split among the economists in our data.5

With this knowledge about actual ideology in hand, we built an algorithm that discovered the relationships between political leanings and word choice in about 18,000 academic papers written by our sample of economists. For example, when writing about business cycles, we discovered conservatives were more likely to write “laissez faire” or “monetary economics” while liberals more often discussed “Keynesian economics” and “labor markets.” (The table below shows the most ideological phrases when economists write about macroeconomics.)

  • Politics
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Showing 187 database articles primarily about Politics

Who Sees Themselves as Working Class?

AI Summary. 60% of U.S. adults identify as working class, including half of college graduates and upper-income earners, making the label broadly adopted across economic lines rather than confined to lower-income or blue-collar workers.

Steven Shepard, Hannah Hartig, Andy Cerda and Jocelyn Kiley Pew Research Center
Date Posted:
September 1, 2026
Is Database:
Database

60% of Americans say “working class” describes them “extremely” or “very” well. Republicans are more likely than Democrats to identify as working class – strikingly 61% of Republicans who have a family income of at least $155,600 identify as working class, compared to 38% of such Democrats.

Does working class identity reflect actual economic status or cultural values?

Core argument: Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.

Most Americans think of themselves as “working class” today: Overall, 60% of U.S. adults say the term describes them well. And the identity is widely adopted by people across all income and educational groups – including half of both Americans who have a bachelor’s degree and those who are upper-income. Those working in blue-collar occupations are particularly likely to identify as working class (77%), [as are] a majority of those working in other occupations (61%). White adults are more likely than Black adults to identify as working class. About six-in-ten White (62%) and Hispanic adults (59%) overall view themselves as working class, as do roughly half of Black (54%) and Asian adults (52%).

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Sixty percent of U.S. adults identify as working class, a label adopted across income and education lines — including half of upper-income Americans and half of bachelor’s degree holders — signaling the term has lost its traditional socioeconomic boundaries.
  2. Blue-collar workers identify as working class at the highest rate (77%), yet a majority of workers in other occupations (61%) claim the same identity, indicating occupational type is a weak predictor of class self-perception.
  3. White adults identify as working class at a higher rate (62%) than Black (54%) or Asian adults (52%), with Hispanic adults (59%) closely tracking the White share.

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000…
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The Rise of Anger: Emotions and Policy Views

Eva Davoine, Stefanie Stantcheva, Thomas Renault and Yann Algan Harvard University
Date Posted:
August 20, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Davoine, et al. show that angry policy-related tweets among voters rose from 34% to 46% over 2013–2025. Angry posts got ~60% more retweets, and experiments that induced anger showed it can move views on trade, immigration, redistribution and climate.

Figure 6 illustrates the monthly evolution of anger among Democratic- and Republican-affiliated X [Twitter] users. Each line reports the share of sentences classified as expressing anger within each political affiliation, and the plotted series are shown as six-month moving averages. It shows that Republican voters start with a higher baseline level of anger at the beginning of the period (about 38% compared to 27% for Democrats). Anger rises sharply for both groups after the 2016 election, but much more among Democrats. As a result, the initial partisan gap is much smaller by 2019. Both series then plateau from 2019 to 2022. Among Democratic partisans, anger declines slightly after Biden’s election but remains well above pre-2016 levels. Republican anger continues to rise during the Biden presidency, reaching approximately 50% by 2025.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile — Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000…
  • Politics

The DSA Sweet Spot: Highly Educated, Downwardly Mobile

Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 22, 2026
Is Database:
Database
Is Important:
Important

Silver finds that the most liberal voters are highly educated and lower-income. Only 19% of Americans with a college degree had a household income of $60,000 or less, but responders to a DSA survey were ~ twice as likely to fall into that category.

The US voters most likely to identify as “very liberal” are those with postgraduate degrees but lower-to-middle household incomes of $30K to $60K per year. This is very much also the sweet spot for the DSA. In the DSA’s most recent member survey in 2021, 80% of members aged 25 or older had bachelor’s degrees, but 45% had household incomes below $60,000 per year. This is unusual because education and income are usually substantially positively correlated. In the composite CES data, only 19% of Americans with bachelor’s degrees or higher had household incomes of $60K or below, while respondents to the most recent DSA survey [were twice as likely to fall into this category].

Related Articles:

  • America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade — American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • Politics

America’s Support for Capitalism Has Declined Over Last Decade

AI Summary. American confidence in capitalism has fallen from 60% to under 50% over the last decade, while only 12% believe democracy is working well and just 35% believe the economy offers a fair path to prosperity.

Aaron Zitner Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
July 9, 2026
Is Database:
Database

A new WSJ poll finds only 35% of Americans think the assertion that “if you work hard, you’ll get ahead” still holds. Only 42% of respondents aged 18–34 think capitalism is working very or somewhat well, relative to 56% of those 65 or older.

Is capitalism losing support among Americans?

Core argument: Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.

Americans are losing confidence in two main pillars of society: capitalism and democracy. Just under half of Americans say capitalism is working very well or even somewhat well, down from 60% who said so about a decade ago, according to a new Wall Street Journal-NORC survey. Only 35% are even fairly sure that the nation offers people the ability to get good jobs and achieve the American dream. Confidence in the nation’s system of government is even lower. Only 12% say democracy is working very well or extremely well, and a mere 16% say average citizens have considerable influence on politics. Two-thirds of Republicans said they were very proud of American history, three times the share of Democrats who said so. And Republicans in the survey stood apart in their belief in American exceptionalism, the long-held idea that the U.S. is unique or superior among nations. Nearly half of Republicans said that America stands above all other countries in the world, compared with only 8% of Democrats and 13% of independents.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Capitalism approval fell 10 pts to 50% over the past decade, driving erosion in confidence across core American institutions.
  2. Only 35% believe the U.S. offers pathways to good jobs and economic mobility, down from prior confidence levels, leading to.
  3. Republicans express 3x greater pride in American history than Democrats (67% vs. 22%), with 48% of Republicans believing America surpasses.

Related Articles:

  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • Political Representation Gaps and Populism — Surveys in 27 European countries show that MPs’ policy views generally match those of their voters on economic issues, but are systematically to the left on…
  • Politics

America Used To Be Exceptionally Patriotic. Now We're Below Average

AI Summary. American patriotism, measured by those "extremely proud" to be American, tracks closely with which party controls the presidency, with partisan gaps widening sharply over time. Republican pride swings ~14 points between administrations, while Democratic pride has collapsed from 58% to 14% across the same period.

Eli McKown-Dawson and Nate Silver Silver Bulletin
Date Posted:
July 8, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Gallup finds only 17% of Democrats are “extremely proud” to be an American, versus 30% of independents and 74% of Republicans – notable declines from 2005–2009, when 58% of Democrats/independents and 79% of Republicans were “extremely proud” to be an American.

Is American patriotism becoming a partisan identity rather than national sentiment?

Core argument: Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.

During George W. Bush’s second term, an average of 58% of Democrats were extremely proud to be American according to Gallup, as was an identical share of independents — though Republicans were higher. The rough parity between Democrats and independents lasted through Barack Obama’s second term, but the share of extremely proud Democrats fell to an average of 30% during Trump’s first term and was just 14% in the most recent Gallup poll. Although Republicans are generally more patriotic, their opinions can shift based on who occupies 1600 Pennsylvania Avenue too. The share of Republicans extremely proud to be American fell from 79% on average during Bush’s second term to 60% during Biden’s term. What happened after Trump retook office? It jumped right back up to 74%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Democratic extreme pride fell 75% from 58% (2004–2008) to 14%, driving a 44-pt partisan gap vs. Republicans’ 74%, the widest.
  2. Republican extreme pride dropped 24 pts from 79% under Bush to 60% under Biden, then rebounded 14 pts to 74%.
  3. Independents’ extreme pride collapsed from 58% parity with Democrats in 2008 to unmeasured levels, indicating depolarization of patriotic expression across.

Related Articles:

  • Zero-Sum Thinking and the Roots of US Political Differences — Surveying a large US sample, Chinoy et al built an index of “zero-sum thinking” using four questions as to whether one group’s gains come at others’ expense…
  • A Note on Factors Influencing Trust in Government — A Pew study finds that only 15% of Americans trust the Federal government to do what is right “most of the time,” down from ~75% in 1960. A secular drop…
  • Life Under Two: Debt, Deficits, and the AI Discontinuity — Paul Kedrosky argues the American economy is undergoing a fundamental shift from > 3% mean annual real GDP growth to “life under two,” or below…
  • Politics

Texas Is Becoming America Inc’s Centre Of Gravity

AI Summary. Texas leads all U.S. states in business investment and population growth, creating roughly 20% of net new jobs nationally from 2020 to 2025, and is on track to surpass California as the largest U.S. economy.

Economist Staff The Economist
Date Posted:
June 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to CBRE, at least 184 American firms, including Tesla and Caterpillar, moved their headquarters to Austin, Dallas or Houston btw 2020 and 2025. During that period, Texas drove ~20% of all net job creation in the US.

Is Texas replacing California as America's economic powerhouse?

Core argument: Texas created ~20% of all net new U.S. jobs from 2020–2025, driving its emergence as the nation’s primary business investment.

On May 27th the shareholders of ExxonMobil approved a plan to cut its ties with New Jersey and reincorporate in Texas, where it has long had its headquarters. The oil giant is not alone. Texas is steadily establishing itself as America Inc’s new centre of gravity. No state receives more business investment or is adding more people to its population. From 2020 to 2025 it created roughly a fifth of all net new jobs in the country. It is only a matter of time before Texas overtakes California as the largest economy in America. Texas’s success should worry those in New York and California monitoring their tax take. At the same time it has spawned a raft of imitators. Legislators in North Carolina have passed a plan to get rid of its corporate-income tax by 2030. Tennessee has copied Texas’s strategy of offering firms shovel-ready mega-sites. Nevada is trying to launch its own business court.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Texas created ~20% of all net new U.S. jobs from 2020–2025, driving its emergence as the nation’s primary business investment.
  2. ExxonMobil’s reincorporation in Texas signals a broader corporate migration that leads to revenue losses for high-tax states like California and.
  3. Texas’s economic dominance positions it to surpass California’s GDP, prompting competitive tax and regulatory reforms across North Carolina, Tennessee, and.

Related Articles:

  • Where Americans Choose to Move and Where They Leave — Btw 2020 and 2024, 3.7% of California’s 2020 population moved out of state. The population of the “Texas Triangle” – the Dallas…
  • Fifty Shades of Growth — Looking at natural population growth @AzizSunderji finds that all five metros with the highest natural population growth, births net deaths, in the entire…
  • As New Jobs In Finance Dry Up, New York City’s Fiscal Model Is Wilting — Since January 2020, private sector real hourly earnings have fallen 9% in New York City, while increasing 3% nationally, as large firms based in NYC move jobs…
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    • Growth
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