Edward Conard

Top Ten New York Times Bestselling Author

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  • “Unintended Consequences represents the most cogent and persuasive analysis of the Financial Crisis to date.” - Andrei Shleifer, 1999 John Bates Clark Medal Winner
  • “…reminds us that inequality sends a signal of what society lacks most, in America’s case, entrepreneurship and risk taking.” - Lawrence Lindsey, CEO, The Lindsey Group, former Director of the National Economic Council
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
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Between Firm Changes in Earnings Inequality: The Dominant Role of Industry Effects

AI Summary. The authors estimate that about 75% of the rise in earnings inequality between firms comes from widening inequality across detailed industries, driven mainly by earnings differences between industries rather than shifts in where people work. Occupation effects account for nearly all of that widening, with managerial, professional, and technical roles showing the sharpest increases.

John Haltiwanger Institute of Labor Economics
Date Posted:
May 12, 2020
Is Database:
Database

75% of rising btw-firm inequality is from rising inequality at industry level, primarily driven by inter-industry earnings differentials.

What drives most of the rise in between-firm earnings inequality?

Core argument: About 75% of the rise in between-firm earnings inequality is attributed to rising inequality across detailed 4-digit NAICS industries, driven primarily by inter-industry earnings differentials rather than shifts in employment distribution across industries.

Approximately 75% of the increase in between-firm inequality is attributed to rising inequality across detailed 4-digit NAICS [North American Industry Classification System] industries, primarily driven by inter-industry earnings differentials rather than shifts in employment distribution. Occupation effects account for nearly all of the rise in these differentials, with 66% due to changing occupation mix across industries and 27% due to existing occupation mix differentials. Managerial, professional, and technical roles have seen the sharpest rise in earnings differentials, while production and sales lag behind. The task-based framework highlights how technology and globalization impact firms differently, with a dominant effect at the industry level. This underscores the need for further research into the evolving role of occupations across industries.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. About 75% of the rise in between-firm earnings inequality is attributed to rising inequality across detailed 4-digit NAICS industries, driven primarily by inter-industry earnings differentials rather than shifts in employment distribution across industries.
  2. Occupation effects account for nearly all of the rise in inter-industry earnings differentials, with 66% due to changing occupation mix across industries and 27% due to existing occupation mix differentials.
  3. Managerial, professional, and technical roles show the sharpest rise in earnings differentials, while production and sales roles lag, under a task-based framework in which technology and globalization affect firms differently.

New Haltiwanger finds structural changes at industry level help explain rising earnings inequality:

“….We provide evidence thatmost (about 75%) of the rising between firm inequality is from rising inequality across detailed 4-digit NAICS industries. Most of this rise in inequality across industries is due to rising inter-industry earnings differentials and not due to changing distribution of employment across industries. We also find that the rising inter-industry earnings differentials are almost completely accounted for by occupation effects. For the raw rise in rising inter-industry earnings differentials, we find that about 92% of the increase is accounted for by occupation effects. About 66% of this is due to changing occupation mix across industries and 27% due to changing occupation mix differentials given the existing differences in the occupation mix across industries…. Consistent with their findings, we find that the occupations with the sharpest rise in earnings differentials that differ by industry are managerial, professional and technical with occupations like production and sales being left far behind.Our contribution is to integrate the changing role of occupations with the rise in between firm and in turn between industry inequality. Our findings show that the changing demand for tasks as evidenced in the changing occupational mix and occupational differentials is closely linked to between firm and between industry inequality....Specifically, we find that the rise in between firm inequality is dominated by a rise in between industry inequality. We find the latter is dominated by rising inter-industry earnings differentials with a more modest role for the changing distribution of employment across industries. In turn, we find that virtually all of the rising inter-industry earnings differentials is accounted for by occupation effects. This includes both changing mix of occupations within and across industries and rising occupation differentials. We find, after controlling for the mix of workers in terms of age, gender, and education (as well as other controls), that the occupations with especially sharp increases in earnings differentials that differ across industries are managerial, business and financial, sciences, legal, and healthcare, with occupations like protective services, sales, and construction being left behind. The increase in the management occupation differential across industries is especially striking…. Put differently, this task based framework helps motivate why changes in inequality associated with the changing role of occupations is linked to the changing role of firms in inequality. Driving forces such as technology and globalization that induce changing demand for occupations impact firms differentially. In principle, this differential impact could be between firms or between industries. Our findings suggest there is a dominant role for the between industry impact. An important direction for future research is to explore the changing role of occupations across industries...."

Between Firm Changes in Earnings Inequality: The Dominant Role of Industry Effects: Extended Excerpt Image 1


John Haltiwanger and James Spletzer, "Between Firm Changes in Earnings Inequality: The Dominant Role of Industry Effects," Institute of Labor Economics, February 2020, https://www.iza.org/publications/dp/12990/between-firm-changes-in-earnings-inequality-the-dominant-role-of-industry-effects

  • Workforce Reorganization
    • High vs Low Skill
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Previous articleMay 12, 2020Five Points about U.S. Trade Over the Last Thirty YearsIP export stagnation reveals trade paradox: Tech-driven US shows flat IP service growth since 1990s. Software exports only $30bn/yr, 25% to Ireland, suggesting tax strategy over trade gains. @BradStesterNext articleMay 13, 2020Evidence Against the Free-College Agenda: An Analysis of Prices, Financial Aid, and Affordability at Public UniversitiesFinancial aid has largely offset the rise in sticker prices of colleges, but hasn’t kept pace with the rise in non-tuition costs. @JasonDelisle
Showing 8 database articles primarily about Workforce Reorganization

Work from Home and Interstate Migration

AI Summary. Survey data show 6.30% of US workers who switched to remote work after the pandemic moved states, compared with 3.58% of those who kept commuting, and plausibly exogenous changes in employer remote-work policies predict both higher remote work and higher interstate migration. Remote workers staying with the same employer are more likely to move states.

Alexander Bick, Adam Blandin, Karel Mertens, et al. Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis Working Papers
Date Posted:
May 29, 2024
Is Database:
Database

The rise in the work-from-home share accounts for more than half of the rise in overall interstate migration since 2019, and states with greater WFH opportunities experienced more out-migration.

Does remote work increase interstate migration?

Core argument: In the Real-Time Population Survey, 6.30% of workers who switched to work from home after Covid moved states since February 2020, compared with 3.58% of workers who commuted both before and after Covid.

In the American Community Survey (ACS), annual interstate migration [AIM] among adults ages 18-64 fell from 2.75% in 2005 to 2.23% in 2010. AIM rose from 2.40% in 2019 to 2.66% in 2022. Data from the Real-Time Population Survey (RPS) provide micro evidence that access to WFH increases interstate migration. [Fig. 4 shows] that 6.30% of workers who switched to WFH post-Covid moved states since February 2020, [compared to] 3.58% of workers who commuted both pre- and post-Covid. A potential concern [is]that the pandemic increased the desire to move across states and a large share of these moves involve WFH, but WFH itself was not necessary for those moves to happen [and thus not causal]. Using novel questions in the RPS - whether workers who commuted prior to the pandemic did so due to job characteristics, personal preferences, or employer requirements, and whether employer WFH policies had changed since 2020 - we find that plausibly exogenous changes in employer WFH policies predict higher rates of WFH and higher rates of interstate migration. Finally, consistent with the interpretation that WFH reduces the benefit of living near a workplace, we find that (i) among workers who remain with their pre-pandemic employer, WFH workers are more likely to move states, and (ii) among workers who move states WFH workers are less likely to change employers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. In the Real-Time Population Survey, 6.30% of workers who switched to work from home after Covid moved states since February 2020, compared with 3.58% of workers who commuted both before and after Covid.
  2. Annual interstate migration among U.S. adults ages 18–64 in the American Community Survey fell from 2.75% in 2005 to 2.23% in 2010, then rose from 2.40% in 2019 to 2.66% in 2022.
  3. Plausibly exogenous changes in employer work-from-home policies predict higher rates of work from home and higher rates of interstate migration; among workers staying with pre-pandemic employers, those working from home are more likely to move states.

Related Articles:

  • Working From Density — Within the same metropolitan-area income quartile, denser neighborhoods have a higher share of jobs that can be done remotely. The authors argue this pattern suggests increased telework raises willingness to pay for housing in high-density places, where leisure amenities and nonwork social interaction are more available.
  • Remote Work Is Less Common Than We Thought — New Bureau of Labor Statistics estimates show hybrid remote work is substantially less common than other surveys indicated, while fully remote work matches other estimates at about one in ten workers, making fully remote slightly more common than hybrid. Nearly one in five college-educated workers are fully remote, and nearly 40% of advanced-degree holders work hybrid or fully remote.
  • Remote Work, Three Years Later — Remote work has reduced office utilization but not yet office occupancy, because most firms are locked into long-duration leases. Baseline estimates suggest remote work will exert 0.8 percentage points of upward pressure on the office vacancy rate near-term, 2.3 more over the following five years, and 1.8 thereafter.
  • Workforce Reorganization
  • Productivity
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Why Does Working at Home Vary Across Countries and Across People?

AI Summary. Cultural individualism accounts for about one-third of cross-country differences in working from home, with the shift from the lowest-individualism country (Taiwan) to the highest (the US) associated with 0.7 more fully paid work-from-home days per week, and 1.1 more among college graduates. The authors find individualism explains more of this variation than industry mix, population density, or lockdown stringency.

Pablo Zarate, Mathias Dolls, Steven Davis, et al. National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
May 17, 2024
Is Database:
Database

A measure of individualism accounts for about 1/3 of the cross-country variation in work-from-home rates, with WFH most prevalent in the Anglosphere and least in Asia. @PabloZarate98 @I_Am_NickBloom @Jose_MariaRD @cevatgirayaksoy

Does culture explain why working from home varies across countries?

Core argument: Cultural factors, specifically Individualism, account for about one-third of cross-country differences in work from home, with the move from Taiwan's lowest Individualism score to the highest in the US associated with 0.7 more full paid WFH days per week.

We examine how work from home varies across countries and across US workers. Our key finding is that cultural factors – specifically Individualism – account for about one-third of the differences across countries. Figure 3 shows the bivariate relationship between individualism and WFH. Moving from the country with the lowest Individualism score (Taiwan) to the one with the highest (the US) is associated with 0.7 more full paid WFH days per week (1.1 among college graduates). Individualism explains far more of the variation than industrial composition, population-weighted density, or lockdown stringency. Across US workers, industry and population density are the two most important determinants. But cultural factors are still statistically significant. Respondents who reside in counties that voted for Joe Biden in 2020 by a larger margin WFH at higher rates even after accounting for industry, state-level wages, population density, and a battery of demographics.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Cultural factors, specifically Individualism, account for about one-third of cross-country differences in work from home, with the move from Taiwan's lowest Individualism score to the highest in the US associated with 0.7 more full paid WFH days per week.
  2. Among college graduates, the gap between the lowest- and highest-Individualism countries is associated with 1.1 more full paid WFH days per week, and Individualism explains far more variation than industrial composition, population-weighted density, or lockdown stringency.
  3. Across US workers, industry and population density are the two most important determinants of working from home, while respondents in counties that voted for Joe Biden in 2020 by larger margins work from home at higher rates even after accounting for industry, state-level wages, density, and demographics.

Related Articles:

  • Remote Work, Three Years Later — Remote work has reduced office utilization but not yet office occupancy, because most firms are locked into long-duration leases. Baseline estimates suggest remote work will exert 0.8 percentage points of upward pressure on the office vacancy rate near-term, 2.3 more over the following five years, and 1.8 thereafter.
  • Does Working from Home Boost Productivity Growth? — After controlling for each industry's pre-pandemic productivity trend, there is essentially no statistically significant relationship between how easily an industry's work can be done remotely and its excess productivity growth during the pandemic.
  • Work From Home and the Office Real Estate Apocalypse — The authors estimate New York City office values fell 45% in 2020 and 39% in the longer run, a $453bn value destruction, with lower-quality buildings hit hardest as tenants shifted to higher-quality space. They argue this has implications for local public finances and financial sector stability.
  • Workforce Reorganization
  • Productivity
  • Workforce

Time Savings When Working from Home

AI Summary. Drawing on a survey of working arrangements across 27 countries, the authors estimate that working from home saved about two hours of commuting per week per worker and will save about one hour per week after the pandemic. That equals 2.2% of a 46-hour workweek, which they value at about 2.2% of after-tax earnings.

Cevat Giray Aksoy, Jose Maria Barrero, Nicholas Bloom, et al National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
January 24, 2023
Is Database:
Database

A @nberpubs analysis finds workers who are working from home in the US save an average of 55 minutes with 39% of those time savings being devoted to a primary or secondary jobs and 33% for leisure activities. @I_Am_NickBloom

How much commuting time does working from home save workers?

Core argument: Drawing on the Global Survey of Working Arrangements covering 27 countries, the authors estimate that working from home saved about two hours per week per worker in 2021 and 2022 and will save about one hour per week after the pandemic ends.

The pandemic-induced shift to work from home yielded large private benefits in the form of commute time savings. To gauge the magnitude of these benefits, we turn to the Global Survey of Working Arrangements and consider data on commute times and the extent of work from home in 27 countries. We estimate that work from home saved about two hours per week per worker in 2021 and 2022, and that it will save about one hour per week per worker after the pandemic ends. That amounts to 2.2 percent of a 46-hour workweek, with 40 paid hours plus six hours of commuting. As we discussed, the after-tax wage rate is a reasonable benchmark for the private value of commute time savings. Thus, we estimate that the private value of the commute time savings associated with work from home will be about 2.2 percent of after-tax earnings in the post-pandemic economy.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Drawing on the Global Survey of Working Arrangements covering 27 countries, the authors estimate that working from home saved about two hours per week per worker in 2021 and 2022 and will save about one hour per week after the pandemic ends.
  2. The estimated post-pandemic saving of about one hour amounts to 2.2 percent of a 46-hour workweek consisting of 40 paid hours plus six hours of commuting.
  3. Using the after-tax wage rate as a benchmark for the private value of commute time, the authors estimate that work-from-home commute time savings will be worth about 2.2 percent of after-tax earnings in the post-pandemic economy.

Analysis from New York Fed shows that Americans spend 60 million fewer commuting hours each day vs. pre-pandemic. They allocated this time primarily toward leisure activities and sleeping, while reducing overall work hours.

“…In the aggregate, Americans now spend 60 million fewer hours traveling to work each day. We investigate how people spend this saved time on other activities. The chart above shows how one hour of foregone commute time is allocated toward other activities. First, we find a substantial fall in time spent working. Overall paid-work hours fell because of substitution toward other activities throughout the day: we see notable increases in leisure time and sleeping. The rise in leisure was particularly pronounced among younger Americans, who reported spending more time at social events, eating at restaurants or bars, and exercising….” David Dam, Davide Melcangi, Laura Pilossoph, and Aidan Toner-Rodgers, “What Have Workers Done with the Time Freed up by Commuting Less?,” Federal Reserve Bank Of New York, https://libertystreeteconomics.newyorkfed.org/2022/10/what-have-workers-done-with-the-time-freed-up-by-commuting-less/

What Have Workers Done with the Time Freed up by Commuting Less?

The COVID-19 pandemic has dramatically changed the way Americans spend their time. One of the most enduring shifts has occurred in the workplace, with millions of employees making the switch to work from home. Even as the pandemic has waned, more than 15 percent of full-time employees remain fully remote and an additional 30 percent work in hybrid arrangements (Barrero, Bloom, and Davis). These changes have substantially reduced time spent commuting to work; in the aggregate, Americans now spend 60 million fewer hours traveling to work each day. In this post, we investigate how people spend this saved time on other activities. Using detailed data from the American Time Use Survey (ATUS), we find that employed individuals allocate their saved commute time toward leisure activities and sleeping, while reducing overall work hours.

Measuring Time Spent

The ATUS is a nationally representative survey that measures both the amount of time people spend on various activities and where these activities take place. ATUS respondents are randomly selected from a subset of households in the Current Population Survey, allowing us to link demographic and employment information to respondents’ time use information. Because COVID-19 disrupted the survey’s data collection between March 18 and May 9 of 2020, the survey results for 2020 reflect data only from May 10 to December 31. To make comparisons with prior years, we restrict the data to this period in the other years as well.

To examine how workers allocate their saved commute time, we apply the methodology of Aguiar, Hurst, and Karabarbounis to the COVID-19 period. For those interested in the details, we aggregate individual ATUS responses to the state-level and exploit variation across states in the extent of commute time reduction. After categorizing more than 400 time use activities into nine major categories, we regress yearly changes in time use for each category on changes in commute time. Our first-differences approach enables us to account for time-invariant state characteristics, and we also include a variety of state-level control variables to account for worker composition. Across specifications, we restrict our analysis to employed individuals in order to exclude reductions in commute times due to job loss. Additionally, to account for the possibility that COVID-19 induced firms to cut hours just as employees were shifting to remote work, we also consider a sample of only full-time employees and find similar results.

Changes in Time Use

The main results are presented in the chart below in which we show how one hour of foregone commute time is allocated toward other activities. First, we find a substantial fall in time spent working; the decrease in hours worked away from home is only partially offset by an increase in working at home. This is in line with results from Bloom, Han, and Liang, who find that remote work led to a decrease in overall hours worked. Moreover, our findings help reconcile earlier work on commute times, which found that even though employees reported allocating 35 percent of their saved commute time to work, they spent fewer total hours in paid employment (Barrero, Bloom, and Davis). Our results from the ATUS suggest that although individuals may have increased time working in the precise time-slot they used to commute, overall paid-work hours fell because of substitution toward other activities throughout the day.

Second, we see notable increases in leisure time and sleeping. The rise in leisure was particularly pronounced among younger Americans, who reported spending more time at social events, eating at restaurants or bars, and exercising. Older age groups, on the other hand, tended to allocate more time to nonmarket work, such as activities related to childcare, the maintenance of the household, repairs, and meal preparation.

Who Are the Activities Conducted With?

The ATUS also includes information on who physically accompanied the respondent during each activity. We use this variable to classify which activities were done with people outside of the immediate household. We categorize solitary activities and those with household members into one category, and activities with friends, co-workers, clients, and non-household family members into the other. As we would expect, the next chart shows that time spent on activities done alone or with household members increased, such as leisure (+2.30 hours) and nonmarket activities (+0.69). Differentiating by age, we see that younger people were the only group to significantly increase their leisure time with non-household members (+1.13), likely reflecting the differential risks of COVID-19.

Our results show important relationships in the substitutability of time use. The findings lend credence to the various reports on employees’ preferences for flexible work arrangements, given that cutting the commute enables people to spend their time on other activities, such as childcare or leisure. This added benefit of working from home—for those who want it—will be an important consideration for the future of flexible work arrangements.

  • Workforce Reorganization
  • Productivity

Some of the World’s Largest Employers No Longer Sell Things, They Rent Workers

AI Summary. Five of the world's 20 largest employers are outsourcing firms, up from one previously, and the sector's annual contract value rose from $12.5bn to $37bn. Outsourcing lets firms cut costs and access specialized skills without adding headcount, but re-badged workers often receive lower pay and fewer benefits, widening wage disparities.

Lauren Weber Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
May 30, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Outsourcing has transformed the global labor market, with 5 of the top 20 global employers in 2017 being outsourcing firms, up from just 1 in 2000.

Does the growth of outsourcing firms widen wage disparities?

Core argument: Five of the world's top 20 global employers were outsourcing firms in 2017, up from one in 2000, as companies shifted from direct employment to renting workers from service providers.

The shift from traditional employment to outsourcing has transformed the global labor market, with five of the top 20 global employers in 2017 being outsourcing firms, up from just one in 2000. The outsourcing sector's annual contract value surged from $12.5bn in 2000 to $37bn in 2016, driven by demand for technology projects and cloud data transfers. Companies like Accenture, which saw outsourcing revenue rise to $16.1bn in 2017, provide a range of services, effectively renting workers to clients. This trend allows firms to reduce costs and access specialized skills without increasing headcount but contributes to income inequality as workers are often re-badged with lower pay and fewer benefits. Outsourcing leads to occupational sorting, where low-skilled workers are employed by service providers rather than directly by companies, exacerbating wage disparities. As automation advances, the need for outsourced labor may decline, further impacting the workforce landscape.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Five of the world's top 20 global employers were outsourcing firms in 2017, up from one in 2000, as companies shifted from direct employment to renting workers from service providers.
  2. Annual contract value in the outsourcing sector rose from $12.5bn in 2000 to $37bn in 2016, driven by demand for technology projects and cloud data transfers, with Accenture's outsourcing revenue reaching $16.1bn in 2017.
  3. Outsourcing lets firms cut costs and access specialized skills without adding headcount, but contributes to income inequality as re-badged workers receive lower pay and fewer benefits and low-skilled workers are sorted into service providers.

Some of the World’s Largest Employers No Longer Sell Things, They Rent Workers

The list of the world’s largest employers was once dominated by household names like Ford Motor Co., J.C. Penney Co., and General Electric Co., companies that made and sold things.

A Analysis conducted for The Wall Street Journal shows those names are nowhere to be found on that list today. In their place are large outsourcing companies like Compass Group PLC, Accenture PLC and other businesses that essentially lease workers to clients.

Of the top 20 global employers in 2017, five are outsourcing and “workforce solutions” companies, according to an analysis by S&P Global Market Intelligence. In 2000, only one employer in the top 20—International Business Machines Corp., which offers outsourced IT services among its many businesses—fell into that bucket.

Outsourcing companies are vacuuming up the world’s workers as traditional employers are handing over more of their tasks to nonemployees, a shift that has transformed the way corporations do business and had profound effects on workers’ prospects and pay.

The past two decades have been boom times for the outsourcing sector, with the annual value of contracts growing to $37 billion in 2016 from $12.5 billion in 2000, according to research and advisory firm Information Services Group Inc. III -1.68% The market is expected to rise again in 2017 and 2018, thanks partly to double-digit growth in big technology projects as more companies transfer massive volumes of data to the cloud.

For employers, dispatching work to outside companies saves money and lets them access skills they need without adding to their headcount. Workers in jobs that have gone to outsourcers, though, can feel moved around like chess pieces, either displaced entirely or re-badged as employees of a service provider, sometimes with fewer benefits and lower pay. A growing body of economic research suggests that outsourcing is a significant factor fueling the rise of income inequality in the past decade.

“If all the engineers are in one firm and the cleaners are in another, you get less diversity within firms and more inequality across firms,” says Nicholas Bloom, an economist at Stanford University.

Some of the World’s Largest Employers No Longer Sell Things, They Rent Workers: Extended Excerpt Image 1


Dublin-based Accenture, best known as an information-technology and consulting firm, has become the de facto back office for hundreds of client companies. The firm employs 435,000 people globally—up from some 200,000 in 2010—and serves 95 of the Fortune Global 100 with consulting or outsourcing services or both. Outsourcing comprised 46% of the company’s 2017 revenue, or $16.1 billion, up from 41% in 2011.

On behalf of loan-servicing companies, Accenture’s people collect debts from homeowners who defaulted on their mortgages. For large insurance clients, doctors and nurses employed by Accenture make wellness calls to diabetes patients. For Alphabet Inc.’s Google, it oversees contractors who review content for the search giant.

“We become part of our clients’ operations, we become part of the talent that’s in their operations,” says Debbie Polishook, group chief executive of Accenture Operations, which houses the company’s outsourcing work.

Some of the World’s Largest Employers No Longer Sell Things, They Rent Workers: Extended Excerpt Image 2


Companies say that unloading tasks to outside firms allows employees to do more high-value jobs. Providers like Accenture tell companies they can do their work better and more cheaply, prodding executives to view labor as an on-demand resource they can rent as needed.

“When CEOs tell me they want to keep all of their talent, my response is ‘Why?’” says longtime Kelly Services Inc. boss Carl Camden, who retired earlier this year. “ ‘If they’re not our people, how can they be our people?’ is a tautology you have to work them through.”

The breadth of services on offer from outsourcing firms is staggering. Compass Group was founded in 1941 to run factory cafeterias in wartime England, eventually branching out into corporate catering. It now employs more than 550,000 and counts among its subsidiaries firms like Eurest Services, which staffs and manages mailrooms for clients, provides them with full-time receptionists, sets up their conference rooms for meetings and operates their warehouses. Eurest’s clients include Google, SAP and Pfizer Inc.

With so much work done outside the company, businesses employ fewer kinds of workers than they used to, a change that economists say has fueled income inequality.

Outsourcing leads to workers being clustered in companies according to their skills, which affects pay and benefits. A bank used to employ janitors and security guards, in addition to traders and salespeople. For the sake of morale and a sense of fairness, management had an incentive to limit the disparities in employees’ compensation. That had the effect of boosting the pay of lower-skilled staff.

Now, those janitors might just as often work for an outside firm like Denmark’s ISS AS, one of the largest facility services companies in the world, while the high-skilled workers remain employed by the bank—a trend economists call occupational sorting. Pay for outside workers tends to be lower because outsourcing firms need to keep costs low to compete for contracts and because the workers don’t reap rewards from the financial successes of the bank.

Companies that provide security guards or IT help-desk workers have to show they can do the job more cheaply than the client can, keeping a tight lid on wages for those workers, says David Weil, a Labor Department official in the Obama administration and an expert on contract labor.

Outsourcing firms’ workforces, though, may shrink as algorithms take on more tasks, says Steve Hall, a partner at ISG.

“The large outsourcers are using a combination of analytics and automation to significantly reduce the need for labor,” he says.
I'm one of the opinion editors atDow Jones MarketWatch, a no-paywall website about all things money. We get about 30 million unique visitors a month, mostly from the U.S. I'm reaching out because I have your book "The Upside of Inquality" and just read theNew York Times article about all the contract workers in Silicon Valley. I'm looking for an op-ed on what this says about the changing nature of work and the political ramifications of this sort of change. Is this a topic you'd be interested in writing about for a broad audience? If so I'd love to talk. I look forward to hearing from you. Silvia Ascarelli

Lauren Weber, "Some of the World’s Largest Employers No Longer Sell Things, They Rent Workers,"Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-of-the-worlds-largest-employers-no-longer-sell-things-they-rent-workers-1514479580

Ed Comment:Silvia,Thank you for taking an interest in my book and offering me the opportunity to contribute. While I would love to write an op-ed for your publication, I just can’t devote enough time at this moment to do this topic justice. There is little doubt that companies have grown shrewder about outsourcing tasks. Firms have increasingly organized by skill level. I mentioned both of these trends in my book, and in a piece that has not yet been published (below). Perhaps the researchers referenced in the footnotes could/would write the op-ed. These dynamics have produced large shifts in the allocation of skill between companies. High-paid workers have increasingly clustered in companies largely composed of high-paid workers, like Microsoft and Goldman Sachs—companies with the knowhow to magnify the productivity of the most productive workers.Jae Song, David Price, Fatih Guvenen, Nocholas Bloom, Till von Wachter, "Firming Up Inequality."i]At the same time, companies like Apple and General Motors, have increasingly outsourced low-paid labor to companies with a preponderance of low-paid workers making it harder for lower-skilled workers to share collectively in the success of higher-skilled workers. Elizabeth Weber Handwerker, “Increased Concentration of Occupations, Outsourcing, and Growing Wage Inequality in the United States,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 2017, http://www.sole-jole.org/17733.pdf.ii]iJae Song, David Price, Fatih Guvenen, Nocholas Bloom, Till von Wachter, "Firming Up Inequality."iiElizabeth Weber Handwerker, “Increased Concentration of Occupations, Outsourcing, and Growing Wage Inequality in the United States,” U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, April 2017, http://www.sole-jole.org/17733.pdf.Lauren Weber, "Some of the World’s Largest Employers No Longer Sell Things, They Rent Workers,"Wall Street Journal, December 28, 2017, https://www.wsj.com/articles/some-of-the-worlds-largest-employers-no-longer-sell-things-they-rent-workers-1514479580

  • Workforce Reorganization
    • High vs Low Skill

Work of the Past, Work of the Future

AI Summary. Urban U.S. labor markets have grown more educated and skill-intensive over five decades, while automation and international trade have pushed non-college workers out of specialized middle-skill jobs into low-wage work requiring only generic skills. The author argues this polarization has eroded the urban wage premium for non-college workers and contributed to a secular decline in their real wages.

David Autor National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
February 25, 2019
Is Database:
Database

Technological changes have disproportionately favored college-educated workers, exacerbating economic disparities & reducing opportunities for non-college workers in high-wage cities. @DavidAutor

Technological changes have disproportionately favored college-educated workers, exacerbating economic disparities &...

Has job polarization erased the urban wage premium for non-college workers?

Core argument: Urban U.S. labor markets have become substantially more educated and skill-intensive over five decades, while non-college workers perform less skilled work than before, a shift attributed to automation and international trade.

Over the past five decades, urban U.S. labor markets have become significantly more educated and skill-intensive, yet non-college workers now perform less skilled work due to automation and international trade. This shift has led to a polarization of urban labor markets, with non-college workers being pushed from specialized middle-skill jobs into low-wage roles requiring only generic skills. Consequently, there has been a secular decline in real wages for non-college workers, as the urban wage premium that once benefited them has diminished. These technological changes have disproportionately favored college-educated workers, exacerbating economic disparities and reducing opportunities for non-college workers in high-wage cities.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Urban U.S. labor markets have become substantially more educated and skill-intensive over five decades, while non-college workers perform less skilled work than before, a shift attributed to automation and international trade.
  2. Non-college workers have been pushed out of specialized middle-skill urban jobs into low-wage roles requiring only generic skills, polarizing urban labor markets.
  3. Real wages for non-college workers have declined secularly as the urban wage premium that once benefited them diminished, with technological changes disproportionately favoring college-educated workers.

"...Urban U.S. labor markets today are vastly more educated and skill-intensive than they were ve decades ago. Yet, urban non-college workers currently perform substantially less skilled work than in prior decades. This deskilling reflects the joint effects of automation and international trade, which have eliminated the bulk of non-college production, administrative support, and clerical jobs, yielding a disproportionate polarization of urban labor markets. The unwinding of the urban non-college occupational skill gradient has, I argue, abetted a secular fall in real non-college wages by: (1) shunting non-college workers out of specialized middle-skill occupations into low-wage occupations that require only generic skills; (2) diminishing the set of non-college workers that hold middle-skill jobs in high-wage cities; and (3) attenuating, to a startling degree, the steep urban wage premium for non-college workers that prevailed in earlier decades. Changes in the nature of work|many of which are technological in origin| have been more disruptive and less beneficial for non-college than college workers...."David Autor, "Work of the Past, Work of the Future," National Bureau of Economic Research, February 15, 2019, https://economics.mit.edu/files/16724

  • Workforce Reorganization
    • High vs Low Skill

New World Order: Labor, Capital, and Ideas in the Power Law Economy

AI Summary. In a power law economy, a small number of firms and individuals capture a disproportionate share of wealth and influence, with the top 1% of earners' income share rising from 8% in the 1970s to over 20% while the bottom 50% saw stagnant wages. The authors attribute this concentration to technology that favors capital and high-skill labor.

Erik Brynjolfsson and Andrew McAfee and Michael Spence Foreign Affairs
Date Posted:
June 19, 2014
Is Database:
Database

The power law economy has created significant economic disparities, with the top 1% of earners seeing their income share rise from 8% in the 1970s to over 20% today.

The power law economy has created significant economic disparities, with the top 1% of earners seeing their income share...

Does technology favoring capital and skills drive income concentration?

Core argument: The top 1% of earners' income share has risen from 8% in the 1970s to over 20% today, while the bottom 50% have seen stagnant wage growth.

In the power law economy, a small number of firms and individuals capture a disproportionate share of wealth and influence, leading to significant economic disparities. The top 1% of earners have seen their income share rise from 8% in the 1970s to over 20% today, while the bottom 50% have experienced stagnant wage growth. This concentration of wealth is driven by technological advancements that favor capital and high-skill labor over traditional labor, resulting in a shift in the labor market dynamics. The rise of digital platforms and automation has further exacerbated these trends, creating a winner-takes-all environment where a few dominant players thrive. Policymakers face the challenge of addressing these imbalances by fostering inclusive growth and ensuring that the benefits of technological progress are more evenly distributed across society.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The top 1% of earners' income share has risen from 8% in the 1970s to over 20% today, while the bottom 50% have seen stagnant wage growth.
  2. In the power law economy, a small number of firms and individuals capture a disproportionate share of wealth and influence, producing significant economic disparities.
  3. Technological advances that favor capital and high-skill labor over traditional labor, along with digital platforms and automation, drive this concentration of wealth into a winner-takes-all environment.

Link and source were there just @ the bottom. citation: Brynjolfsson, Erik and Andrew McAfee and Michael Spence, "New World Order: Labor, Capital, and Ideas in the Power Law Economy"Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014. Available at:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141531/erik-brynjolfsson-andrew-mcafee-and-michael-spence/new-world-order

Brynjolfsson, Erik and Andrew McAfee and Michael Spence, "New World Order: Labor, Capital, and Ideas in the Power Law Economy"Foreign Affairs, July/August 2014. Available at:http://www.foreignaffairs.com/articles/141531/erik-brynjolfsson-andrew-mcafee-and-michael-spence/new-world-order

  • Workforce Reorganization
    • High vs Low Skill
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Growth
    • Inflation
  • Productivity
    • Investment
  • Workforce
    • Inequality
    • Wages/Income
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