Edward Conard

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Monday, November 2, 2026

Is This The First Clear Evidence Of AI’s Impact On The Labour Market?

AI Summary. Productivity gains and headcount declines attributed to AI are concentrated in the US tech sector, with no comparable pattern in US finance and professional services or in other high-income countries. The column argues the evidence is more consistent with interest rate increases, inflation, and economic uncertainty prompting large technology firms to cut staff than with AI-driven displacement.

John Burn-Murdoch Financial Times
Date Posted:
November 2, 2026

AI-adopting sectors’ output has risen further above its pre-2023 trend in the US than in Europe. John Burn-Murdoch points to US tech layoffs after 2022 rate hikes, hinting that the reduction in employment may itself be the reason for increased productivity.

Do tech job cuts reflect AI or economic conditions?

Core argument: Burn-Murdoch finds the productivity divergence in AI-adopting sectors is concentrated in US tech and absent in the UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, and the EU27, and “weak to non-existent” in US finance and professional services.

Labour productivity in the sectors with heaviest adoption of AI has decisively ticked up from its pre-2023 trend, while other sectors have not. The link visible in the US between AI usage, productivity growth and falling employment is absent elsewhere. Where the pattern does show up, it is overwhelmingly a story about the tech sector rather than the broader triumvirate of tech, finance and professional services. The key inflection point comes in 2022 — when AI meant chatbots, not agents. The productivity story is not one of accelerating output and revenue, but flatlining or contracting headcount. Put all of this together and “productivity is surging in AI-adopting sectors” [might] become “rate hikes, inflation and other economic uncertainty starting in 2022 caused companies to pull back on hiring, and Big Tech went further in making substantial lay-offs long before production-ready AI.” None of this completely rules out any role for direct AI job displacement. AI is already disrupting the nature of many jobs. Hiring slowdowns and lay-offs began as a response to broader economic shocks and uncertainty, and could now be extended by company beliefs that AI allows them to do more with less.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Burn-Murdoch finds the productivity divergence in AI-adopting sectors is concentrated in US tech and absent in the UK, Canada, Australia, France, Germany, Sweden, and the EU27, and “weak to non-existent” in US finance and professional services.
  2. Tech employment contraction dates to Q4 2022, before production-ready AI, with productivity gains arising from flat or falling headcount against stable revenues at Alphabet, Meta, Microsoft, and Spotify, while Bank of America, Visa, Accenture, and Deloitte show no comparable pattern.
  3. Burn-Murdoch argues rate hikes, inflation, and economic uncertainty from 2022 onward better explain Big Tech headcount cuts than AI-driven displacement, noting a Goldman Sachs link between AI usage and employment declines disappears when a richer employment dataset is substituted.

Related Articles:

  • Looking for the Ladder — The article argues that the hiring downturn in occupations most exposed to generative AI reflects interest-rate sensitivity rather than AI itself, since roughly 38% of workers in the most AI-exposed quintile work in information, finance and insurance, and professional and technical services, versus under 2% in the least-exposed quintile.
  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector — Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.
  • Investment
  • GDP
    • Growth
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
  • Workforce
    • Unemployment/Participation

The Smartest People in AI Believe This Is the World’s Most Important Chart

AI Summary. An internal analysis of 15,000 artificial intelligence research-and-development tasks at Anthropic rated each on a six-level autonomy scale, finding the share where AI performed most of the work under human supervision rose from none a year earlier and 1% in March to 26% by August.

Ben Cohen Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
November 2, 2026

Internal Anthropic data shows AI leads on 26% of the firm’s AI development and leads and collaborates on more than 95% of the work suggesting that while recursive self-improvement is not “inevitable…it could come sooner than most institutions are prepared for.”

How quickly is AI taking over AI research work?

Core argument: Claude led 26% of Anthropic’s AI R&D work by August, up from 1% in March and none a year earlier, on a six-level scale where “AI leads” means AI performs most of the work under human supervision.

A Claude agent dug through [Anthropic's] Slack messages and internal documents to identify 15,000 tasks of AI R&D work. A Claude detective investigated exactly how that work was done. Then a Claude judge weighed the evidence and rated the work on a six-level scale, from no AI to fully autonomous AI. The most telling bars are the ones in orange for “AI leads,” meaning it performs most of the R&D while a human supervises—the fifth of the six levels. A year ago, AI led none of this work. As recently as March, it only led 1%. By August, Claude was leading 26% of the work on future Claudes. And that number is almost certainly higher today. Even as the company’s researchers delegate to AI, it’s worth remembering that 0% of this work is being done entirely by AI. It still hasn’t reached the sixth level of automation. But at this rate of progress, AI taking us out of the loop might just be a matter of time, computing power and the decisions of human beings inside the labs. “We are not there yet, and recursive self-improvement is not inevitable,” Anthropic recently wrote. “But it could come sooner than most institutions are prepared for.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Claude led 26% of Anthropic’s AI R&D work by August, up from 1% in March and none a year earlier, on a six-level scale where “AI leads” means AI performs most of the work under human supervision.
  2. Anthropic’s assessment used a Claude agent to mine Slack messages and internal documents for 15,000 AI R&D tasks, a Claude detective to investigate how each was done, and a Claude judge to rate the work.
  3. None of Anthropic’s AI R&D work is done entirely by AI, the sixth level of automation, and the company wrote that “recursive self-improvement is not inevitable” but “could come sooner than most institutions are prepared for.”.

Related Articles:

  • The AI Re-Acceleration That Wasn’t — An analysis of Epoch's Capabilities Index data, controlling for developer and model family, finds no statistically significant breakpoint in AI progress; a segmented model fits no better than a straight-line trend (p = 0.615), with the estimated slope change ranging from -8.4 to +23.4 points per year.
  • Why .400 Hitters Disappeared — and What It Means for AI — Artificial intelligence models' capability gains are shrinking in percentage terms, falling from about 15% relative to the baseline early on to roughly 10% for the same absolute increment, narrowing the gap between frontier and good-enough models. The author argues this points to a commoditizing market where price, not minor model differences, becomes the main differentiator, pressuring frontier firms' margins.
  • Investment
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

OpenAI Raises Less Than Half of $30 Billion Target in Latest Round

AI Summary. OpenAI has secured roughly $11bn in commitments for its latest funding round, less than half its initial $30bn target, after tepid interest from some large investors amid market jitters over the artificial intelligence trade. The deal values the company at $1.25tn, below the $1.4tn valuation it had hoped to achieve.

Berber Jin Wall Street Journal
Date Posted:
November 2, 2026

OpenAI has secured ~$11B in commitments against its original $30B fundraising target, at a $1.25T valuation rather than the $1.4T it initially sought. The company is now targeting up to $20B in total, seeking to raise $9B from family offices and high-net-worth individuals.

OpenAI has secured ~$11B in commitments against its original $30B fundraising target, at a $1.25T valuation rather than the...

Is investor appetite for AI funding rounds weakening?

Core argument: OpenAI has secured roughly $11 billion in commitments for its latest funding round, less than half of the $30 billion it initially targeted, according to people familiar with the matter.

OpenAI has raised less than half of the $30 billion it had initially targeted for its latest funding round, with market jitters over the AI trade dampening investor appetite for one of the industry’s biggest names. After receiving tepid interest from some large investors, OpenAI has so far secured roughly $11 billion in commitments for the new financing, according to people familiar with the matter. The deal values the company at $1.25 trillion—less than the $1.4 trillion valuation that it had earlier hoped to achieve.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. OpenAI has secured roughly $11 billion in commitments for its latest funding round, less than half of the $30 billion it initially targeted, according to people familiar with the matter.
  2. The financing values OpenAI at $1.25 trillion, below the $1.4 trillion valuation the company had earlier hoped to achieve.
  3. Market jitters over the AI trade dampened investor appetite for OpenAI, with some large investors showing tepid interest in the round.

Related Articles:

  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • Wall Street’s AI Debt Machine Is Starting to Choke on Supply — At least 18 data-center financings in the junk-bond and leveraged loan markets carry double-digit yields, and a $5bn syndicated loan for neocloud Volta Infrastructure required steeper discounts and higher interest, pushing its yield above 11%. The average yield on investment-grade technology bonds has risen to about 6%, roughly 1.4 percentage points higher than a year earlier.
  • A Catalyst For The AI Bubble Break — Historically, controlling for valuations, a 1% rise in the share of the market represented by initial public offerings has been associated with roughly a 4% decline in prices. With large artificial-intelligence company listings expected and share issuance exceeding buybacks, equity supply could shift from shrinking about 1% a year to growing near 5%, implying returns roughly 20% below average.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

The Cage Fight for Capital

AI Summary. A slowdown in artificial intelligence financing could become self-reinforcing, as falling stock prices widen credit spreads, which further slows financing. The author argues the S&P 500's roughly 8% gain this year rests on a small number of stocks driven up by competition among deep-pocketed players betting on artificial intelligence.

Paul Podolsky A Letter From Paul
Date Posted:
November 2, 2026

Taking the lay of the land, Paul Podolsky observes reflexivity in the financing of the data center buildout: “If stocks go up, the financing is easy. If stocks go down, the financing becomes much more challenging, and slower demand makes the stocks go down further.”

Could a slowdown in AI financing feed on itself?

Core argument: The S&P 500 remains up about 8% for the year after October 3, a gain the author attributes to a small number of stocks that went vertical earlier in the year.

If the financing slows, it creates a cascade of self-reinforcing forces. Falling stock prices widen credit spreads, which slows financing, which leads to falling stock prices. After [Friday, October 3], the S&P 500 will still be up about 8% this year. The S&P is up because earlier this year a small number of stocks went vertical. The cage fight for capital pushed up the SanDisks and Dells. The richest guys in the world take huge bets, stomach volatility, and win. The magic chalice is the singularity, which they believe is at hand. But the singularity is expensive, and there are too many players in the room. For instance, I suspect Musk will try to use his balance sheet to take out his sworn enemy Sam Altman at OpenAI. This week Meta announced a stock and bond offering that was purportedly oversubscribed, but the stock fell. Amazon and Google modestly missed earnings and went more cash flow negative. Musk recently said he had raised $40B for SpaceX, but when fact-checked, that turned out not to be entirely true.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The S&P 500 remains up about 8% for the year after October 3, a gain the author attributes to a small number of stocks that went vertical earlier in the year.
  2. The author argues that slowing financing sets off a self-reinforcing cascade in which falling stock prices widen credit spreads, which further slows financing and drives prices lower.
  3. Meta’s stock fell despite a purportedly oversubscribed stock and bond offering, Amazon and Google modestly missed earnings and went more cash flow negative, and Musk’s claim of raising $40B for SpaceX did not fully hold up to fact-checking.

Related Articles:

  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • Capital Is Making a Comeback — Tangible investment in property, factories and equipment fell from 12.5% to 8.5% of private gross domestic product, while intangible investment in intellectual property, software and process knowledge rose from about 11.5% to 16.75%. The author argues demand for tangible capital investment will now have to rise.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research
    • Investment

America Is Making a ‘Freaking Fortune’ In an Energy Crisis

AI Summary. European and Asian buyers pay over $30 per million British thermal units for natural gas while US buyers pay around $3 and Canadian buyers about $1.5, a roughly 12x gap that is the widest on record. US liquefied natural gas exports have not been enough to fully link the domestic market to global prices.

Javier Blas Bloomberg
Date Posted:
November 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

The price of natural gas in Western Europe and Japan is now a record 12x that of the North American price, as the shale revolution and ample domestic reserves shield North American gas consumers from the fallout of the Iran war.

How wide is the gap between US and overseas gas prices?

Core argument: European and Asian gas buyers pay north of $30 per mBtu while US buyers pay around $3 and Canadian buyers about $1.5, a gap reaching a ratio of 12 times.

While European and Asian consumers are now paying north of $30 per million British thermal unit for their gas, US buyers pay around $3 per mBtu. Last week, US gas prices briefly touched a two-year low of $2.5 per mBut — in the middle of an energy crisis. Canadian costs are even lower, at about $1.5 per mBtu. The price difference between gas in Europe and Asia versus North America, reaching now a ratio of 12 times, has never been wider; not during the 2022 gas shock following the Russian invasion of Ukraine, nor in 2011-2012 after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Today, the US is exporting huge amounts of gas as LNG. But even that isn’t enough to fully connect its domestic market to the global one. As such, America is making a double profit: First, it enjoys ultra-low gas prices; second, it’s paid enormous sums for its exports.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. European and Asian gas buyers pay north of $30 per mBtu while US buyers pay around $3 and Canadian buyers about $1.5, a gap reaching a ratio of 12 times.
  2. The price gap between European and Asian gas and North American gas has never been wider, exceeding the spreads during the 2022 shock after Russia’s invasion of Ukraine and in 2011–2012 after the Fukushima accident pushed Japan toward gas.
  3. US gas prices briefly touched a two-year low of $2.5 per mBtu, and large LNG exports have not fully connected the domestic market to the global one, leaving America with low domestic prices and large export earnings.

Related Articles:

  • U.S. Economy Less Vulnerable To Geopolitical Oil Price Shocks Than In The Past — The United States became a net oil exporter in late 2019, and oil and oil product spending fell from near 8% of GDP in 1980 to 3% in 2024. The authors estimate a 15% global oil supply disruption would now cut annualized U.S. real GDP growth by 0.3pp, versus 1.7pp in the rest of the world.
  • Fighting Words: The Energy Transition in 2026 — Estimates based on primary energy overstate how much electricity is needed to replace oil in passenger cars, since electric motors convert 80%-90% of electricity into motion versus about 18% for gasoline cars. Measuring useful final energy net of waste heat avoids this "primary energy fallacy": the US consumed 45 exajoules of useful final energy versus 95 exajoules of primary energy.
  • Power Politics: Energy Self-Sufficiency in a Modern Mercantilist World — China leads in adding power to the grid, with more than 30,000 miles of ultra-high-voltage transmission lines versus zero in the US and lead times for large transformers of 48 weeks against a US average of 143 weeks. This positions China to accommodate new demand sources such as artificial intelligence.
  • Energy
  • GDP
    • Business Cycle
    • Growth
  • Security

Obamacare Dealt Yet Another Blow as Premiums Jump Again

AI Summary. The average premium in the Affordable Care Act insurance marketplaces is projected to rise 13%, according to an analysis by the health research group KFF. That increase is slightly higher than elsewhere, with consulting firms projecting roughly 10% increases for employer plans covering about 150m people and more than 10% for federal workers.

Reed Abelson and Margot Sanger-Katz New York Times
Date Posted:
November 2, 2026
Is Database:
Database

According to a KFF analysis, the average benchmark health care premium on the Obamacare insurance marketplaces will increase 13% in 2027, compared to 10% for private insurance. This follows a 26% increase last year.

According to a KFF analysis, the average benchmark health care premium on the Obamacare insurance marketplaces will increase...

Are marketplace health premiums rising faster than employer plan premiums?

Core argument: Average premiums in the Obamacare marketplaces will rise 13% in 2027, according to an analysis by KFF that combined newly published federal prices for 30 states with state-level figures.

Obamacare premiums will rise an average of 13% in 2027, following a 26% increase in 2026. Much of the increase reflects rising medical costs, with employer-plan premiums also expected to climb about 10%. But the expiration of enhanced federal subsidies has left some Obamacare customers particularly exposed. Remaining income-based subsidies will shield most enrollees from next year’s premium increases by shifting the additional expense to taxpayers. Those ineligible for assistance—including many self-employed workers and early retirees—must absorb the full increase, sometimes after already paying over $1,000 more per month in 2026.Many customers have responded by buying cheaper coverage with higher deductibles, pushing the average deductible to nearly $4,000 this year. Having already traded down, they have less room to offset further increases. KFF estimates suggest enrollment had fallen by nearly five million by June, while a Commonwealth Fund survey indicates that the uninsured rate among working-age adults has risen.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Average premiums in the Obamacare marketplaces will rise 13% in 2027, according to an analysis by KFF that combined newly published federal prices for 30 states with state-level figures.
  2. Reports by several consulting firms project that 2027 premiums for employer plans, which cover around 150 million people, could rise by about 10%, below the 13% marketplace increase.
  3. Premiums for federal workers are increasing by more than 10%.

Related Articles:

  • Saved by Medicaid: New Evidence on Health Insurance and Mortality from the Universe of Low-Income Adults — Using linked Census and tax records for 37m low-income adults, the authors estimate that state Medicaid expansions raised enrollment by 12 percentage points and cut mortality among low-income adults by 2.5%, implying a 21% reduction in the mortality hazard of new enrollees. They estimate direct budgetary costs of $5.4m per life saved and $179,000 per life-year saved.
  • A Long-Run Economic Model for Projecting the Finances of the U.S. Government and National Spending on Healthcare: Analysis of Productivity Increases and Health Sector Reform — A long-run model in which health spending, the federal budget, and capital investment are jointly determined by supply and demand projects U.S. federal debt reaching 151% of GDP in 2036 and 309% in 2056, versus the Congressional Budget Office's 120% and 175%. Rising real interest rates compound deficits and debt.
  • Will Medical Care Strangle or Save the Federal Budget? — A National Bureau of Economic Research paper projects U.S. medical spending, 18% of GDP in 2024, reaching 19%–26% of GDP by 2040, with federal medical spending consuming 45%–61% of federal revenue excluding Social Security contributions. The author argues only the low-spending path is consistent with current tax levels and other commitments.
  • Healthcare/Seniors
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Government Spending
  • Politics
  • Workforce

Tuesday, November 3, 2026

This Time Would Have To Be Very Different. Part II

AI Summary. Holding US corporate free cash flow at its record 15% share of gross value added and keeping valuation multiples fixed implies a real expected return of about 5.3%, below what US corporate capital has historically delivered. Earning the historical average would require that cash flow share to keep rising, a bet on capital gaining at labor's expense.

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents
Date Posted:
November 3, 2026
Is Database:
Database

If the free cash flow of the entire US corporate sector were to hold at its record ~15% share of corporate value added, corporations would return only ~5.3% over the next decade. To earn the historical mean return, FCF would have to keep rising, implying a structural transformation favoring capital at labor’s expense.

Do record corporate cash flows still imply below-average expected stock returns?

Core argument: Holding the multiple fixed, a 3.26% free cash flow yield plus the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ 4.58% projected nominal GDP growth and 2.5% inflation implies a real expected return of roughly 5.3% on US corporate debt plus equity.

At a CAPE of 40.7 US stocks look extremely expensive, and expected returns are low, especially compared to TIPS yields. Plugging in today’s numbers, you back out an expected real return of around 3% over the next decade, compared to a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.6%. Now, instead of an investor holding a single share, we could look at an investor who owns the entire corporate sector, all equity, bonds, and other liabilities. This investor acquired a claim to FCF, the total amount of cash that can be paid out to its owners, including bondholders: gross corporate value added left after paying workers, the government, and investment expenditure. This FCF is now about 15% of corporate value added. Earnings minus FCF is net investment; corporations have invested less. Its FCF yield is 3.26%, vs. 3.21% since 1952. That delivers an approximate real expected return of 5.3%, below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Holding the multiple fixed, a 3.26% free cash flow yield plus the Survey of Professional Forecasters’ 4.58% projected nominal GDP growth and 2.5% inflation implies a real expected return of roughly 5.3% on US corporate debt plus equity.
  2. The 5.3% real return assumes free cash flow stays at its record 15% of gross value added indefinitely, and still falls below what US corporate capital has historically delivered.
  3. Earning the historical average return requires the free cash flow share of value added to keep climbing, a bet on a structural transformation of US capitalism favoring capital at the expense of labor.

Related Articles:

  • This Time Would Have To Be Very Different — The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 stands at 40.7, implying an earnings yield of 2.46% and, combined with an estimated 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth, a real expected return near 3% a year. Against a 2.75% inflation-protected 10-year Treasury yield, that leaves an equity premium of roughly 25 basis points, assuming the elevated multiple holds.
  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • A Macroeconomic Perspective on Stock Market Valuation Ratios — The authors argue that a decline in labor's share of US corporate value added, combined with weak corporate investment, mechanically raises valuation-to-earnings ratios even without changes in expected returns or growth. They find corporate enterprise value rose alongside an equal-sized increase in free cash flow's share of value added.
  • Reconciling Macroeconomics and Finance for the U.S. Corporate Sector: 1929 to Present — Using integrated U.S. macroeconomic and financial accounts, the authors find that fluctuations in expected cash flows to corporate owners, rather than expected rates of return, have been the dominant driver of swings in U.S. corporate market valuations. They attribute most valuation fluctuations to changes in the share of corporate output flowing to owners as pure rent.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

The Changing Shape of the U.S. AI Capex Boom

AI Summary. U.S. business spending on computers, telecommunications equipment, and data center construction is running more than 100% above its pre-ChatGPT trend, reaching 2.5% of U.S. economic output, roughly double the 1.3% average from 2009 to 2024. Anthropic and OpenAI, currently net consumers of computing capacity, are poised to invest heavily in additional supply.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
November 3, 2026

US spending on computers, telecom equipment, and data-center construction is running more than 100% above its pre-ChatGPT trend. Klein notes that Anthropic and OpenAI, which already rent compute from the hyperscalers, are poised to add direct demand as they build their own infrastructure.

How large has AI-related business investment grown relative to economic output?

Core argument: U.S. business spending on computers, telecoms equipment, and data center shell construction is running more than 100% above the stable pre-ChatGPT trend in dollar terms.

The U.S. dollar value of business spending on computers, on telecoms equipment, and on the construction of data center shells is currently running more than 100% above the stable pre-ChatGPT trend. As of 2026Q3, this investment was equivalent to 2.5% of the dollar value of all the goods and services produced in the U.S., roughly double the stable 2009-2024 average of 1.3%. It is worth pointing out that the six publicly-listed hyperscalers are not the full set, just the only ones for which we currently have roughly comparable data via audited financial statements. There are two other hyperscalers that are not (yet) publicly-listed: Anthropic and OpenAI. Unlike the other six, Anthropic and OpenAI are net consumers of “compute”, rather than net suppliers, but they are still poised to invest heavily in generating additional supply. They will likely become a significant source of direct demand for the goods installed in data centers, in addition to their existing indirect demand via renting compute from the other six.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. business spending on computers, telecoms equipment, and data center shell construction is running more than 100% above the stable pre-ChatGPT trend in dollar terms.
  2. As of 2026Q3, that investment equaled 2.5% of the dollar value of all U.S. goods and services produced, roughly double the stable 2009–2024 average of 1.3%.
  3. Anthropic and OpenAI, two hyperscalers that are not yet publicly listed, are net consumers of compute rather than net suppliers, yet are poised to invest heavily in generating additional supply.

Related Articles:

  • Change Is Accelerating Because It’s All Interconnected — The authors estimate that artificial intelligence equity valuations discount roughly 3.5% annual productivity growth and trend nominal output growth well above the recent past, while consensus forecasts and broader markets imply growth closer to recent experience. On that basis, either AI stocks or broader macro markets are meaningfully mispriced.
  • Financing the AI Buildout — The authors estimate roughly 57 gigawatts of operating US data center capacity against a planned development pipeline of about 509 gigawatts, which is not a completion forecast since projects may be delayed, scaled back, or abandoned. Their central scenario has 182.8 gigawatts of added capacity becoming operational through 2032, 117.2 gigawatts completed later, and 226.9 gigawatts never completed.
  • AI Set to be Largest CapEx Cycle Ever … and Soon Majority Externally Financed — Hyperscaler and data-center investment is tracking toward $1.5tn annually by 2030, which in real terms would exceed the 2005-06 housing boom, the 1990s fiber peak, and the 1882 railroad peak combined. External debt and equity are projected to fund close to 90% of the buildout, making it dependent on credit markets.
  • Investment
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

What Millions Of Data Points Reveal About US Inflation

AI Summary. An alternative inflation gauge tracking millions of prices across 87% of the consumer price basket puts headline inflation at 4.4% versus the official 3.7%, but its trimmed mean at 2.2%. The data indicate price increases are concentrated in energy, airfares, and computers rather than broad-based, with tariffs producing one-time increases.

Anna Wong, Troy Durie, Daniel Ripperger-Suhler, Joshua Danial, et al. Bloomberg
Date Posted:
November 3, 2026

A Bloomberg analysis of real-time prices finds price pressures are more localized now than they were in the 2022 inflation, with the current wave largely driven by the datacenter buildout and the spike in oil prices; e.g. motor fuel is up 39.9% y/y and laptops more than 57%.

Is US inflation driven by a few categories rather than broadly?

Core argument: The Bloomberg Price Project’s trimmed mean, computed across over 30,000 individual products, places underlying inflation at 2.2% through October, below the Cleveland Fed’s 2.7% reading, even as its headline September figure of 4.4% exceeds the official CPI’s 3.7.

The BPP’s trimmed mean shows the underlying pace of inflation at 2.2% through October. That’s already close to the Fed’s 2% target and below the 2.7% reported by the Cleveland Fed, whose data run through September. The tens of thousands of products tracked in the BPP make it possible to pinpoint the drivers of inflation more precisely. When the Fed was hiking rates in big steps in 2022, the data show price pressures across a broader range of categories. This year, the BPP data show only a narrow group of goods driving most of the increases — primarily those related to the AI boom and the war-fueled spike in the cost of oil.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The Bloomberg Price Project’s trimmed mean, computed across over 30,000 individual products, places underlying inflation at 2.2% through October, below the Cleveland Fed’s 2.7% reading, even as its headline September figure of 4.4% exceeds the official CPI’s 3.7.
  2. Motor fuel is up 39.9% year-over-year through late October, with the war in Iran cited as the primary cause, while airline tickets are up 31.3%, with budget carriers accounting for the bulk of that increase.
  3. AI-related demand for memory chips has pushed laptop prices up 57.5% and desktop prices up nearly 20%, while the Bloomberg Price Project finds Trump’s import levies produced a one-time price increase rather than persistent inflation pressure.

Related Articles:

  • U.S. Inflation Not Getting (Much) Worse, or Better, but Consumers are Fine — U.S. underlying inflation has been remarkably stable for several years at a rate modestly above pre-pandemic levels, and the author argues it will not return to the Federal Reserve's 2% target without deliberate policy action. Consumer spending remains strong, with core retail sales running about 7% annually, roughly 2 percentage points above the 2017–2019 average.
  • Demand-Driven Inflation — Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
  • Fiscal Influences on Inflation in OECD Countries, 2020-2022 — Across 21 economies, the authors find that headline and core inflation responded positively to a measure of government spending increases scaled by pre-pandemic debt-to-GDP and average debt duration. Estimated coefficients of 0.4–0.5 suggest 40–50% of the extra spending was financed through inflation, with the rest through conventional public finance.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

Saudi Budget Deficit More Than Doubles as War Hurts Oil Finances

AI Summary. Saudi Arabia posted a quarterly budget deficit of 84bn riyals ($22.4bn), about 145% larger than the prior quarter, as oil receipts fell almost 40% to roughly 116bn riyals amid disruptions from the US-Iran war. Non-oil revenues fell around 7% and overall spending dipped 8%.

Mirette Magdy Bloomberg
Date Posted:
November 3, 2026

Saudi Arabia’s quarterly fiscal deficit more than doubled to $22.4B, up 145% from the prior quarter due to a decline in oil revenue. Spending is expected to rise due to the Saudi campaign against the Houthis and increased infrastructure spending.

Does war-driven disruption to oil revenue widen Saudi Arabia's budget deficit?

Core argument: Saudi Arabia posted a third-quarter budget deficit of 84 billion riyals ($22.4 billion), up about 145% from the prior quarter, according to a Finance Ministry statement.

Saudi Arabia’s quarterly fiscal deficit more than doubled as the kingdom’s oil revenues tumbled in the face of disruptions from the US-Iran war. The government posted a budget shortfall of 84 billion riyals ($22.4 billion) in the third quarter, up about 145% from the prior period, according to a statement from the Finance Ministry. Oil receipts dropped almost 40% from the prior quarter to about 116 billion riyals. Non-oil revenues fell around 7%, while overall spending dipped by 8%.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Saudi Arabia posted a third-quarter budget deficit of 84 billion riyals ($22.4 billion), up about 145% from the prior quarter, according to a Finance Ministry statement.
  2. Saudi oil receipts fell almost 40% from the prior quarter to about 116 billion riyals amid disruptions from the US-Iran war.
  3. Saudi non-oil revenues declined around 7% while overall government spending dipped 8%.

Related Articles:

  • Disappearing Gulf Capital: The Iran War Risk Wall Street Isn’t Watching — Saudi Arabia has withdrawn large financial commitments including a $200m gift to New York's Metropolitan Opera and support for the LIV golf league, and no equally large sovereign capital pool—Japan, Norway, or Singapore—is positioned to replace Gulf funds. A pullback could push US artificial intelligence firms toward greater reliance on debt issuance.
  • Saudi Arabia to ‘Take Stock’ of Spending After Oil Price Drop — The International Monetary Fund projects Saudi Arabia's budget deficit will widen above 4% of GDP, estimating the oil price needed to balance its books at $92 a barrel, with debt at 26% of GDP against a 40% ceiling. Saudi officials plan to maintain spending while reassessing management of development projects.
  • World Economic Outlook: Resilience Under Strain, Urgent Choices — Global current account balances widened to about 3.8% of world GDP, driven mainly by a rise in China's surplus to about 0.6% of world GDP (3.7% of China's GDP) and larger surpluses across other Asian economies, while the United States remained the largest deficit economy at about 1% of world GDP. Imbalances are projected to remain elevated.
  • Energy
  • GDP
    • Financial Markets
    • Savings Glut/Trade Deficit

Italy’s ‘Exit Tax’ Plan Spooks Rich Expats

AI Summary. Italy has proposed a 26% tax on unrealized gains for people with assets of €800,000 or more who relocate abroad, a measure wealth advisers warn risks driving away wealthy expatriates drawn to cities such as Milan. Other countries, including the US, already impose similar exit taxes on wealthy individuals.

Amy Kazmin, Jamie John and Josh Spero Financial Times
Date Posted:
November 3, 2026

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has proposed a 26% exit tax on profits accrued by individuals who have assets of €800,000 or more who decide to relocate from Italy.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni has proposed a 26% exit tax on profits accrued by individuals who have assets of...

Does taxing unrealized gains on departure risk driving away wealthy residents?

Core argument: Italy’s draft budget proposes a 26% tax on paper profits for people holding assets of €800,000 or more who relocate out of the country.

Italian Prime Minister Giorgia Meloni’s plan to impose an “exit tax” on people who leave Italy from next year risks driving away rich expatriates drawn to cities such as Milan over the past decade, wealth advisers have warned. In its draft budget submitted to parliament over the weekend, Meloni’s three-party coalition proposed a 26% tax on paper profits accrued by people who have assets of €800,000 or more and decide to relocate from Italy. Many other countries already impose an exit tax on wealthy individuals who relocate. The exit tax, which Meloni’s government has described as targeting the “super-rich”, will apply to people who were tax residents in Italy for six of the 10 years before their departure, but could also be refunded if financial assets are not liquidated for some years after they leave. In the US, those with a net worth above $2mn who give up their green cards or citizenship must pay capital gains tax on the paper gains of their assets across the world.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Italy’s draft budget proposes a 26% tax on paper profits for people holding assets of €800,000 or more who relocate out of the country.
  2. Wealth advisers warn that Giorgia Meloni’s proposed exit tax risks driving away rich expatriates drawn to Italian cities such as Milan over the past decade.
  3. The US imposes an exit tax requiring those with net worth above $2mn who give up green cards or citizenship to pay capital gains tax on paper gains of their worldwide assets.

Related Articles:

  • A One-Time Tax With Lasting Effects — A proposed one-time 5% tax on California billionaires would still give them reason to leave after the snapshot date, since its retroactive residency provision faces legal challenges that may not survive. The author argues that expectations of future wealth taxes could drive relocation decisions whether or not such taxes materialize.
  • The Net Present Value of the Billionaire Tax Act: An Assessment of the Fiscal Effects of California’s Proposed Wealth Tax — A proposed one-time 5% California tax on the worldwide net worth of individuals above $1bn would have positive net present value only if its revenue exceeds the present value of income taxes lost to departing billionaires. The authors' simulations yield negative net present value in 71% of draws, averaging -$24.7bn.
  • Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California — A California ballot measure raising top marginal income tax rates by up to 3 percentage points prompted an additional 0.8% of the affected tax base to leave the state, with an estimated income elasticity of 2.5–3.2 for high earners who stayed. The authors estimate these responses eroded 45.2% of windfall revenues within one year and 60.9% within two.
  • Taxation
  • Fiscal Policy


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