Edward Conard

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  • “Unintended Consequences offers deep and well-argued analyses on almost every issue.” - The New York Times
  • “A full-throated defense of economic dynamism.” - The Wall Street Journal
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences is full of substance, it is one of the must-read books of the year, and once I finish it I will be giving it a second read through right away.” - Tyler Cowen, Professor, George Mason University
  • “…a comprehensive explanation of the modern economy.” - Julian Robertson, Founder, Tiger Management
  • “Unintended Consequences provides a provocative interpretation of the causes of the global financial crisis and the policies needed to return to rapid growth. Whether you agree or not, this analysis is well worth reading.” - Nouriel Roubini, New York University; Chairman, Roubini Global Economics
  • “…a must-read for serious students of economic policy.” - Glenn Hubbard, Dean, Columbia Business School, and former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisers
  • “Unintended Consequences is far smarter and more thought-provoking than most economics written for the general public” - Greg Mankiw, Harvard University, Former Chairman of the Council of Economic Advisors
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  • “…serious thinking for serious thinkers. …a thought-provoking blueprint for growing middle- and working-class incomes.” - Mitt Romney, former Governor of Massachusetts
  • “There are an amazing number of good ideas and interesting points made in Unintended Consequences. The thinking underlying it, and the obvious depth of understanding of the author, are very impressive.” - Steven Levitt, coauthor of Freakonomics; 2004 John Bates Clark Medal
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Friday, October 23, 2026

What a Global Debt Crisis Looks Like

AI Summary. An analysis indexes 10-year government bond yields across countries from the start of the year, cumulating their rise in basis points, and compares each against an equal-weighted average of daily changes in all those yields to show which countries are performing better or worse than average.

Robin Brooks Robin Brooks Substack
Date Posted:
October 23, 2026

Brooks argues a global debt crisis is underway, pointing to contagion from France driving rising yields in Italy and Spain, and a flight to safety driving down yields in the US, while low-debt safe havens like Germany, Sweden and Switzerland extend their outperformance.

Are government bond yields rising faster in some countries than others?

Core argument: The charts index 10-year government bond yields to 100 on January 1, 2026, and cumulate each country’s rise in basis points, so a reading of 200 means a yield up 100 basis points since the start of 2026.

The blue lines in the charts show how 10-year government bond yields have evolved so far this year. I’ve indexed them to 100 on January 1, 2026, and cumulate the rise in basis points from that day to yesterday. If you’re at 200 as of yesterday, that means your ten year yield is up 100 basis points since the start of 2026. The black line in each chart is the same and is the equal-weighted average of daily changes in all of these yields. I cumulate this up to show who’s better or who’s worse than average.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The charts index 10-year government bond yields to 100 on January 1, 2026, and cumulate each country’s rise in basis points, so a reading of 200 means a yield up 100 basis points since the start of 2026.
  2. A black line identical across the charts cumulates the equal-weighted average of daily changes in all the yields shown, serving as the benchmark for which countries are better or worse than average.

Related Articles:

  • What’s the Matter With France? — France's official retirement age for full benefits was 62 in 2023, versus 67 in Denmark and the US, and its average actual retirement age was the lowest in Western Europe while life expectancy at 65 reaches about 87, two years longer than in the US.
  • Global Debt Report 2026 — Gross central government borrowing across OECD countries rose 7% to a record $17tn, about 23% of GDP, and is projected to reach roughly $18tn, or 24% of GDP. The United States and Japan account for close to 80% of the area's refinancing requirements, with the US share rising from 57% to 70%.
  • Are Government Bonds Safe in Times of War and Pandemic? — Government bonds severely underperform in wartime, in absolute terms and relative to equities, housing, and economic growth, unlike in financial crises when bonds tend to outperform stocks. The U.S. and U.K. reduced war-driven debt-to-GDP ratios without explicit default, using surprise inflation and financial repression that shifted fiscal burdens onto bondholders.
  • Financial Markets
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • GDP

A One-Time Tax With Lasting Effects

AI Summary. A proposed one-time 5% tax on California billionaires would still give them reason to leave after the snapshot date, since its retroactive residency provision faces legal challenges that may not survive. The author argues that expectations of future wealth taxes could drive relocation decisions whether or not such taxes materialize.

Josuha Rauh, Benjamin Jaros, Gregory Kearney and Siddharth Gundapaneni The Fiscal Reality Check
Date Posted:
October 23, 2026

Moneyed individuals representing at least ~30% of California’s billionaire wealth have left the state ahead of the proposed Billionaire Wealth Tax.

Does a one-time wealth tax still give billionaires reason to leave?

Core argument: California’s Prop 40 one-time 5% wealth tax leaves billionaires with incentives to leave the state after the snapshot date, contrary to Gabriel Zucman’s claim that one cannot avoid the tax by moving.

[Responding to Gabriel Zucman's claim, “There is no incentive to move to another state. One cannot avoid the tax by moving. This is one of the main reasons why it was structured as a one-time tax.”] Billionaires still have incentives to leave after the snapshot date. They may reasonably question whether the retroactive residency provision will ultimately survive the many legal challenges it will face, and the passage of the tax may alter their expectations about future wealth taxation. Even if billionaires consider the initial 5% tax insufficient reason to leave California, the belief in the possibility of future, additional wealth taxes could change their decision-making, regardless of whether those taxes ultimately occur or not. This is not an unreasonable or merely hypothetical concern. Zucman himself has called the fight over California’s Prop 40 “the beginning of a global movement to end the ultra-rich’s ability to escape taxation with impunity.” Additionally, fellow Prop 40 proponent Emmanuel Saez said back in June that “we will have to see whether this one passes and then whether it makes sense to do a permanent wealth tax down the road.”

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. California’s Prop 40 one-time 5% wealth tax leaves billionaires with incentives to leave the state after the snapshot date, contrary to Gabriel Zucman’s claim that one cannot avoid the tax by moving.
  2. Billionaires may reasonably question whether Prop 40’s retroactive residency provision will survive the many legal challenges it will face.
  3. Gabriel Zucman has called the Prop 40 fight “the beginning of a global movement to end the ultra-rich’s ability to escape taxation with impunity,” and Emmanuel Saez raised the prospect of a permanent wealth tax later, which could shift billionaires’ expectations.

Related Articles:

  • The Net Present Value of the Billionaire Tax Act: An Assessment of the Fiscal Effects of California’s Proposed Wealth Tax — A proposed one-time 5% California tax on the worldwide net worth of individuals above $1bn would have positive net present value only if its revenue exceeds the present value of income taxes lost to departing billionaires. The authors' simulations yield negative net present value in 71% of draws, averaging -$24.7bn.
  • Behavioral Responses to State Income Taxation of High Earners: Evidence from California — A California ballot measure raising top marginal income tax rates by up to 3 percentage points prompted an additional 0.8% of the affected tax base to leave the state, with an estimated income elasticity of 2.5–3.2 for high earners who stayed. The authors estimate these responses eroded 45.2% of windfall revenues within one year and 60.9% within two.
  • Ed Conard Debates Furman On “The Expected Value of Risk Taking” — A debate on U.S. fiscal policy argues that spending increases, rather than the tax increases needed to fund them, slow growth, and that higher taxes would reduce the expected value of America's innovative risk-taking. The argument holds that cutting debt below 100% of GDP is critical.
  • Taxation
  • Fiscal Policy
  • Politics

Winter Arrives In Markets

AI Summary. The decline in US Treasury yields since their recent peak was driven by falling real yields rather than lower inflation expectations, which have been stable, a pattern consistent with a risk-off bond rally. Stock declines have been concentrated in hyperscalers, semiconductors, and data-centre-linked industrials, while nearly three-quarters of S&P 500 stocks are up.

Robert Armstrong Financial Times
Date Posted:
October 23, 2026

Armstrong argues that the Treasury rally, with the 10-year yield falling to 4.96% and an accompanying rout in technology stocks, has “the feeling of a turning point.” Since October 5, data-center-related sectors have sold off, while defensive sectors—health care and consumer staples—have outperformed.

Are falling Treasury yields signaling risk aversion rather than lower inflation?

Core argument: Treasury yields peaked in the first week of this month, and the entire decline since then came from falling real yields, with break-even inflation expectations extremely stable rather than reflecting expected disinflation.

Treasury yields peaked in the first week of this month. The decline since then does not reflect an anticipated reduction in inflation. The whole move was driven by falling real yields. Break-even inflation expectations have been extremely stable. A drop in real yields that is not about central bank positioning is usually about slowing growth expectations, or the perception of rising risks elsewhere in the markets. This looks like the latter — a classic risk-off bond rally, driven by fear. The pieces for this fear trade have been falling in pace for some time now. The stocks that have fallen most since yields peaked, on the other hand, are remarkably concentrated among hyperscalers, semiconductors and industrial stocks associated with data centre construction. Everyone else is doing OK; almost three-quarters of the stocks in the S&P 500 are up since October 5.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Treasury yields peaked in the first week of this month, and the entire decline since then came from falling real yields, with break-even inflation expectations extremely stable rather than reflecting expected disinflation.
  2. A fall in real yields unrelated to central bank positioning typically reflects slowing growth expectations or perceived rising risks elsewhere, and this move looks like a risk-off bond rally driven by fear.
  3. Stock declines since yields peaked are concentrated among hyperscalers, semiconductors and industrial stocks tied to data centre construction, while almost three-quarters of S&P 500 stocks are up since October 5.

Related Articles:

  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
  • Meta Credit Risk Gauge Surges to Record on AI Spending Plans — The cost of insuring Meta Platforms' debt against default reached a record high and its bonds weakened as plans to increase capital spending revived investor concern that large technology firms will issue more debt to fund artificial intelligence buildouts. Default protection costs also rose for Oracle, Microsoft, and Broadcom.
  • Slowing Token Spend Shows Compute Demand Isn’t Unlimited — Demand for computing power appears highly price-sensitive, with modest increases in token prices pushing buyers to cut usage or switch to cheap open-source alternatives, undercutting claims that demand is unlimited. Return on invested capital at the five largest cloud providers is declining as invested capital grows faster than the earnings it generates.
  • Financial Markets
  • GDP

U.S. Inflation Not Getting (Much) Worse, or Better, but Consumers are Fine

AI Summary. U.S. underlying inflation has been remarkably stable for several years at a rate modestly above pre-pandemic levels, and the author argues it will not return to the Federal Reserve's 2% target without deliberate policy action. Consumer spending remains strong, with core retail sales running about 7% annually, roughly 2 percentage points above the 2017–2019 average.

Matt Klein The Overshoot
Date Posted:
October 23, 2026

Klein observes that recent benchmark revisions to retail sales and inventories suggest that inventories from 2023 to the present have been larger than previously thought– suggesting less risk of shortages, but also less willingness to draw down inventories to cushion supply and demand shocks, allowing larger swings in prices.

Will inflation return to target without deliberate policy action?

Core argument: U.S. CPI rose 0.65% month-over-month in September (8.1% annualized) and PPI for final demand rose 1.34% (17.4% annualized), the fastest since March 2022, while CPI excluding volatile categories ran at 3.0–3.5% annualized.

The big takeaway is that the dollars spent at “nonstore retailers” (e-commerce) and “food services and drinking places” had been overstated by about 12% each, while retailers’ inventories, particularly at “building materials, garden equipment, and supplies dealers” and “general merchandise stores” were revised up. Until the revisions, it had seemed as if retailers were, in the aggregate, running down their inventories and operating with levels of stock that were as tight as during the run on goods in the pandemic and great reopening. Put another way, retailers might have been limiting consumer inflation in the near-term, while creating the risk of larger price increases in the future. The revised numbers suggest less imminent risk of a sudden spike in prices due to inventories running out. But the new data also imply that retailers were not as willing to run down their inventories in response to spikes in demand or disruptions to supply as we had previously thought. In other words, they were not willing to adjust their buffers in order to moderate swings in prices.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. U.S. CPI rose 0.65% month-over-month in September (8.1% annualized) and PPI for final demand rose 1.34% (17.4% annualized), the fastest since March 2022, while CPI excluding volatile categories ran at 3.0–3.5% annualized.
  2. Matthew Klein argues underlying U.S. inflation has been stable for several years at a rate modestly above pre-pandemic levels, with no “immaculate” disinflation to the Federal Reserve’s 2% target without deliberate policy action.
  3. Benchmark revisions cut nonstore retailer and food services sales from 2018 onward by roughly 12% each, leaving the inventory-to-sales ratio flat since 2023 at 2018–2019 levels, with total and core retail sales running about 7% annually.

Related Articles:

  • Demand-Driven Inflation — Demand and supply curves estimated from pre-pandemic data imply relatively flat demand curves in the US and euro area, so adverse supply shifts would produce large output losses but comparatively little inflation. The authors argue explaining the observed combination of high inflation and output requires outward demand shifts, including accommodative monetary policy alongside fiscal expansion.
  • The Fed Finally Gets It — Federal Reserve officials' assessed risks to their employment and price stability mandates had tended to move together rather than inversely, suggesting common forces were driving both. That pattern has now shifted, with officials more optimistic on growth and employment and less concerned about downside risks than before the pandemic.
  • What Six Years of Inflation Mean for the Midterms — US consumer prices have risen almost 29% over the past six years, about 3x the pace of the prior six years, and on average prices have risen faster than wages over that period.
  • Inflation
  • GDP
  • Monetary Policy

The Factory Outside Phoenix That Could Save American Manufacturing

AI Summary. Taiwan Semiconductor Manufacturing Company's first Arizona plant has produced chips for two years at an output rate comparable to its Taiwanese facilities, with second and third factories under construction ahead of schedule. The company raised its total planned US investment to $265bn, which the author reads as confidence in the Arizona operations.

Dan Wang New York Times
Date Posted:
October 23, 2026

Dan Wang argues that the Arizona TSMC expansion is “a winning formula for American reindustrialization.” “The most important asset TSMC offers is not money, equipment or local employment but what’s known as process knowledge.”

Dan Wang argues that the Arizona TSMC expansion is “a winning formula for American reindustrialization.” “The...

Can advanced chipmaking succeed in the US at Taiwan-level output?

Core argument: TSMC raised its total planned investment in Arizona to $265 billion in July, which the author reads as a sign of confidence in the Phoenix operations.

TSMC Arizona’s first plant has been producing chips for two years, and its rate of output in Phoenix is comparable to that in Taiwan. Despite some turbulence with permitting and union relations the second and third factories are being built ahead of schedule. TSMC’s announcement in July that it would raise its total investment to $265 billion is an obvious sign of confidence in Arizona’s operations. TSMC Arizona ought to be embraced as a beacon of America’s revitalized industrialization. A few decades ago, Japanese automakers introduced management techniques and engineering processes to the United States that gave a boost to the competitiveness of American automakers.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. TSMC raised its total planned investment in Arizona to $265 billion in July, which the author reads as a sign of confidence in the Phoenix operations.
  2. TSMC Arizona’s first plant has produced chips for two years at an output rate comparable to that of the company’s Taiwan facilities, and its second and third factories are being built ahead of schedule despite permitting and union friction.
  3. The author argues TSMC Arizona should be embraced as a beacon of American reindustrialization, likening it to Japanese automakers whose management techniques and engineering processes boosted U.S. automakers’ competitiveness decades ago.

Related Articles:

  • TSMC Overseas Fabs – A Success? — TSMC's Arizona chip plant cannot compete on cost with its Taiwan operations because U.S. construction and operating costs are far higher, even though equipment costs — usually the largest share of cost per wafer — are similar across locations. The author argues the Arizona plant does little to reduce concentration of advanced logic production in Taiwan.
  • China’s Hidden Tech Revolution — The article argues that the United States should treat mass production as equal in importance to invention and research, rather than dismissing manufacturing as a commoditized activity best done overseas. Regaining leadership in emerging technologies requires treating manufacturing as integral to technological advancement.
  • TSMC To Speed Up Construction Of US Chip Plants By ‘Several Quarters’ — TSMC says it is accelerating construction of its second and third Arizona plants by several quarters to meet strong U.S. customer demand for smartphone and AI computing chips. The company has committed an additional $100bn to build five more facilities in the state and expects around 30% of its 2-nanometer and more advanced capacity to be located in Arizona.
  • Investment
  • Productivity

Monday, October 26, 2026

Will Medical Care Strangle or Save the Federal Budget?

AI Summary. A National Bureau of Economic Research paper projects U.S. medical spending, 18% of GDP in 2024, reaching 19%–26% of GDP by 2040, with federal medical spending consuming 45%–61% of federal revenue excluding Social Security contributions. The author argues only the low-spending path is consistent with current tax levels and other commitments.

David Cutler National Bureau of Economic Research
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

From 1970 to 2010, growth in US medical spending outpaced GDP growth by ~2.4pp annually. From 2010 to 2024, that growth differential fell to just 0.3pp. If it persists, medical spending reaches only 19% of GDP by 2040; if excess spending growth reverts to 2.4pp, it reaches 26%.

How much federal revenue will medical spending consume by 2040?

Core argument: David Cutler projects U.S. medical spending reaching 26%, 22.3%, or 19% of GDP by 2040 under high, benchmark, and low scenarios, versus 18% in 2024 and 6.9% in 1970.

Figure 1 shows that in 1970, medical care was 6.9% of GDP. In 2024, it was 18%. From 1970 through around 2010; mean medical spending growth exceeded GDP growth by 2.4 pp annually. Since 2010, the growth of medical spending has exceeded the growth of GDP by only 0.3 pp annually. There is no comparable time period with anything like the sustained slowdown in spending growth since 2010. Patient cost-sharing has increased enormously [indirectly reducing overall expenditure via incentives] as shown in Figure 5. An additional role [was] played by the diffusion of cost-reducing technologies. Because they are often less invasive, second-round therapies typically have lower unit prices. [mechanism in Fgure 6]. Finally, there [are] fewer expensive new innovations than in the past. [However], recent data show an uptick in spending growth in 2024, which continued in 2025. Some of this is a result of new technologies— prime examples are GLP-1 medications and new drugs for cancer that are taken on an ongoing basis. To consider a scenario with [a reversion to] more rapid spending increases, I assume that the growth of medical spending above GDP growth after 2024 returns to the average rate realized between 1970 and 2010. This scenario is shown as the High-spending scenario in figure 1, in which medical care in 2040 rises to 26% of GDP.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. David Cutler projects U.S. medical spending reaching 26%, 22.3%, or 19% of GDP by 2040 under high, benchmark, and low scenarios, versus 18% in 2024 and 6.9% in 1970.
  2. Federal medical spending consumed 45% of “discretionary revenue”—total federal revenue less Social Security contributions—in 2024, up from 13% in 1987, and Cutler projects 61% by 2040 under the high-spending scenario.
  3. Cutler states that only the low-spending scenario is consistent with current tax levels and non-medical spending commitments, attributing the post-2010 slowdown to high-deductible plans, prior authorization, cost-reducing technology, and reduced administrative friction.

Related Articles:

  • Has the United States Bent the Health Care Cost Curve? — The authors estimate that a slowdown in US health care spending reflects technology-associated changes in health and site of care (21% of the slowdown, double that in Medicare), more elastic long-run supply (6%), market changes reducing and making demand more elastic (11–27%), improved population health (7%), and slower price growth net of upcoding (24%).
  • A Long-Run Economic Model for Projecting the Finances of the U.S. Government and National Spending on Healthcare: Analysis of Productivity Increases and Health Sector Reform — A long-run model in which health spending, the federal budget, and capital investment are jointly determined by supply and demand projects U.S. federal debt reaching 151% of GDP in 2036 and 309% in 2056, versus the Congressional Budget Office's 120% and 175%. Rising real interest rates compound deficits and debt.
  • Can AI Avert the Impending Federal Budget Crisis? — U.S. GDP per capita, about $87,000, is projected to reach $102,000 by 2035 with 1.8% annual productivity growth, or $110,000 with 2.7% growth. Because the healthcare sector has been slow to adopt AI, health spending is projected to rise from 18.3% of GDP to 21% under slower growth and 21.7% under faster growth.
  • Healthcare/Seniors
  • Fiscal Policy
    • Fiscal Deficits
    • Government Spending
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

The Hackening Has Begun

AI Summary. Increasingly capable AI systems allow software vulnerabilities to be found and exploited at far greater speed and scale, leaving a vast installed base of old, poorly maintained, interconnected software exposed. Disclosures of common vulnerabilities have accelerated sharply, with monthly reports running several times earlier levels and high-severity and critical flaws increasing rapidly.

Paul Kedrosky Applied Complexity
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026

Kedrosky warns “The Hackening” is underway as the diffusion of AI enables sophisticated cyberattacks at scale. 5.2% of all critical software vulnerabilities ever reported were disclosed in October, and ~ half the critical software vulnerabilities ever found were found in 2026.

Is AI accelerating the discovery and exploitation of software vulnerabilities?

Core argument: Disclosures of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) accelerated sharply in 2026 after years of steady increases, with monthly reports running at several times their 2025 levels, and high-severity and critical vulnerabilities rising rapidly as well.

We are entering what some call The Hackening, a period of radical technological instability where systemic frailties are everywhere. You can see it everywhere. For example, the Port of Los Angeles recently reported more cyberattacks per month than it saw in entire years before 2020. This might be less worrisome if the number of reported software vulnerabilities was not exploding. But it is. After years of steady increases, disclosures of common vulnerabilities (CVEs) accelerated sharply in 2026, with monthly reports now running at several times their 2025 levels. This is not simply an explosion in AI helping detect minor software defects. High-severity and critical vulnerabilities are increasing rapidly as well. Sure, there are caveats about changing reporting practices and the role of AI in these numbers (detection slop?). But the broader picture is deeply unsettling, as the PHP security disclosure made clear.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Disclosures of common vulnerabilities and exposures (CVEs) accelerated sharply in 2026 after years of steady increases, with monthly reports running at several times their 2025 levels, and high-severity and critical vulnerabilities rising rapidly as well.
  2. The Port of Los Angeles reported more cyberattacks per month than it recorded in entire years before 2020.
  3. Increasingly capable AI systems make it possible to discover and exploit software vulnerabilities at speeds and scales previously unimaginable, leaving an enormous installed base of old, poorly maintained, and deeply interconnected software as a soft target.

Related Articles:

  • Patchmageddon — The number of reported software vulnerabilities has been rising, with 1.5%–2.0% exploited each year, and the average time from a vulnerability's disclosure to its first confirmed exploitation fell below 100 days, with median times reaching zero. The same AI tools that find and exploit flaws can also propose code fixes.
  • Misanthropic: On Mythos, Bad Human Behaviors and Systems Vulnerabilities — Anthropic reports that its Mythos model has detected thousands of high-severity cyber vulnerabilities, including ones found by chaining multiple obscure software weaknesses, and that these hacking skills are emergent rather than a designed capability. Mythos completed a corporate network attack simulation estimated to take an expert over 10 hours, which no other frontier model had solved.
  • Emerging Details of Chinese Hack Leave U.S. Officials Increasingly Concerned — U.S. intelligence and national security officials have told major telecommunications companies to find a permanent way to expel Chinese hackers from the deepest parts of the nation's communications networks. Critical parts of the system date to the late 1970s or early 1980s and are too old to upgrade with modern cybersecurity protections.
  • Security
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

The Internet’s Wuhan Moment

AI Summary. The author argues AI agents will reshape the internet into a space built for machine-to-machine interaction, where reaching banks, doctors, or utilities requires proving you are human and critical services connect through narrow, monitored channels. Access to large-scale computing may require more vetting, with formal mathematical proofs of software correctness becoming as routine as testing.

Azeem Azhar Exponential View
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026

Azhar argues that the offensive cyber capabilities of AI will eventually result in a less open but ultimately safer internet. “If software making starts to favour reliability and security, we might end up with a more robust codebase than we had imagined.”

How will AI agents reshape access to the internet?

Core argument: AI agents will reshape the internet into a place built for agents talking to agents, with users required to prove they are human to reach banks, doctors or utilities, and critical services connecting only through narrow, closely monitored channels.

Agents will reshape the internet. The open internet will survive, but as a place built for agents talking to agents. To reach your bank, your GP or your water company, you will have to prove you are human. Critical services will talk to the internet only through narrow, closely monitored channels. Openness at machine speed will be hostile to humans. We don’t, after all, take afternoon strolls down the middle of the freeway. We didn’t eradicate Covid. It became another flu. There is more spam email than ever, and we probably see less of it. Cyber attacks will follow the same path. You’ll get hit. What matters is how quickly you can recover. Software will get better. Formal verification has been such a headache until now. It will become essential. Proofs will become as routine as testing. Ultimately, bugs in today’s software are finite. Today attackers are finding them first. There is a plausible path to defenders getting the rest.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. AI agents will reshape the internet into a place built for agents talking to agents, with users required to prove they are human to reach banks, doctors or utilities, and critical services connecting only through narrow, closely monitored channels.
  2. Cyber attacks will follow the path of Covid and spam email, becoming endemic rather than eradicated, so what matters is how quickly a victim can recover rather than avoiding being hit.
  3. Compute may become increasingly controlled, with renting serious compute requiring much more paperwork, sellers carrying out checks, and possibly paying up when their customers misbehave.

Related Articles:

  • Patchmageddon — The number of reported software vulnerabilities has been rising, with 1.5%–2.0% exploited each year, and the average time from a vulnerability's disclosure to its first confirmed exploitation fell below 100 days, with median times reaching zero. The same AI tools that find and exploit flaws can also propose code fixes.
  • Misanthropic: On Mythos, Bad Human Behaviors and Systems Vulnerabilities — Anthropic reports that its Mythos model has detected thousands of high-severity cyber vulnerabilities, including ones found by chaining multiple obscure software weaknesses, and that these hacking skills are emergent rather than a designed capability. Mythos completed a corporate network attack simulation estimated to take an expert over 10 hours, which no other frontier model had solved.
  • Emerging Details of Chinese Hack Leave U.S. Officials Increasingly Concerned — U.S. intelligence and national security officials have told major telecommunications companies to find a permanent way to expel Chinese hackers from the deepest parts of the nation's communications networks. Critical parts of the system date to the late 1970s or early 1980s and are too old to upgrade with modern cybersecurity protections.
  • Security
  • Productivity
    • Innovation/Research

No Signs of AI Payoff Outside the Tech Sector

AI Summary. Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the seven largest technology companies but flat for the rest of the S&P 500, with no signs of artificial intelligence boosting productivity growth. The author argues that as long as spending on artificial intelligence stays confined to a small part of the economy, its macroeconomic effects will remain very limited.

Torsten Slok Apollo
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

Citing flat revenue per worker, and profit margin growth for the S&P 493, Slok argues that so far, AI’s diffusion through the economy has delivered “zero financial payoff to corporate America outside of tech.”

Is artificial intelligence boosting revenue and margins outside big tech?

Core argument: Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the Magnificent 7 but flat for the S&P 493, with no signs of AI boosting productivity growth or delivering financial payoff outside the tech sector.

With no impact on the bottom line, mainstream corporate America is pulling back and starting to view token spending not as a source of growth but as a cost center that weighs on margins. VC-backed companies are spending more and more on tokens, but mainstream corporate America does not need the latest model and is unwilling to pay for it. As long as agentic AI and token spending are confined to a small part of the economy, the macroeconomic effects of AI will be very limited. The question looking ahead is whether, even as models become commoditized, mainstream corporate America can turn increasingly cheap intelligence into higher revenue growth and higher profit margins. That may be harder than it sounds. The AI story will be decided in the S&P 493, not the Mag 7, and so far, there is no evidence that revenue growth or margins are improving outside the tech sector.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. Revenue per worker and profit margins are rising for the Magnificent 7 but flat for the S&P 493, with no signs of AI boosting productivity growth or delivering financial payoff outside the tech sector.
  2. Mainstream corporate America is pulling back from AI and treating token spending as a cost center that weighs on margins, while VC-backed companies spend increasingly more on tokens.
  3. The macroeconomic effects of AI will remain very limited as long as agentic AI and token spending stay confined to a small part of the economy.

Related Articles:

  • Circularity in AI Shows Up in Token Spending Too — Payment-data analysis finds 80% of the largest corporate AI spenders are venture-backed, versus 13% of the median spender, indicating that much token spending is funded by venture capital rather than earnings. If AI payoffs are slow, venture returns could suffer and a funding pullback could weaken demand for computing power.
  • Califoreboding — A basket of 42 AI stocks accounts for 60%-80% of all S&P 500 earnings growth, price returns and capital spending, while 60% of S&P 500 stocks sit 20% or more below their highs and only 30% outperform the index. AI-related construction spending has risen 38%, the only positive trend as manufacturing, commercial real estate and residential construction decline.
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This Time Would Have To Be Very Different

AI Summary. The cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio for the S&P 500 stands at 40.7, implying an earnings yield of 2.46% and, combined with an estimated 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth, a real expected return near 3% a year. Against a 2.75% inflation-protected 10-year Treasury yield, that leaves an equity premium of roughly 25 basis points, assuming the elevated multiple holds.

Hanno Lustig The Two Cents
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026
Is Database:
Database

At 40.7, CAPE is nearing its December 1999 peak of 44.2. For the S&P 500 to beat TIPS over the next decade, today’s near-record P/E multiple must persist for ten years, or real earnings must grow more than 5.8% a year—a pace exceeded in only two decades since 1880: the 1920s and 2010s.

How much do stock valuations offer over inflation-protected Treasuries?

Core argument: The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.

The CAPE is currently trading at 40.7, which is close to an all-time high. You’re paying close to 41 times annual earnings when you buy the S&P 500. The implied earnings yield is only 2.46%. According to AQR, a reasonable estimate for real earnings growth (on a per share basis) is 1.8% per annum. If you plug in today’s numbers, you end up with a real expected return of around 3% per year for U.S. equity. That’s a surprisingly low number. When you compare it to the 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, you’re left with a razor-thin equity premium. The stock market will only yield an extra 25 basis points per annum over the next, say, 10 years to compensate you for taking on equity risk. You might think this is a very conservative estimate, but it’s actually not, because we’re implicitly assuming that the CAPE stays at 40.7 over the next 10 years. That’s quite a lofty multiple. Even casual eyeball econometrics suggests that that’s not a great assumption, because the price-earnings ratio tends to revert back to its mean.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. The S&P 500’s cyclically adjusted price-earnings ratio stands at 40.7, close to an all-time high, implying an earnings yield of just 2.46% for buyers of the index.
  2. Combining the 2.46% earnings yield with AQR’s estimate of 1.8% annual real per-share earnings growth yields a real expected return of roughly 3% per year for U.S. equity.
  3. Against a 10-year TIPS yield of 2.75%, U.S. equities offer an equity premium of about 25 basis points per year, an estimate that assumes the CAPE stays at 40.7 for a decade despite the price-earnings ratio’s tendency to revert to its mean.

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China’s Youth Unemployment Rate Edges Down Slightly But Jobseekers Still Doing It Tough

AI Summary. China's National Bureau of Statistics reports youth unemployment, covering those aged 16 to 24 and excluding students, fell to 18% from 18.9% the prior month. A record 12.7m university graduates entered the job market this year, and the prior month's rate matched the highest level since the calculation was revised to exclude students.

Alice Li South China Morning Post
Date Posted:
October 26, 2026

China’s youth unemployment (ages 16–24) dropped to 18% in September from 18.9% in August. 12.7 million new university graduates entered the workforce this summer, ~4% more than last year.

Is China's youth unemployment rate still near record highs?

Core argument: China’s unemployment rate for 16–24 year-olds excluding students fell to 18% in September from 18.9% in August, according to National Bureau of Statistics data.

The unemployment rate among people aged 16 to 24, excluding students, fell to 18% in September from 18.9% in August, according to data released by the National Bureau of Statistics. With around 12.7 million university graduates having entered the job market this year, a record high, the youth unemployment rate in August matched its level a year earlier, equalling its highest point since Beijing revised its calculation methodology in 2023 to exclude students.

Takeaways by Macro Roundup® AI

  1. China’s unemployment rate for 16–24 year-olds excluding students fell to 18% in September from 18.9% in August, according to National Bureau of Statistics data.
  2. China’s August youth unemployment rate of 18.9% matched its level a year earlier, equalling the highest point since Beijing revised its calculation methodology in 2023 to exclude students.
  3. Roughly 12.7 million university graduates, a record high, entered China’s job market this year.

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